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ABSTRACT

A graduate course on rural development issues is presented
that focusses primarily on the processes involved in development
both at a personal and abstract level.

A theoretical foundation

for the course is outlined based on David Kolb's theory of
experiential learning. This model is transcribed into learning
environments necessary to focus participant awareness of issues
surrounding their own learning style. The role of the facilitator
who demands attention to learning style as well as content in
rural development is defined, utilizing Malcolm Knowles'
andragogical concepts. Finally the course curriculum is
presented, followed by lesson plans and readings supplemental to
the text books.

Master's Project
Proposal Outline

Mark Meassick
October, 1987

Key Issues in Rural Development:
A University Graduate Course
The Problem
The Center for International Education needs a course to
address issues in rural development. Many center graduates return
to the field and get involved in some aspect of rural
development. Many incoming students have expressed a desire to
take such a course. There is no course within the University that
addresses rural development as a field.
Rural development is a very broad field, grappling with
issues that require knowledge in sociology, economics,
anthropology and education. The artificial academic delineations
of these disciplines often fail to reflect the complex reality,
the interrelationships and the interdependence of issues that
people in rural communities face in defining and solving their
problems or in just living their lives. The central problem in
developing a course to deal with this complexity is to integrate
the process as part of the course content.
This integration
provides the opportunity to experience the ambiguous nature of
rural development activities.
A development worker living in a rural community must be
able to fit the different bodies of knowledge together in a way
that is apporpriate to address a specific issue. Different parts
from different disciplines are needed for different problems. Is
that ambiguous enough? Skills to confront ambiguity are the types
of skills that a course curriculum in rural development should
provide.
Purpose
Primary Question
How would a course curriculum on rural development for
university graduate students be structured and what would the
content include so that thinking- feeling- and action-oriented
learning styles are interwoven to create a vibrant experiential
setting in the classroom to learn different aspects of rural
development?
Implementing questions
1. What is the rationale for a course in rural development
and how does this rationale affect the course structure?
la. What issue/topic/areas of rural development will provide
a useful a framework for the curriculum?
2. What are the factors that typify different learning
styles that people use and why are they important for a
course in rural development?

3. What kind of classroom activities and case study usages
will achieve the shifts in different learning styles within
each participant?
4. What is the role of the facilitator/teacher to create a
situation that participants can learn in, learn from and
learn through?
S. What kind of curriculum design will fuel learning
utilizing the different learning styles?
6. What will each session include and how will each session
be structured in view of the above considerations?
Significance of Study
This study is intended for three distinct audiences.
Professors in the field of international education who have not
been in the field for significant amounts of time to adequately
experience the ~urrent ambiguities surrounding issues in rural
development will be able to use the techniques in this course.
Participants will be able to assess the merits of a course
designed deliberately to shift their style of learning. Other
curriculum development researchers may benefit from the approach
outlined in this study.
Review of the Literature
Two primary sources will be used in this study. Case studies
and analyses of rural development from different perspectives
will provide the substance of the course. Resources on simulation
and games, learning theory in the classroom, and curriculum
design will serve to develop the rationale and structure for the
course. Specific resources on economics, foreign aid, technology
transfer, diffusion of innovation, management and non-formal
education will provide course readings and substance for class
discussions.
Clarification and Delimitation of This Study
Assumptions - The primary assumption of this study is that
people learn best through praxis. As a result it is necessary to
create experiences in the classroom that provide a basis for
reflection. I also assume that techniques oriented toward praxis
transfer skills and create opportunities for paradigm shifts
within individuals. The study also assumes that reflection can be
facilitated through writing about experiences.
Methodology
This study will primarily be a review of the literature. The
final product, a course manual, may be tested later on, but that
assessment is not a part of this study.
[see next page]
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Implementing
Questions
#1

Sources

Data Gathering
Method(s)

Experience of others
Research critiques

Interviews with
UMass faculty and
students
R. of Literature

#2

Curriculum design
sources, simulation
studies, adult
learning theory

R. of Literature

#3

Adult learning
theory

R. of Literature

#4

Learning theory
leardership lit.

R. of Literature

#5

Books on Rur.dev.
Films, videos,
tapes, slides.

R. of Literature

#6

Current course
Syllabi on R.D.

R. of Literature
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Chapter 1

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IS NOT URBANE

A Working Definition of Rural Development
There is no definitive strategy to promote rural
development.

Rural development describes a

variety of unrefined

methods and strategies to change some behavior or pattern in a
group of people or in a community in some particular way to
produce an outcome,

usually called an improvement. Many observers

of rural development agree that improvement is dependent upon
many factors inherent in and external to the people affected.
This systemic definition offers a new and exciting way to
approach rural development that encorporates an appreciation for
relativity. Thre is a relationship between various endogenous
factors that affect development strategies,

between different

exogenous factors and between factors endogenous and exogenous to
the community. Calling it "appropriate" relativity better
illuminates the point. Like all terms prefixed with "appropriate"
the key is to know where to use what when,

or when to use what

where.
In other words it is crucial to look at the
interrelationship betweeen the setting of an event (or a behavior
or pattern),

the event and intervening in the event.

Looking at

the interrelationships is only the passive part of the story.
Being an effective,
catalyst,

creative and positive innovator,

change agent, motivator,

~,

instigator,

animateur or interventionist

requires an act. When one is in such a role not to act is to act.
Hence the need for proper tools for action, and the equipment and
processes necessary for tool production.
I still have not offered a precise definition of rural
development. Every definition in the literature of rural
development is suitable to the definer. Unfortunately, there are
many people affected by rural development who are not yet in the
literature. What do they think? For those people rural
development is not rural it is "my" development or "my families"
development or "my neighbors" development. "Rural" is the term
used by outsiders to label a group of people who have a certain
characteristic. It is not a label those groups frequently use to
describe themselves.
Rural development includes the myriad of needs of all people
involved in rural development. It is not just the needs of the
rural people themselves, their leaders, their neighbors, their
families and friends.

A definition of rural development must

include the needs of outsiders who define events and phenomena in
their own language, who give money as charity or for opportunity
as they perceive it, who earn a living, who conscientize oth~r~,
who work for social change, or who desire to gain a new
experience. These needs all contribute to what rural development
is.
Rationale for a Course in Rural Development
The Center for International Education and the University of
Massachusetts have periodically conducted courses in rural
development. There has been no such course during the past five

years. Many students in the CIE program in particular have
expressed a desire for such a course. Most international programs
usually address some aspects of rural development, whether it is
in planning educational programs, improving literacy, improving
health or assessing employment opportunities. This makes a
compelling case for the re-introduction of such a course at CIE.
This course is designed to help outsiders question there
assumptions about rural development, rural poverty and rural
people. I assume that everyone who would take this course can no
longer be considered a rural person. Each person may have a
different understanding and appreciation of rural lifestyles but
by pursuing graduate study they have removed themselves from the
people of rural areas and now approach the problems in their
lives differently.
I want the course to equip participants with the skills to
analyze different rural situations, with the knowledge to be able
to ask informed questions for assessment and evaluation and with
the self-awareness to persistently question the assumptions they
bring to the rural setting. This last goal leads to an important
assumption of the course. I am assuming that engaging in the
self-analysis process is a skill that can be used as a training
tool to promote rural development. An underlying strategy will be
to create situations for self-analysis and to become aware of how
this process occurs.
Course Structure
Getting people to question their assumptions initiates a
process that has been described by others as transcendence or as

paradigm shifts. An environment that allows the opportunity for
self-reflection which may or may not promote these shifts
requires careful planning and innovative techniques. The goal of
this course is not to force paradigm shifts within individuals.
This is not only very improbable in any setting, but also not a
desirable primary goal in this course.
While I want the opportunities for participants to change to
be created in the course of the course, I also want them to
experience other levels of learning. I, as the course designer,
can only mark out a path to be explored; the followers of this
path will perceive the landmarks in their own way. In this case
the critical lesson is to learn that what one perceives as a
landmark may merely be a stone and the real landmark may be the
path itself.

Praxis can create a diversification in an

individual's interpretation of events. An important part of this
course will be to create experiences that are "hands on," through
reading, discussion or games that allow individuals to reflect on
how they interpret events.
Transfering information in such a way that people learn new
viewpoints and alternative world views of others is also as
important as questioning one's own assumptions. It could be
argued that the international experience that many participants
will bring to the course demonstrates that people have the
ability to view the world from another perspective. I assume
that, while the experience may have been an opportunity to learn
new perspectives, participants may not be aware of how such
changes may be induced or imparted to others. After all, inherent

in rural development is some perceived need for people to change
and adapt to new circumstances that rise in the course of
history. One way to promote opportunities for

these self-

questioning moments with useful information is to create a
learning environment that encorporates thinking-,

feeling- and

action-oriented activities that push the participants to
experience the issues of rural development,
How can this learning environment be created? One method,
justified in the next chapter, involves blending different
learning techniques around each topic. The blend allows the
learning style focus to shift at intervals so that participants
have the chance to shift how they view and interpret a certain
situation and material. These "shifts" by the facilitator will in
some small way simulate shifts in perspectives that are necessary
for development workers who must encorporate multiple
perspectives and explore wide varieties of considerations when
engaged in effective development activities. There is no
justification for this idea;

it is my intuition and part of the

experiment of this course.
An important implication that arises is how can a
participant recognize when such a shift has occurred? I will
assume that through a process of identifying a particular
development problem and analysing it from a variety of
perspectives presented throughout the course,

participants will

be able to discover changes in their perceptions. This will
require tightly structured learning assignments that build into a
final documentation of the development in each person's thought

surrounding some issue in rural development. Each participant
will produce an account of a rural development problem of special
interest to them, applying new concepts and ideas as they are
presented throughout the semester. Hopefully,

the evolution of

thought will be apparent in the document.
Course Objectives
1. To allow participants to analyze their attitudes, knowledge
and experiences surrounding rural development and to assess and
evaluate these as new material and ideas are presented and
experienced.
2. To broaden class participants' understanding of various roles
played by practitioners, participants and other actresses in
rural development.
3. To provide a foundation for analytical skills for participants
to act effectively as practitioners in sustainable rural
development programs.
4. To examine rural development from a multi-discilplinary
perspective so that participants are aware of the economic,
political, sociological, anthropological, and educational
perspectives on rural development; and to discern the artificial
convenience of these delineations.
5. To evaluate a course design that promotes learning through the
use of techniques that shift focus from thinking-oriented to
feeling-oriented to action-oriented learning styles so that
different learning opportunities are created within and between
each participant.
Primary Issues
1. Perspectives - A brief historical outline of rural development
approaches, and a case study to illuminate the interests of
various groups involved in rural development activities and to
provide a common reference point for the participants.
2. Intervention, motivation, and justification - analysis of the
need for rural development efforts and particular strategies to
discover the implications it has on the people affected.
3. Designs of rural development strategies - survey and analysis
of previous strategies and generation of possible alternative
strategies for sustainable development in the future.
4. Management and administration of rural development - analysis
of different management strategies and their implications for
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design and participation.
5. Empowerment, participation and liberation - analysis of how
rural development activities affect and are affected by these
ideas and by different definitions of these ideas.
6. Development of guidelines for effective and sustainable rural
development strategies - a look at evaluation criteria and
influences in the decision-making process that inhibit and
enhance effectiveness, including the generation of new ideas to
improve the effectiveness of rural development programs.
Secondary Issues to Provide Perspectives on Primary Issues
1. The economic and political perspectives on rural development.
2. The gender perspectives on rural development.
3. The anthropological perspectives on development.
4. The educational perspectives on rural development.
5. The technological perspectives of rural development.
A Final Word
Each of these secondary issues will be considered in all of
the primary issues under discussion. By presenting a wide variety
of points to view on each topic I hope that the participants will
develop the skills to integrate information from a variety of
fields to address the rural development problem that they have
identified and are exploring.
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Chapter 2
LEARNING STYLES LEARNING THEORY

A Brief Perspective on Learning Theory
Most of the literature addressing learning theory has at
least three primary biases:

it focuses on how children learn,

with mere brief allusions to adult learning;
specialized,

it is highly

usually directed to cognitive learning or motivation

or the structural aspects of learning;

and its experimental

research is centered in Western cultural contexts.
this skewness,

In spite of

learning theory has provided valuable,

far-

reaching and extensive insight into how human beings learn
things. The skewness however also presents problems in adapting
the knowledge generated by learning theory to specific groups.
The difficulty is not making reasonable generalizations based on
research findings,

but in translating this knowledge into useful

tools for adult education.
In the past there has been specific focus on adult learning
needs. These have been present in the writings of William James,
John Dewey, Jean Piaget,
most important.

Erik Erikson and Kurt Lewin to name the

It was Erikson and Lewin whose writings placed

prominant importance on how adults learn and what environments
facilitate adult learning. Kolb has taken these ideas and
formulated a theory of experiential learning that provides the
skeleton for

this course in rural development.

Kalb's ideas are important because they focus primarily on
how adults perceive and process information. This chapter will

IL

outline Kolb's theory of experiential learning alluding to why
this approach is appropriate for a course in rural development.
It will not elaborate on the development of the theory or discuss
the contributions of the aforementioned scholars.

It is important

to demonstrate that this learning skeleton can support muscle for
conceptualizing ideas and circulation for processing information
about rural development in particular.
Experiential Learning Theory
"Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created
through the transformation of experience."l

There are six

important characteristics of experiential learning:
1. Learning is best conceived as a process, not in terms of
outcomes.
2. Learning is a continuous process grounded in experience.
3. The process of learning requires the resolution of
conflicts between dialectally opposed modes of adaptation
to the world.
4. Learning is an holistic process of adaptation to the
world.
5. Learning involves transactions between the person and the
environment.
6. Learning is the process of creating knowledge.
Learning as a process rests on the assumption that "ideas
are not fixed and immutable elements of thought but are formed
and reformed through experience."(p.26)

Defining learning in

terms of outcomes becomes "a definition for nonlearning in the
sense that the failure to modify ideas and habits as a result of
experience is maladaptive."(p.26)

The purpose of education

should be to stimulate inquiry and skill in the process of

1 Kolb, David A. Experiential Learning: Experience as The
Source of Learning and Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. (1984), p. 38. No other footnotes will be
recorded, all of the information in this chapter is excerpted
from this work.

knowledge getting,

not to memorize a body of knowledge. This is

also refered to by Freire as the "banking" concept of education.
It is through the interaction of expectation and experience
that learning occurs. Hegel said that "any experience that does
not violate expectation is not worthy of the name experience."
(p.28) "The fact that learning is a continuous process grounded
in experience has important educational implications. Put simply,
it implies that all learning is relearning. How easy and tempting
it is in designing a course to think of the learner's mind as
being as blank as the paper on which we scratch our outline.
Everyone enters every learning situation with more or less
articulate ideas about the topic at hand. Thus, one's job as an
educator is not only to implant new ideas but also to dispose of
or modify old ones."(p.28) It is critical that educators
recognize that it is not enough to merely set people off in small
groups to discuss issues or to lecture them. The educator must
engage and direct the learner in an educational process that
"begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories,
examining and testing them,

and then integrating the new, more

refined ideas into the person's belief systems"(p.28) if the
learning process to be facilitated.
The resolution of conflict has been ref ered to by Freire as
"praxis" and by Piaget as accommodation and assimilation. For
Freire this conflict is resolved through dialogue.

"Learning is

by its very nature a tension- and conflict-filled process."(p.30)
Effective learners need four different kinds of abilities:
concrete experience abilities, where the learner can be involved
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fully,

openly and without bias in new experiences;

observation abilities,

reflective

being able to reflect on and observe

experiences from many perspectives; abstact conceptualization
abilities,

being able to create concepts that integrate their

observations into logically sound theories;
experimentation abilities,

and active

where learners are able to use

theories to make decisions and solve problems.(p.30)

Integrating

these four abilities is difficult since they are polar opposites.
"Learners must continually choose which set of learning abilities
he or she will bring to bear in any specific learning situation."
(p.30)

~C°"""" "'P"'''°'"\
Testing implications
of concepts in new

Observations and
reflections

'""'"°"'

'°"'~'

_/

\.______ concepts
F"m"'°"andof generalizations
Figure 2.1 The Lewinian Experiential Learning Model

Learning is holistic in the sense that it "involves the
integrated functioning of the total organism perceiving,

thinking,

feeling,

and behaving."(p.31) Most research about human

behavior has been very specialized and to integrate it all into a
holistic framework would be simplistic and impossible.
are to understand human behavior,
way,

"Yet if we

particularly in any practical

we must in some way put together all the pieces that have

been so carefully analyzed.
and how we feel,

In addition to knowing how we think

we must also know when behavior is governed by

thought and when by feeling.

In addition to addressing the nature

of specialized human functions,

c

IJ

experiential learning theory is

also concerned with how these functions are integrated by the
person into a holistic adaptive posture toward the world."(p.32)
"The transactional relationship between the person and the
environment is symbolized in the dual meanings of the term
'experience'

-

one subjective and personal,

the other objective

and environmental."(p.35) "The concept of transaction implies a
fluid interpenetrating relationship between objective conditions
and subjective experience,

such that once they become related,

both are essentially changed."(p.36)
Learning must also be understood in terms of the nature and
forms of human knowledge and processes that create knowledge.
Epistimological considerations offer explanations for solving
problems that are rooted in conflicting assumptions about the
nature of knowledge and truth.

"Experiential learning theory

provides a perspective from which to approach these pracital
problems,

suggesting a typology of different knowledge systems

that results from the way the dialectic modes of concrete
experience and abstract conceptualization and the modes or active
experimentation and reflective observation are characteristically
resolved in different fields of inquiry."(p.37)
These primary characteristics of experiential learning can
be viewed as being parallel to characteristics of rural
development. Over time experience in rural development has
demonstrated that it is indeed a process and that there are no
quick remedies. This process is continuous;

there is no clear

point at which a community becomes developed. Thirdly,

effective

rural development necessitates the resolution of conflicts

I'

to

between many opposing factors;

macroeconomic planning vs.

microeconomic and social consequences;
community self-reliance;
vs.

outside assistance vs.

urban-oriented interpretation of need

local rural knowledge;

or,

providing needed services vs.

developing sustainable local institutional capabilities.
In view of the many conflicts present it is important to
employ a holistic approach that attempts to address the
interrelatedness between conflicts and within conflicting
approaches to rural development.

Adaptation of approaches based

on results must occur and change through time and space. There is
much distinguishment between short-term performance of a strategy
or idea,

the medium-range learning that occurs in communities and

agencies, and the long-term development of communites and people
involved in rural development. These three perspectives create
different types of knowledge, each restructuring priorities and
understanding of the knowledge creator. This knowledge will form
the basis of further action and hence determines the specific
approach to be employed.
If agents of rural development can begin to become conscious
of their own assumptions and knowledge perspectives,

they can

better integrate information about rural development for
themselves and help others to integrate information.

One way that

will promote this is an understanding of learning patterns and
learning styles.
Learning Styles
Kolb delineates the four types of learning that depict the
adult learning cycle. They were described earlier as concrete

i7

experience (CE),

reflection and observation (RO), abstract

conceptualization (AC), and active experimentation. These
learning types symbolize a process and a style of learning. "This
is not a four step process. Each of these stages involves some
overlap, interaction and flexibility.

A creative tension exists

between Active Experimentation and Reflection and Observation
that,

if nurtured helps the learner to have a more enriching

learning experience. This is equally true for Concrete Experience
and Abstract Conceptualization."2
Juxtaposed between these learning processes are styles that
depict the way learning abilities manifest themselves.
socialization experiences in family,

"Through

school and work, we come to

resolve the conflicts between being active and reflective and
between being immediate and analytical in characteristic ways,
thus lending reliance on one of the four basic forms of knowing:
divergence, assimilation, convergence, and accommodation." (Kolb,
p.77) Each individual develops a learning style that incorporates
these four styles,

though some aspects are stronger or weaker

than others. Each of these styles can be described as follows:
The convergent learning style relies primarily on the
dominant learning abilities of abstract conceptualization
and active experimentation. The greatest strength of this
approach lies in problem-solving, decision-making, the
practical application of ideas and where there is a single
correct answer or solution to a question or problem.
Convergers are controlled in expressing their emotions and
they prefer dealing with technical tasks and problems rather
than social and interpersonal issues.
The divergent learning style has the opposite learning

2 Mullinex, Bonnie. "Rebuilding a Tree of Knowledge: Adult
Learning in Theory, Fact and Practice," Comprehensive Examination
Paper, University of Massachusetts-Amherst (May, 1987), p. 44.
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strengths from convergence, emphasizing concrete experienc
and reflective observation. The greatest strength of this
orientation lies in imaginative ablitity and awareness o~
meaning and values, being able to view concrete situations
from many perspectives. The emphasis is on adaptation by
observation rather than action. Divergers are better in
situations that call for alternative ideas and implications,
are interested in people, and are imaginative and feelingoriented.
In assimilation, the dominant learning abilities are
abstract conceptualization and reflective observation. The
greatest strength of this orientation lies in inductive
reasoning and the ability to create theoretical models and
in assimilating disparate observations into an integrative
explanation. Assimilators, like convergers, focus more on
ideas and abstract concepts rather than people. Ideas,
however are judged less in this orientation by their
practical value. It is more important that the theory be
logically sound and precise.
The accommodative learning style has the opposite strengths
from assimilation, emphasizing concrete experience and
active experimentation. The greatest strength of this
orientation lies in doing things, in carrying out plans and
tasks and getting involved in new experiences. The adaptive
emphasis of this orientation is on opportunity seeking, risk
taking and action. Accommodators are adept at adapting
themselves to changing immediate circumstances. They tend to
solve problems in an intuitive trial-and-error manner,
relying heavily on other people for information rather than
their own analytic ability. They are at ease with people,
but are sometimes viewed as impatient and pushy. (Kolb,

p.77-78)
The figure below illustrates the relationship between the
learning processes and the learning styles.

1

Self as
process transacting
with the
world

£

.,

.!
f

~

"8

....8

~

·~
.>.

e 0..,.,

"'
Q:i

~

Self as
content interacting
with the
world

~

"O

.,c

.!:!

~

.,x 15<ii

a.E -0
0

v

E

·!::'

5E
:§., .~
"O

~

"'

~

~

.,
·;

c

0

·;;

c

.9

Self as
undifferentiated immersed in
the world

AE
RO
Assimilation

Figure

The

Experlentla~

Learning Theory of Growth and Development

c

.Q

.~

<ii

·~

a.

tJ)

Human Development
The diagram's third dimension will complete our discusssion
of experiential learning theory.
the human development process.

This dimension provides focus on

"Development on each dimension

proceeds from a state of embeddedness,

defensiveness,

and reaction to a state of self-actualization,

dependence

independence,

proaction and self-direction. This process is marked by
increasing complexity and relativism in dealing with the world
and one's experience and by higher-level integrations of the
dialectic conflicts among the four primary learning modes."
(p.140) Progress throught the stages of acquisition,
specialization and integration will vary depending on learners'
individual personality and cultural experience.

"Even though the

stages of the developmental growth process are depicted in the
form of a simple three-layer cone,

the actual process of growth

in any single life history probably proceeds through successive
oscillations from one stage to another. Thus,

a person may move

from stage two to stage three in several separate subphases of
integrative advances,

followed by consolidation or regression

into specialization." (p.141)
Acquisition is the stage of acquiring basic learning
abilities and cognitive structures.

"Development is marked by the

gradual emergence of internalized structures that allow [one]

to

gain a sense of self that is separate and distinct from the
surrounding environment."
to learn,

(p.142)

It is developing the capacity

not necessarily the actual learning of specific skills.

Kolb focuses this stage mainly in childhood,

though it may be

interpreted differently,

depending on cultural considerations.

Specialization describes how "people shaped by cultural,
educational, and organizational socialization forces develop
increased competence in a specialized mode of adaptation that
enables them to master the particular life tasks they encounter
in their chosen career (in the broadest sense of the word)
paths." (p.142) "Stability and change in life paths are seen as
resulting from the interaction between internal personal dynamics
and external social forces,

emerging from which is the tendency

for there to be a closer and closer match between self
characteristics and environmental demands." (p.143) Most
importantly of all for a classroom course is that "development in
general tends to follow a path toward accentuation of personal
characteristics and skills,

in that development is a product of

the interaction between choices and socialization experiences
that match these choice dispositions for later experience."
(p.143)
The personal styles tend to gravitate toward specific kinds
of experience while interpretations of experience, already preselected (not as deliberately as the word),
that specific personal learning style.
defined primarily in terms of content experiences I

have had,

tend to reinforce

"The self in this stage is
things I

goods and qualities I

can do,

possess. The

primary mode of relating to the world is interaction the world (build a bridge,
on me (pays me money,

raise the family)

I act on

and the world acts

fills me with bits of knowledge),

neither is fundementally changed by the other." (p.143)

but

The specialization level accomplishments of security and
achievement often place personal fulfillment needs in the
background.

"This drive for fulfillment is thwarted by the needs

of [Western?] civilization for specialized role performance."
(p.146) One's style serves to define and shape the flow of
experience providing more direction and structure to one's
development. The question becomes,

how does one break this

mutually reinforcing pattern of experience and style and choose
other types of experiences and define them differently?
"Integrative consciousness introduces purpose and focus to
this random process." (p.144) "To achieve inte.grative
consciousness, one must first free oneself from the domination of
specialized interpretative consciousness." Jung called it the
process of individuation.

Actually saying what integrative

consciousness is presents an impossibility;

"integrative

consciousness by its very nature cannot be described by any
single interpretation.'' (p.158) Integrative consciousness has a
transcendent quality of "climbing out of the specialized adaptive
orientations of our worldly social roles."

(p.158)

Kolb describes integrative levels of predominantly
affective,

perceptual,

symbolic and behavioral interpretations of

experience:
The integrative levels of affective complexity begin with
the relativistic appreciation (in the fullest sense of the
term) of value systems and conclude with an active value
commitment in the context of that relativism. Integration in
perceptual complexity begins with a similar relativistic
appreciation of observational schemes and perspectives and
concludes with intuition - the capacity for choosing
meaningful perspectives and frameworks for interpreting
experience. With integrative consciousness, symbolic
complexity achieves first the ability to match creatively

symbol systems and concrete objects and finally the capacity
for finding and solving meaningful problems. Behavioral
complexity at the integrative level begins withy the
development of an experimental, hypothesis-testing approach
to action that introduces new tentativeness and flexibility
to goal-oriented behavior - tentativeness that is tempered
by the active commitment to responsible action in a world
that can never by fully known because it is continually
being created. (p.159)
The Skeleton for Supporting Rural Development
Experiential learning theory as outlined above has many
obvious· analogies with rural development theories. While it may
be accused of having a cultural bias,
value bias,

gender bias,

class bias or

it does offer some explanation for learning that is

much more holistic than other approaches. It can establish a
foundation to allow participants in a course to build their own
model of rural development and learning. By consciously
developing and alluding to parallels between learning styles,
human development and rural development issues and approaches, an
interactive environment can be created that demands intergration
of not only information but processes.

Attempting some holistic

approach to teaching may lead to more holistic learning. Analogy
and metaphor are useful tools to illustrate complexity,

to

facilitate exploration at many levels and to maintain perspective
of "the big picture."
Many of the analogies are obvious. Different learning style
biases could be construed as analogous to different approaches to
rural development. Many development efforts have stemmed from a
convergent learner bias,

that there is a right answer. This could

be interpreted as typifying the modernization model of
development which views development in mostly technical terms.
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The outlook purveyed by dependency theorists could be viewed as
the creation of people having a more assimilative learning style.
Dependency theorists place importance on the soundness of their
theory and is less focussed on people's living standards or
conditions (unless it adds to the preciseness of the theory).
I

am not hypothesizing that these analogies are true,

but

illustrating that these parallels imply that experiential
learning theory can create a solid framework to address rural
development issues and concerns. Why is this parallel important
and how is it useful? Marshall McCluhan said that "the medium is
the message." If an approach to teaching rural development issues
can be found that mirrors the processes involved in rural
development,

then the opportunity for lasting learning is

created. For instance,

if participants are in a course that

attempts to present information so that it caters to each of the
four primary learning styles,

they may gain insight in how to be

more effective in their own work later on as facilitators and
imporve their abilities to assess learning opportunities for
others. They may not,

but at least an opportunity has arisen that

might otherwise have been missed.
Determining how to best transfer the foundations of
experiential learning theory,

learning styles,

human development

and rural development into the classroom will be the subject of
the next chapter.

Chapter 3
PUTTING STYLE INTO THE CLASSROOM

The theory of experiential learning has created an overall
framework of learning goals for this course. Linking performance,
learning and development within the individual and within the
content of rural development issues,

questioning assumptions and

integrating different learning styles becomes the skeleton of the
course. Transferring these goals into achievable objectives will
require consideration of learning style,

growth and creativity of

each participant. These process objectives will later be viewed
in conjunction with the content objectives of the course.
The Stylizing of the Classroom
There are two factors Kolb outlines that inhibit the
consideration of learning styles in the classroom; accentuation
and specialization.

"Feldman and Newcomb describe the

accentuation process as it affects the college experience:
Whatever the characteristics [learning styles] of
an individual that selectively propel her toward
particular educational settings-going to college,
selecting a particular one, choosing an academic
specialization, associating with a particular group of
peers-these same characteristics are apt to be
reinforced and extended by the experiences incurred in
those settings. (Kolb, p.164)
"Thus,

if students with a particular learning style choose a

field whose knowledge structure is one that prizes and nurtures
their style of learning,

then accentuation of that approach to

learning is likely to occur." (Kolb,

p.164)

Specialization in learning style is a direct result of
accentuation. Robert Altmeyer demonstrated the affect of the

accentuation process and that it did indeed lead to specialized
learning styles.

In a study of engineering/science and fine-arts

students "the surprising finding was that engineering/science
students decreased in creative thinking and fine-arts students
decreased in analytic reasoning over the college years." (Kolb
p.166) So not only does accentuation lead to strengthening
certain specialized learning styles,

it also tends to weaken the

other learning styles.
There have been many new techniques employed in the
classroom to improve management of the learning process. These
include:

"computer-aided instruction;

materials in math,
instruction;

experienced-based learning

science, and psychology;

programmed

games and simulations; and small group work."

(Kolb,

p.196) "The weakness of nearly all these techniques is the
failure to recognize and explicitly provide for the differences
in learning styles that are characteristic of both individuals
and subject matters." (Kolb,

p.196) The task of this course is to

make explicit reference to learning style so that learners have
the opportunity to make their own learning style more flexible
and adaptable.
"Any educational program, course design,

or classroom

session can be viewed as having degrees of orientation toward
each of the four learning modes in the experiential learning
model,

labeled as affective,

perceptual,

symbolic,

and

behavioral, to connote the overall climate they create and the
particular learning skill or mode they require. Thus an affective
environment emphasizes the experiencing of concrete events; a

symbolic environment emphasizes abstract conceptualization; a
perceptual environment stresses observation and appreciation; a
behavioral environment stresses action taking in situations with
real consequences. Any particular learning experiencecan have
some or all of these orientations to differing degrees at the
same time." (Kolb,

p.197) Unfortunately,

these styles are rarely

if ever made explicit in the classroom setting.
There seem to be four cues that can serve to assess the
environmental orientation of a course:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

primary source or use of information;
rules guiding learner behavior;
facilitator's role;
provision for feedback. (Kolb, p.197)

Each of the four learning envorinments in their absolute sense
elicit a picture that can be described using these four cues as
follows:
Affective complex learning environments are ones in
which (1) the emphasis is on experiencing what it is
actually like to be a professional in the field under study.
(2) Learners are engaged in activities that simulate or
mirror what they might do as graduates, or they are
encouraged toe reflect upon an experience to generate these
insights and feelings about themselves. The information
discussed and generated often comes from expressions of
feelings, values, opinions by the learner. (3) The
facilitator serves as a role model for the field or
profession, relating to the learner on a personal basis and
as a colleague. (4) There is accepted discussion and
critique of how the course is proceeding, making events
emergent rather than prescribed.
Perceptually complex learning environments are ones in
which (1) the primary goal is to understand something: to be
able to identify relationships between concepts, to be able
to define problems for investigation, to be able to collect
relevant information, to be able to research a question. To
do this (2) learners are encouraged to view the topic or
subject matter from different perspectives (their own
experience, expert opinion, literature) and in different
ways (listen, observe, write, discuss, act out, think). If a
task is being done or a problem is being solved, the

emphasis is more on how it gets done, the process, than on
the solution. Learners are left to conclude answer define
criteria of success for themselves .and individual
differences are allowed and used as a basis for further
understanding. In this process, (3) the facilitator
serves
as a mirror or process consultant. He or she is nonevaluative, answers questions with questions, suggests
instead of critiquing and relates current issues to larger
ones. (4) There is planned time spent looking back at
previous steps, events or decisions in order to guide the
learner in future activities.
Symbolically complex learning environments are ones in
which (1) the learner is involved in trying to solve a
probelm for which there is usually a right or best solution.
(2) The source of information, topic or problem being dealt
with is abstract, in that it is removed from the present and
presented via reading, data, pictures, lecture inputs, etc.
In handling such information the learner is both guided and
constrained by externally imposed rules of inference, such
as symbols, computer technology, jargon, theorems, graphical
keys, or protocols. (3) The facilitator is the accepted
representative of the body of knowledge - judging and
evaluating learner output, interpreting information that
cannot be dealt with by the rules of inference, and
enforcing methodology and the scientific rigor of the field
of study. (4) Success is measured against the right or best
solution, expert opinion, or other wise rigid criteria
imposed by the teacher or accepted in the field of study.
Behaviorally complex learning environments are those in
which (1) the emphasis is upon actively applying knowledge
or skills to a practical problem. The problem need not have
a right or best answer, but it does have to be something the
learner can relate to, value and feel some intrinsic
satisfaction from having solved. (2) Completing the task is
essential. Although there may be an externally imposed
deadline or periodic checkpoints for which reports or other
information are required, most of the learner's time is hers
to manage. She is thus concerned with what effect her
present behavior will have vis-a-vis the overall task to be
done. The learner is always left to make decisions/choices
about what to do next or how to proceed. (3) The teacher can
be available as coach or advisor, but primarily at the
learner's request or initiative. (4) Success is measured
against a criteria associated with the task: how well
something worked, feasibility, sellability, client
acceptance, cost, aesthetic quality, etc. (Kolb, p.198)
Of course every learning environment has some degree of each
of these characteristics. While the language Kolb has used to
describe the learning style environments,

along with the

experiential learning theory,
artificiality,

seem to create a sense of

the ideas and concepts described by the words have

some intuitive validity for me. Someone else may discount these
descriptions on the basis of the lack of cultural considerations,
gender considerations or value considerations. This is equally
valid. However,

it is extremely necessary to attempt to create

some theoretical construct to practice learning management.
Without some kind of evolving framework learners and facilitators
do become entrapped in their own styles of learning. By taking
this model and attempting to apply it to a classroom setting a
dialectic between theory and practice, action and reflection will
allow an opportunity to refine the model and to refine the
experience. Without the model refinement is more remote.
The obvious challenge to face is inventing a course design
that allows all of these different environments to be experienced
by the learner. The details of this design will be elaborated
later. The application of learning styles adds an important
dimension to the classroom setting.

A dimension of learning

process is created with learning content. A creative tension is
developed between the learner and herself. This operates
concommitantly with learner and facilitator and course content
and learner. The class learning atmosphere is multi-dimensional.
New possibilities are always being created.

Knowledge can be

created. Personal power can be developed and oppression can be
reduced.

Opportunities for human development may be revealed.

Integration in the Classroom
How to view learning styles in the classroom gives

facilitators and participants insight in how to promote the
learning process. These insights must be considered along with
the other learning objectives of individual growth and
creativity. Here "in making students more well-rounded,
is to develop the weaknesses in the students'

the aim

learning style to

stimulate growth and their ability to learn from a variety of
learning perspectives. The aim is to make the student selfrenewing and self-directed;

to focus on integrative development

wherer the person is highly developed in each of the four
learning modes:

active, relfective,

abstract and concrete. The

student is taught to experience the tension and conflict among
these orientations,

for it is from the resolution of these

tensions that creativity springs." (Kolb,

p.203)

How to achieve this aim in the classroom or in the
university environment is unclear.

Promoting integrative

development and adaptive learning behavior will not result in
radical changes or improvements in one course. The entire program
needs to review its reward systems,
criteria. The program,

selection and evaluation

not just the course needs to have a

specific reference point.

(Kolb,

p.206) It may be that the

reference point is that the goal of the program is the students'
development as self-directed learners.

Its focus becomes more

concerned with learning capacities and abilities so that learners
become more balanced in their learning style preferences.

(Kolb,

p.206)
Revealing the Hidden Curriculum
The major task of this chapter is to explicitly state the

~

I

- I

underlying orientation of this course. There will be a conscious
effort to focus on learning style adaptability. The hidden
curriculum is implicit in what the facilitator does,

and as Bloom

says, "it is probably better learned and longer remembered than
the explicit objectives of the manifest curriculum." (Bloom,1981,
p.148)
This aspect of teaching has been seriously neglected by
professors at the Center for International Education. While
professors have been respectful of students' abilities to learn,
they have not provided education in how to expand learning
capacity. This is often described by students as a "lack of
direction." Most of the time professors tend to teach to their
own style of learning. While they may be quite adaptive in their
own learning style,

their teaching is more often than not

dominated by one style rather than accommodating to all styles.
Again,

this is not deliberate,

but unconscious.

It needs to

become a critical area of consideration in course design and
instructional approach.
Considerations of facilitator roles in this course will
follow in the next chapter. These issues can certainly be
generalized to other aspects of courses at the Center for
International Education.

Chapter 4
FACILITATING STYLE

The Facilitating Function
Building on our metaphor of the rural development course as
a human body, this chapter will examine the facilitator as the
heart of the course. The circulation of information, the supply
of vital tools to the central nervous system, which symbolizes
the participants is performed by the heart. It has a consistent,
steady beat and the electric impulses that students feed back to
monitor its pulse link it inextricably with the· nervous system,
the participant group. It is divided into four chambers that deal
with four different functions. One chamber takes in old, used
information and sends it through another chamber to receive new
life and to become revitalized. A third chamber takes in this
newly rejuvenated flow of enriched information, leading to
another chamber that pushes this new perspective out into the
rest of the body. Nothing is unaffected.
Notice that it is not the heart that actually rejuvenates
the blood content. It merely acts as a receptacle to channel the
flow of information, creating a division between new and old,
discovered and undiscovered, from which the nervous system
benefits. The heart is very unobtrusive, always beating and
facilitating renewal. Yet if it goes into distress, if it skips a
beat, or fibrilates, the entire organism becomes disoriented and
dizzy. Listen to your heart beat. No really stop and try. The
pulse is very subtle, very steady and very distinct from the

blood itself.
The Role of Instruction
Bloom distinguishes between curriculum and instruction as
two separate activities separated by a fundemental difference.
Changes in instruction technique and method can usally be seen
much more immediately than changes in curriculum.!

"The major

task facing an instructional specialist [is] the identification
of those teaching-learning activities which are to be used. An
additional task [is] the sequencing of these activities."2

These

tasks can vary widely.
The way a teacher approaches these tasks could be described
as the teacher's style. Bloom explains that "group instruction
produces errors in learning at each stage of a course how effective the teacher is [my emphasis]."3
strategies require three things:
by the teacher;

feedback,

no matter

Mastery learning

group instruction,

that created

providing participants with information

and means to assess what they have learned; and individualized
help,

so that participants may understand concepts that they may

have missed. Without any one of these components instruction will
not reach its potential effectiveness, and the learner will
experience frustration.

Each participant has different needs and

as a result will need different types and qualities of
instruction to assist them in mastering material.
1 Bloom, Benjamin S. All Our Children Learning: A Primer for
Parents, Teachers, and Other Educators. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1981, p.121.
2 Bloom, p.

122.

3 Bloom, p.140.
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Bloom outlines five variables to be considered when
designing instructional approaches toward a strategy for mastery
learning:
1. Learner aptitude for a particular kind of learning
or the learning style of the learner.
2. The quality of instruction or the degree to which
the presentation, explanation, and ordering of elements
of the task to be learned approach optimum for a given
learner.
3. The learner's ability to understand instruction,
that is his or her ability to understand the task to be
learned and the procedures to be followed in the
learning of the task in a group atmosphere.
4. Perseverence, the time the learner is willing or can
spend in learning a particular task.
5. The time allowed for learning by the instructor,
which will be too much time for some learners and too
little time for others.4
These variables merit analysis, and are especially critical
in graduate study. Too often instructors ignore the learning
styles of their students and assume that students are selfdirected because they are older or more mature. This approach
assumes that the learning abilities of students are the same.
Instructors abdicate responsibility for improving students'
learning abilities. This is fallicious andragogy.
to respect students'

learning capacity,

It is important

but learning is a skill

and a students' ability can be refined and expanded given proper
attention. The role of instruction in this course will be to
facilitate the improvemen~ of learners'

learning skills,

by using

the content of rural development as a medium for learner
experimentation.
Principles of Teaching
Knowles focus on andragogy has led to the application of

4 Bloom,

pp.156-65.

teaching principles to specific conditions of learning that
facilitate growth and development. These conditions are produced
through the teaching-learning transaction. The link between
learning conditions and teaching principles outlined below
produces effective opportunities for growth and development:
Conditions of
Learning

Principles of Teaching

1. The learners feel
a need to learn.

1. The teacher exposes the learners to
new possibilities for self-fulfillment.
2. The teacher helps the learners
clarify their own aspirations for
improved behavior.
3. The teacher helps the learners
diagnose the gap between their
comfortable and conducive to interaction
(preferably no person sitting behind
another).
4. The teacher helps the learners
identify the life problems they
experience because of their gaps in
knowledge and skills.

2. The learning
environment is
characterized by
physical comfort,
mutual trust and
respect, mutual
helpfulness, freedom
of expression and
acceptance of
differences.

5. The teacher provides physical
conditions that are6. The teacher
accepts the learners as persons of worth
and respects their feelings, ideas and
experience.
7. The teacher seeks to build
relationships of mutual trust among the
learners by encouraging cooperative
activities and refraining from inducing
competitiveness and judgemental
attitudes.
8. The teacher exposes his or her own
feelings and contributes resources as a
colearner in the spirit of mutual
inquiry.

3. The learners
perceive the goals of
a learning experience
to be their goals.
aspirations and
present level of
performance.

9. The teacher involves the learners in
a mutual process of formulating learning
objectivesin which the needs of the
learners of the institution, of the
teacher, of the subject matter, and of
the society are taken into account.
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4. The learners
accept a share of the
responsibility for
planning and
operating a learning
experience, and
therefore have a
feeling of commitment
toward it.

10. The teacher shares his or her
thinking about options available in the
designing of learning experiences and
the selection of materials and methods,
and involves the learners in deciding
these options.

5. The learners
participate actively
in the learning
process.

11. The teacher helps the learners to
organize themselves (project groups,
learning-teaching teams, etc.) to share
responsibility in the process of mutual
inquiry.

6. The learning
process is realted to
and makes use of the
experience of the
learners.

12. The teacher helps the learners
exploit their own experiences as
resources for learning through the use
of such techniques as discussion, role
playing, case method, etc.
13. The teacher gears the presentation
of his or her own resources to the
levels of experience of particular
learners.
14. The teacher helps learners to apply
new knowledge to their experience to
make the knowledge more meaningful and
integrated.

7. The learners have
a sense of progress
toward their goals.

15. The teacher involves the learners in
developing mutually acceptable criteria
and methods for measuring progress
toward the learning objectives.
16. The teacher helps the learners
develop and apply procedures for selfevaluation according to these
criteria.(Knowles, p.57-8.)

This course will try to incorporate all of these principles
into the methods used. The facilitator role will necessitate a
keen sensitivity to learning style. It is only with this
sensitivity that the facilitator may even approach becoming
effective to every learner in the classroom. Furthermore, it is
only through demonstrating the usefulness of these techniques
that the facilitator can urge others to adopt them.

An essential

part of this course will be to discuss the use of techniques that
adhere to the above principles, using formative evaluation
sessions conducted throughout the course.
The next chapter will demonstrate how the concepts of
experiential learning theory and this framework for the
facilitator manifests into a coherent course design.

.
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Chapter 5

CREATING A COURSE WITH STYLE

Designing a course is art. Just as the sculptor cuts and
fits wood together to form shapes,

so the course designer cuts

and pastes readings and materials to form a coherent workable
environment. Both have many tools at their disposal,

but what

makes the sculptor and the course designer an artist is knowing
when to use the right tool for the right material or medium.
Nails do not penetrate oak and boring instruction does not
penetrate wandering minds. Another feature of the artist is
perceiving a message in something that may not be readily
apparent to someone else. Thus, a block of wood becomes an
exquisite work of art that can be appreciated and felt by others.
Designing This Course
I have tried to take a large unmanageable body of knowledge,
rural development, and remove the outer layers to create a
sculptured course that will give participants a look at its
essence. Only they will be able to judge whether this approach is
significant. I
the design,

have attempted to not only create a work of art in

but through experiencing the design I

am trying to

create a larger framework for learning. The course focus on
learning style,

learning ability and learning capacity will

hopefully provide learners with the opportunity to integrate
their learning style,

improve their learning ability and come

closer to their learning capacity.
The processes in the classroom have been recast into actual

course content. Ample time has been created throughout the course
so that participants may reflect on their own approaches to
learning. Each session pays careful attention to shift
presentation styles to appeal to different types of learners. A
lecture, small group discussion,

large group debate and a

formative evaluation session may be part of one class session. I
have tried to consider techniques best suited to particular
objectives (see Knowles,

p.240 for synopsis). Often the

evaluations of the course are linked to time for participants to
evaluate their own behavior in class. This type of reflective
activity provides fuel and substance for the course. Rural
development issues create Qpportunities for experimenting with
ideas and insights that participants generate.
The Course Requirements
The course will present some initial constraints that the
participants must confront,

just as they would deal with

constraintts if they were to enter into a rural development
situation. There will be four agreements that all participants
must agree to if they want to stay in the course. They have not
been created to be oppressive or demanding,

but to create

constraining circumstances that most people might face in a new
rural development situation. The four agreements are:
1. Agree to come to every class on time.
2. Agree to complete all work assigned before
class.
3. Agree to stay at each session until it is
over.
4. Agree not to gossip about what is said in
this class.
The agreements also reflect my expectations as the

facilitator. Without these minimum requirements from the
participants the learning objectives set out for the course
cannot be achieved. Some may seem obvious,

but it is important to

obtain specific agreement with each participant to ensure that we
understand each other. These will not be negotiable.
Everything else about the course will be negotiable.

If

participants have suggestions about improving the course in any
way, such as increasing participation, these can be discussed and
necessary changes can be made. The sessions have been planned to
focus on processes of rural development. The specific content I
have chosen can easily be altered to include other aspects that
cater to specific learner interest.
The course sessions are outlined as follows:
Session
Session
Session
Session
Session
Session
Session
Session
Session
Session

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-

Establishing Balance

-

Intervening and Motivating Who for What?

- Identifying Development Problems
- Differentiating Help and Hindrance
- Learning Style

-

Building Trust
The Green Revolution Game
- Managing Ambuguity
- Empowering Yourself
- Ending Gracefully

Session 7 will take a full Saturday to complete. It is a
simulation of a rural development project with all the players
involved in a typical model.

It should provide a synthesizing

experience for all of the previous material and bridge the ending
sessions of the course that deal with liberation issues. The
detailed objectives and activities of each session can be read in
the next chapter,

the course syllabus.

To provide a thread to link these processes together each
participant will be asked to develop and write a case on a rural

development issue/topic/problem which is of special interest to
them. The paper will initially be written in parts as they relate
to each of the course sessions. The facilitator,

myself, will

provide feedback on each part. Then at the end participants will
be expected to submit a final paper that identifies a
problem/topic/issue and then anaylyzes it in view of the
different processes of development that we discuss and experience
at each session. The course sessions will cater directly to each
of the four learning styles. The paper will focus primarily on
conceptualizing and reflection.
Accompanying each session will be a homework assignment.
Each assignment will have reading and writing. The readings have
been linked to the writing so that they provide a framework to
develop the case study. The readings have been selected because
of their particular content or perspective. There are articles
dealing with economics, anthropology,

sociology, education and

development.
Specific case studies have also been included to look at
sectors as interrelated wholes, rather than entities that can be
analyzed separately. While it is essential that each sector, be
it agriculture, health, water, appropriate technology,

business,

or education be the focus of inquiry so that it may develop as a
field,

it is equally essential that the rural development worker

view the application of these sectors in terms of their
interrelatedness. Case studies help to present this viewpoint.
The Course Materials
There are four texts that are required for this rural

expectations, hopes,

fears and ignorance. The facilitator of this

course must be genuinely concerned with the development of his or
her learners because this is the kind of attitude that is needed
from practioners active in rural development.
Course Evaluation
The standardized evaluation forms will be used to evaluate
the course at semester's end. During the last session there will
be time devoted to course and facilitator feedback.

Time will

also be spent for learners to evaluate their own progress and
performance in the course,

focussing on their flexibility and

adaptability as learners. This is outlined in the last session.

development course:
1. Moris, Jon R. Managing Induced Rural Development.
Bloomington, IN: International Development Institute,
1981.
This book provides a brilliant overview of rural
development issues from the perspective of the
practitioner. It looks at broad policy questions as
well as specific management problems at the local
level. It also includes a guide to the current
literature that addresses rural development issues as
well as theoretical questions about development.
2. Chambers, Robert. Rural Development: Putting the
Last First. Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1983.
Specifically concerned with the role outsiders
play in rural development, Chambers offers insight into
how outsiders acquire and use knowledge. He discusses
issues of empowerment and the research needs of rural
development as a field.
3. Hyden, Goran. Beyond Uiamaa in Tanzania:
Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980.
This is the predecessor of Hyden's new book, No
Shortcuts to Progress, which is a more general
treatment of rural development policy. This book
presents one of the most comprehensive analyses written
on the Ujamaa development strategy in Tanzania, one of
the most important episodes in the rural development
field. It provides an excellently detailed case that
can be discussed throughout the course.
4. Bureaucracy and the Poor. Ed. David C. Korten and
Felipe B. Alfonso. Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1983.
Presents many cases that are written from a management
perspective. Korten has outlined a new development
strategy that he entitles "People-Centered
Development." These essays are written to include
discussion of participation, empowerment and local
institution building.
Supplementing these primary texts are other readings drawn
from the fields of anthropology,

economics and politics. They

encompass a wide variety of perspectives, from World Bank to
Oxfam, from micro to macro. The readings are included in the next
chapter after each session outline.
I have spent great lengths of time arduously piecing the

readings together so that each reinforces certain aspects of the
other, and so that all of them relate to the development process
under discussion at the next class. I

have also been careful to

provide adequate class time to discuss the readings.

It is a

common complaint that readings rarely are discussed in class and
that this deficiency creates uncertainty in participants about
the purpose and their interpetations of the readings.
The Green Revolution Game will be played during session 7 on
a Saturday. I

have not played the game,

but I

of it and Chambers recommends it in his book.
copy of it from England. When it arrives,

have read reviews
I am awaiting a

I will ask various

people to participate in the game next semester in order to
assess it and modify it as necessary.
If there is any more time than the ten sessions in the
semester I

hope to be able to show a film.

I have not utilized

other mediums of communication because quite frankly I
researched this at all. I

have not

have considered showing The Mission to

demonstrate how intervention strategies for development may not
mean much in view of systemic problems and barriers.
Course Instruction
As discussed in the previous chapter, andragogical
principles will guide the facilitator's behavior. The role model
aspects of learning will be an important characteristic of the
instructional style. The facilitator must be a flexible,

adaptive

learner and actively demonstrate this capacity. This means
conceptualizing experiences and providing practical examples of
concepts.

It means the facilitator shares his or her feelings,

Chapter 6
LEARNING MODULES
Course Sessions
Session 1

-

Establishing Balance

Session 2

-

Identifying Development Problems

Session 3

-

Intervening and Motivating Who for What?

Session 4

-

Differentiating Help and Hindrance

Session 5

-

Learning Style

Session 6 - Building Trust
Session 7 - The Green Revolution Game
Session 8 - Managing Ambiguity
Session 9 -

Empowering Yourself

Session 10- Ending Gracefully

Homework Assignments
Homework 1 - Formulating the Development Problem
Homework 2 - Observing Others
Homework 3 -

Affecting Others Effectively

Homework 4 -

Designing an Approach

Homework 5 - Establishing Trust
Homework 6 - Managing Rural Development
Homework 7 - Managing for Solutions
Homework 8 - Organizing Management
Homework 9 -

Empowering Others

Homework 10- Analyzing Your Case
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LESSON 1
ESTABLISHING BALANCE

Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Understand the structure of the course;
Understand the agreements to take the course;
Know what the presenter expects of the participants;
Recognize what issues in rural development are important to
them;
5. Develop specific questions surrounding issues in rural
development that they would like to address.

Activities
1. Introductions and list of addresses/telephone nos.
(20 min)
2. Outline of course content and syllabus
.
(15 min)
a) Emphasize multidimensional aspect of course and
interdisciplinary nature.
b) Oppourtunities to reflect on their own learning styles
will allow participants to become more flexible learners.
3. Outline of my goals for the course
(25 min)
a) To create oportunities for participants to become more
aware of their own learning style preferences.
b) To facilitate participants to acquire skills to become
effective development workers.
c) To provide information to improve participant knowledge
about the rural development field.
d) To apply andragogical learning concepts rather than
pedagogical ones.
4. Course agreements
(20 min)
a) Discuss the nature of agreements and why they are
essential.
b) Discuss why they need to be explicitly agreed upon- that
the course is designed assuming that these agreements have
been kept.
c) The agreements:
1. The participant agrees to come to every class on
time.
2. The participant agrees to complete all work assigned
before class time.
3. The participant will stay in each class until it is
over.
4. The participant agrees not to gossip about this
class.
5. Course requirements
(10 min)
a) Case analyses
b) Personal case development and analysis process.
c) Free to stop class at any time to make observations about

group process occuring in class.
d) Please buy the books.
e) Negotiations- everything in this course is negotiable
except the agreements.
6. Break
(10 min)
7. Organize triads
(10 min)
8. Brainstorming
(20 min)
a) Write down all the issues concerning rural development
that you think are important and should be covered in this
course.
9. Question/problems development
(20 min)
a) Each triad writes down ten problems in question form that
they would like answered by the end of this course.
10. Process consultation
(30 min)
a). In large group each person takes five minutes to free
write their impresssions of this first session focussing
on:
1. Impressions of first class group dynamic.
2. Perception of facilitator.
3. Perceptions of overall course.
4. Perception of work in small group triads.
11. Handout homework number 1 - Formulating the Development
Problem.

HOMEWORK 1
FORMULATING THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM
1. Read Ahmed BRAC ~ase. Note down issues he discusses that
relate to the ones generated by your triad.
2. Read Moris, chapters 1 and 2.
3. Read Hyden, pp.1-36.
4. Writing.
1. Formulate a single question surrounding a specific
topic/issue/problem of rural development .that you would
like to explore during this course.
2. In no more than one of a page explain why this
issue/topic/problem is important to you.
3. Utilizing the reading and the class discussions ask
at least 20 questions that would guide your exploration
of the problem/topic/issue that you identified.
4. Please make a photocopy to hand in at the next class.
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PREFACE
Any development practitioner looking for fresh ideas and practical lessons concerning integrated, community-based programs for meeting the
basic
needs of poor rural families will find this report on the Bangladesh
Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) of considerable interest.
This case study is the second in a series of critical examinations of
unconventional family-cen~ered rural programs that form the core of empirical evidence for an international project on this subject being conducted by
the International Council for Educational Development (ICED) in cooperation
with a variety of developing countr~es and external assistance agencies. The
purpose of the overall project is to develop and disseminate a body of pertinent information, illustrations, and operational guidelines drawn from actual experience that can be useful in a wide ra~ge of developing countries in
connection with designing, implementing and evaluating multipurpose communitybased programs for improving the quality of family life among the rural poor.
The reader will see that BRAC is a strictly home grown, locally staffed
and managed program, born as an emergency relief measure in the turmoil of a
great national struggle for independence. It has since evolved--and is still
evolving--into a unique multifaceted rural development program whose experience
to date offer a variety of positive lessons for others along with some equally
important negative ones that the leaders of BRAC are quick to point out without a trace of defensiveness. BRAC's managers have maintained from the outset
an experimental attitude and flexibiJity of mind and a demonstrated readiness
to convert past weaknesses into future strengths. Through this open-minded
process of trial and error and learning-hy·-doing, the BRAC program has grown
steadily in strength and in its dimensions and effectiveness. Even as this
preface is written, further important changes born of experience are in process of being introduced.
The principal author of this report--Manzoor Ahmed, deputy director of
the ICED project--has frequently expressed the great difficulty of capturing
in written words the spirit and vitality of this living, growing multifaceted
program. The relatively small scale of BRAC's activities, its freedom as
a
voluntary organization from the often irresistible rigidities and inertia of
large public programs, and the uncoumon enthusiasm and dedication of its leadership and workers have found expression in a continuous surge of fresh ideas
and plans and in a dynamism to which no written report can do full justice.
While it is undoubtedly true that these special assets and qualities cannot readily be duplicated on a nationwide scale, this by no means rules out the
possibility that various specific lessons from BRAC's experiences can be usefully applied to larger public programs and in quite different contexts.
What this report presents--to borrow the language of the cinema--are some
revealing snapshots of BRAG as of early 1977, with a series of selective flashbacks to significant episodes in its earlier career. The report also undertakes
to assess the significance of these past and current experiences, the 1mpacts
that BRAC has had thus far on the lives of villagers and villages in the area
it serves, and the new directions expected to emerge in subsequent months and
years. The concluding section of the report attempts to place in perspective
a number of lessons from BRAC's experience that would seem to be of particular
interest and value to development practitioners elsewhere in Bangladesh
and
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in other developing countries.
A brief explanation is in order about how the study was conducted. As
in all field research studies, choices had to be made regarding the most significant types of evidence to be collected and analyzed, the most appropriate
and efficient methods for doing so, and the most effective uses of the limited time, manpower, and financial resources available.
The investigators made extensive use of available quantitative data and
documented information such as earlier project plans and proposals, service
records, periodic reports, and the results of limited previous evaluation efforts. These were supplemented by a sample household survey conducted in 10
villages in the so-called Sulla Project area to collect basic reference data
on the socioeconomic circumstances of families, the extent of their participation in BRAC activities, their knowledge of the program, and their own assessments of what BRAC had done, or could do in the future, to improve their
own lives. In addition the investigators visited all the project sites, joined
the daily cycle of activities of some of the field workers, and spent many hours
interrogating workers and project leaders in the field and at the headquarters.

A special comment should be added regarding the relative roles of quantitative and non-quantitative evidence in an operationally-oriented study
such as this. It is obviously important to collect and analyze whatever
statistical evidence may be available on such matters as the inputs into
the program, the services delivered,the costs and sources of support, and
the measurable impacts of the program on various facets of family and community life. It must be recognized, however, that reliable quantitative
evidence of this sort is frequently very difficult to come by, especially
in home grown programs such as BRAC that never ran the gauntlet of preparing a proper plan and submitting a persuasive proposal to some external
assistance agencies whose sophisticated program analysts insisted on baseline surveys and built-in evaluation provisions as a condition for providing
support. The plain fact is th<'t tbe entrepreneurs of such home grown programs, whose sophistication is of a more down-to-earth variety, are usually
so anxious "to get on with the job" that they see little point in diverting
scarce talent and energy into recording statistics that might some day warm
the hearts of professional evaluators.
In all events, even an ideal supply of quantitative data, if available,
would still not provide answers to some of the most important questions on
the minds of practitioners~questions that by their very nature defy quantitative treatment. This applies, for example, to the important task involved
in each ICED case study of identifying key internal or envirorunental factors
that have either facilitated or inhibited the successful performance of a
particular program, which can be extremely useful for planners of other programs to be aware of. These factors typically turn out to include such things
as the calibre of leadership, the validity of the underlying assumptions of
the program, the adequacy of the initial diagnosis and planning, the organizational arrangements and relationships, the t00tivation of staff and receptivity of the interested clients, the relevance and adequacy of the educational
components, and not least of all the nature of the socioeconomic environment
and general political climate. These kinds of factors obviously cannot
be
measured with a slide rule or computer, but they can nevertheless be identified and reasonably evaluated in a scientifically objective manner
through
the application of sensltive, informed, and systematic observation and judgment. In short, to equate scientific method narrowly with quantitative
iv

measurement, especially in the social sciences, is to rule out the possibility of providing valuable fresh insights to practitioners and reasoned
and responsible answers to some of their most urgent questions.
Although full responsibility for the content, interpretations and
findings of this report resides with the author and ICED, we wish
to
express our appreciation to all of our colleagues in Bangladesh
who
contributed so importantly to this study. In particular we are grateful to Dr. Mohammed Ashraf Ali of the Institute of Education and Research
at Dacca University for conducting the household sample survey and writing
up sections of the preliminary draft report; to Saleh Chowdhury, a journalist with professional training in social work, for helping in the sample
survey and sharing his insights into rural life; to Dr. Mohammed Selim,
Director of the Institute of Education and Research and more recently
Educational Advisor to the Mir.istry of Education, for his sage advice,
encouragement, and interest in the study; and to UNICEF officials in
Dacca, particularly Carl Schoruneyer and Joseph Acar, for their help with
both logistical support and substantive comments.
Above all we express our appreciation to the Executive Director of
BRAC, Mr. F. H. Abed, and his numerous co-workers both .in Dacca and in
the field for their generosity with time and patience in meeting all requests of the investigators and for their unstinting cooperation
with
the study. Overworked project managers who already have problems enough
can be forgiven if they are wary of outside investigators who do not only
impose on their time but may end up making gratuitous criticisms and reconnnenda tions that create still further problems. It must be said of
Mr. Abed and his colleagues that their reaction to ICED's proposed case
study was quite different. They actively welcomed a searching independent review of BRAC's activities, the shortcomings along with the virtues, believing that they as well as others might profit from it. When
asked to review and comment on a draft of the report and to set the author
straight on any erroneous or offensive statements, they raised no objection to the fact that it candidly singled out apparent weaknesses along
with the evident strengths of the program. Their reaction instead was
to agree, and to point to actions they were already taking or planned to
take to remedy these shortcomings. Perhaps this attitude toward honest
criticism is a good part of the explanation of why BRAC has progressed
so far so fast, notwithstanding formidable obstacles.

Philip H. Coombs
Director of the Project

October 1977
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CHAPTER 1

THE BACKGROUND
AND AN OVERVIEW

The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Connnittee (BRAC), an indigenous
voluntary organization, functions in selected rural areas of Bangladesh.
It attempts to bring a limited amount of external assistance and the
idealistic impulses of a group of educated young people to bear on the
problem of extreme poverty and deprivation among the rural people in
Bangladesh. It has designed a program with a combination of activities
that aims at:
(a)

improving the economic situation of the rural families by
helping them adopt more productive farming practices and
increase earning from nonagricultural sources, including
income-supplement activities of women;

(b)

providing basic preventive and curative health care
family planning services at an affordable cost;

(c)

building local institutions and expanding the
basic
educational opportunities, so that
the people
can
actively participate in their own affairs and the development activities can become increasingly self-managed;

(d)

making an impact on the living condition of the poorest
and the most disadvantaged rural families, who
often
fail to become the beneficiaries of rural services not
specially geared to the needs of the poorest.

and

The significance of the BRAC program and the reason for ICED's
interest in examining it lie in the broadness of BRAC's vision that,
nonetheless, focuses on the basic needs of the deprived rural families and recognizes the value of an integrated approach to meeting
these needs.
Background and Setting
The program began in 1972 in a cluster of villages in the
Sulla, Derai, and Baniyachang thanas (sub-districts) of Sylhet district in the aftermath of the war of liberation as a relief effort
for those war victims whose homes, cattle, and boats for fishing
and transportation had been destroyed and whose fields
had
lain
fallow for a year. Being on the international boundary
between
Bangladesh and the Indian states of Meghalaya and Assam and having
a 60 percent Hindu population,
the project area of
about 200
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villages (120,000 people in 160 square miles of territory) suffered more
than its share during the war. With the assistance of Oxfam of England
and Canada, BRAC provided construction materials to rebuild the houses,
timber to build boats, and other assistance to help the people resettle
in the villages. BRAC soon discovered that the villagers, back from
refugee camps to their homes, while no more dependent on charity for
their daily ration of food, were in a state of destitution not very different from that in the refugee shelters. It was clear that sustained
development efforts, not mere temporary relief measures, were needed to
have any tangible impact on the living condition of the people in the
area.
The Sulla area is unique in some ways but similar in others to the
rest of the Bangladesh countryside. Topographically the area falls in
the depressed haor (semi-permanent lake) region, which means that most of
the area is submerged for six to eight months in a year. The total cultivable land in the project area is about 64,000 acres, of which 60,000
acres are suitable for only one deep-water rice crop in the winter. For
over six months in the year, the area takes on the appearance of a sea
--a watery expanse extending to the horizon in all directions with little
scattered islands sheltering people and animals in thick clusters of huts
made of bamboo and corrugated iron sheets.
The topography of the area sets a limit to its agricultural prospects
and increases its isolation from the urban centers and the rest of the
country. On the other hand, fishing is an important occupation in
the
area. It is the primary means of
livelihood
for
20 percent of the
families and a secondary occupation for most of the rest.
The density of population in the area is close to 700 per square mile
--less than one-half of the national average only because much of the land
area is not habitable.
With over a quarter of the families having no farm
land, and about 20 percent possessing farms over one acre in area, most of
the landholdings are below the one acre level.
Even when farming and fishing are combined, a practice that is followed by most of the families, the
primitive technology and the low level of productivity in both activities
assure at best a precarious living.
Both farming and fishing are susceptible to the vagaries of nature--the unpredictable late autumn floods
and
hailstorms occasionally wipe out the one rice crop (boro) primarily grown
in the area; irregular floods also affect the fish harvests adversely.
The ecological features of the area are somewhat forbidding as far as
economic development is concerned--probably more so than the typical rural
area of the rest of the country. However, in terms of the level of poverty,
the dependence on primary production activities based on primitive technologies, the high rate of population growth, the low level of education,
the
inadequacy of government institutions and public services, and the
basic
cultural patterns and values, the area is not significantly different from
other rural areas in the country and is subject to the same
challenges,
problems, and prospects of development as the rest of Bangladesh •
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Major Program Elements
The 200-odd villages of the project area, chosen because of relief
needs and geographical contiguity rather than administrative convenience,
cover the whole of Sulla thana, three unions of Derai thana, and
two
unions of Baniachang thana. Spending a little over Tk 4 million (about
US$207,000) in the course of three years to the end of 1975 (excluding
the initial relief expenditures), BRAC appears to have served
directly
at least one-half of the area population with one or more of its program
activities. BRAC has faced and attempted to solve with varying effectiveness many problems that other rural programs, large or small, public or
private, will have to face and resolve in the future.
BRAC has apparently identified a cluster of basic needs of
the rural people that are amenable to deliberate collective efforts, if they are supported by a sufficient input
of technical and financial resources. It has
fashioned
a program to utilize these resources for a direct assault
on the problem of satisfying the basic needs.
BRAC has recruited for its staff a group of young men and
women, most of whom are university graduates.
While the
knowledge, skills, and educational back~round
of
such
people can be an asset to a development program, the high
educational qualifications can also alienate them from the
rural people, and their values a nd temperament may make
BRAC has attempted to
them unsuitable for rural work.
capitalize on the idealistic impulses of the young, to instill in them the spirit and values of the organization,
to give them the necessary understanding of the issues and
intricacies of implementing a multipurpose rural development project, and to develop their ability to relate to
and communicate with the rural people.
The field staff of BRAC is complemented by local young men
and women from rural families who are recruited, trained,
and utilized for various roles in the implementation of the
program.
The program has apparently managed to work with the village
power structure; it has gained their tolerant acceptance if
not actual support of a program which helps the underprivileged in the village but eventually and potentially threatens to upset the existing power structure.
The program functions within the context of services and
activities of the government departments concerned
with
rural areas, however inadequate these services may be. One
of BRAC's tasks is to work out a compatible relationship
between itself and the government agencies and programs at
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both the local and national levels and to secure the
cooperation of the government agencies whenever necessary and possible.
In order to increase farm productivity, create
new
employment, and improve the nutritional balance, the
program has introduced some new farm practices, facilitated the supply of essential inputs, and helped in
procuring and maintaining farming and irrigation equipment. All of these, though on a limited basis,
have
apparently been done without using a large complement
of specialized agricultural extension staff.
The program in addition to providing health,
family
planning, and functional education services to women,
has attempted to bring women into the mainstream
of
economic and development efforts by using local women
personnel in some of the program activities, by offering special skill training to women, ~nd by encouraging
the formation of women's cooperative economic enterprises.
One component of the program is the attempt to encourage
village youths to undertake collectively corrnnunity service activities as well as cultural, sports, and recreational activities to enliven the overall corrnnunity atmosphere. Selected youths are also given training
to
help in the management of cooperatives.

The health and family planning component of the program
is founded on the concept of a low-cost basic preventive
and curative service delivered by community-based auxilliaries and backstopped by paramedics and qualified physicians and clinical services. A health insurance plan
is a significant feature of this effort.
BRAC has invested considerable effort and resources in
an experiment to raise the effectiveness and efficiency
of its adult education program. BRAC's early
efforts
were troubled by the typical problems of most
wellintentioned traditional literacy programs, such as difficulty in sustaining learner interest and motivation,
teaching techniques that smack of infantile pedagogy,
inappropriate content materials, and lack of followup
materials. With the technical support of World Education, Inc. of U.S.A. and World Literacy of Canada BRAC
has developed methods and materials for a
functional
education program that promises to produce better results and to be more relevant to the total development
efforts carried out by BRAC.
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One of BRAC's main objectives is to build local institutions
and organizations that will permit the development efforts to
be carried out with the active involvement of the rural people
and will lead the way to greater self-management of these efforts by the local people. To this end, BRAC has put a heavy
emphasis on building community centers and forming cooperative
societies of different types.
All of these elements of the BRAC program, as noted earlier, have by
no means achieved a high level of effectiveness; the performance
varies
between communities in the project area. The important point is that all
of these elements are seen as the necessary constituents of a program for
improving the quality of life of rural families.
Since the initial development phase of Sulla (called Sulla Project,
Phase II) came to a conclusion at the end of 1975, BRAC has initiated
a
third phase of the Sulla Project, extended its development activities
in
rural locations in other districts, and reoriented and reorganized its program activities in both Sulla and other locations on the basis of the experiences acquired from the early Sulla efforts. The basic program objectives of BRAC, however, have remained unchanged; the redirected
program
activities are designed to achieve the same basic goals more effectively.
Goals of the Study
The purpose of this case study is to carry out an analysis of various
necessary operations and tasks that have been undertaken in designing, managing, and implementing the program. In this process, evaluative judgement
including assessment of various components of the program is made to
the
extent permitted by available information.
Certain operations are connnon to all programs aiming at the improvement of rural living conditions: diagnosing the local situation
with
respect to the development needs, potentialities, and obstacles; designing
a strategy of actions and building an organizational structure; recruiting,
training, and utilizing the staff; selecting learning contents and preparing and supplying learning materials; developing and applying appropriate
learning methods; securing the involvement of the clientele and building
or strengthening local participatory institutions; establishing working relationships with the government agencies at the different levels and
with
the local power structures; and mobilizing resources of various types from
local and external sources. All these are tasks that have to be tackled at
a certain level of effectiveness by all programs of rural development.
An
analysis of BRAC experience, it is hoped, will shed light on the procedures,
methods, techniques, and steps adopted as well as on the obstacles and the
favorable circumstances encountered in carrying out the vital tasks of program implementation in one case. The BRAC experience also provides
an
opportunity for examining not only the practical application and meaning of
the concepts of integrated rural development, but also the participation and
involvement of the clientele in self-sustaining and self-managed development
programs~concepts that are emphasized by BRAC and other programs focusing
on the disadvantaged segment of the rural population.
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The case study has attempted to match the implementation steps taken with
the results achieved, not only in terms of the stated and predetermined
goals,
but also of the unanticipated byproducts and costs incurred in terms of rooney as
well as human and material resources. The assessment of the results as far
as
possible is necessary for analyzing and understanding the process of implementation. The negative aspects of the program can be as instructive as the positive
achievements as far as the case study is concerned.
A further aim of this case study~in combination with similar other
case
studies undertaken by ICED--is to make a contribution to building an inductiveempirical base for extracting useful lessons and formulating general principles,
operational guidelines, and evaluative criteria for conceptualizing, designing,
:implementing, managing, and evaluating other programs that will improve the situation of the rural poor.
An Overview of BRAG
By the end of 1976 BRAC grew to be a multifaceted development program of
considerable size employing over 180 full-time staff members with an
annual
operating budget of about Tk 5 million. The BRAC activities, with general guidance and support from the Dacca central office, spread to several rural locations
with at least 300,000 potential beneficiaries in three districts. In addition,
BRAC contributed to the national rural development effort by publishing a monthly
rural newspaper that circulated throughout the country, by establishing a training program that provided training to rural development workers of other organizations in the country, and by developing and producing functional education and
health education materials that could be used by other programs. The total program is organized as a number of sub-projects (though usually referred to as "projects" in BRAC parlance), each of which is briefly described below.
The Sulla Project.
Sulla is the oldest and best known of BRAC projects. It is in Sulla that
BRAC began its relief activities and then initiated the rural development program
that came to be called Sulla Project, Phase II. This phase of the Sulla Project
began in November 1972 and lasted until December 1975 when Sulla Phase III
was
launched.
The activities carried out during Phase II included construction of gonokendro (community center) in the project villages, a functional education program, agricultural development, promotion of cooperative societies, fisheries
development, vocational training for women, and a health care and family planning program.
For the implementation of the above activities, a fairly elaborate field
organization with full-time staff personnel was built up. The project area was
divided into 11 sectors, each with an Area Manager and a field camp where 4 to
5 field-level development workers, known as Field Motivators, resided and functioned under the guidance of the Area Manager. The 11 field camps were supervised by 2 zonal program coordinators. A Field Coordinator had the overall
responsibility for directing the project. The health care and family planning
program was implemented by 30 paramedics, divided among the field camps
and
supervised by 4 medical doctors.
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Phase III plans (January 1976 to December 1978) still emphasized
health care and family planning as a major project component. Functional education was to be reoriented to stress its roles of "consciousnessraising" and helping specific interest groups more directly in being organized for collective self-improvement activities. There was to be, on
the whole, an emphasis on helping functional groups of landless laborers,
women, young people, and fishermen in improving their situation through
collective efforts instead of conducting separate sectoral activities.
During the first year of the third phase, women Field Motivators
and paramedics were recruited and trained for the first time, a step
that was expected to be the beginning of a new trend. Otherwise the
field organization remained essentially the same as during the second
phase.
Manikgang Project.
This project located in the Manikganj thana, 40 miles west of Dacca,
was initiated in April 1976 after BRAC became familiar with the area
and
its population by conducting a rural works project in the thana.
The
Manikganj project embodies the lessons of experience in Sulla and reflects
the emerging program approach of BRAC.
The health and family planning component remains a major sectoral
activity in this project. All other development activities, however, are
not planned to be sectorally separated but rather designed according
to
the specific preference and capacity of functional interest groups, such
as landless laborers, women, youth, rural artisans, and managed mainly
through the collective efforts of these groups rather than by BRAC's own
personnel. Functional education is to be used as the main vehicle of organizing the functional groups and developing their capacity to engage in
self-help activities. Rural youth, especially the educated ones uncertain
about their vocation and purpose in life, are regarded as an important resource to be tapped for becoming "agents of change" and local organizers
of the collective activities. BRAC plans include provisions for training,
technical assistance, and limited financial assistance to the local youth
organizations.
Jamalpur Project.
This project in 30 villages near Jamalpur town in Mymensingh district
had its origin in an involvement of BRAC in conducting a functional education program for destitute rural women who were participants in a UNICEFsponsored food-for-work project. At the conclusion of the UNICEF project,
the rural women and the local instructors of functional education earlier
trained by BRAC were eager to continue the education and development effort,
if only they could receive some guidance and assistance. BRAC assisted the
group of 15 women instructors/development workers in preparing an operational plan and found for them a source of financial assistance to implement
the plan. Launched in early 1976, the plan included the following:
functional education centers and groups for women in each of the villages;
a
family planning program, including child health and maternal care; improvement of preventive health measures and hygiene in the villages; joint savings and cooperative economic projects for women (including horticulture,
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poultry raising, and use of fallow land); and formation of women's organizations for self-help efforts. This project for underprivileged rural
women
is directed and managed entirely by BRAC workers, who are all
local women
originally recruited as functional education instructors for the UNICEF project.
The Materials Development Unit.
Dissatisfied with conventional adult literacy methods and materials,
BRAC found the need for developing a more effective approach to functional
education and creating relevant educational materials for this purpose. As
a part of this effort to design a new functional education program
(for
which BRAC received technical assistance from World Education, Inc., a technical assistance agency based in New York), a materials development unit was
established at BRAC headquarters in Dacca in 1974.
The staff of the
unit
was intimately involved in developing the new educational methodology, identifying the relevant lesson content, preparing and field-testing the trial
materials, and preparing the successive sets of functional education materials. The unit, with a full-time staff of four writers, evaluators,
and
illustrators, is engaged on a continuous basis in assessing and modifying
the old materials and designing, field-testing, and producing new materials.
Training and Resource Centre (TARC) .
As BRAC began to build a sizeable field organization with full-time
personnel and initiated a functional education program that required special training for instructors and supervisory staff, the need arose for a
systematic staff training arrangement. With the assistance of a consultant provided by the Ford Foundation and banking on its own training needs
for field personnel, BRAC developed a series of short training courses or
"modules" on topics considered important in improving the skills and competence of the staff. These topics include communication, organizational
analysis and needs assessment, program planning, group dynamics, leadership, "consciousness-raising," and functional education methodology. The
training center--based partially in the Dacca office and partially in Savar,
20 miles northwest of Dacca, where the facilities for the center, including
residential accommodation, were under construction--employed six full-time
trainers in late 1976. The center, besides meeting BRAC 1 s own needs, also
conducted training courses for rural development and functional education
workers on commission from other voluntary organizations in Bangladesh.
Gonokendro.
Recognizing the scarcity of relevant reading materials for rural
readers, BRAC began to publish in 1973 a monthly tabloid of 8 to
12
printed pages with development-related information, articles, and news
items. Although the journal was seen originally as a means of providing
reading materials to neoliterates emerging from the functional education
courses, it turned into a more general interest rural journal
(without
the gradation of vocabulary and careful selection of the texts required
for neoliterates), especially after UNICEF offered to underwrite the cost
of distributing 60,000 copies every month to rural primary school teachers.

! _)
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The Research and Evaluation Project.
Soon after the beginning of its development phase, BRAC saw a need
for a system of orderly collection and analysis of base-line information
about the project area and population and of service data. It saw
a
need for a general assessment of the changes or lack of changes resulting
from BRAC activities. Aided by a grant from the Ford Foundation, a small
research and evaluation unit was set up which at the end of lG76 had five
full-time research assistants and statisticians. The plans for research
and evaluation included the following: base-line sample surveys of project areas for selected socioeconomic indicators; assessment of the impact
of specific sectoral activities, such as health and family planning; and
an in-depth economic-anthropological study of selected villages, in order
to evaluate the overall socioeconomic impact of the project activities on
the village communities. Assistance of researchers from local
research
institutions were available for designing and conducting the surveys. The
services of an anthropological researcher from the Marga Institute in Sri
Lanka was available for designing the village studies and training
the
research workers for this purpose.
Rural Works Program.
The works program, by means of which rural agricultural laborers are
paid wages in cash or in food grains during the "slack" farming season for
work in useful community works projects, has become a regular annual BRAC
activity. BRAC used the works program to build physical infrastructures
to improve the agricultural potential of the Sulla and Manikganj project
areas, to provide a means of sustenance to vulnerable groups in the project area at a time of food shortage and unemployment, and to involve local people in planning and implementing development schemes in their own
localities. In Manikganj, the works program was the means for BRAC
to
get acquainted with the area and its population, to establish BRAC's own
credibility and reputation among the local people, and to identify promising members of local youth groups and involve them in BRAC development
activities.
During the 1975-76 dry season 30 works projects, including embankments, irrigation canals, drainage canals, roads, and fishery and irrigation ponds, were completed in Sulla and Manikganj. The projects provided 87,000 man-days of employment and cost a total of Tk 545,000.
Various facets of these program components and how they relate to
each other in shaping ·the total rural development thrust of BRAC
are
examined in the following sections of this report.
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FUNCTIONAL EDUCATION
A Conventional Beginning
Widespread illiteracy among the rural people was seen by the organizers
of BRAC as a major contributing factor to rural underdevelopment and poverty.
Spread of literacy was considered necessary for communicating new knowledge
and ideas to the people and for creating among them an awareness of their
situation and of ways of changing thjs situation.
A strong literacy drive was therefore launched early in the project as
a major element of its rural development strategy. With a goal of eliminating
almost 90 percent illiteracy ir. the Sulla Project area within a period of three
years, 255 literacy centers were opened in 220 villages in 1973, and 300 local
men and women were trained and employed as teach~rs.
It was a conventional literacy campaign, concentrating on the skills of
reading and writing, with traditional pedagogic techniques in a classroom
environment. Some efforts were made to include rural topics in the lessons.
There was a great surge of enthusiasm initially and 5,000 villagers enrolled
in the courses.
But interest waned quickly and the dropout rate shot up. Some centers
closed down because learnerd did not show up, ar..d others took as long
as
twelve months to complete the six-month course because of high absenteeism.
Only 5 percent of those enrolled completed the course.
A combination of factors contributed to the failure of this. educational
effort. An unusually high level of flood in 1973 not only damaged many of
the centers and made them unusable but also caused extra economic hardship to
the people of the area. BRAC launched the campaign on the assumption
that
there was a high level of demand for literacy and all that was needed was to
provide the opportunity to attend literacy classes. Very little attention was
given to appropriate teaching techniques for adults, and the lessons were prepared on the basis of preconce:fved notions of what was good for the learners.
The most serious problem was that the learners soon discovered that the acquisition of literacy skills required considerable effort and time; yet these
skills and the reading lessons bore little relevance to the innnediate and
burning problems of their life. Customers for the literacy courses, therefore, declined sharply.
The Functional Approach
Having reached the conclusion that mere teaching of alphabet and arithmetic was not enough to hold the interest of the learners and of no direct
benefit to the rural learners, BRAC began searching for a new approach. It
was felt that new methodology and materials had to be developed that would be
perceived as useful and relevant by the learners in their daily life. In this
10
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task BRAC enlisted the assistance of consultants from World Education,
Inc. to develop, test, and implement on a pilot basis an adult functional
literacy education program designEd (a) to maintain learners' interest
and participation in the educational program, (b) to enable learners to
read with understanding and write legibly simple texts likely tG be of
use to them, and (c) to modify learners' attitudes and behavior toward
family planning, nutrition, health and agricultural practices.
The main steps followed in implementing the new functional education
program were assessment of learners' needs and interests, development of
learning materials and methods, training supervisors and instructors, and
implementation of a pilot phase in order to test and revise materials and
methods.
The assessment of learning needs was based on a canvassing of
the
villagers' views on their main concerns and problems about which they needed new knowledge and information. This was supplemented by the BRAC field
workers' knowledge and understanding of the general rural condition.
A
survey was carried out in 19 villages in the Sulla Project area to collect
general information about village socioeconomic situations and to determine
the villagers' perception of their learning needs. Consequently, several
major content topics for the functional education program were identified:
(a) soil and use of fertilizers, (b) high yielding rice cultivation, (c)
animal husbandry and poultry, (d) fisheries and pisciculture, (e) cooperatives, (f) nutrition, (g) hygiene and public health, (h) family planning-male orientation, (i) family planning--female orientation, (j) child care,
and (k) cottage industries.
In early 1974, a materials development unit, consisting of an education and training adviser, one illustrator, three writers, and
a typist,
was set up in BRAC's head office in Dacca. The first round of materials
--large charts with drawings, "generative words," and short suggestive sentences--was the product of brainstorming among the materials development
unit staff centering on the themes identified as the main concerns of the
rural people. A consultant from World Education with experience in materials development for functional adult education programs served as a resource person for the unit.
Methodology and Materials
The preparation of materials was, of course, contingent upon a methodology for the use of the materials. The World Education consultants introduced to the materials development unit and other senior BRAC personnel the
functional education methods developed for World Education-assisted programs
in Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and other countries. The main elements of
this methodology were:
(a)

identification of key concepts relating to the learner
group's major problems and potential ways of dealing with
these problems;

(b)

preparation of lessons (pictures, words, sentences, reading
and writing exercises, arithmetic exercises) centered
on
the selected key concepts;
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(c)

group discussion of the key concepts (aided by relevant
pictures and drawings), encouragement of active participation by group members, presentation of practical
experiences, and comparison of conflicting ideas and alternative action possibilities;

(d)

introduction to relevant words, sentences, and arithmetic
exercises following the discussion as a means of recording
and expressing ideas, increasing knowledge, and gaining access to useful information; and

(e)

recognition of the instructor, not as a traditional teacher,
but as a facilitator of group discussion and group learning.
(Credit for farm production, for instance, may be a theme
that would be the basis for an extended discussion of the
learners' situation in relation to farm credit and would
also supply the key words and sentences for one or more
lessons. The identification of the main themes and the
generative words derived from the themes is done through
the needs assessment exercise mentioned above.)

In conformity with this methodological approach, the BRAC staff
developed a basic functional education course for the rural learners
of Sulla comprising 80 lessons--56 of which were regarded as
core
materials for both male and female learners and 24 as variations designed to fulfill the special needs of either the male or the female
learners. Sets of posters with the illustrations, words, and sentences
for the lessons bound in the form of a flip-chart were prepared for use
with each learning group. The same lessons and exercise sheets were
printed in handy book-size pages and bound in a looseleaf book for each
learner.
The materials were tested with 1,175 learners in 59 learning groups
in Sulla when the first cycle of the functional education course
was
launched in May 1974. On the basis of a review of the first cycle experience, the materials unit decided to reduce the number of lessons in the
six-month course (two or three sessions per week) from 80 to 70 and the
number of differentiated lessons for men and women was reduced to 14 from
the original 24. Many illustrations were revised to improve their capacity
to communicate messages and generate group discussion. The written content
of some of the lessons was also changed.
The revision and modification of the lessons and adaptation of them
to the needs of new learner groups in different geographical areas are a
continuous responsibility of the materials unit. Its members spend much
of their time in the field observing the actual use of the materials, test~
ing new materials, and gathering ideas for improving the lessons. A current
round of revision of the materials (late 1976 and early 1977) is discussed
later in this chapter.
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Training Instructors and Supervisors
Orientation and training were necessary for both supervisors and
instructors in the program in order to familiarize them with appropriate use of the materials and methods and, probably more importantly,
to change their conventional perception of the role of the instructor
in a learning group. The members of the materials unit and other BRAC
personnel designated to become trainers of field personnel, together
with the assistance of a World Education consultant, worked out the
orientation and training content and method for the supervisors
and
the instructors.
The Field Motivators, who have overall responsibility for initiating and supervising all village level activities of BRAC, were also to
be the supervisors of the functional education activities. The instructors for the learning groups were to e young men and women with
some
post-primary formal education background, chosen on a part-time
basis
from the same villages as of the learners.
The first cycle of functional education courses, however,
was
launched in May 1974 without going through the supervisory training
phase. The cycle began directly with the recruitment and training of
61 instructors in the project area. The importance of a thorough understanding of the concept and process of functional education by all supervisory personnel of BRAC and the need for continuous support and guidance to the instructors were soon realized, and training sessions for
all BRAC personnel with supervisory responsibilities were arranged
before the second cycle of courses.
The World Education consultant who had earlier assisted in designing the functional education program returned in September 1974
and
organized a five-day training session in Dacca for 11 area managers, members of the materials development unit, and other core personnel of BRAC
who would subsequently have training and other responsibilities in
the
functional education program. Immediately following this session, a fiveday course for the Field Motivators was held at the Sulla Project site at
Markuli. The training was conducted by the Area Managers and the
World
Education consultant attended as a resource person.
In addition to the initial training of instructors, short workshops,
follow-up meetings, and refresher courses were organized for the instructors by the Area Managers and Field Motivators, and they, in turn, attended
review meetings organized by the training and materials development staff
at the head office.
The training sessions, passing through initial trials and errors,
have evolved into a common pattern (known as the BRAC Functional Education Training Module), though variations for specific groups are possible and even encouraged. The session normally lasts for five full days.
The specific objectives of the training are: (a) to help participants
shed their inhibitions in group situations and understand the dynamics
of an effective group as well as the worth of individual members in the
group, (b) to eliminate the traditional notions of "experts" and "teachers" and to demonstrate that everyone in a group can enrich the group's
'. ~.
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learning experience, (c) to familiarize the participants with the materials
and methods of the course and their role as facilitators of group interaction, and (d) to let the participants engage in practice and dennnstration of the methods to be used later with the learners.
The major activities of the training sessions include the following:
identification and discussion of the participants' own expectations about
the training session and its outcome; brainstorming about anticipated problems in functional education groups and the participants' own misgivings
and doubts about the approach; discussion of the familiar methods of teaching literacy and numeracy; simulation games and role-playing to sharpen understanding of the learners' and instructors' roles as well as the general
rural situation; discussion of the specific steps in the functional education lessons; demonstration lessons by the trainer and the participants who
volunteer; discussion and demonstration of effective group procedures; and
critical analysis of the participants' experience in the training session
at various stages along the way and of the entire experience at the end.
When feasible some of the demonstration lessons are conducted with actual
illiterate learners. An instructor's guide that outlines the objectives
and steps for each of the 70 functional education lessons has been prepared in 1974. It serves as a useful training aid as well as a handy reference for instructors in the field.
Readin~

Materials

With the aim of providing relevant and informative reading materials
to rural readers, BRAC began publishing the monthly journal, Gonokendro
(The People's Forum) in April 1973. Written and edited by a full-time
staff of two, the tabloid-size eight-page paper (later increased to 12
pages) started with an initial print run of 2,000 copies. The circulation shot up to 30,000 copies when UNICEF agreed to buy and distribute
copies to 30,000 rural primary school teachers as a supplementary reading material for themselves and their students. UNICEF later decided to
distribute 60,000 copies to cover most rural primary schools in the country.
Besides the primary school teachers, the general distribution in the rural
areas was less than 1,000 copies in mid-1976, even though BRAC tried to promote subscription among the functional education participants.
A content analysis of one volume of Gonokendro (12 issues from April
1975 to March 1976) showed that the materials in the journal were on agriculture (rice, jute, horticulture, wheat, fishery, cattle, and poultry);
health and nutrition; family planning; women's socioeconomic situation;
cooperatives and the rural economy; primary education; and general information (10 to 20 percent of the space). Each issue also contained some literary and entertainment pieces covering about 10 percent of the columns. The
lead articles in the 12 issues were headed as follows: "Deep water rice,"
"Population Education in Bangladesh," "Main causes of malnutrition," "Cattle
Wealth of Bangladesh," "Our fishery resources," "Preparation for winter farming," "Cultivating improved varieties in the Baro season," "Population growth
has to stop," "Food for work," "Foreign market for jute has to be protected,"
"Ups and downs in jute farming."
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Although the paper is well-written in an attractive racy language
and is well edited and covers topics likely to be of interest and use
to rural readers, it requires a level of language proficiency significantly beyond the level of an average neoliterate. It is well suited
to primary school teachers and others who have language skills expected
at least of primary school completers. This is the group it serves now
--not, by any means, an unimportant service. But it does not fill the
alarming vacuum that now exists in neoliterate reading materials
with
systematically chosen texts of graded levels of complexity.
The Results

As noted earlier, with 35 male and 26 female instructors, the first
cycle of courses was opened for 734 men and 441 women from over 50 villages in the Sulla Project area. Another 85 villagers joined the learning groups after the formal beginning, making a total enrollment of 1,260.
The new participatory learning process and the emphasis on familiar problems of rural life aroused a high level of enthusiasm; regular attendance and retention showed marked improvement in comparison to the earlier
literacy efforts. A total of 520 learners (41 percent) completed all 80
lessons, and another substantial number completed more than half of the
course. A second cycle of courses was offered in June 1975 in 53 centers
with 1,338 learners, of whom 616 or 46 percent, completed the lessons.
What is the significance of these results? For one thing, a much
larger number of rural people compared to that of the previous literacy
efforts considered it worthwhile to devote the time and energy to completing the lessons. Moreover, the attention and effort given to preparing the materials, developing the methodology, and training
the
instructors, as well as the participatory learning process employed in
the program must have made a qualitative difference in the learning
outcome that could not be indicated merely by the completion rate.
The important question, however, is: What is the achievement of
the participants in the educational program in terms of (a) literacy
and numeracy skills, (b) new knowledge and information useful in improving rural living conditions, (c) critical awareness of the situation in
which the participants find themselves, and (d) use of the newly acquired
knowledge and awareness to change the situation?
BRAC has not undertaken any systematic evaluation to provide a definitive answer to this question. BRAC workers, however, through their
continuous contact with the rural people in the project area, including
the participants in the educational program, have formed their own views
about the results of the educational efforts and have accordingly influenced the subsequent course of the educational program. ICED investigators, on the basis of extensive discussion with workers in the field
and at headquarters and visits with the rural participants of the program, have reached the following conclusions:
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1. Most of those who finish the course do not achieve a level of skill
sufficient to write an informative letter to a friend or a relative or
to
read a newspaper column. They also do not achieve a level of self-sufficiency
in literacy skills that would permit them to improve their skill level on their
own if reading materials for neoliterates were available. A small proportion,
no more than a quarter (estimated generously) of those who complete the course,
achieves a level sufficient to continue to improve their skills if they have
relevant reading materials for neoliterates and the opportunity to use
frequently their skills in their daily life. In the absence of both, most
of
these people are likely to relapse into illiteracy. For a rural resident in
a Sulla village, it would take extraordinary individual motivation and determination to continue to make use of his newly acquired literacy skills and to
improve them.
2. To the extent that the lessons cover information and knowledge useful to improvement of rural living conditions and an understanding of
the
dynamics of the rural socioeconomic situation, and to the extent that the
skills of the instructors and their supervisors are sufficiently put to use
(these skills vary in the groups), there is a greater knowledge and understanding among the participants about various rural problems and their own
situation than in a comparable group of nonparticipant rural residents. (To
be any more precise about the level of knowledge and understanding of the
learners would call for a somewhat elaborate evaluation effort beyond
the
scope of this study.)
3. There is, however, no clear evidence that the knowledge and awareness gained from the functional education program have been put to effective
use. The level of participation in the various BRAC development activities,
either as beneficiaries or as contributors of the functional education group
members, is not significantly different from that of nonmembers. Nor does
the "standard of living" of the group members as a group appear to be different from that of the nonmembers. It is evident that the BRAC program organizers, at least initially, have not viewed the participation in functional
education as a precondition or an essential element of participation in other
development activities. Nor has the functional education program led to such
initiatives and self-help efforts among the participants as to cause them to
be marked apart as the focus of special development efforts either by BRAC or
other agencies.
Implications of the Early Experience
The functional education experience in Sulla reconfirms what has been
found repeatedly in literacy efforts: that in a nonliterate environment and
a primitive rural economy with most people engaged in subsistence activities,
literacy is not a practical necessity, and it is extremely difficult to maintain 100tivation and interest in literacy efforts, even when these efforts form
a part of a broader functional education program. In fact, in these programs
the literacy components tend to dominate the program and distract attention
from
other important goals of the program, such as that of creating a
critical awareness of the learners' situation and the dissemination of useful
knowledge.
The rural people are generally interested in literacy, as their initial
response to any kind of literacy effort shows, because they see in it a visible and tangible objective to attain skills which the privileged ones possess
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and also a promise of change in their own condition. A rude awakening
soon follows when mastering the skills proves to be hard work and the
promise of change turns out to be elusive. Interest wanes and the dropout rate mounts. A functional education program deemphasizing literacy
and stressing the intangible "conscientization"l objective
probably
would not evoke the same kind of initial enthusiasm among the people;
but if the program were well-conceived and well-managed, the interest
in it would be likely to increase cumulatively and should be more enduring than in a traditional literacy program.
The Sulla experience also indicates that just initiating a number
of development activities, including educational programs, in the same
area and under the same organizational auspices will not lead spontaneously to an integrated development effort with the educational programs
supporting and reinforcing the total development effort. The educational program has to be directly and deliberately geared to satisfying the
needs of knowledge, skills, understanding, and group efforts for various
development activities--especially if popular support and initiatives are
called for in these development activities.
An independent functional
education program with a heavy emphasis on the mechanics of literacy does
not satisfy these needs effectively.
The implications of the Sulla experience have led the BRfaC leadership to two somewhat conflicting responses: (a) a revision of
the
functional education materials laying a greater stress on the mechanics
of literacy and arithmetic, and (b) a greater emphasis on the "conscientization" role not only in the educational effort but in the total
development approach of BRAC.
The primary aim of the revision of the materials, undertaken
by
the Materials Development Unit, seems to be improvement of the achievement level in literacy skills of those who complete the course.
The
number of lessons is to be raised from 70 to 100, apparently because a
larger number of lessons is considered necessary for achieving a functionally useful level of proficiency in reading and writing.
Every
eleventh lesson in the course is to be a review lesson focusing on the
mechanics of literacy and arithmetic such as the vowel signs and
the
arithmetic functions. The sequence of the lessons is to be based
on
the level of complexity of the mechanics. Some modification of content
in the light of experience and a more logical clustering of lessons by
major themes are also to be done in the course of the revision. Changes
of the "generative words" and specific content items are also intended
to make the materials usable widely in different parts of the country.
Expansion of BRAC activities in various locations and the increasing
interest by voluntary organizations as well as government agencies in
1 Raising the level of consciousness about one's own condition
through a dialogical process--a concept advocated and popularized by
the Brazilian educationist Paulo Freire.
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in terms of methodology, content, field personnel, and the organization and
management of BRAC field activities are yet to be fully worked out, although
the general trends and directions are evident from project plans.
Reconciling Literacy and Functionality
On the whole, the BRAC program managers appear to be minimizing and underrating the divergent rationale and philosophies of (a) the approach underlying a functional education course with a predetermined lesson
sequence
that imposes a literacy bias and criterion of learning achievement on all
rural learners and an all-purpose readymade educational package to be used
by various organizations in various situations; and (b) a truly functional
program that is shaped and controlled by each learning group's priorities
and perception of the crucial problems and is characterized by a "conscientization" effort that directly leads to actions for changing the existing
situation. The latter approach would call for:
(a)

Instructors or learning group facilitators who are not just
tutors of literacy skills but are individuals with a
high
level of sophistication and a highly developed critical awareness about the dynamics of the rural situation who can help
organize not just the educational activity but also the action
programs that accompany or follow the educational efforts. The
instructor has to become also the field worker for the development activities to be launched collectively by the learning
group.

(b)

Generation of learning materials by the learning groups themselves, based on the specific situations they face and the
action programs they choose to undertake. A central materials
development unit can prepare resource materials and prototypes
to be drawn upon by the groups and can provide guidance and
techniques to the groups and the instructors for creating at
least a significant proportion of their own learning materials.
The instructor/field worker has to have training in improvising
relevant learning materials and in assisting the learning groups
to create their own learning tools and content--another task for
the materials development unit.

(c)

Planning, implementing, and managing the BRAC activities at all
levels, particularly at the field level, in a way that recognizes the central importance of "conscientization" of the participants and shuns the temptation to impose solutions or manipulate
compliance of participants in the name of efficiency or any other
pretext.

(d)

Adequate provisions for acquiring functionally useful levels
of
literacy skills and supplying relevant reading materials for those
who are interested. While literacy should not dominate the functional education program and should not be a major criterion
for
judging the performance of the program or of the learners, literacy
need not be relegated into an inconsequential position in the program. Just as the literate "do-gooders" should not impose literacy on others at the slightest pretext, neither should they withhold
it arbitrarily. Literacy will probably maintain its attraction for
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the rural people, and only by allowing everyone a crack at it
(or more than one crack) is it possible to know who has the
motivation and the determination. As the momentum of development quickens, the customers for literacy will grow too.
It
is, however, evident that those who survive a basic
cycle
need further assistance in bringing their skills up to
f unctionally usable levels. They also need relevant reading materials and help in availing themselves of opportunities to
use
their new skills. Improving the general learning environment
and expanding the scope of literacy use can be an element
in
the various development activities undertaken in the village.
(e)

Pragmatic strategies and tactics to overcome the inevitable obstacles put up by the local power structure that has a vested
interest in maintaining the status guo or seizing control of
the development activities. While resistance may arise to an
educational program seen as a pure literacy effort, an authentic "conscientization" effort is bound to face much more vehement
and sinister opposition. In each situation the BRAC workers and
the local participants have to make a realistic assessment
of
the several obstacles, issues, and activities that give rise to
possible confrontation. They must be ready to take advantage of
all progressive elements and forces in the locality as well
as
in the national political scene.
BRAC is obliged to weigh carefully against potential outcome of its effort the possible dangers of exposing the deprived rural residents to even greater
deprivation and even oppression by initiating an educational
effort. Its assessment should be shared fully with the participant groups.

The degree of effectiveness BRAC will achieve in its functional education efforts will depend on how successfully BRAC tackles these questions.
Insofar as functional education is intimately linked with the whole development approach of BRAC, the realization of the overall development objectives
of BRAC also will depend heavily on how well these issues are handled.
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CHAPTER

3

HEALTH AND
FAMILY PLANNING
The Health Situation
The health problems in the Sulla Project area are similar to those
found throughout rural Bangladesh. Caused by the absence of basic hygiene
and sanitation provisions and frequently complicated by malnutrition, preventable and communicable diseases abound. Adequate information about the
prevalence and incidence of diseases in the area is not available.
The
service statistics of BRAC and the observations of its health workers indicate that diarrhea and gastro-intestinal diseases, internal parasites, and
respiratory infections account for about 60 percent of the total morbidity
in the area. Infection of the skin and of ears, eyes, and throat amounts
to another 15 percent of the diseases. If common cold and general bodily
aches and pains, described as rheumatism, are added to the above list, it
would cover over 80 percent of the diseases for which the people of Sulla
sought treatment from BRAC paramedics (see Table 3.1).
Undernutrition and malnutrition are particularly noticeable prior to
the harvesting of the boro, the only rice crop in much of the area. Specific nutritional deficiencies in the form of night blindness and stomatitis
are frequent. Tuberculosis is prevalent, although its intensity is
not
known. Incidence of malaria has gone down recently and smallpox, a scourge
in the past, seems to have been eliminated as a result of an internationally
assisted goverrmevt eradication campaign against malaria and smallpox.
Mortality rate for the area, on the basis of a 1975 sample survey, is
estimated to be around 15 per 1,000 population with a heavy concentration
among infants, children under five, and pregnant mothers. The survey has
shown that two-thirds of all deaths in the project area occurred among
children up to the age of 4 years. The rate was 186 per 1,000 for infants
(from birth to age 1). It fell sharply to 23 per 1,000 for children (1-4
years). From age-groups 15-19 to 45-49 the death rate was more or
less
constant around 1 per 1,000, and it rose gradually for older people over
50.l The population growth rate for the area is estimated by BRAC at 2.5
percent. Both the crude birth rate and the crude death rate in the project
area, according to the sample survey, is slightly lower than the national
rate (40 and 15 respectively compared to 47 and 17). 2
lBRAC, Base-line Survey of Sulla (October-November 1975), Dacca, 1976.
2However, the infant mortality rate was found to be higher than in
another thana with good demographic records. Matlab Demographic studies
(May 1967-April 1968) indicated an infant mortality rate of 125 compared
to 186 in Sulla in 1975. (BRAC, Base-line Survey of Sulla (October-November
1975), Dacca, 1976 9 pp. 4-5.)
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Table 3.1
Incidence of Diseases Treated by Paramedics in Sulla
July-September 1976

Disease Symptoms

Number of Cases

Percentage

982

10.4

Dysentery (chronic and acute)

1 727

18.2

Worms

1 043

11.0

Hyper acidity

285

3.0

Common cold

992

10.5

Acute bronchitis

423

4.4

Pneumonia

263

2.8

Ear, eye, throat condition

630

6.6

Skin infection

763

8.0

Rheumatism

787

8.3

Others

1 590

16.8

TOTAL

9 485

100.0

Diarrhea

Source:

BRAC Service Records.
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Services Other Than BRAC
The stipulated pattern for government personnel for health care in
a thana is one health administrator (physician), a medical officer and
other staff for a 25-bed hospital, two or three health inspectors, and a
family welfare worker for vaccination and preventive care
per 5,000
people. The family planning staff is supposed to include a thana Family
Planning Officer, a number of Lady Family Planning Visitors for maternal
and child health care as well as some clinical services such as IUD insertion, and three family planning workers per union (one male and
two
female). In 1976, the government personnel and facilities in the area did
not conform to this standard. In the project area, encompassing one thana
and parts of two other thanas, there were two physicians serving as Thana
Health Administrators and 15 other health workers for two thanas.
The
family planning personnel included, besides the two thana officers,
14
field workers. The thana health center existed only in one thana, Derai.
It had offices for the health officials, a dispensary and outdoor clinic
(open about two hours a day, six days a week), a 25-bed indoor treatment
facility, and a seldom used operation theatre.
The government health personnel are known to remain confined to the
thana center waiting for the people to come to them and providing
such
curative services as inadequate and irregular supplies of medicine permit.
Frequent complaints about the absence of the doctor, the nonavailability
of medicine, and the considerable distance that most of the thana residents have to cover to come to the center discourage effective use of the
center. Visits to villages by the health workers are made mainly for vaccination drives against smallpox and cholera. The family planning program,
which has recently undergone a major reorganization at the national level
and the impact of which is still to be felt in all the rural areas,
has
remained ineffective in both motivational work and in recruiting acceptors.
The private practitioners of western medicine in the area include 11
doctors (2 regular medical graduates, 3 LMFs, and 6 national doctors). 1
All of these doctors are located in four bazars (trading centers) in the
area. A number of "village doctors" (compounders or pharmacist's assistants, and practitioners of indigenous medicine) are also mostly located
in the bazars. All health workers, government and private, are men.
BRAC Health Care and Family Planning Approach
True to its character as a relief program in its initial phase, the
early BRAC activities in the health area consisted of fielding four medical teams in 1972 to provide daily outpatient services in four camps. When
1r.MF (Licentiate of the Medical Faculty) doctors, licensed by the
State to practise medicine, have four years' training after 10 years of
general schooling, compared to five years' training after 12 years of
schooling for MBBS. The LMF program was discontinued under pressure
from the medical establishment to "raise the standards of the medical
profession."
National doctors are trained in a private medical school, not recognized by the government as equivalent to the state medical colleges.
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a cholera epidemic became a real threat and beyond the capabilities of
the small medical'teams to handle, the doctors also trained a group of
villagers in the techniques of taking care of cholera and severe diarrhea cases. In addition a child feeding program was undertaken with
UNICEF assistance. Up to 15,000 children of poor families in the area
were given a ration of corn-soya milk as a supplement to their diet to
avert the dangers of serious malnutrition.
As the BRAC activities began to evolve into a development program
from a relief operation, the need arose for converting the ad hoc medical relief effort into a program of medical care, public healt-;:and
family planning that would become an integral part of the total rural
development effort of BRAC.
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The disease pattern in the villages, encompassing a preponderance
of collmlunicable and preventable diseases, and thehealth manpower situation in the rural areas dictated a solution that had been found effective
in a number of other developing countries. It was to raise a cadre of
paraprofessional health workers from the rural residents themselves (parairedics) to treat the common diseases and conduct preventive and health
education activities. It was decided that the cormnon clinical facilities
and technical medical personnel would provide backup support to both the
health care services and the family planning services. The main objectives of the health care and family planning program, as these were seen
at the time of initiating this program in mid-1973, were:
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a.

to train a cadre of paramedics. to treat 18-20 connnon illnesses,

b.

to make available inoculation and vaccination against the common
preventable diseases,

c.

to motivate and educate villagers to take preventive sanitation
and public health measures, and

d.

to form a cadre of female family planning workers to serve as
distributors of contraceptives and recruiters
of acceptors
with the paramedics' guidance and supervision.
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Organization of the Services
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The paramedic is in a central position in the delivery of health
care in BRAC. Each paramedic, responsible for 4,000 to 5,000
people
in five to eight villages, visits the villages once a week or as nearly
so as possible, treats the specified common health problems, discusses
and provides advice on sanitation and hygiene measures, and looks after
the health problems of mothers and children brought to his attention by
the family planning organizer in the village.
The health and family planning activities are organizationally
linked with other BRAC activities through the camp, the base unit for
all activities in a cluster of villages. The paramedics are also based
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in the camps (one or two for each camp), where they conduct a daily clinic
for an hour in addition to the village rounds and maintain liaison with
other BRAC personnel and activities. The Area Manager, head of the camp,
and the Field Motivators, who initiate and guide the village activities,
also have general supervisory responsibilities for the health and family
planning activities in the villages.
Existing groups for functional
education, cooperatives, and women's activities are used in most motivational and educational work relating to preventive health measures, sanitation, nutrition, and family planning. In this effort, the Area Managers
and the Field Motivators work as a team with the paramedics.
Educating
the public about the health insurance scheme (see below) and mobilizing
support in its favor again require a team effort by all BRAC field personnel.
Technical supervision of the paramedics is the responsibility of the
three physicians based in three health centers in the project area
(a
ratio of one physician to 40,000 people--the present overall ratio in rural
Bangladesh). The physicians provide initial and refresher training to the
paramedics, look after the patients referred to them.by paramedics and the
family planning organizers, and supervise the paramedics' work by frequent
field visits. The main task of the physicians is to provide technical support and supervision to the paramedics and to take care of the referral
cases. They do not deal with patients directly except in exceptional emergencies. The centers where the doctors are based are modest facilities
where simple surgical procedures, common pathological tests, and such family
planning services as IUD insertion, tubal ligation, and vasectomy can be performed.
The village level family planning functions (i.e., making direct contacts with child-bearing age women, informing them of the contraceptive
alternatives, distributing supplies, maintaining records of acceptors, advising about side effects, recruiting candidates for terminal methods, and
so forth) are the responsibility of the Lady Family Planning Organizer
(LFPO) . She serves a village (about 100 families) and is a native of the
village. She makes referrals to paramedics and the physicians as necessary.
She looks, however, to the Field Motivators and the Area Manager for guidance and active help in educational and motivational work, specially
in
dealing with existing community groups or when special community assemblies
are arranged for this purpose.
The health care and family planning components of the second phase of
the Sulla Project (1973-76) have functioned on the basis of the
organizational structure described above. This structure aims at bringing the basic
health care and family planning services to the people's doorstep,
meeting
the most urgent need, hitherto unmet, of simple domiciliary care, utilizing
the available health manpower efficiently, emphasizing preventive measures
and basic health care in place of expensive hospitals and sophisticated curative services, and integrating health care and family planning with other
aspects of rural development.
Experience in the Sulla area with this organizational approach, however, has pointed out some practical problems and has led BRAC to explore
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certain modifications of this approach in the third phase of the Sulla
and in new projects in other locations.I
First, it was found that there was a preponderance of adult males
being treated by the paramedics, even though disease pattern and specific mortality rates indicated that child-bearing women and children under
five were most in need of medical services. For example, the age and sex
distribution of patients treated by paramedics in the Markuli area during
a one-month period (from August 10 to September 10, 1974) was as follows:

Age
in Years
0-5
6-15
Over 15
TOTAL

No. of
Male
Patients
111
109
_]12_
539

Percentage of
Male
Patients
13.5
13.3
38.8
65.6

No. of
Female
Patients
96

50
139
285

Percentage of
Female
Patients
11.6
6.1
16.9
34.6

Women were apparently reluctant to come themselves or bring their
children to paramedics, who were young men and mostly unmarried.
The
treatment of pediatric and obstetric-gynecological problems requires a
personal rapport with the mother that is not easy for young men to establish in a Bengali village.
Second, despite the weekly village visit of the paramedics, the
degree of contact between the paramedics and the villagers and the accessibility to medical service were found to be insufficient.
A
villager of ten had to wait up to a period of one week or travel some
distance to one of the camp clinics before he could get help on
any
urgent medical problem.
Finally, the paramedics were found to be spending most of their
time in the village providing curative services and very little time
teaching preventive care and health education. Moreover, the once-aweek visit to the village for a few hours did not create a rapport and
mutual trust between the paramedics and the villagers that is essential
for the acceptance of new ideas and information.
The changes initiated in organization and staffing to overcome the
problems encountered in Sulla were three-fold: (a) formation of a cadre
of auxiliary women health workers who under the supervision of paramedics
would establish a continuous presence of the ~ealth program in each village--each being based in her own village and each serving no more than
100 families on a narrower and more specific range of health problems
than those treated by paramedcis (see below the discussion about personnel); (b) employment of women paramedics and a significant increase
in
their numbers (see the chapter on women's programs); and (c) emphasis on

1

BRAC, The BRAC Health Care, Preventive Medicine and Family Planning Program, Dacca, n.d.
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public health education, preventive measures, and nutrition education through
a systematic corranunity-centered effort, particularly through women's groups
such as mothers' clubs (see the chapter on women's programs).
In addition, it was seen as an important objective to develop the organizational structure and the service delivery system in a manner that
would
make the health program increasingly self-sufficient in financial and management terms. The health insurance scheme designed to achieve this goal is discussed below in the section on financing.
Health Personnel
Categories and Functions
Three categories of personnel form the health and family planning staff
of BRAC. They are (a) the newly introduced (in 1976) village-based women auxiliaries, known variously as the Peoples' Healer (Shasthya shevika) or locally
as the Daktarnee (the lady doctor) and the older category of Lady Family Planning Organizers (LFPO), (b) the paramedics, and (c) the qualified physicians.
Women auxiliaries are seen by BRAC as the most effective means of reaching
rural families; consequently, BRAC has no current plan to use men as village
health auxiliaries.
As noted above, the village-based auxiliary or the peoples' healer is
the response to the need for maintaining a continuous contact of the health
program with each village and for ensuring greater accessibility of the services to the village people. Her tasks, therefore, are three-fold: (a) providing specific treatments for selected cormnon and uncomplicated disease
symptoms such as diarrhea, dysentery, scabies, headache and fever, and intestinal worms (the list may vary somewhat depending on the village needs);
(b) providing specific advice and information to mothers about nutrition,
child care, vaccination, and family planning; and (c) distributing oral contraceptives. This list is not intended to be rigid or restrictive. The
healer may be given more limited responsibilities (for example, when an LFPO
is functioning in the same village) or additional tasks depending on
the
ability to learn and performance of the healer and the need of the village.
The additional tasks that the healer may take over are vaccination and inoculation and midwifery.
The functions of the LFPO have been mentioned already. With the healers
placed in each village, the role of the LFPO needs reassessment. The logical
solution would appear to be.to combine the LFPO and healer functions and
to
retrain the interested and competent LFPOs for the healer's job. BRAC, however, is not certain about the proper course to follow. Apparently, women of
relatively high level of education and social status are interested in beco~
ing healers, whereas the LFPO's position is seen somehow related to the tasks
of traditional birth attendants or dais, ranked relatively low in the social
status hierarchy. Having two separate groups of village level workers for the
health and family planning services offers the advantage of aligning the support of some influential village women for the health activities, but it has
the disadvantage of affecting adversely the social esteem and credibility of
the LFPO and of separating the interrelated health and family planning activities. The solution ultimately accepted will depend on trials, underway
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currently (1976) in selected villages, with different patterns: newly
recruited healers performing both health care and family planning tasks,
LFPOs converted into healers carrying out their old and new functions,
and division of duties between LFPOs and healers in the same villages.
The responsibilities of paramedics have been discussed in the previous section. With the posting of healers in each village, the paramedic continues with his usual weekly village visit, but now visits homes
identified by the healer as having health problems and follows up previously
treated cases. He devotes more time to health education and preventive
care by attending meetings of village groups, such as mothers' clubs,
functional educational groups, and primary schools. With a potential
decrease in the paramedic's work load, and in view of the seriousness
of another problem in the villages, the idea of training paramedics for
treating and preventing common diseases of cattle and fowl is being examined in BRAC. It is not known whether the treatment of cattle
and
people by the same person will be found acceptable by the people. Presumably, the cattle will have no objection to this arrangement!
The functions of the physicians--anyone with MBBS, LMF, and National
Certificate, and all three types are represented in BRAC staff--have been
described above. As a BRAC document states,
The classic role of the physician as that of a
healer is being redefined in BRAC. We view
him
first and foremost as a teacher, then a
planner
and lastly one directly involved in curing.l
With an increasingly important role of the village-based healer as the
front line worker of the health and family planning program, her training and ultimate technical backstopping and supervision of her performance are the responsibility of the physician posted in the health center
serving a particular area.
Recruitment and Training
The criteria for recruitment as a people's healer are that (a) she
is a female member of the community, preferably over twenty years of age,
(b) she is acceptable to the community, and (c) she is enthusiastic about
her new responsibilities and willing to move freely about the village.
She may be illiterate if she meets the other criteria.
The training of the healer is carried out in one of the villages and
conducted by physicians or paramedics supervised by physicians. The main
methodology is demonstration and practice of the tasks--identifying
the
disease symptoms, mixing and applying medicine, communicating with clients,
handling money, and so forth~repeating these as many times as necessary to
ensure mastery of the tasks. For the benefit of illiterate healers,
the
drugs are premixed with individual dosages separated or marked and each drug
color-coded for easy identification. The initial training of healers lasts
up to four weeks in two to three hours of daily sessions. Refresher sessions are held as needed.

lBRAC, The BRAC Health Care •.. Ibid., p. 12.
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Since LFPOs do not handle medicine, a less rigorous training method
has been followed in their case. The one week training for them includes
discussion and deroonstration about the need for family planning, the relationship of family planning to nutrition and child care, means of contacting child-bearing couples, and the recording of data. The training
is
conducted by the paramedics and the Field Motivators.
To qualify as a paramedic in the BRAC health program, the candidate
must (1) have at least matriculation certificate (10 years of formal education), but relaxable in the case of female candidates; (2) be well motivated and willing to travel from village to village; and (3) be acceptable
to the village communities to be served by him. Until mid-1976 all paramedics in BRAC were men; since then a group of 15 women have been placed
in training to become paramedics.
The training of paramedics is conducted by the BRAC physicians and
is held in the project area, except for one week's special training
at
the Cholera Research Laboratory in Dacca on diarrheal treatment methods
developed at the laboratory. It is a fairly rigid well-structured training course that lasts for six roonths and includes two months of classroom
sessions on theoretical aspects and four months of supervised practice.
A training manual for the paramedics has been prepared that lists
the distinguishing symptoms, danger signs to be watched, and specific
treatments for the following common diseases:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Diarrhea
Dysentery (acute, bacillary)
Dysentery (chronic, amoebic)
Enteric fever (typhoid)
Conunon cold and influenza
Pneumonia
Sore throat
Bronchitis
Scabies
Boils
Burns
Ringworm
Roundworms and threadworms
Anaemia
Fever
Headache
Rheumatism
Stomach ulcer
Malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies
(including night blindness and stomatitis)
Women's conditions (including pregnancy
and post delivery problems)

In addition, the procedure and dosages for inununizations (DPT, tetanus
toxoid, smallpox, BCG and TABC) are described in the manual.
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The training also emphasizes the basic philosophy and mottoes of
the program, the supervisory and management responsibilities of paramedics, conununication with village people, and the importance of prevention.
The quality that is given the highest importance in the recruitment of a physician is his enthusiasm for the BRAC program and
its
objectives and his willingness to learn from his own experience. There
is no formal training program in BRAC for a physician. His professional training does not prepare him for the role he is expected to play as
a teacher, planner, and provider of technical backstopping in a comprehensive rural health care system. However, for the professional
and
intellectual rejuvenation of the physician and as a kind of
special
incentive, there is provision for short study tours in other developing
countries to observe the rural health problems or innovative projects
and for attending short advanced public health education and management courses.
Services Provided
In the Sulla Project area in 1975 curative and preventive services
were provided by 31 paramedics. As noted earlier, they provided treatment for the common ailments and referred complicated cases (about
5
percent of the patients) to the physicians.
The number of cases treated by the paramedics and physicians
in
1975 was about 50,000, mostly among the members of the insurance scheme
(see below). With 13,500 members in the insurance scheme in 1975, and
each member requiring treatment on an average of three times a year, the
number of noninsured patients was very small.
Although anyone in the project area could take advantage of the curative service by paying the cost of medicine (an average of 2.50 taka) and
a modest service fee of Tk 0.50 per consultation, even these charges were
apparently high for many families. The insurance scheme was intended to
overcome this problem by distributing the cost burden evenly in the population. However, as mentioned earlier, the reluctance of women to be treated
by male paramedics and the inadequate provision of service in the absence
of a village-based health worker prevented the spread of the insurance
scheme. Therefore, on a regular basis, the benefits of the curative services were enjoyed mostly by a small proportion (about 12 percent) of the
area population. As a part of the plan to expand the benefits, the village-based people's healer scheme was initiated in 1976, and training of
female paramedics was begun. At the end of the year, 30 people's healers
(Shasthya shevika) were working in 30 villages, mostly with insured groups,
and 15 female paramedics were in training.
One specific preventive measure widely available was primary smallpox vaccination for all children. DPT and BCG injections for children as
well as tetanus toxoid for pregnant mothers were to be ma.de
selectively
available in 1976 and were planned to be made generally available subsequently.
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Besides general advice by paramedics on prevention and hygiene during
contacts with the villagers, group efforts on health education were carried
out through mothers' clubs as well as functional education groups, primary
schools, and cooperative society meetings. The most systematic of these efforts were the mothers' clubs, 73 of which were started under BRAC auspices
and were functioning in the project area in 1976. The ioothers' clubs activities are described in the chapter on women's programs.
Family planning services were offered through 87 Lady Family Planning
Organizers in the project area in 1976. The services included contact with
eligible couples and explanation of the methods, means, and importance of
family planning; distribution of oral pills, condoms, and EMKO foam; followup of side effects; and referral to clinics for insertion of IUD or terminal methods.
The family planning program started in January 1974 and reached a peak
of 2,105 acceptors in May 1975. Since then, the number of acceptors
seems
to have reached a plateau and has remained around 2,000 in 1976. In December
1975, 1,892 women were on pills, 38 had IUDs inserted, and 40 men had undergone vasectomy.l Tubectomy was not made available until 1976 because, as the
BRAC leadership put it, the husbands in male-dominated societies avoided the
much simpler procedure of vasectomy and prevailed upon their wives to undergo
tubal ligation. The plan was to have a sufficient number of vasectomy clients
first and then to offer both vasectomy and tubal ligation. As it turned out,
the campaign for vasectomy did not have a great success, and the denial
of
tubal ligation probably imposed more hardship on women willing to take a terminal measure than the pain they were spared. Tubectomy, therefore, began to
be available in 1976.
The services of LFPOs were available in 1976 to 87 villages,
or less
than half of the 200 villages in the project area. The current acceptance
ratio, if computed on the basis of the total eligible couples in villages
actually served (estimated to be about 10,000) rather than of the eligible
couples in the whole project area (about 20,000) is approximately 20 percent--compared to a national estimate of about 5 percent.2
While 20 percent acceptance rate is relatively high, what precisely this
means in terms of impact on population growth rate was not clear. Some benchmark data for 1975 were collected by BRAC, but no comparative demographic data
for a later check were available. In any event, the program was not extensive
enough or had not been in existence long enough to provide any definitive conclusion regarding its impact. The rate of continuation among contraceptive
acceptors after 12 monthly cycles of pill distribution was reported to be 62.6
percent after 12 monthly cycles and 54.9 percent after 18
cycles
of
distribution. 3
Physical side
effects
of
pills
were
reported
to
1 BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, pp. 24-25. Service statistics
for December 1976 showed 2,082 continuing pill acceptors, and a total of
74
IUD acceptors and 59 vasectomies in Sulla by December 31, 1976.
2According to the BRAC oral pill follow-up survey of February-March,
1976, the estimate of acceptance rate is 21.1 percent of the eligible married
women in the villages covered by family planning services.
3 BRAC, Oral Pill Follow-up Survey: Family Planning in the Context of
Integrated Rural Development, Dacca, March 1977, Table 13.
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be the single most important reason for discontinuation.
3.2 and 3.3.)

(See Tables

Financing the Health Program
A primary health care service designed to meet the basic health
care needs of the people on a permanent basis cannot remain dependent
forever on philanthropic support of voluntary organizations.
It is
BRAC's belief that its low-cost health delivery approach will make it
possible to have a self-sufficient community health service financed
by the conununity's own resources with some supplementation from
the
national government or other outside sources.
The group health insurance scheme is designed to mobilize community resources for the health program and to keep the cost burden
for
the rural families at an acceptable level. The main features of
the
scheme, as it operated in Sulla till 1976, are as follows:
a.

A group consisting of at least 75 percent of the population
of a village with a minimum of 175 people can enter the
scheme.

b.

The annual premium of 4 kilograms of paddy (unhusked rice)
per person is payable in advance (collected after the
main harvest).

c.

The insured families must accept and cooperate in BRAC's
preventive health program (particularly, inoculation and
vaccination).

d.

BRAC provides weekly paramedical curative health service
to the group, including referrals to doctors when necessary, without further cost.

(With the introduction of shasthya shevikas, curative care is
available on a continuous basis in each village. The preventive
measures such as vaccination and mother and child care through the
mothers' clubs are, in principle, available to all project
area
people, irrespective of participation in the insurance scheme.)
The insurance scheme was launched in May 1975 and a drive was
organized by the paramedics and the Field Motivators to enroll members and form village committees for the collection of the annual
in-kind premium. BRAC estimates are that throughout the project
40 to 50 percent of the families were prepared to join the scheme,
but only 10 percent of the villages could muster 75 percent coverage to qualify for group insurance. By early 1976, only 37 groups
covering 13,500 people had joined the scheme.l

1 BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 22.
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Table 3. 2
Stated Primary Reasons for Discontinuation
of Contraceptive Use

Reasons

Number

Percentage

Physical side-effects

247

30.8

Desire for another child

156

19.4

Accidental pregnancy

130

16.2

Not needed for unspecified reasons

91

11.4

Other reasons

36

10.7

Husband's objection

37

4.6

Fear of method

28

3.5

27
802

3.4
100.0

Forgetfulness

N ==

Source:

BRAC, Oral Pill Follow-up Survey: Family Planning in the Context
of Integrated Rural Development, Table 15.

HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING

35.

Table 3.3
Physical Symptoms Mentioned Most Frequently for
Discontinuing Contraceptives

Most Important
Reason
(Percentage)

Symptom

Second Most
Important Reason
(Percentage)

Dizziness

27.2

24 .9

Excessive Bleeding

21.8

5.8

Headaches

13.0

15.9

Irregular Bleeding

7.9

4.8

Vomiting

7.5

11.6

Colic

3.8

3.7

Disability, neurosis

3.4

13. 2

Lack of appetite, dyspepsia

1. 7

3.2

Fatigue

1. 7

5.3

Difficulty in breast feeding

1.2

2.1

Bleeding between periods

0.8

2.6

Weight gain or loss

0.8

0.5

Other breast problems

0.4

0.0

Skin diseases

0.4

0.0

8.4
100.0

6.4
100.0

Others

Source:

BRAC, Oral Pill Follow-up Survey: Family Planning in the Context
of Integrated Rural Development, Table 16.
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At a time of relatively low paddy rice (late 1976) the annual per
person premium of 4 kilograms of paddy valued at Tk 6.00
covered
roughly SO percent of the drug costs on the basis of 3.3 consultations
per person per year at an average drug cost of Tk 3.SO per consultation.
The trends in cost of production and the international prices
suggest
that rice prices will stabilize at a higher level of around Tk 100.00
per maund (40 kgs.). The current premium rate of 4 kgs. would therefore
cover about 80 percent of the drug costs--if the drug costs also remain
stable.
Recurring costs other than for medicine are estimated to be no more
than two-thirds of the drug costs on the basis of the cost structure proposed by BRAC for the third phase of the Sulla Project. Following broad.1.Y. the BRAC cost projections for the Sulla Project, the following
per
capita annual recurring costs are derived:
Taka
Medicine
12.00
Other supplies (contraceptives, clinical
2.00
supplies, vaccinations, etc.)
Personnel
Doctor (Tk lSOO per month/30,000 people) 0.60
Paramedics (Tk 7SO per rnonth/4,000
people)
2. SO
Shasthya Shevika/LFPO
(Tk lSO p.m./1,000 people)
1.80
4.90
Travel (20% of doctor & paramedic salaries)
0.62
0.49
Training (10% of all salaries)
20.01
TOTAL ••.••••
BRAC leaders believe that it would be feasible gradually and sufficiently to increase the insurance premium during Phase III (1976-78)
to cover all of the medicine and supply costs. The personnel costs have
to be met from other sources. BRAC's proposal for Phase III states that
the salaries of paramedics and the shas th ya shevikas will be "required ·
to be borne by the Village Development Committee who will receive grants
from the Cooperative Society. The cost of administration and doctors'
salaries will require funding from outside sources. 11 1 Whether the Village Development Cotmnittee can pay the salaries of the health worker will,
of course, depend on how successful, economically and otherwise, the cooperative societies are.
Recordkeeping and Evaluation
A reluctance to devote any substantial effort to maintaining more
than the most rudimentary service data and other project statistics is
clearly detectable in BRAG. As stated in a project document, "Paper is

1 Ibid., p. 10.
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not only expensive, it creates an army of clerks when we want an army
of health workers."
The paramedic maintains a notebook in which he enters the date
and the village visited every working day and records the patient's
name, age, sex, symptoms, diagnosis, treatment, and money
collected
for medicine. These records are reviewed llXJnthly by the physician.
The LFPO used to maintain two notebooks, one for listing the target couples and the other for acceptor information. These have
been
replaced by a card to be maintained by the LFPO for each married woman
between 15 and 45. The cards are used to record name and age of husband' and wife, number and ages of children, type of contraception accepted, period when used, and reason (if any) for discontinuation.
The cards are used for referral service in the clinic.
The shevika is required only to record the number of patients
seen and whether they are adults or children.
If the data recorded by the paramedics and LFPOs were consolidated and analyzed, they would provide the basic quantitative indication of curative medical services provided and the acceptance
and
retention rates for family planning. These, however, would not provide any accurate indication of the impact of the health efforts in
terms of morbidity, mortality, and overall health situation of the
population; nor would there be an indication of the effects on birth
rate and population growth rate or of the differential characteristics of acceptors, dropouts, and non-acceptors in the family planning
program.
Recording of births, deaths, morbidity, nutrition status, and
socioecono1'1ic characteristics of patients and family planning patients
on a continuing basis is regarded by BRAC as "a very expensive and
time consuming process"l and not an appropriate task for the health
workers. The necessary evaluative data about the health and family
planning activities as well as other aspects of the BRAC project are
planned to be collected by a sample survey of the population every
three to four years. Such a sample survey of 1600 households
was
conducted for the first time in Sulla in late 1975. A follow-up survey of oral pill acceptors was undertaken in February-March 1976.
Both of these, being the first surveys, provided useful benchmark
data (but no comparative data for assessing the impact of the program).

Outlook for the Future
Whether the BRAC health and family planning program will survive
and grow as a viable approach to meeting the health and family planning needs of the rural people in Bangladesh and whether it will influence significantly the national programs will depend, first, on
the results of the efforts under way to extend the accessibility and
1

The BRAC Health Care .... op. cit., p. 15
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coverage of the services to the total project area population and, second,
on how successfully a management structure evolves that is compatible with
local management of the program (without the guiding hand of BRAC) and
with the overall organization and management of development
and
local
government in the area.
Greater Access.
As noted already, access to and coverage of the services are affected
by cultural factors (the women's reluctance to face men paramedics), physical factors (once-a-week presence of the paramedic for a few hours),
and
the nature of the service (dominance of an "outpatient" type curative service and the lack of dialogue, social interaction, and a seeking of advice
and reassurance that is possible only with the presence of a health worker
in a village). Attempts to remove these barriers
to quantitative
and
qualitative improvement of the program are being made by the introduction of
the village-based auxiliaries (healers) and the recruitment of new
female
paramedics. The outcome of these recent moves in both quantitative and qualitative terms are yet to be seen.
Visible Impact.
The extension and intensification of service coverage should begin to
be reflected in the health and demographic status of the area population in
the near future.
BRAC apparently has not paid sufficient attention to assessing the impact of its services on such indicators as the rates of morbidity, mortality, and births. It appears to be
particularly modest
about its effect on the high mortality rate. One of its reports states:
"A fall in death rate may be noted but is not anticipated. Food production, flooding, and social stability will probably have greater effects
on mortality rates than the heal th care or preventive medicine program. " 1
Obviously, a high mortality rate is not the main problem; it is but
an indicator of the health status of the population.
An improvement in
the general health status should reduce mortality rate, especially
when
certain segments of the population are found to be particularly vulnerable
and are contributing disproportionately to the total mortality rate.
A
concentrated attack on the health hazards of infants, children under five,
and mothers who fall victims to communicable diseases and preventable but
fatal infections such as tetanus is quite feasible and compatible
with
BRAC's health care approach and is likely to curtail both the specific and
overall rate of mortality significantly.
Improving Records.
BRAC's reluctance to have the health workers spend much time on collecting and recording statistics is understandable.
On the other hand,
the fairly intensive coverage of rural families envisaged by its service
delivery approach (having a ratio of no more than 150 families to
one
village-based auxiliary) should permit the maintenance of a set of selected data about the health situation in the area without imposing
too

1 The BRAC Health Care ... , p. 16.

HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING

39.

heavy a tax on the worker's time. The information recorded may include
births, deaths, incidence of selected disease symptoms, children's nutritional status (using a simple QUAC stick or other appropriate measurement), contraceptive acceptance, and continuation of contraceptive
use.
The periodic sampling of the population still would be useful for assessment of the impact of overall BRAC efforts and may be supplementary
to
the regular recording of information. The advantages of consolidation of
the selected data--say, on a monthly basis for each paramedic's area and
on a quarterly basis for the project area--are many: (a) it would provide a ready check on the health situation of the area; (b) it would
help determine appropriate emphasis on specific therapies, preventive
measures, and educational actions for each locality at a particular
time; (c) it would encourage the workers to maintain systematic con. tact with their clients and remain fully informed about the health situation in the area; and (d) it could be a tool for creating an awareness in
the communities about their health and population situation and about the
results or lack of results of their collective efforts.
Coopting Indigenous Medicine.
BRAC has taken an initiative to coopt the. practitioners of the
various forms of nonallopathic medicine (ayuverdic, unani, and homeopathic) into the comprehensive health care system for a rural area.
The advantages of this move are seen to be three-fold:
First, the potential power of these practitioners of medicine to
resist the spread of the BRAC approach and to create misgivings about
it among the rural population will be neutralized. Second, to the extent the therapies and health measures of the indigenous and non-allopathic medicinal practices are relatively effective, cheap, and compatible with popular beliefs, these practices may be included with beneficial results in the repertoire of treatments of the paramedics
and
the shasthya shevikas. Finally, these practitioners of medicine--being
a group of people living in the rural areas and catering in their own
way to the health needs of the rural population could be put to good
use as paramedics within the primary health care system and could be
prevented from being the purveyors of poor medical service at a high
cost to the patients.
The success of this move will depend on whether a commonly agreed
list of therapies and health measures can be prepared, whether the local
"doctors" can be brought into a specially designed paramedic
training
program, and whether these "doctors" perceive the move to be in
their
long-range interest. Identifying elements of nonallopathic medicine
that can be incorporated into the curative and preventive practices of
the basic health care system of the country calls for a substantial research and investigation effort. The prospect of government assistance
and collaboration of other agencies in the country concerned about rural
health could be explored by BRAC.
Improving Family Planning.

As for family planning, the tasks before BRAC are to extend the
coverage of the services to all the project area villages (instead of
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less than half the villages as in 1976) and to push the curve of the acceptor
rate upward beyond the plateau that the curve seems to have reached. An optimal acceptor rate among the couples of childbearing age at the present stage
is about one-third of the total (leaving out those who are already
pregnant
and those in a state of postpartum amenorrhea).l However,
identifying and
reaching the appropriate clients in this group and maintaining their acceptor
status would require a more precise and differentiated approach than a general
"shot-gun" approach to the provision of family planning service, which
actually may do more harm than good by interfering with the natural fertility
reducing effects of the biological factors.
The potential of traditional and nonwestern methods of restricting births
appears to have been ignored in BRAC family planning efforts. There has been
almost an exclusive reliance on just one birth control technology--the
pill
(other than the terminal measures of vasectomy or tubectomy).
While this
dependence on one method may have been justified and may have to continue-given the fact that this is culturally an alien technology and produces,
at
least for some, adverse physiological side effects--the other indigenous
and
"non-technological" methods such as rhythm, abstinence·, late marriage, breastf eeding (in order to extend lactational amenorrhea), azl (coitus interruptus)
warrant a fair trial. The offering of wise and appropriate counsel to potential candidates about methods other than the standard prescription of
pills
would require a personal, well-motivated, non-stereotyped approach.
Another issue that has to be resolved is the overlap between the functions
of the Lady Family Planning Organizer and the shas th ya shevik.a.
The
logic
and rationale behind the integrated health care approach of BRAC calls for
a
merger of these two positions in the village. If indeed there is a social stigma attached to those in family planning services, there is all the more reason
to combine the positions of the LFPO and the shevika in order to assure a greater social acceptance for those in family planning services. Such a move,
of
course, should be accompanied by an educational effort to remove the roots of
the prejudice. The trial under way with different combinations of roles and
functions of the village-based worker will probably suggest the best course of
action in this respect.
Organizational Issues.
A number of organizational and management issues has to be tackled during
the third phase of the Sulla Project (and in the course of initiating BRAC-sponsored health programs in other locations). How can the health care system continue to function when the BRAC umbrella and resources are removed?
What kind
of organizational structure will ensure that the needs of the people will
be

Lrbe period of temporary sterility after a live birth. This period is
estimated to be 17 months in Bangladesh for a woman who breastfeeds her child.
Use of contraceptive pills ends the state of amenorrhea and
increases
the
probability of conception if the woman is negligent about
taking the pills
regularly or if she drops out. See Lincoln C. Chen,~ al, Recent Fertility
Trends in Bangladesh: Speculation on the Role of Biological Factors and Socioeconomic Change, Dacca, The Ford Foundation, December 1976.
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adequately served, that the necessary resources will be available, that
the workers will be paid, and that they will perform their duties?
How
can the group insurance scheme be kept alive and prevent the paramedics
and the shevikas from being individual private entrepreneurs? How can
the beneficiary population participate in the management of the program
and keep it compatible with their overall development needs and priorities?
The approach that is favored by BRAC and expected to be worked out
in detail and gradually implemented over the next two or three years
is
the transfer of the management responsibilities to a representative body
at the thana level with subsidiary bodies at the union (a unit of 10-20
villages) level. The COII'ailittees at the thana and the union levels, formed
with a representation of the different categories of workers in the program and the beneficiary population (and with the representation of BRAC
management at the initial stage), will be made responsible for making
appropriate arrangements and taking the necessary steps for:
collecting the group insurance premium
seeking and receiving supplementary resources needed for
operating the program
organizing training and supervision of the workers and
maintaining the standard of their performance
paying the workers
procuring, storing, and distributing the supplies
maintaining appropriate liaison with other development
activities and agencies within the area and outside
Supplementation of the locally generated resources of the program
may come from the Thana Development Committee or a central federation of
the village cooperative societies that is expected to emerge from
the
BRAC development efforts in the area. Another possible source is a government subvention to the program for performing functions of the national health and family planning services.
The extent of supplementation
available from the Thana Development Conunittee, or, for that matter, the
mobilization of local resources possible through a general acceptance of
the health program and widespread enrollment in the group insurance scheme,
will depend on the overall development achievement of the total range of
BRAC project activities in the area and the climate of hope and confidence
created by these activities.
It is BRAC's expectation that the thana and union committees for
health will be affiliated or partially overlap with representative bodies
(~·..&·• the Thana Development Committee) which will emerge in order
to
oversee, manage, and keep alive the overall development program for the
area initiated by BRAC.
It is evident that if the BRAC health and family planning program
develops along the line envisaged and becomes capable of offering comprehensive health care service to the area population, an acconuoodation has

·.:l
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to be reached with the government health and family planning activities in
the area. There are three possible alternatives. The government could
provide financial assistance to the program, ensure that the entire area
population is served, and see that specific government health and family
planning objectives are fulfilled. In this case, the government personnel and facilities from the area could either be withdrawn or turned over
to the management of the local program. This alternative should not be
seen as the abdication of government responsibility for health care and
the transfer of government ftmctions to a private organization. If the
BRAC goals are fulfilled and local representative organizations emerge to
take over the management of health and other development services,
the
health care program would become the program of the local communities
(rather than of BRAC). The government public health service would provide
technical and financial support to locally managed programs instead of running the local program itself. Ideally, this is the direction in which all
government development agencies should move if fostering self-reliant communities and mobilizing local resources are considered important goals.
A
second possibility is the continuation of the status guo whereby both
the
government health service and the BRAG project would attempt to serve inadequately the health needs of the local population without consolidating their
efforts and resources and without the emergence of local organizations assuming greater management responsibilities for the local program. Under
this
alternative, BRAC would play a useful role in filling at least a part of the
gap in local health care as long as the government service remains weak and
out-of-reach of most of the rural people. Obviously, the full potential of
a cormnunity-based primary health care system with appropriate back.stopping
from the national government and support from other extra-community sources
will not be realized under this option. The least desirable alternative is
that two rival structures of facilities, personnel, and services would attempt to expand themselves without any effort to cooperate and complement
each other wasting national resources, creating confusion and distrust among
the people, and leaving the basic health needs of the people badly served.

CHAPTER

4

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
In the Sulla Project area, almost all of the cultivable land (60,000
acres out of a total of 64,000 acres) is one crop rice land suitable
for
boro rice farmed during the dry season (November-April) after the flood
water recedes. The farm land remains inundated the rest of the year.
An ICED sample survey revealed the predominance of agriculture in the
economic life of the area. Over 53 percent of the households
relied for
their livelihood exclusively on farming their own land; about 20
percent
of the landless families depended on farm lahor as the main source of incorre. For over 10 percent of the households fishing was the primary source
of family earnings. The same survey also showed that the pressure on
the
limited farm land was high: 54 percent of the families had farms less than
one acre in size; 17 percent had farms of between 1 and 3 acres; and
only
3 percent of the families had over 3 acres of farm land. Twenty-six percent
of the families owned no farm land. According to BRAC's independent estimates, landless and near landless families would constitute at least onethird of the households in the project area.
The agricultural needs of the area, defined by the ecological limitations, are as follows: (a) to make the best use of the limited cultivable
land during the short farming season by increasing the productivity of rice
on land with sufficient moisture and producing on thE rest of the
land
other crops requiring less moisture in order to increase total agricultural
income and to improve the nutritional balance, (b) to make a special effort
to help farmers with small landholdings use high yielding seeds and fertilizers, and (c) to help the landless and the near landless make intensive use
of plots attached to the homestead to meet at least partially their basic
food and nutrition needs and also to help them make collective use of communal or state land whenever available.
The government assistance for agricultural development, in principle,
consists of agricultural extension service, provisions for agricultural inputs, and support of farmers' cooperatives. The extension field staff in
the thana is headed by the Thana Agricultural Officer, TAO (usually with a
university degree in agriculture). The TAO supervises the Union Agricultural Assistants, each of whom is responsible for rendering technical advice to farmers in about 20 villages with up to 10 thousand farmers. The
inputs supplied by the government at subsidized price include low-lift
pumps, fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds. It is the government policy
under its Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) to encourage the
formation of primary cooperative societies of farmers at the village level
and a central federation of cooperatives at the thana level which then
can be the main channel for providing credit, inputs, and extension advice as well as the means for attaining economies of scale in various
farming activities.
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In practice, the government infrastructure for agricultural development has not functioned at any reasonable degree of effectiveness for various reasons. The principal reasons include: inadequate training, supervision, technical backstopping, and incentives fer the extension staff;
limited supply of inputs and credit insufficient to meet the total needs;
village social structure and land tenure that allows the benefit of cooperatives and government inputs to be enjoyed by relatively larger landowners; and inefficiency of the overall administrative structure that causes
frequent breakdown in the logistics of supply, supervision, and maintenance
of services. The net result is that the government agricultural services
reach too few with too little too ineffectively. The IRDP with its goal of
creating village level cooperatives with broad-based membership appears to
offer some prospect for invigorating the agricultural services and increasing the efficiency of the scarce inputs. Other national level efforts are
underway to improve the extension service and the supply of inputs, but the
results of these efforts are yet to be felt in the project area. BRAC
in
its third phase program in Sulla is attempting to supplement and support the
IRDP efforts in the project area to expand the structure of cooperatives and
increase its effectiveness. (see discussion in ch. 7.)
The main features of BRAC agricultural activities in Sulla during the
second phase were agricultural support blocks, camp demonstration plots, introduction of new vegetable crops, support to landless groups, and assistance
in flood protection and irrigation.
Components of the Agricultural Program
Agricultural Support Blocks
The agricultural support blocks were intended to enable BRAC to concentrate its limited resources and personnel on a limited area of land
and
a
small number of farmers to produce a demonstration effect in respect of
improved practices in rice cultivation.
During each planting season
20-30
agricultural support blocks, each with an average of 50 acres of land,
were
organized by BRAC workers in the eleven camp areas for cultivation of
high
yielding varieties of boro rice with equipment and inputs within the means of
local farmers. Five to six hundred farmers in the support blocks received the
following types of support:
Block farmers were brought together into regular meetings early
before the onset of the agricultural season and during the season in order to plan and implement the agricultural plan for each
block.
Farmers were assisted in planning the input needs, arranging finances,
and procurement. Most farmers were able to arrange the supplies with
their own resources.
Farmers were advised about preparing compost pits and the use of
organic fertilizer.
Some of the farmers received credit from BRAC for fertilizer and
seeds.
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High yielding rice seeds were supplied by BRAC at cost. New
short-duration high yielding varieties were introduced
by
BRAC, particularly for land vulnerable to early flooding.
The responsibility for the extension work with the support block
farmers lay primarily with the Field Motivators who were supervised by
the Area Manager for each camp. Information about the increase
in
yield resulting from the block support activities was not collected by
BRAC. BRAC, however, claimed that "support block farmers in most cases
were able to show substantial improvement in yield. 11 1 Th~ farmers themselves perceived the activities to be sufficiently beneficial to continue
their participation in the blocks during successive years.
Camp Demonstration Plots
Each of the eleven BRAC camps in the Sulla Project area set up its
own demonstration plots, and the BRAC personnel residing in the camps
contributed the labor to grow various crops in these plots. An average
of two acres was leased from local farmers for rice or wheat demonstration, and an additional half acre was used for different varieties
of
vegetables and legumes. The plots were the means for practical farming
experience for the BRAC workers, demonstration of methods and results,
and a way of establishing credibility for BRAC extension service. As
reported in a BRAC report:
... [At first] the sight of university graduates ploughing
and transplanting brought laughter and sarcasm from villagers.
The seriousness and persistence of BRAC workers soon changed
their attitude to one of respect.
When the plants stood out
as sor.ie of the best that they had seen grown in the area, the
cultivators started asking for advice and requesting BRAC workers to visit their fields.2
New Vegetables
Prior to BRAG activities in the project area, vegetable growing was
almost unknown in the area, and vegetables were regarded as an inferior
type of food. BRAC launched a vegetable growing campaign in order
to
make better use of land unsuitable for rice and to supply the nutritional needs of the population. In cooperation with the Mennonite Central
Committee (an American voluntary organization active in improving
the
productivity of small farmers in Bangladesh), vegetable seeds were imported and distributed each year to 10,000 families and primary
and
secondary schools in the project area. Vegetables new in the area such
as carrots, broccoli, and Chinese cabbage were grown successfully alongside those already grown in the area such as tomatoes, cauliflower, and

1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, pp. 12.
2BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, pp. 12-13.
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radishes. Up to 800 acres of land were put under vegetable cultivation in
the area per year.
Seeds were given free the first year, but in subsequent years they were
sold. Instructions on seedbed preparation, transplantation, and care of plants
were provided by BRAG field motivators, and growers' plots were repeatedly visited by them at the initial stage. Horticulture exhibitions were organized in
each camp, and prizes were given to the best growers. Although seeds were not
distributed free after the first year, no problem was encountered
in selling
the seeds.
BRAG also encouraged the growing of fruit trees in the area. After the
unusually high floods of 1974 when all the papaya trees in the area were destroyed, BRAG transported thousands of papaya saplings, as well as seedlings
and saplings of coconut, banana, mango, and guava, and distributed them
at
cost to villagers.
Support to Groups of Landless
BRAG organized groups of landless laborers for cultivation of fallow land
leased from local landlords or of state-owned land. Only about 600 acres of
such land was available for lease, and all together 300 landless farm laborers
in groups of 25 on an average benefited from this effort. The land available
for this purpose was not readily cultivable; it required leveling and clearing, and the supply of water had to be arranged and water chc.nnels laid out.
BRAG workers advised the groups on preparing the land and making a farm plan
for optimal use of the land, supplied credit for purchasing the ne~essary inputs, and provided the services of low-·lift irrigation pumps and power tillers,
the cost of which was recovered after the harvest. The program increased the
income of the beneficiary families substantially, but the size of the program
was limited by the high pressure on cultivable land in the area.
Assistance for Irrigation and Flood Protection
Agriculture in the project area suffers from too much water during most
of the year and too little of it in relatively higher land during the
dry
season. BRAG procured 19 low-lift diesel pumps of 2-cusec capacity to irrigate boro land without sufficient residual flood water. The pumps
were
leased to groups of farmers in the support blocks and among the landless
groups.
BRAG charged a rental of Tk 225 per acre for the pumps and took care of
the fuel, maintenance, and operation of the pumps. The average area irrigated
by each pump was 52 acres. This compares favorably with the average of about
20 acres in the government (Agricultural Development Corporation) program for
extensive use of low-lift pumps to increase cropping intensity. The government in its program subsidized the cost of pump use, charging about Tk 1,000
as rent for each pump for a season (irrespective of acreage covered) with
fuel and operation costs paid by the farmers. BRAG, on the other hand, realizing over Tk 10,000 for each pump per season, more than covered the capital
and operating costs of the pumps. This was possible because BRAG saw to it
that a sufficient amount of land was included in the irrigation plan of the
group renting the pump and that a breakdown would not occur ruining the crop
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and the farmers' investment in time and money. Besides ensuring the supplv
of fuel, spare parts, and proper operation of the pumps through its
ow~
well-trained operators, BRAC also had a small maintenance shop for the overhaul and repair of the pumps and other equipment such as 10 power tillers
and two outboard motors for the small boats used by the staff during the
floods.
(The power tillers were rented to farmers without draught animals
and the groups of landless farmers.)
Building flood protection embankments, as well as drainage and irrigation channels, were undertaken during the dry season of 1974-75 and 197576 as a "food-for-work" program under which workers received their wages in
wheat supplied for this purpose by Oxfam of Canada and ll.K. Additional protection embankments and water channels were also excavated during the same
years by voluntary efforts of the local people organized hy BRAC workers.
It is reported by BRAC that:
During the early floods of April 1974, when the neighbouring
areas suffered total destruction of their crop, the BRAC area
only suffered a 40 percent crop loss due to the successful effort
of the BRAC workers in mobilizing and activising entire villages
for building dams and embankments day and night to fight the
rising water.l
The Third Phase Plans
The third phase plans for Sulla (implementation of ~hich began in
1976) call for continuation of the agricultural worK begun earlier and
propose some new elements: a rice seed multiplication project,
new
initiatives in animal husbandry, and increased emphasis on supporting
agricultural opportunities for groups of landless and women from poor
families.
With the spread of high yielding rice varieties, the supply of good
quality seeds becomes a critical bottleneck. Government seed farms currently meet only a fraction of the total demand of the country, and it is
difficult for farmers to arrange procurement from the limited government
supply without direct BRAC intervention. The small farmers themselves
find it difficult to put aside seed grains and to control the quality of
seed production without some assistance. The BRAC project is intended
to train and support some model farmers to undertake seed multiplication
on a commercial basis. Best quality first generation seeds are to be
procured by BRAC and supplied to the farmers who will be provided a price
guarantee and whose fields will be supervised by a qualified agronomist
to ensure quality control. BRAC will arrange proper storage of the seeds
in specially constructed ferro-concrete bins in the humid climatic condition of the area. It is expected that the production, storage, and sale
of high quality rice seeds will eventually be taken over by the central
body of the local cooperatives or the Thana Development Committee
and
will become a source of income for the central body.
Preparation of land in the Sulla area, as in the rest of the country, is almost entirely dependent on cattle drau2ht power. Feeding the
cattle is a serious problem during the six months of flooding when the
cattle remain confined to the pens. During the dry winter months
the
situation improves, but as more fallow land comes under cultivation the
1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 14.
I,
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the competition between grazing and farming land becomes more intense. The
paucity of veterinary care is another problem that means wastage from
ill
health and premature death of cattle. BRAC plans to introduce high yielding
fodder crops such as Guinea grass and alfalfa, begin extension work on locally suitable silage methods, and start a basic veterinary service by training
the paramedic in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of the conunon cattle diseases (as well as the diseases of poultry and ducks).
A special effort is to be made during the third phase to form cooperative groups of landless farm laborers and destitute women and to make use of
all available land on lease either from the state or from local landowners.
BRAC will support these groups initially until the first harvest, while the
land is levelled, irrigation facilities built and the first crop planted. It
will also make credits available on the basis of production plans of
the
groups by arrangement with a commercial bank. In addition, BRAC workers will
provide continuous extension support to these groups.
Fishery Development
BRAC estimates that 20 percent of the households in the Sulla Project
area depends on fishery as a major source of income.
The natural water bodies of the area are owned mostly by the state,
and the fishing rights in these waters for a specified period are leased to
cooperatives of local fishermen. Since collective fishing requires high capital inputs in nets, boats, and royalty payments to the government as well as
in storing, transporting, and marketing the highly perishable commodity, the
cooperatives are financed and controlled largely by nonfishermen moneylenders
who provide credits at usurious rates and serve as middlemen for marketing.
As a result fishermen as a class are one of the most exploited and poorest
groups in the area.
BRAC supported a number of fishermen's cooperative societies by providing them boats and nylon twines for fishing nets. Altogether 15 medium-sized
fishing boats and 10,000 pounds of twine were distributed. But, by BRAC's
own admission, this had only "peripheral impact." It is estimated that an average cooperative society of 150 members requires a working capital of Tk 100,000
to 120,000 to fish in a water area leased for two years. The fishermen can
reap the full benefit of their labor and extricate themselves from the vicious
cycle of exploitation, if they can procure this capital on reasonable terms
and arrange for marketing their catch without depending on the moneylenders
and the middlemen employed by the moneylenders.
In the third phase of Sulla, BRAC proposes to meet the full credit requirements of a number of societies under financial arrangements with connnercial banks similar to those planned for landless groups. BRAC also plans to
assist in organizing a fishermen's cooperative marketing society and training
a number of fishermen for marketing activities.
In order to help youth and women's groups in the fishermen's communities,
BRAC also organized, during the second phase, the digging of six large ponds under the "food-for-work" program which were used for pond-fishery. The
ponds
were stocked with quick-growing Nilotica fingerlings imported by UNICEF
from
Thailand. A number of the youth group members were sent to Jamalpur for training in Nilotica culture.
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Concluding Points
While the impact of the fishery program during the second phase of the
Sulla Project was, by BRAC's own account, marginal in improving the wellbeing of the fishermen, the achievements of the agricultural program were
also not very clear. Once again the reason for the lack of a clear picture
of the results is BRAC's reluctance or inability to devote the necessary
effort (and workers' time) to a collection of elementary benchmark data and
a collection and recording of information about the services provided
and
the results achieved. Basic information about the initial condition of the
farmers in the support blocks and the changes in their condition
brought
about by BRAC services could have been collected without substantial expense
of time and money, and it would have identified and made clear the benefits
derived from the effort.
What is now known is that the total beneficiaries of the two main and
intensive ef forts--the support blocks and group farming by landless laborers
--were relatively small in number. In any one season a maximum of 600 farmers and 300 landless laborers were involved in the two activities out of
a
total of over 15,000 heads of farmers' and landless laborers' families
in
the area. About 40 Field Motivators sper:t most of their time during
the
farming season with the farmers' and laborers' groups (a ratio of one motivator to 25 farmers). This is a relatively high extension worker-to-farmer
ratio by any standard with its consequent cost implications.
To the extent that credit, supply of inputs, and logistics (and not just
the knowledge gap) were the impediments to increased agricultural productivity
in the area, the support blocks and the camp demonstration plots were unlikely
to have much spillover effect on other farmers in the area. Obviously,
the
scarcity of rentable land, subsistence support when the land is prepared
and
planted, and credit for inputs were the main obstacles for the landless laborers' groups. Supply and logistics apparently were also major problems for the
support block farmers as is clearly indicated by the BRAC emphasis on procurement of seeds and fertilizers and the operation and maintenance of power pumps
and tillers.
Under these circumstances, the approach to serving the total farming population and to improving the overall agricultural situation would be to establish and strengthen the institutions that serve the supply and logistical
needs, such as the cooperatives, the government distribution mechanism of seed~
and fertilizers, and the supply and maintenance of the irrigation pumps
and
tillers (again the responsibility of the government Agricultural Development
Corporation). BRAC put great stress on the formation of cooperatives--thts being the central institutional strategy of the BRAC development approach (see
the chapter on institutional structures). However, the support block operation does not appear to have been linked directly with the formation
and
strengthening of the cooperatives or, for that matter, with other BRAC components, such as functional education and the health program. All of these run
parallel to each other with only incidental overlap of clienteles rather than
in a strategic concentration of multifaceted program efforts on the same communities. Nor were there attempts to work with the Agricultural Development
Corporation for better utilization of irrigation pumps and tillers in the
area or for improved distribution of seeds and fertilizers. Of course, in
this case the willingness to cooperate and work together must be mutual,
and the government agencies often are not overly eager to admit that they
./:
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need the help of a private organization.
own project for the third phase.

On the problem of seeds, BRAC has its

The agricultural extension work of BRAC carried out by the Field Motivators appears to be based on standard technical prescriptions and generally accepted notions about the improvement of rice and vegetable cultivation rather
than on specific technical analysis and recommendations derivative of
such
analysis. The Field Motivators had neither special training in agriculture, nor
the technical advice and services of an agronomist or a soil tester.
On
the
other hand, .if the obstacles to agricultural improvement were more institutional
than technological, specialized technical knowledge of the field workers
and
the backstopping of an agronomist would be less important. The problem would be
to use effectively already known and applicable techniques. However, the services of an agronomist would be required in the third phase for the seed multiplication project. It should be possible to utilize him in a broader role
of
providing technical support to the extension team.
In view of the high pressure on land and the large number of very small
landholders depending on farming for their livelihood, it would be very important to explore the question of optimal economic use·of the small farms
and
the limits and possibilities of changes in cropping pattern and cropping intensity. This is also an important question for the landless groups who manage to
lease some land.
BRAC made a special effort to improve the lot of the landless laborers by
organizing group farming projects, and it plans to continue this effort during
the third phase with both the landless laborers and destitute women. As noted
already, these efforts are handicapped by the limitation of land available for
renting out and by the financial and technical support needed to put the groups
to work on land which is often of marginal quality.
Despite all the efforts,
the return realized by each individual member of the group may be too small to
make an appreciable difference in his standard of living--partly because
of
BRAC's understar.dable desire of not leaving out any of the landless families
in a village project. It therefore becomes important to look for a broader
range of income earning opportunities for the landless families, such as a
combination of rural public works, nonfarm activities, farm laborers' work,
horticultural and animal husbandry activities around the home, group farming
projects, and group economic projects in agricultural processing.
Ideally,
the planning, managing, and participation in the group farming projects should
be organized within the framework of a broader approach to improving the earning and employment opportunities of the poorest rural families. The institutional vehicles of functional education groups, cooperatives, and membership
in health insurance schemes can be used then to reinforce the economic improvement efforts, to give a sense of cohesion and purpose to the participants, and
to facilitate a larger role of the participants in the management of these
efforts.
There are indications that BRAC is attempting to apply the lessons of the
experiences in Sulla in its new projects, particularly in Manikganj. The Manikganj Project put a heavy emphasis on the institutional structure in the villages
--organizing youth's and women's organizations and cooperative societies,
and
planning and implementing various development activities, including agricultural
activities, through the groups in an integrated manner. We return to this question in the chapter on institutional structures.
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The third phase efforts in fishery development--to the extent that
capital funds are available and participation is made broad-based--should
have a greater impact on the condition of the fishermen than the second
phase activities.
No attention has been paid so far to the long range fishery prospects, nor to th~: possibilities of technological improvements in raising
both yield and employment in fishery activities in the area. This would
probably require a regional approach extending beyond the project area,
also resources and expertise difficult to muster without government support. In any case government support would be needed for any long-range
fishery development in the area, because the government is the owner of
the fishing grounds and the ultimate authority for imposing and enforcing
regulations in such matters as fishing seasons, selective catching, terms
of fishing rights. These questions deserve attention as they affect the
welfare of a sizeable proportion of the population in the project area.
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CHAPTER

5

PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN

Activities that have been designed by BRAC to contribute to the improvement
of social and economic status of women fall into two categories:
(a)
(b)

integrating women into the general development activities
of the project, and
special activities in response to special needs of women.

The general program activities which serve women clientele or have substantial involvement of women in one form or another are functional education,
agricultural and horticultural extension, family planning, and health care.
Activities which respond to special women's needs include mother and childcare clubs, skill training for women, women's cooperatives, women staff development, and the women's project in Jamalpur.
Serving Women Through General Programs
Functional Education
Women have participated in a major way in the functional education program.
In the Sulla Project, of over 1,100 completers in the first two cyclces of
courses in 1975 and 1976, about 400 were women. One-half of the centers were for
women and the number of women instructors was of the same proportion.
The project in Jamalpur with functional education as the key element serves
exclusively the low-income rural women in a cluster of 29 villages. This project,
as noted earlier, originated from a project to help destitute women in the
same
area.
The content of the functional education lessons also attempts to reflect
women's needs and interests. While 70 percent of the content are of
general
interest, 30 percent are differentiated for men and women. The special lessons
for women cover such topics as women's contribution to agricultural production;
food processing and preservation; nutritious cooking; savings habits; survey of
the community birth, pregnancy, and family planning status; family planning
methods; cooperation among women; nutrition surveys; breast feeding; and fire
hazards in the kitchen. Some of the general lessons which are designed
for
both men and women also include topics of special significance in improving the
condition of women; for example, equal rights for men and women, cooperatives
for women, nutrition topics, family planning methods, survey of family planning
and nutrition status in the canmunity, pregnant mothers' health, plight of wida:,..rs,
evils of early marriage, and child care.
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AgriculturaJ and Horticultural Extension
Women have a traditional role in Bangladesh in the horticultural activities around the home. BRAC extension service in horticulture, therefore,
serves both men and worocn. As noted in chapter 4, about 10,000 families in
the Sulla Project area benefited each year by the distribution of vegetable
seeds and by technical advice, and up to 800 acres of land were put
under
vegetable cultivation, including such newly introduced items as carrots,
broccoli, Chinese cabbage, as well as the more traditional vegetables. BRAC
also provided seedlings of fruit plants such as coconuts, bananas, mangoes,
guavas, and papayas, which were planted and reared to a large extent by the
women.
In the Jamalpur Project one of the major activities is to encourage
and assist women in undertaking vegetable, fruit, and other crop cultivation collectively as well as individuz.lly. This young project, only
in
its first year of operation in 1976, has yet to yield substantial results
in the horticultural area. Future plans for Jamalpur as well as
other
areas include efforts to design extension services for economically viable
collective or individual projects on grain processing, poultry and duck
raising, and animal husbandry. Another area to be examined is those technologies that will reduce the drudgery and increase the productivity
of
routine chores around the home: grain processing and storage, food preparation, water collection, household cleaning and sanitation, and so forth.
Health Care and Family Planning
Women constitute a specially vulnerable group in regard to health.
The BRAC health care program, important for the whole population, meets
a special need for women.
Bringing health care directly to the rural
homes through the paramedics also facilitates women's participation in
the program. Special measures to improve the health care provisions for
women through staff development and village women's assemblies are mentioned below.
The family planning program in BRAC, following nearly universal
practice, uses a female-oriented approach: persuasion of women
to
take contraceptive measures. BRAC also encourages male vasectomy because of the simplicity of the procedure and the relatively smaller
medical risks involved. Furthermore, it shows that the responsibility
for family planning lies in a direct personal sense as much with
the
male as with the female population. The BRAC clinics in the Sulla Project also perform tubal ligation operations. However, these terminal
measures are resorted to by only a small number even when
family planning practices are widespread. Without underestimating the
importance of educating men about family plar-ning, it can be said that
the success of the family planning program of BRAC depends very much on
how effectively the female population is reached with the message and
the services of family planning.
The use of female workers in the family planning program and the
related program of mother and child care education are discussed below .
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Mother and Child Care Clubs
Widespread health and nutrition problems of pregnant and lactating
mothers and children observed in the Sulla Project area led to a special
effort to reach this group. The paramedics in their respective villages
organized "mothers' clubs" or a monthly discussion group of the pregnant
and lactating mothers in the village.
This group meets in the village
gonokendra or a suitable home, where health problems and preventive and
curative measures for mothers and children are discussed under the paramedic's guidance and certain services are provided. The services include
blood pressure check, iron and vitamin supplement for pregnant mothers,
weighing the children and recording their weight on "Road to Health" cards.
In the Sulla Project area 73 mothers' clubs were functioning in mid1976, with attendance in each ranging from 10 to 20 mothers plus their
children. About 15 other clubs have been organized in the Jarnalpur Project
area.
A series of posters and a discussion guide keyed to the posters have
been produced by the BRAG materials development unit in order to provide
some structure and guidelines for the mothers' club meetings. Another purpose of the materials and the discussion guide is to enable field workers,
such as functional education instructors without paramedic training,
to
conduct mothers' club discussion groups.
The multicolor wall poster set prepared for the mothers' clubs contains
15 posters on nutrition, care for pregnant and lactating mothers, child care,
family planning, common diseases, and vaccination and inoculation. Each
of
the wall posters is used as the main visual aid for conducting one discussion
session. The discussion guide, compiled in the form of a mimeograph booklet,
explains the basic principles to be observed in effective group
discussion,
the objectives of each session, the main message or information to be conveyed
to the group, the leading questions arising from the wall poster designed for
the particular session, and other questions to maintain the momentum of
the
discussion, with possible follow-up actions to be engaged in by the group and
the discussion leader.
The mothers' club as a device for organizing mother and child health
care is a recent BRAC activity that begar-. in the Sulla Project area
only
in the latter part of 1975 and even more recently in the Jamalpur area, where
the discussion groups are led by the women field workers (experienced functional education instructors who are serving as multipurpose motivators/organizers and supervisors of functional education).
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the clubs. Discussion
with the field workers in Jamalpur revealed a number of problems. Although
a sizeable group gathers on the appointed day, there is often a lack
of
continuity because the same person does not come on a regular basis. There
appears to exist a superstitious belief that weighing a child attracts the
evil eye and causes harm to the child's health.
Some of the field workers
decided to counteract this belief by taking their own little children
to
the village discussion meetings and weighing them in front of the
village
mothers.
It is also often found that some members of the group want
to
discuss problems and topics other than mother and child care. The meetings
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are also frequently attended by a few women who are not pregnant or lactating mothers. They come sometimes as chaperons of the young mothers (especially if a male paramedic is the discussion leader) or just as curiosity
seekers.
In the light of the experience with the mothers' clubs the BRAC
discussion leaders have accumulated some ideas for the future development
of this activity including the following:
(1)

converting the mothers' club into a more general forum for
village women concerned with health and nutrition and renaming it
the women's assembly (Mohila Shobha)

(2)

broadening both its membership and scope and using i t as the
vehicle for discussion, education and planning for
general
development activities that are of interest to the group or
emerge out of the functional education program.

It is interesting that both of these possibilities involve broadening the role and function of the women's forum and a departure from
a
rigidly structured and imposed discussion session. The participants, it
appears, are interested in setting their oFn agenda, pace,
and ground
rules. It is also noteworthy that BRAC field workers on their own have
detected and recognized these tendencies. However, how these needs would
be handled and what steps would be taken to prepare the discussion leaders to meet this demand, to provide the learning materials, and to
link
up the assemblies with other economic and educational activities
were
still to be worked out.
Vocational Training and Cooperatives
In its effort to help destitute women (without a male breadwinner
in the family) earn a living and enable other women to supplement the
family income, BRAC began a vocational training program in Sulla.
The
original ambitious plan envisaged four vocational training centers for
women in the project area teaching many types of productive skills.However it was possible to open only one sewing center in Derai, and the
plan for a weaving center had to be abandored because of problems faced
in procuring cotton yarn that had even made many professional
weavers
unemployed.
In the sewing center 89 women in three batches received training
for three months in tailoring. UNICEF donated sewing machines and cloth
which were used to train the women in making children's clothing.
The
training, however, did not lead to the establishment of economic enterprises that provided employment and income to the trainees.
Apparently,
the local demand for commercial tailoring was being met by the existing
tailors in the bazars, and none of the trainees could afford to invest
in a sewing machine for meeting only the family clothing needs.
BRAC learned from the experience that the problem of unemployment
and absence of earning opportunities in a poor rural area could not be
solved by a skill training effort alone. It decided that "the training
of women in skills which require assistance of male members in such matters as the procurement of raw materials, marketing of finished
goods,
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etc., would not be the right approach for ensuring their economic independence."
BRAC's emphasis, therefore, shifted from skill training to proirotion of collective economic projects by women compatible with the local market demands.
The
women were brought together through functional education groups and the formation of women's cooperatives.
In the Sulla area, some 30 women's cooperatives had made an embryonic
beginning by mid-1976 and were engaged in collective projects in agriculture
(growing of rice, potatoes, legumes, and vegetables), making fishing nets,
and pond fishery. BRAC Field Motivators helped in the initial formation of
the groups, advised the groups about the principles and practices of cooperatives, encouraged them to accumulate capital by regular (though small) saving.
and provided them with small credits with which tc launch their projects.
In the newly initiated Jamalpur Project, by October 1976, there were 29
women's cooperative societies with a total membership of 353, mostly destitute
women or members of the poorest families. Their savings in less than six months
had approached Tk 1,000. With the assistance of the women field workers
of
BRAC and the promise of small loans from BRAC, the group had already launched
or were planning projects in block-printing of cloth, weaving, silkworm raising, oil pressing, running grocery shops, bamboo crafts, poultry, pond fishery,
and farming.
A comparable approach is proposed in the plans for the Manikganj Project:
BRAC's functional education classes will be the initial media
to bring women together. These classes will stimulate women to
think creatively about their environment and to develop their decis ion-rnaking pawers. The learners from these functional education
classes will become the potential core membership of women's societies .... Those members interested in savings and loans will
set
rice saving targets, and with the amount saved credit unions or rice
banks will be established. Loans will then be given to finance srnallscale, village-based economic activities •... The choice of activities
by the women will depend in part on local availability of raw materials
and marketing facilities.
Certain activities will generate cash incomes for the women; others will add to the nutritive value of their
families' diets.2
Women Staff Development
Very often in rural development programs, even when special needs and
problems of women are addressed, the responsibility for carrying out
the
development activities is in the hands of men, and the women become passive
beneficiaries of the project activities and services.
In BRAC, women workers had been employEd as functional education instructors and Lady Family Planning Organizers. However, the Field Motivators

1 BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 19.
2 BRAC, Manikganj Project, p. 15.
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and the paramedics--the personnel responsible for organizing and initiating
the functional education and family planning activities in the villages,
supervising and guiding the instructors and the LFPOs, and providing backstopping to these frontline workers often by direct contact with the rural
residents--were all male. As noted elsewhere, the effectiveness and expansion of the health program suffered because all the paramedics were
men
with whom the village women hesitated to communicate freely.
In 1976, BRAC initiated a number of steps to remedy this situation and
to establish a parity of esteem and responsibilities between men and women
among the BRAC personnel.
As noted in the chapter on health and family planning, all or nearly
all frontline health and family planning workers--the village-based auxiliaries or the shasthya shevikas (with or without the duties of the family
planning organizer)--would be women from the respective villages.
This
was more than adding another tier of workers in the hierarchy; it signified
a change of approach in the delivery of health service that made the village-based shevika the key link in the chain that connected the health program and the rural people.
The third phase of the Sulla Project (beginning in 1976) included the
provision for training and recruiting 15 female paramedics. The training
of these paramedics, besides the subjects contained in the regular paramedic
syllabus, would include midwifery, mother and child care, and certain women's
diseases. The female paramedics were also to be trained in IUD insertion and
tubal ligation in order to reduce further the dependence on qualified doctors.
With the

goals

of

training

women program

personnel,

transfer-

ring to women the direction of women-related activities, and exploring
new
program ideas for improving the social status and economic condition of rural
women, BRAC decided to open one camp in the Sulla Project area to be directed
and staffed entirely by women. It was felt that in an all-female environment
some of the housing problems and social obstacles in recruiting female fulltime staff might be overcom~. The women's camp in Anandapur, with a direct
responsibility for programs in a cluster of 10 villages and indirect responsibility for support of BRAC activities affecting women in the whole project
area, opened in March 1976 with a female Area Manager and three Field Motivators (two local and one outsider). Nine other women joined the camp
as
trainees who would serve as BRAC personnel in Sulla or in other locations.
The women in BRAC who conceived the idea of the camp (and one of whom serves
as the Area Manager) describe the role of the camp as follows:
These staff [in the camp] carry out the female segment of
BRAC's ongoing activities: functional education,
public
health, family planning, cooperatives. They will also experiment with and demonstrate potential economic activities
for
women: poultry and duck farming, food processing, intensified
horticulture, manufacturing of utility items, etc. Eventually
it is hoped they might design extension services and appropriate technologies to improve women's grain processing,
fuel
processing, water collection, etc.
Anandapur Camp will serve also as a training centre for prospective female leadership from other areas. Each camp's staff
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members [there are eleven other all-male camps in the Sulla
Project area] are being encouraged to locate a core of motivated and interested women from their camp areas to facilitate
some of the development activities ~ow being facilitated by
male staff. Anandapur camp will serve both as an experimental laboratory (in which various ideas for women's development activities can be tested and evaluated) and as a training
centre (for local female leadership) .1
The Jamalpur Project
In the Jamalpur Project of BRAC, which evolved from an ad hoc functional
education component in a UNICEF-sponsored "food-for-work" schemefor destitute
women into a special women's project of BRAC, the women functional education
teachers took the initiative and assumed responsi.bility for planning, managing, and implementing the whole project. When the UNICEF-assisted
project
came to an end in November 1975, the 15 women instructors decided to continue
the functional education courses and to expand the scope of their activities
to village-based women's development work in the villages of the functional
education participants. The women teachE:rs, with the assistance of BRAC headquarters staff, prepared the project plans for poor rural women in 28 villages
of the Jamalpur subdivision. The objectives of the project, as formulated by
the women after investigating the needs and priorities of the potential participants in the villages, were as follows:
1.

to make village women conscious of the root causes of their problems
and to help them seek solutions;

2.

to control population growth through family planning rnovitaion
delivery of services;

and

3.

to encourage joint savings and cooperative economic activities
village women;

by

4.

to educate village women in hygiene and nutrition;

5.

to encourage horticulture and poultry raising by women;

6.

to encourage village women to utilize fallow land surrounding their
respective villages;

7.

to intitiate women's organizations in the villages; and

8.

to educate village women.

The 15 women set up their headquarters and a dormitory facility (for those
not resident of the town) in a rented house in Jamalpur town and launched
the

lKhushi Kabir, et al., Rural Women in Bangladesh:
Dacca, The Ford Foundation, May 1976, Appendix A, p. 5.
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project in January 1976.
Most of them came from the general area. Ten of
them were marriQd and were in the age-range of 19 to 25 years (except one
who was 45). Their formal educational achievement varied from eighth grade
to twelfth grade. They came to BRAC as candidates for the instructor's position in UNICEF-assisted functional education without any previous development work background and were chosen from a total pool of 60 applicants
on
the basis of an interview by the BRAC functional education coordinator. After
their selection, the women went through a five-day training course for functional education instructors. This training, the experience of conducting
thE: functional education courses with the destitute women, and two short evaluation and planning workshops (organized for them by BRAC to help evaluate thi
results of their work with the destitute women and to consider the issues in
planning the future Jamalpur Project) were the women's main training and professional development exposure before they embarked on the new project.
By November 1976 the 14 women and one team leader were working in pairs
five days a week in the 28 villages (with a population of 36,000 and 6,400
families). In 15 functional education centers, close to 200 women attended
courses three days a week. As mentioned earlier, 29 women's savings groups
were engaged in or planning group economic projects.
In 32 mothers' clubs, women discussed once a week (average attendance
of 10-15) health, nutrition, hygiene, sanitation, and child care
problems
and actions. Over 550 acceptors of family planning measures were recruited
(including 170 tubal ligation and 29 vasectomy cases). Each Saturday
the
women instructors/field workers met to report and discuss the previous week's
activities and to plan for and discuss the next week's activities.
The
teachers formed their own savings society and opened a joint bank account.
The teachers together with selected village women received training
with
BRAC headquarters assistance in public health and nutrition, duck and poultry raising, composting, and horticulture. (For instance, two rural women
from Jamalpur were sent to Sylhet, 200 miles away, for a six-week training
course in duck farming conducted by a church organization. On their return,
these women started demonstration duck farms and were ready to advise others
interested in raising ducks.) In the course of a few months the team
of
functional education teachers were maturing into a team of development workers.
Concluding Points
The relatively new and exploratory activities related to the improvement of economic condition and social status of women and making women partners in the overall rural development efforts already succeeded in indicating
the potentialities of these activities and in demonstrating the promise of
specific program approaches.l
It is evident, in thE: first place, that rural women, even those without formal education and experience in roles outside the family environment,
can serve effectively as frontline workers in such roles as those of Shasthya shevikas,Family Planning Organizers, and functional education
lsee Khushi Kabir,~ al., Rural Women in Bangladesh .... ,££· cit.
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instructors (who, of course, must have some fonnal education).
Second, women with some educational achievement and an interest in assuming a role outside home--irrespective of whether they are from a rural
or
a
semiurban background--may be motivated and trained to take up supervisory, leadership, and field operation responsibilities involving extensive travel, public
contact, and personal initiatives (as in the position of paramedics and
the
Field Motivator).
Third, relatively inexperienced women with appropriate motivation, interest, and training, are able to plan, design, manage, and implement a development program designed to benefit rural women.
Finally, social constraints and inhibitions can be overcome if female
workers live and work in teams. Village women also respond to female field
workers and are willing to travel from their homes to attend meetings, form
cooperatives, and participate in collective activities.
Despite the promising leads given by the BRAC efforts, many of the most
apparent economic and social problems of the women participants in the various
projects are by no means about to be solved.
The capacity to save money among the members of the cooperative groups is
very small, and it cannot begin to provide the necessary capital even for modest
economic ventures. For the limited number of groups with economic propositions
in Sulla and Jamalpur, BRAC has given the seed money. But with a larger number
of groups in the two areas and particularly if the approach is expected to expand to other areas, the demand for capital funds and the problem of managing
and monitoring the use of these funds will be beyond the capacity of BRAC as
well as that of other agencies, including the government.
Identifying and designing viable economic projects ensuring a reasonable
return to each member of a group have been found to be extremely difficult.
The experience to date in BRAC s~ggests that for maintenance of motivation and
effort, it is crucial that an individual's return is sufficient to make
at
least a small impact on his economic position. It is not enough for a
group
project's total return to be relatively large, if the total when divided among
members becomes insignificant.
Even if projects are theoretically sound, they need management and supervision that is not always within the competence of BRAC field workers. Anything
beyond extremely simple and primitive production or processing activities often
requires complementary inputs and support beyond the means of the project.
These are difficult to organize.
Besides these obvious difficulties, the fundamental problem

lies in

the

subsistence character of the rural economy with its extremely limited effective
demand for commercial products and services. This situation severely limits the
opportunities for families without access to agricultural land. A general improvement in the economic situation, spurred by higher agricultural production
and better distribution of income, will generate the demands for nonsubsistence
goods and servjces and create a trore conducive environment for the poor women's
economic ventures. Improvement of the women's situation beyond a certain point
and beyond small numbers included in special "hot-house" projects is inextricably connected with overall rural development with equitable distribution.
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It bears reemphasizing, however, that a lot more can be done to
involve women prominently in health, family planning, education, and
other social development efforts for rural families. This involvement
will not only enhance the social status and self-esteem of women, but
also help make the development activities more effective.
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6

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF STAFF

A difficult problem in all rural development programs is the recruitment of field workers and supervisory people who not only are well-motivated,
dedicated, and willing to give up the attractions of the city, but are also
perceptive about rural problems, sensitive about pride and values of the rural
people, and above all, willing to learn from their experience. A difference
is usually noted in· spirit and motivation between the personnel in the government agencies and those in nongovernment voluntary agencies--often because of
the close-knit interpersonal relationships in a small organization,
the influence of ideologically motivated leadership in voluntary programs, and the
fact that voluntary organizations tend to attract idealists. However, voluntary organizations have their own share of personnel problems in finding the
right people for the right tasks, helping the workers develop the necessary
skills and competence, and maintaining their motivation and confidence in the
face of frustration and failures. Any program past the stage of a small shoestring operation and employing paid workers needs to be concerned about
the
questions of recruitment, staff development, and efficiency of performance.
Another issue is to what extent and in what way government field agents
can
sustain the kind of motivation and enthusiasm that many workers in voluntary
programs apparently have.
BRAC Personnel
In July 1976, BRAC's personnel roll included 157 full-time members, excluding part-time workers in the villages such as the Lady Family
Planning
Organizers, and voluntary workers such as the functional education instructors,
and youth program leaders. By the end of the year, the total number of fulltime personnel rose to about 200 with the addition of 30 newly recruited shasthya shevikas and 14 trainee female paramedics.
Of the regular personnel, about 10 may be regarded as constituting the
directing staff of BRAC, including the Executive Director, the coordinators of
different administrative functions, the Program Administrators for Sulla
and
Manikganj, and the Medical Officers. The support staff including the training
and materials personnel, staff writers, clerical workers, drivers and mechanics, custodial staff, and office helpers numbered about 50. The number of paramedics including the trainee women recruits was 45. The main workhorse
for
BRAC's field activities with direct and multiple responsibilities for identifying and assessing opportunities and needs for field activities and initiating,
guiding, and supporting them, is the Field Motivator, 49 of whom were in employment in mid-1976. Directly above the Field Motivators, with immediate responsibility for guiding and assisting the Field Motivators, W8re 19 Program
Supervisors (also known as Area Managers).
The Field Motivator is the basic rank to which new multipurpose field
workers are recruited, and at this level the BRAC personnel receive
their
62
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orientation and experience in the rural development approach of BRAC. Although lateral entry at the higher management levels has been necessary
initially and still continues to some degree in the headquarters, a career
ladder appears to be emerging as more workers are promoted to higher levels
in the hierarchy from the rank of the Field Motivators. Recruitment
and
training of specialized BRAC workers in health and education has been discussed in other chapters. This chctpter will deal mainly with the
Field
Motivators--the backbone of the BRAC personnel structure.
Recruitment Criteria and Procedure
There was initially a heavy emphasis on high formal education qualification in the recruitment of BRAC personnel; this emphasis still persists
although its application appears to be somewbat less rigid now.
At
the
beginning of the Sulla Project, when BRAC had to recruit both the field level workers and the supervisory personnel (at that time there had been no
opportunity to appoint supervisors by promotion), the bas1.c requirements for
Field Motivators were college graduation (two to three years of college education after the higher secondary stage), and the candidates for supervisory positions such as Area Managers (also called Program Supervisors)
were required to have a master's degree. The emphasis was on the level of
college qualifications rather than on a specific disciplinary background
because a master's or bachelor's degree in any subject was acceptable
as
the requisite qualification.
The argument for the high value attached to formal education degrees
(irrespective of the subject of study) as put forth by BRAC was that a high
level of formal education was likely to be associated with an adequate level
of intellectual competence, leadership qualities, and an ability to analyze
and learn from new experiences. The possible alienation of the educated
youth from the rural environment and the difficulties in establishing a
bond of empathy and rapport between the rural people and the urban-educated
youth were apparently not a great concern to BRAC. The feeling was
that
with its very low level of urbanization, Bangladesh was essentially a "rural"
country and even the university-educated young people were not completely
severed from their rural roots. The most important reason for insisting on
high educational credentials probably was that with the prevailing high level of unemployment am:>ng the college educated there was an ample supply of
these candidates for BRAC jobs.
As it turned out, the university degree was not actually the determining factor in recruitment. In selecting the personnel from the large
pool
of available candidates, all with university degrees, BRAC management
used
other criteria. Assessment of the candidate's suitability for the Field Motivator's job, determined through personal interview and personal reconunendations about an individual's qualities and aptitudes, was really the decisive
factor. It was all quite subjective--contingent largely on the notion of
the qualities and competence considered necessary for the field worker's
job by the person conducting the interview or making the recommendation.
It is difficult to make a judgment on the formal qualifications and
the selection procedure followed, because there is really no benchmark
for comparison. The Executive Director of BRAC considered t!1e process
as "hit or miss" and found the attrition rate among workers as relatively
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high. He pointed out that, out of hundreds of job applicants who submit
their applications whenever new recruitment is announced, ten might
be
selected. Out of the ten, t"1o would not turn up, t"1o would leave during
the first D.10 months, two would be asked to resign as incompetent within
the first few months, b.10 would continue as "plodders" in their level of
performance and motivation, and two would turn out to be effective, wellmotivated, and enthusiastic. Most of the workers would stay on if they
survived the first six months.
In order to improve on the "hit or miss" results described above, a
new selection procedure was introduced in 1976. This procedure consists
essentially of a two-day group interaction session of the applicants retained on a "short list" after preliminary screening of the written applications. The group session, called the "selection course" requires
the
applicants to engage in a series of exercises selected from BRAC training
modules (see below) involving communication, planning, and analytical skills.
The exercises offer the opportunity to BRAC management to observe and assess
the applicant's personality, perception of rural development problems, leadership qualities, analytical ability, and planning capability. The applicant also has the opportunity to get a taste of what might be required of
him as a BRAC worker and whether the job suits his own expectations
and
temperament.
The procedure is applied in selecting new male and female
Field Motivators. This procedure makes the selection process more systematic and permits at least an attempt to relate a potential recruit's competence, aptitude, and personality traits to the tasks required to be performed by the Field Motivator. The process, however, is yet to undergo
sufficient trial to warrant any definitive judgment.
Staff Training
The training and orientation of the Field Motivators and other nonspecialized BRAC personnel have been dependent on a combination of brief
orientation sessions and the initiation of the workers into the
methods
and approaches of BRAC through practical experience.
The new recruits go through an initial orientation course for about
a week in which the new personnel become familiar with the BRAC development approach, an overview of the program activities, specific responsibilities and assignments of field workers, and the work procedures · and
the administrative routines. After they are dispatched to the field, the
apprenticeship continues at least for a three-month period when the
new
recruits are accompanied and guided by their senior colleagues.
After
this apprenticeship period, the new Field Motivators are given independent
assignments and increasingly greater responsibilities. The Program Supervisors (previously known as Area Managers), each one of whom supervises no
more than four or five Field Motivators, are always at hand to assist and
advise the latter. Moreover, the full-time field workers of BRAC (Program
Supervisor, Field Motivators, and paramedics) usually reside in a communal
style in camps.
This leads to a close association with almost daily
comparison of notes and ideas, both formally at the Program Supervisor's
initiative as well as informally.
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Problems and progress in field activities and plans for the subsequent
months are taken up at monthly meetings at the project level (e.g., in Sulla,
Manikganj, and Jamalpur), attended by all Program Supervisors and selected
Field Motivators in turn. These meetings serve as a learning experience for
the Motivators and they provide training and scpervisory guidelines for the
Supervisors.
In addition, special training opportunities are organized on specific
topics. For instance, before the introduction of the second cycle of the
functional education course and after the revision of the course content and
methodology at the end of the first cycle, all field staff in the Sulla Project went through a five-day training session on the implementation of
the
functional education program. The Sulla Project staff attended special training sessions on cooperative principles and practices organized in Camilla in
cooperation with the Cooperative College and the Academy for Rural Development. A month-long staff development workshop was conducted in the Sulla Project in July-August 1976, in which BRAC headquarters personnel, training
staff, and field staff deliberated on seven selected topics--reorientation
of functional education instructors, functional education methodology, BRAC
approach to development, "consciousness raising" among the rural people,
human relations, leadership and communication, and the third phase strategy
for the Sulla Project. Similarly, a week-long evaluation and planning workshop was organized for the functional education teachers in the Jamalpur
Project before they launched the special women's project there.
A small training team under a Chief Trainer was put together in BRAC
headquarters early in 1974 and given the responsibility for arranging the
special training and orientation sessions for the BRAC field personnel and
for developing a portfolio of training materials and methods on specific
topics called training modules. BRAC received assistance from a training
expert provided by the Ford Foundation in the preparation of the training
modules. The modules are resource materials on a specific subject that can
be drawn upon in organizing a training session on the subject. These can be
modified, adapted, and combined for specific groups, depending on their needs
and the available training time. In fact, for each group of trainees, a
special training program that may vary from a day to a month is worked out
by adapting and combining the modules.
The training modules developed so far are the following:
1.

Communications. There are three modules in the communications
area--(a) teachi_ng of methods for dissemination of ideas in a
way that creates a sense of participation from all parties concerned; (b) organizational analysis and needs assessment to understand exactly what the organization desires from its workers,
what the workers expect of the organization, and what they together expect their accomplishments to be; and (c) program planning where all members are involved in the process of establishing the goals and objectives of the program leading to plans and
objectives to which all parties are committed.

2.

Group dynamics. Establishing a sense of team effort through
genuine interaction, teaching how to work together for common
goals, and reaching consensus.
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3.

Leadership. Helping trainees to be self-confident and identifying
and helping develop qualities and skills needed to achieve leadership status that is freely accepted by the people concerned.

4.

Consciousness raising. Helping trainees develop analytical skills
to understand why certain conditions and situations exist in
the
rural areas and to formulate and assess alternative approaches to
solving specific rural problems.

S.

Functional education. Training instructors in methodologies developed specifically for use with BRAC functional education material. 1
Training and Resource Center (TARC)

With the establishment in mid-1976 of a Training and Resource Center consisting of six full-time staff members, the staff training program has become a
systematic and regular activity and has developed into a service that is available to other organizations and groups interested in rural development and the
BRAC program approach. The establishment of TARC does not mark any basic change
in training content and methodology, but it permits orderly planning and management of the training activities and provides some assurance that the necessary
staff and resources are devoted to training. An important motivation for setting up the center was also the growing demand by many voluntary organizations
in the country for training assistance from BRAC for their own workers. Another
reason was a new emphasis in BRAC's own program strategy on rural youth "selfstarter" groups and youth leaders who might be trained and supported to initiate
rural self-help projects without building a heavy staff and organization structure maintained by BRAC (see the chapter on institutional structures).
In 1976, about one-half of TARC staff time and training activities was
spent in providing services to other voluntary organizations. 111ey were charged
fees roughly on the basis of actual costs for the services provided. 111e rest of
TARC activities were devoted to training BRAC's own staff and rural youths identified as potential leaders of "self-starter" groups. A program timetable of TARC
for one month (December 1976) ir.dicates the typical scope and nature of TARC activities (see Table 6.1).
111e Training and Resource Center was located in Dacca in 1976 in a rented
building adjacent to the BRAC headquarters. It is planned, however, that
the
center will be set up in a rural location with residential accommodation and run
like an ashram where trainees and trainers together form a connnunity,
meeting
their basic needs through necessary manual labor and creating an environment for
a total living-learning experience. 2 It is also planned that the training staff
will alternate between training work at the center and regular field assignments
in BRAC projects.
Six acres of land have been purchased at a cost of Tk 400,000 in Savar, 20
miles west of Dacca, for the site of the training center. 111e dormitory, staff

lBRAC, Training and Support Programme for Rural Development, n.d., pp. 2-3.
2BRAC, Training and Support Programme ..... p. 5.

STAFF

Tab le 6 .1
TARC Program for the Month of December, 1976
Organization
Providing
Trainees

Trainer

Date/
Period

Mijanur Rahman

13th-17th

Youth leaders'
training

BRAC/Manikganj

ManikganJ

Selim Ahmed
Shahid Talukder

8th

Project planning
workshop

Connnunity
Development
Foundation

CDF-Dacc

Selim Ahmed

9th-17th

Management of
works program

BRAC

Dacca &
Savar

Rafiqul Islam

9th-20th

Works program

BRAC

Sa var

Mijanur Rahman
Selim Ahmed

19th-24th

Motivation and
cormnunication
training

Swallows of
Sweden

Dacca &
Shaturia

Mahbuba Karim

7th-9th

Follow-up of
previous trainees
and consultancy

UNICEF

Mijanur Rahman
Selim Ahmed
Rafiqul Islam

27th-31st

Youth leaders'
training

BRAC
Manikganj

Manikgac~

Shams ul Huda

8th-16th

Poultry extension

BRAC/Jamalpur

Jamalpur

Shamsul Huda

20th-31st

Poultry complex
construction

BRAC/TARC

Savar

Gishpoti Roy

6th-12th

Pond fisheries

BRAC/Sulla

Sulla

Gishpoti Roy

18th-3ls t

Duck hatchery
construction

BRAC/TARC

Savar

Source:

Assignment

Training and Resource Centre,
Dacca.

Venue

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee,
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residences, meeting rooms and other facilities are expected to cost a similar
amount. The annual recurring expenses for running the center is estimated to
be about Tk 350,000--a part of which will be recovered from fees for services
provided to other organizations.
Maintaining Motivation and Morale
Persistence in rural development work and efforts to improve the condition
of the poorest in a political climate and socioeconomic environment not particularly conducive to rapid social change takes a high level of stoic fortitude
and a certain philosophical disposition. Successes when achieved are small and
slow to come, and frsutrations and failures are frequent. A consistently high
level of enthusiasm among rural development workers is unrealistic to expect. A
high degree of "achievement motivation" gratified by quick and visible accomplishments is probably not as helpful to a rural development worker as it might
be in McClelland's entrepreneurial world.l Morale and enthusiasm among the BRAC
workers, therefore, have their natural "ups and downs," as the Executive Director put it. It is also likely that a number of the BRAC workers would prefer to
have remained in the city with a desk-bound job in a government or commercial off ice and have come to BRAC only as a second choice.
On the whole, however, the level of enthusiasm and dedication among the workers is regarded as high by the BRAC leadership--an assessment confirmed by
ICED
researchers' impressions from visits to project sites and discussions at
field
camps. This is attributed to a number of factors by the Executive Director
of
BRAC:
1.

Friendly interpersonal relationship among the workers is emphasized
and the leadership pays attention to and helps resolve any interpersonal problems among workers.

2.

There is a high level of flexibility in administration and management of program activities. Workers have a great deal of freedom
about taking initiatives and making decisions and usually
would
receive backing from the leadership in their decisions and judgment.

3.

There is an informality in relationship between the workers and the
program management. The Executive Director and other program leaders are freely accessible to all workers.

4.

The communal environment of camp living generates an organizational
spirit and helps to protect the workers from the sense of isolation
and frustration a conscientious rural development worker may feel.
Concluding Comments

It is not clear what the dividends have been in terms of performance and
motivation because of the emphasis on formal education credentials in the recruitment of Field Motivators and higher level personnel. A variation seems
to persist among personnel in performance and commitment to program goals as
indicated by the "hit or miss" character of the results obtained from the re-

1

David W. McClelland and David G. Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement:
Accelerating Economic Development through Psychological Training (New York:
The Free Press, 1971).
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cruitment process. The new recruitment approach thrcugh group interaction
exercises is an interesting innovation and represents an attempt to make
the selection of personnel more rational and less intuitive. However, if
this approach proves to be more satisfactory, it would only indicate
the
importance of assessing personal traits and qualitiEs of individuals rather
than placing a premium on university degrees.
Apparently little weight is given to the local background of the workers--the project staff being drawn from all over the country. The educational requirements, in a sense, restrict the possibility of local youths
being employed as Field Motivators, because very few university-educated
young men can be found living in their own villages. There are both ad.vantages and risks in giving a preference to the local candidates in recruitment. The local youths are likely to be acquainted with and sensitive
to local social and cultural characteristics and capable of identifying
with the aspirations and values of the people in the area. On the other
hand, in a social structure marked by inequity, the most likely candidates
for a development worker are apt to be members of the local "gentry," or
similar privileged groups, and they may not be effective in serving
and
safeguarding the interests of the local poor. A Field Motivator from
another district, even if he comes from a class background similar to that
of the local workers,will probably not be inclined as much to identify
himself with or to be sympathetic to the local power structure. Generalizations, of course, are inappropriate because the determining factor is
each individual's own attitudes and level of awareness of the rural socioeconomic condition.
In the light of recent shifts of emphasis in BRAC program strategy
towards stronger local organizations and less reliance on a large BRAC
staff for local project management, the pros and cons of recruiting local field workers need to be reexamined. There may be significant advantages and far-reaching consequences of recruiting and training local Field
Motivators who may, after a stint with BRAC, pursue a career in politics
and local government and carry over the BRAC experience and outlook to
their new vocations. Such workers would not become professional BRAC
field workers, and their life's ambition and the rewards and incentives
would not be tied to the career ladder held out by BRAC. Obviously, it
is not necessary or appropriate to apply the principle of local recruitment rigidly, even if it is found to be generally desirable.
The establishment of a training center and setting up courses ready
to be offered on request may have led to a process of growing formalization of training and an abstraction of training from the essence of program activities. Formal training sessions on specific topics and skills
as well as for general orientation can be extremely valuable. However,
the practical insight into the intricacies of rural life, the perception
of the problems of the rural poor, the approaches to dealing with them,
and the skills and understanding necessary for effective human relations
are developed through practical experience and are very much affected by
the program objectives and rationale.
The training modules will never
replace the learning experiences of the field worker during his initial
apprenticeship and as he begins to take on independent assignments
and
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responsibilities; but the training sessions and the
invaluable as complements and stimulants to further
tary and catalytic role of a training center needs
continues to provide its services to BRAC and other

BRAC

refresher workshops can be
learning.
This complemento be recognized as TARC
organizations.

If indeed it is desirable in voluntary organizations to have field workers
whose life's ambition does not lie in climbing the career
ladder
in a rural
development program and if the skills as a rural development worker cannot
be
abstracted from the substance of the program to be put into the content of
a
training course, then approaches followed for staff development and utilization
in large public programs and small voluntary agencies must be somewhat divergent.
Centralized planning and decisiorunaking, larger bureaucracies, standardized personnel management and administrative procedures, whjle understandable in large
public programs, do not readily lend themselves to the improvisation, individualization, and destandardization possible in recruitment, training, interpersonal
relationship, and administrative procedures in small voluntary programs.
The
public programs also would have these advantages to the extent that the nature
of the public programs change in the direction of greater decentralization, local integration of development efforts, and local flexibility.

CHAPTER

7

DEVELOPMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Creation of appropriate institutional infrastructures is both a pre-condition for effective rural development programs and an objective
of
such programs. The organizational and staff structure of a program and the
concomitant mobilization of the beneficiary population into participatory
institutions make it possible to carry out thE. program activities.
This
process of participation at the same time can help the beneficiary populations develop their own capabilities to control and manage the development
activities in a locality--growing increasingly less dependent either
on
outside voluntary organizations or a centralized government bureaucracy.
BRAC's approach to rural development attaches a high value to the
growth of local participatory institutions and self-sustaining and selfmanaged rural development. However, in the short span of time since the
inception of the BRAC development program, there has been an evolution of
concepts and strategies about creating and strengthening institutional
structures for rural development. Definitive solutions to the problems
of institutional structures have not been found by BRAC and probably should
not be expected; nevertheless, the BRAC experience with these problems and
its continuing efforts to deal with them are instructive.
BRAC Organization and Staff Structure
In 1976, the BRAC organization was physically spread out in Dacca,
where the central offices were located, and in three project locations-Sulla, Manikganj, and Jamalpur.
The central offices consisted of the Executive Director's office,
the administration and accounts departments, the materials development
unit, the Gonokendro editorial office, the research and evaluation unit,
and the Training and Resource Center (until the Savar site for the center is fully developed) .
The field organization was most elaborate in Sulla where BRAC was
born and where the project had been in operation the longest. The Sulla
Project area was divided into 11 sectors under 2 zones. Each sector was
headed by an Area Manager (also known as a Program Supervisor) who had
an average of 4 Field Motivators and 3 paramedics working under him. The
Area Managers reported to the two Program Coordinators in charge of the
two zones, and they in turn were supervised by the Field Coordinator for
the Sulla Project. There were also three Medical Officers in the project
area in charge of three cl~nics and responsible for providing technical
support to the health workers in the area. In mid-1976 there were 42
Field Motivators and 31 paramedics in the Sulla Project area (in addition
14 women paramedics were under training). There were also 30 newly appointed shasthya shevikas functioning as full-time village health
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Figure 1.
Simplified Organization Chart of BRAC
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auxiliaries in 30 villages; shevikas were to be ultimately appointed in each
village in order to intensify the coverage of and improve the access to the
health services in the area. There were also about 90 part-time Lady Family
Planning Organizers and an unspecified number of volunteer and unpaid functional educational instructors and youth workers in the project area.
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In the Manikganj Project in late 1976, there were 7 Program Supervisors
under the direction of the Program Administrator. Ultimately, in each of the
8 unions (with a total population of about 100,000) to be covered by the BRAC
project, a team of 2 Program Supervisors was planned to be posted. No Field
Motivators were proposed to be appointed in Manikganj. The health care activities were not yet operational in Manikganj. The plan, however, was to post
a single paramedic in each union and 3 to 4 village-based auxiliaries in each
village~a smaller ratio of paramedics to population than in Sulla and a greater reliance on the shevikas for basic health and family planning services.
(Meanwhile, BRAC supported financially a local voluntary family planning organization based in Manikganj that provided clinical services and performed tubectornies and vasectomies.)
In Jamalpur's special women's project covering 28 villages and a total
population of 36,000, there were 14 women functional education instructors/
field workers under the supervision of a Program Supervisor. Functional education groups, mothers' clubs, women's cooperatives, and group economic activities were to be organized, and nonclinical family planning services were
to be provided by these women with the assistance of local volunteers. Basic
health care was not included in the initial phase of the Jamalpur Project.

!
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The field organizations in Manikganj and Jamalpur, both of which were initiated in 1976, show a distinct shift from the pattern in Sulla. The significance of this shift is discussed later in this chapter.
The organizational structure described above was not meant to carry out
the rural development program of BRAC by itself. The effectiveness of this
structure depended on how well it could help create and support various organizations and institutions of the local people as the instruments for implementing the multifaceted development program of BRAC. We turn now
to
these organizations.
Cooperatives and Other Local Organizations

- ·'

Cooperative societies of rural groups with homogeneous economic and development interests are seen by BRAC as essential for collective self-help efforts as
well as efficient provisions for support services and inputs. A major task
of
all BRAC field workers is the promotion of cooperatives~educating rural residents about the importance and ways of coope:ra tion, encouraging them to save and
to undertake cooperative projects, and assisting them to form and manage cooperative societies.
BRAC was interested in forming new societies as well as rejuvenating existing farmers' and fishermen's cooperatives in the Sulla Project area. Many of the
old societies had become ineffective, having fallen into the hands of powerful
groups in the village such as the larger landowners and m:ineylenders.
Input
allocations, credit facilities, and other benefits of cooperative societies
available from the government were monopolized by members of the managing group
to the detriment of general members' interest. Furtherm:)re, corruption and mis-
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management at the top were a conunon feature of the cooperatives.
One of the first tasks before BRAC was to rid the cooperatives of their
unsavory image. It was necessary to restore the confidence of the general
members in cooperative societies and eliminate the prevalent corruption and
bad management. BRAC emphasized the importance of cooperative spirits, savings habits, collective responsibility, and cooperative projects, rather than
achievement of legal status as a registered society under government regulation, although this was not discouraged. All Field Motivators were trained
in cooperative accounting practices, and books of accounts of the societies
were updated and regularly maintained. BRAC arranged with government cooperative inspectors for audit and regular inspection of the societies' state
of affairs. The societies were encouraged to hold regular weekly meetings,
and the members were encouraged to attend these meetings. BRAC field workers attended many of these meetings. New management connnittees were elected
for many societies in a democratic mannEr. A training session was arranged
for 154 chairmen and secretaries of the cooperatives by the joint efforts
of the BRAC staff and the extension officers of the cooperative department.
About 120 primary cooperative societies were active in the Sulla Project area in 1976. About 80 of these were farmers' cooperatives, approximately 30 were fishermen's cooperatives, and the rest were societies formed
by women's groups and landless laborers. The combined savings of these societies had exceeded Tk 200,000 by early 1976. Following the national pattern under the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) of the government,
the Sulla Thana Central Cooperative Association (STCCA) was formed in early
1974. The role of the central association is to serve as a channel
for
credit funds and inputs available from the government for the primary society's members, to provide common services to the small primary societies
they are unable to arrange by themselves, and to maintain liaison with government departments on matters of common interest to the rural cooperative
members.
Interference by a prominent member of the ruling political party, who
was interested in controlling the government patronage offered through the
central association and was opposed to the prominent role of BRAC in the
local cooperative movement, gave the STCCA an inauspicious start.
The
situation improved, however, after the change of government in August 1975.
The government appointed a Project Officer under the IRDP whose job was to
provide teclmical assistance and management advice to STCCA.
The STCCA
and through it the primary societies received the exclusive fertilizer
dealership for the thana, and a credit fund of Tk 500,000 for lending to
members of the primary societies was made available by the government.
A
central association was also formed in 1976 in Derai thana, part of which
is included in the BRAC project area.
Deviating somewhat from the IRDP national pattern, the Sulla central
association decided to decentralize its activities by forming another tier
of association in each of the four unions in Sulla thana with all the primary societies in the union as its members. There was an enthusiastic response to this idea from primary societies, and land and money were donated
by the local people for erecting the STCCA office.
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In the Jamalpur Project some 29 women's groups were engaged in collective economic projects.
(See ·discussion in the chapter on women's programs.)
In Manikganj, during the first year of its operation in 1976, 27 groups of
women and landless laborers with a total membership of over 400 were being
assisted by BRAC field workers in group economic activities, including handhusking and marketing of rice, farming, weaving, and pottery. These groups
in Jamalpur and Manikganj were at a pre-cooperative stage in the legal sense
and were entirely dependent for credits and inputs on BRAC, not being eligible for support from the government sources.
In addition to the above, in
November 1976, there were 19 other groups in Manikganj with 339 members
which had made more progress towards becoming full-fledged cooperative societies with elected managing conunittees, regular membership meetings, and
weekly thrift savings. Among these groups were 10 women's cooperatives with
158 members, 6 landless farmers' groups with 138 members, 2 weavers' societies
with 24 members, and 1 potters' society with 19 members.
As the description of the Jamalpur and Manikganj efforts in the development of cooperatives (and collective economic enterprises) indicates, there
is a deliberate emphasis in these projects to concentrate on helping the
underprivileged groups organize collective self-help efforts through cooperatives--in contrast to the general cooperative development effort in the
country by such agencies as the IRDP and the cooperative department, both of
which have concentrated on cooperatives of landowning farmers.
The cooperatives and pre-cooperative groups were seen as the institutional means for economic improvement. For the purpose of mobilizing people's
initiative and motivation, creating a conducive environment for self-help
efforts, and raising the level of awareness about the roots of rural problerrs
and ways of dealing with them, BRAC introduced two kinds of institutions--the
Gonokendro (people's center) and the functional education groups.
The Gonokendro, a modest building established in each village as a center
of village community life and a physical base for various development efforts,
was given a high priority in the second phase of the Sulla Project. Construction of 175 Gonokendro buildings were planned through joint contributions of
BRAC and the individual village communities. BRAC was to supply the building
materials and the villagers were to provide the land, labor, and the furniture.
Actually 129 buildings were constructed by the end of 1974--mostly modest
bamboo and timber structures.
While the accomplishments in physical construction of the buildings were
relatively good, the experie.nce of Gonokendro was an eye-opener for BRAC.
In
many instances, it was found difficult to overcome the rivalry of opposing
factions, patronized and supported by influential families in the village.
Many of the village committees formed for directing the Gonokendro did not
have the support and confidence of the whole village.
In at least one-third
of the villages, it was not even possible to agree on a site for the center.
Apparently, the Gonokendro as a focal point for village organization and
activities was BRAC's own concept of how the villagers could be organized and
mobilized for development efforts. This concept ignored the reality of
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conflicts of interests among the village residents and the fact that the
village community was not really one entity. The Gonokendro, an attractive idea on the face of it, did not live up to BRAC's expectations. BRAC
concluded:
"Despite the fact that this programme accounted for a substantial part of BRAC effort the achievement of the programme was not commensurate with the effort. 11 1 While building a community center ir. the village
was not ruled out if the village desired it and was willing to contribute
to its building and upkeep, it was not included as a project item in the
third phase of Sulla or in other BRAC projects.
The role of the functional education groups in helping self-help efforts
and in supporting the total rural development efforts has been discussed elsewhere in this report.
The group health insurance scheme and the mothers' clubs also have been
described in other chapters of the report. The insurance scheme is intended
to mobilize local financial support for the health care and family planning
services, distribute the cost burden of health care evenly among the population and keep it within acceptable limits, and eventually be a mechanism for
substantial participation of the local people in the management of the health
program. The mothers' clubs are designed to facilitate health and nutrition
education and to serve as a forum for collective and individual actions for
the improvement of mothers' and children's health.
Important questions about the institutional and organizaticnal arrangements of a rural development program are to what extent these arrangements
facilitate community participation in its various dimensions and promote
better integration of the program activities among themselves and with other
rural development efforts.
Community Participation
Two main aspects of community participation are the distribution of
the benefits of the development program among the various segments of the
community population and the degree of active involvement of the beneficiary population in managing and carrying out the development activities.
Since BRAC has been in operation for some length of time only in the
Sulla Project area, ICED attempted to determine to what extent the benefits
of BRAC activities reached the poorer and the more underprivileged groups.
A random sample of 240 households from 11 villages where BRAC had been
active were asked about the. nwnber of instances they had benefited from
various BRAC activities since the inception of these activities in the respective villages. The responses were classified according to the level of
education and landholdings of the heads of the household.
(See Tables 7.1,
7.2, and 7.3.)
It was found, somewhat unexpectedly, that the overall

lBRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 7.
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Table 7 .l
Distribution of Benefits Related to the Level of
Education of the Head of the Household

Level
of
Education

Total
Respondents
Heads of
Households

Frequency of Mention of Benefits
Agric.
Family
Health
Coop.
Planning
Other*

Illiterate

105

44

56

34

28

29

26

38

210

37

320

36

Less than
Complete
Primary Ed.

66

28

46

28

32

33

18

25

172

30

268

30

Primary Ed.
and above

56

23

so

31

30

31

20

29

149

26

249

28

Complete
Secondary
School and
above

13

5

10

6

7

7

7

9

36

6

60

7

97 100

71

100

567

100

897

100

Total

~~~~~#:;--~--~%~~~~#::--~-%---::-#~~%.:__~--,#-=--'---'%'""'--~~#-'-~~%-·~-#-=..::::.:::.:::.=_%

TOTAL

240
100
162 100
*see first footnote of Table 7.2.
SOURCE:
ICED Field Data

Table 7.2
Distribution of Benefits Related to Land °'1nership
Size
of
Landholdings

Total Respondents
Freguenst of Mention of Benefits
Family
Agric.
Heads of
Other*
Planning:
Households
Health COOE·

No land
Less than
l Acre
1 to 3
Acres
3+ Acres
and above
Tar AL

%

#

%

#

%

8

8

21

30

111

20

173

19

6

6

6

10

14

44

8

70

52

32

40

41

7

10

164

29

263

29

67

41

43

44

33

46

248

43

391

43

97 100

71

100

567

100

897

100

#

%

62

26

33

20

130

54

10

40

17

3

8**
240

100

Total

#

%

#

#

163 100

%

8

*Other activities include fisheries cooperatives, youth groups, women's groups,
functional education, providing power tiller and water pump, supply of seeds , and
useful literature and advice.
**Many of the larger land-owners' families are joint families with several
nuclear units within the joint family structure, which partially explains high
frequency of mention of benefits from the various BRAC activities.

Source:
.•

-~

ICED Field Data.
I -
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Table 7.3
Contribution to BRAC Project Activities by Level of Education
and Land Ownership of Head of Household

Freg,uency of Mention of Contribution
Donation:
Paid
Participation
Voluntary
Cash or in
Services
in Planning and
Service
Kind
Management

Level
of
Education
Illiterate

4

16

2

Less than Complete
Primary Education

4

15

1

Primary Education
but less than
Complete Secondary
Education

7

17

1

3

Secondary
Education
and above

6

3

1

1

1

13

1

2

1

2

1

Land 01N11ership
No

land

Less than 1 Acre
l+ Acre to 3 Acres

5

15

3+ Acres and above

16

21

N=240.
Source:

ICED Field Data.
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benefits as well as the specific benefits from the health activities, cooperatives, and the family planning efforts (as the respondents perceived
the benefits) were distributed more or less evenly among the groups with
different educational levels. Groups with higher levels of education were
not enjoying a disproportionate share of the benefits.
The findings were quite different when the benefits were related to
the landholding pattern.
Households with no land or less than an acre of
land revealed themselves to be recipients of benefits much less frequently
than their share in the sample population and those with three acres or
more land mentioned instances of benefits totally out of line with their
proportion in the sample. The totally landless households fared somewhat
better than those with less than an acre of land, apparently because of
some special efforts to help landless laborers and destitute women, though
even in this case the frequency of mention of benefits was less than proportionate to their number.
The most "discriminated" group was also the
largest group of households--those with less than one acre of land.
The
pattern of benefits according to landholdings for specific sectors was not
the same for all sectors.
(Table 7.2)
The distribution of health care
benefits was similar to the skewed pattern of overall benefits. In agricultural cooperatives it was more skewed in favor of the larger landowners
than the overall pattern. The distribution of benefits was somewhat more
favorable for the two poorer groups in regard to family planning.
The specific quantitative dimensions as shc:Mn in the table may not
reflect a high level of precision, because the investigators in the sample
survey relied on the verbal responses tc their questions and were not able
to apply any independent verification to the responses.l The investigators
believe, however, that the main findings of the survey regarding the direction of bias in the distribution of benefits are valid.
The absence of a relationship between educational distribution and
the distribution of BRAC benefits and the positive relationship between
landholding and benefits apparently mean that ownership of land is a more
important determinant of economic status and social influence than educational achievements and that distribution of education does not have a high
correlation with the distribution of land ownership. These cross-relationships, however, need further investigation, especially for the purpose of
assessing the role of education in rural development and determining educational policies.
The heads of the same sample of households were asked about their
contribution to BRAC activities by means of participating in program planning and management, providing voluntary services, providing services for

lThe landholding pattern, for example, indicated by the survey is somewhat at variance with the findings of a BRAC survey in 1975 of 2300 households,
which shows that 34 percent of the households are totally landless, 18 percent
have one acre or less land, and 25 percent possess between 1 and 5 acres. The
discrepancy, however, does not alter the basic characteristics of the ownership
pattern.
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payment, and offering cash or in-kind donation. The responses were predominantly negative for all educational groups and land ownership groups.
(See Table 7.3)
This apparently was not because they were unwilling to
contribute.
In response to queries, 90 percent of the sample household
heads expressed the willingness to commit labor and time to support BRAC
activities and 8 percent said they would contribute cash and materials to
help BRAC. The lack of contribution, at least in part, was due to the
organizational structure of the BRAC program that did not create conditions
for mobilizing local contribution.
The overall picture that emerges regarding community participation is
that the benefits of BRAC activities in Sulla were enjoyed disproportionately
by the relatively better-off families with larger landholdings and that the
institutional structure of BRAC did not exploit to the full extent the
latent potentials of engaging the beneficiary population in planning and
managing the program activities and of mobilizing the community resources.
On the question of the integrated approach, the Sulla experience points
to a number of problems that defy easy solutions. Having decided to address
various urgent rural problems in the areas of health, family planning, farming, fisheries, the landless, women's situation, and education, and lacking
the human and material resources to provide a reasonably comprehensive coverage of the entire project area population, BRAC scattered its sectoral activities among certain villages and certain population groups, making none the
true beneficiary of an integrated approach. As we have seen in the discussion
of the major sectoral activities, any overlap of participation among different
activities was coincidental rather than central to the program approach followed in Sulla. There was no central organizational mechanism that mobilized
groups of population to assess their own development needs and priorities and
to launch a multifaceted self-help program. The functional education groups
might have been the institutional means for homogeneous interest groups to be
organized for improving their own condition. But functional education in
Sulla, as we have noted earlier, was not linked directly to development action,
and the instructors and the BRAC field workers did not view functional education as the prelude to collective and organized action. The sectoral activities together constituted an integrated approach in an abstract sense from the
point of view of BRAC as an organization, since these appeared to complement
each other, but they remained somewhat compartmentalized for the beneficiary
population.
The links of BRAC activities with nonBRAC development efforts--mostly of
the government agencies--were tenuous. As noted in th~: chapters on the major
sectoral activities, the differences in program approach and objectives, the
inadequacies of resources and personnel in national programs, and sometimes
the inclination to compete rather than to cooperate on both sides stood in the
way. The lack of resources for comprehensive service coverage either by BRAC
or by the government agencies left room for a tacit territorial anC'. jurisdictional division of labor.
Cooperation between BRAC and other agencies had been most pronounced in
respect of the agricultural cooperatives and the formation of the thana central
associations. After initial political problems the central associations,
formed with BRAC encouragement and support, received the standard financial
and technical support and the government allocation of agricultural inputs

. ;,fO
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available to all IRDP sponsored central associations. There was apparently
a sufficient commonality of objectives and approach between IRDP and BRAC
in this respect.
The problems of the institutional structure and organization in the
Sulla Project were apparently recognized by the BRAC leadership. In attempts
to deal with these problems, new program strategies and institutional approaches emerged, as the plans for the third phase of Sulla and the new Manikganj
project were prepared.
New Organizational Approach in Sulla
The main organizational goal for the third phase (1976-1978) of the Sulla
Project as stated in the project proposal is as follows:
to organise and develop appropriate village and local level
institutions, in order to effectively involve the masses of rural
population in mobilising the communities' resources for their own
development and to provide services to those whose needs are
presently being ignored.l
The major features of the third phase plans, from an organization and institutional point of view, are the following:
1. The third phase puts special emphasis on organizing disadvantaged
rural groups with homogeneous development interests, such as landless laborers, small farmers, destitute women, fishermen, artisans, and the youth. The
functional education courses are to be organized for such homogeneous groups
and are to be used for planning and implementing group projects rather than
only for literacy teaching and "consciousness raising" in an abstract sense.
Another device to be used for spurring group action is the village workshop. These workshops, conducted by BRAC staff and local youth qroup members,
are to be a series of "conscientization" sessicns with all the members in a
village community.
In these sessions, a critical aEalysis of the village
socioeconomic structures and problems is to be made and action plans formulated for social and economic change.

As a result of the village workshops and the functional education program,
village organizations such as youth groups, women's associations, and cooperative societies of different types are expected to emerge, and a village development conunittee with the representation of these organizations is likely to
be formed.
The village developrrent cor.1!11i.ttee is to plan and guide the broader
community-wide development services in such areas as those of health, sanitation, family planning, and education. BRAC staff and the yot·.th groups are to
monitor the progress of the action programs of the village organizations and
the village development conmittee and provide critical support.
2. The BRAC field staff that was operational during the second phase is
to be maintained during the following three years or even slightly increased
with the addition of women Field Motivators. However, the main energy and
time of the field workers are to be devoted to "ins ti tution-building"--forrnation of homogeneous action groups of women, youths, landless laborers, fishermen, and so on, and supporting the plans and activities of these groups rather

~RAC,

Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 1.
1t.i- I

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

81.

than just organizing and carrying out sectoral activities initiated by BRAC
its elf.
3.
services
that can
managed.
with the
services

The sectoral activities are to be used not only to provide needed
but also to enhance the formation of organizations and institutions
help make the sectoral activities more self-sustaining and selfTilis is to be achieved by drawing up sectoral plans and objectives
involvement of the homogeneous interest groups and channeling the
through the groups.

4. The central association of cooperatives at the thana level is planned
to be more broad-based to include all cooperative groups rather than only agricultural cooperatives. The capacity of the central association is to be developed to service and support the various primary groups and to coordinate and
guide development efforts that affect the different village level societies.
5. Tile BRAC organizational structure is expected to withdraw gradually
at the end of the third phase leaving probably only a skeleton staff for
technical support to the central association. The roles and functions that
BRAC is performing are to be taken over by the central association or a
similar central body and the village development committees.
At the time of collecting materials for this report in late 1976, some
progress had been made in moving towards this new institutional approach.
The formats and procedures of conducting the village workshops had been prepared, BRAC field staff had been briefed about the workshops, and a small
number of the first round workshops had been conducted. The reorientation
of the functional education courses was under way, but the full implications
and the operational consequences of the new role of functional education were
yet to be fully worked out.
It was apparent that no systematic planning and
thinking had yet gone into broadening the central association and building
its strengths for ultimately taking over many of the BRAC organizational roles.
Local Self-Sustaining Institutions in Manikganj
The new BRAC project in Manikganj initiated in mid-1976 may be regarded
as a testing ground for the lessons learned from the Sulla Project. From the
very beginning, the emphasis in Manikganj was on keeping BRAC's own staff at
a minimum level, forming local organizations of homogeneous groups for collective development action, and using youth groups as a catalyzing force for
local activities.
The initial preparation for the Manikganj Project was done through a foodfor-work program (FFWP) designed to attack three physical constraints to agricultural development in the area--early monsoon flooding, drainage, and irrigation in the dry season. Members of the local youth organizations participated in the FFWP by working with BRAC pErsonnel to establish contact with the
people, select FFWP sites, motivate the people living adjacent to the sites to
give additional voluntary labor to the scheme, supervise the work, organize the
transportation of wheat to the sites, and make payment to the laborers. The
food-for-work program carried out between November 1975 and April 1976
not
only improved the physical infrastructure for agriculture and provided food
and cash to the vulnerable groups at a time of food scarcity, but also helped
identify promising youths and youth groups for future BRAC work, invclved local people in planning and implementation of development schemes, helped BRAC
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to be acquainted with the local development problems and prospects, and
enhanced BRAC's credibility with the local people.
BRAC is of the view that throughout rural Bangladesh there are hundreds of rural youth groups, educated but unemployed,who can act as catalytic agents for various development oriented organizations and programs.l
From the youth group identified in each village in Manikganj, two to
three are to be selected to undergo functional education instructor training, and then the group is to open a functional education center in its own
community. As mentioned in the chapter on functional education, the functional education program is to be used as the main initial thrust for organizing groups for planning and carrying out self-help activities in
Manikganj. As the groups begin to express the need for other programs,
other youths are to be trained as paramedics, family planning workers, and
motivators to assist in cooperative formation and other developmental activities .2
The strategy of supporting local youth groups is also being tried in
Shaturia, the thana adjacent to Manikganj. A dozen members of local youth
groups spent several months in Sulla acquiring practical experience of the
BRAC development approach. On their return to Shaturia the youth trainees
formed an alliance of 13 local youth grol-,ps and planned development activities in the areas of public health, family planning, functional education,
fisheries, agriculture, and formation of ccoperative groups. They were
assisted by a BRAC staff member and received a limited financial support
from BRAC. The Shaturia experience prompted BRAC to explore the prospects
of a spcial program of training youth leaders of "self-starter" development
programs and supporting such programs with small financial grants and technical advice.
The sectoral activities in health, family planning, and extension services for agriculture and fisheries in Manikganj are to be channeled and
carried out through the local groups emerging from the efforts of the youth
workers and the functional education program. As in the third phase of
Sulla, ultimately the responsibilities for coordinating and supporting the
development services are to be taken over by a thana level association of
the primary groups.
Concluding Comments
In BRAC's efforts to create a viable institutional structure for its
rural development program, a change of approach is readily discernible.
Originally the pattern was characterized by a large paid field staff, BRACinitiated and managed sectoral activities not fully integrated with each

lBRAC, Manikganj Project, p. 9-10.
2rbid., p. 10.
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other, a low level of community participation in planning and managing activities, and insufficient positive discrimination in the program in favor of
the poorest people. This had changed to a pattern marked by a small number
of full-time and paid field staff, reliance on members of local youth groups
for field work, emphasis on building organizations of disadvantaged groups
with homogeneous development. interests, and a more prominent role given
to
functional education and village workshops in forming primary action groups
and in planning and carrying out the combination of sectoral activities
through the local organizations.
The new approach began to be reflected in BRAC activities and project
proposals in 1976 and is still in the process of )eing shaped and elaborated.
It is certainly compatible with BRAC's basic goals of promoting self-sustaining rural development, creating and strengthening local institutions,
and
helping improve the living condition of the rrost deprived and the poorest. It
is too early to tell how this approach will fare in reality and h<:M effectively
BRAC will be able to put it into practice.
Two critical questions in relation to the growth of the local institutions
are how the local power structure will be dealt with and h<:M the local institutional structure can be made strong enough to permit the "withdrawal" of BRAC.
What will be the response to BRAC's organizational efforts of the incestuous alliance of the larger landowners, moneylenders, and influential
families whose po,..ier, influence, and privileges are certain to be threatened? During the second phase of the Sulla Project BRAC had infringed on the vested interests of the local power structure only marginally; there was no concerted
and broad-range effort to organize the various deprived groups and to utilize
the idealism and the receptivity to change of the youth in this effort.
In
many instances the benefits of BRAC activities were enjoyed as much or
more
by the better-off families as the poorer families.
It might be noted here that a somewhat dramatic brush with the local power
structure came early in BRAC's life in a project in Rowrnari in the northern
district of Rangpur. This ended in a BRAC retreat and eventual abandonment of
the project.
In the wake of the 1974 floods and famine, a famine relief project
was
launched in Rowmari with Oxfam-UK aid. BRAC also decided to initiate a multipurpose rural development program in the area, capitalizing on its association
with the local people and on its familiarity with the local situation. However,
soon after the relief operation began, BRAC faced a boycott and ostracism from
the carpenters who refused to build the BRAC office building, the local
bank
manager who refused to release funds from the BRAC account, the bullock
cart
drivers who refused to transport BRAC supplies, and the firewood merchants who
refused to sell their firewood to BRAC. A BRAC worker was assaulted in
the
night and was accused by village leaders of rape, even though he was not in the
locality at the time of the alleged "incident." It turned out that all
this
activity was orchestrated by an influential local man who was chairman of the
board of the IRDP-sponsored Thana Central Cooperative Association, a
wealthy
landowner, a jute exporter, and a former. member of the parliament from
the
locality.
He and his allies were apparently afraid of losing control of
the
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local TCCA and other local institutions and also the system of patronage,
influence-peddling, and corruption that went with this control.
With the intervention of government officials from the district, the
relief operation was salvaged and BRAC brought it to a successful conclusion.
It had fed 8,000 to 13,000 children for up to four months, averting malnutrition and many probable deaths. BRAC and its financial sponsor Oxfam-UK
decided, however, to pull out from the development program in Rowmari when
it became obvious that BRAC and the local TCCA were unable to work together.l
In order to have a better insight into the mechanism of social change
in the village in the face of numerous obstacles, BRAC is supporting with
a grant from the Ford Foundation an anthropological study of two villages
in the two project areas of Sulla and Manikganj.
Two research assistants
have been hired to apply the "participant observation" techniques in the two
selected villages. An anthropologist from the Marga Institute in Sri Lanka
has been appointed as a consultant for preparing the research design, training the researchers in methodology, and supervising the·study. The study is
expected to provide useful policy guidance from a disciplined observation of
the interplay of the "system" of values, resources, and social and economic
relationships in a village. Preliminary results of the study are expected in
late 1977. 2
The reaction of the local power structure is only one element in the
process of nurturing and strengthening local organizations of deprived grours
and building an institutional structure for self-sustaining development. Another important element is the intention and attitudes of the national government in regard to the local government structure and thE degree of decentralization and sharing of authority considered necessary or desirable. The BRAC
efforts might be seen by the govenunent as a useful trial with important lessons for the national rural development program.
In this case a favorable
climate of suprort and cooperation from the government agencies, particularly
the local and district officials, can reinforce and accelerate the process
initiated by BRAC. Alternately, the BRAC activities may be viewed as wellintentioned efforts of a voluntary organization that the government would
tolerate as long as no laws are violated.
In such an atmosphere, BRAC and the
local organizations would be up against the added obstacle of noncooperation
and foot-dragging of government agencies and their local agents. BRAC's experience and lessons would also have that much less impact on the government rural
programs and the national rural developmc,nt policies and strategies.
In fact, while at the field level the interaction between the BRAC activities and the government rural services have not generally been close if only
because the thin spread of the government activities leave plenty of room for
vo1untary agencies to function, at the national level there appears to be a

lsee BRAC, Report on Rowmari Thana Childfeeding and Nutrition Programme,
Dacca, n.d.
Also Cole Patrick Dodge and Paul D. Wiebe, "Famine Relief and Development
in Rural Bangladesh," Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, May 29, 1976,
pp. 809-817.
2aRAC, Newsletter, vol. 1, No. 3, May-June 1976, pp. 6-7.
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general awareness and appreciation of BRAC's useful work and bona fides
among government leaders and officials involved in rural develor:rnent.
A
member of the BRAC governing body is a member of the Council of Advisers
to the President (i.e., a member of the President's Cabinet equivalent to
a Minister) and there are other well-wishers of BRAC in influential official pcsitions. There is increasing interest from relevant government
agencies in BRAC's functional education and health care efforts. For
instance, the Integrated Rural Development Program in launching a project
for women's cooperatives has called upon BRAC's assistance for developing
the educational components and training the field workers. The Division
of Population Control and Family Planning has often cited the Sulla Project of BRAC as an example where a family planning effort integrated with
a broader rural development program has demonstrated encouraging results.
However, a sense of goodwill towards BRAC and appreciation of its efforts
among individual government leaders do not necessarily translate into the
adoption of appropriate lessons from the BRAC experience in government
programs, which would often call for basic reorientation of objectives and
policies in government programs rather than the transplantaticn of certain
methods and techniques.

CHAPTER 8

COSTS AND FINANCES
The Pattern of Costs
Available information about the budgets of the various components of
BRAC indicate the magnitude of the different project activities, the breakdown of the total costs into major cost categories, and the relative proportions of the cost categories compared to the total or to each other. The
cost data are based on the proposed budgets for each of the major projects
for the planned duration of the project, which varied from one year to three
years. Actual expenditure data were not available as these projects were
yet to come to a conclusion at the time of collecting the cost data (excepting the Functional Education Development project for which the data in
Table 8.1 represents actual costs). However, major deviations from the
budget in the total expenditures or in the relative proportions among cost
categories were not expected.
(Unfortunately, the breakdown of budget
according to the categories in Table 8.1 for Sulla Phase II--the one major
project that came to a conclusion at the end of 1975--was not available.
This would have permitted a comparison of the pattern of expenditure between the early Sulla ph.ase and the later projects.)
All of the projects
included in Table 8.1, except Functional Education Development, had their
beginning in 1976 and they presumably reflect the changes in program approach
following the early Sulla experience.
Among the six projects included in Table 8.1, the first three (Sulla
Phase III, Jamalpur and Manikganj) are more representative of the normal and
major activities of BRAC. Among the last three, the Training and Resource
Centre is unusual because it has a large capital component (training facilities, dormitories, etc.) because of the nature of the project. The last two
projects--Research and Evaluation and Functional Education Development--include provisions for foreign consultancy that consume a very large chunk of
the total budget in each case and distorts the relative shares of the different cost categories.
Table 8.1 shows that in all of the projects the staff cost is a major
item if not the largest item in the total budget. The field staff ar,d head
office overhead (which is essentially the head office staff salaries and the
staff support and logistics costs) together accounted for 49 to 72 percent of
total recurring costs in the different projects. The capital costs (land,
building, transportation, equipment, and furniture) are relatively low or even
nil in all the projects except the Training Centre project.
In the two major
projects--Sulla Phase III and Manikganj, they are 5 percent and 15 percent
respectively. The lower figure in Sulla is explained by the fact that it inherited capital assets from the previous phase of the project.
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Table 8.1
rCT)

Categories of Budgeted Expenditures for Major BRAC Project Ac ti vi ties
Sulla
Phase II I
( 3 Yrs.) 1

Items
Capital Expenses
Recurring Expenses
Field Staff
Head Office Overhead
Materials & Supplies
Other Cos ts: (Travel,
logistics, training,
data processing,
reports, etc.)
Special Costs
Loan Fund
Grants to Local
Organizations
Foreign Consultancy
Total

VJ

kl

~

1-i
k.

~

~

VJ
f..,

VJ

0

310 000
5 260 000

150 000

Manikganj
(3 Yrs.)

Research &
Eval. Proj.
(2 Yrs.)

(Taka)
Functional
Ed. Dev.
( 19 Mos.)

605 000

723 000

2 383 000

1 222 000

204 00()

357 000

2 727 000
521 000
1 164 000 2

78 000
24 000
18 000

1 224 000
491 000
314 000 2

380 000
216 000
50 000

114 000

122 000
54 000
120 000

848 000

30 000

354 000

576 000

90 000

61 000

255 000

208 000

361 000

965 000

111 0003

500 000

'.~1

-,~

250 000

5 931 000

Capital Cost as %
of total

Jamalpur
(12 Mos.)

Training·&
Resource Centre
( 3 Yrs.)

465 000

150 000

3 953 000

1 945 000

255 000

208 000

459 000

565 000

5.2

0.0

15.3

37.2

0.0

0.0

Staff + Overhead
as % of total

54.8

68.0

43.4

30.6

24.8

31.2

Staff + Overhead
as % of total recurring

61. 7

68.0

72.0

48.8

55.9

49 .3

1 1ndicates duration for which the budget allocation has been made.
2 Excluding part of the medicine costs to be recovered from patients.
3
only loan guarantee expenses assuming availability of loan funds from commercial sources.
Source:

BRAC Project Docwnents.

(.)

..,.........................................

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The large difference in materials and supplies costs between Majikganj
and Sulla Phase III is largely because of the plan to provide an intensive
health and family planning coverage in Sulla and to build a base stock of
supplies prior to BRAC withdrawal from the area at the end of Phase III.
In both cases, the costs under this category would have been higher without
the provision for recovery of drug costs from the patients.
(Total
drug
costs are to be recovered in Sulla and 50 percent in Manikganj through insurance charges and ser:vice fees.)
Without these provisions the costs would
have gone up to Tk 1.6 million and Tk 250,000 respectively in Sulla
and
Manikganj.
The category "other costs" includes two major items--staff travel and
staff training.
Staff travel is generally calculated to be about 20 percent
of salaries for all personnel with supervisory roles. Training and retraining constitute a substantial expenditure item for all field level personnel.
In the case of Sulla Phase III this category includes the costs for functional education and village workshops, whereas functional education costs
at
least partially fall under "grants to local organizations" that are expected
to carry out this activity in Manikganj. The large expenditure under
this
category for Training Centre obtains because the maintenance of trainees
while resident in the Centre is a substantial cost item.
The loan fund for cooperatives and other group economic enterprises is
smaller for Sulla than for Manikganj because it is expected thct commercial
banks w~ll be found interested in extending credit to groups in Sulla under
BRAC guarantee. The amount provided in the budget represents the write-off
cost for bad debts (up to 20 percent of the total loans).
In Manikganj, the
loans are to be provided from BRAC's own funds.
Grants to local organizations of youth, women, and landless represent a
new program aliproach that emphasizes the important role of local organizations
and local self-management of group activities. The grants are to be provided
as seed money for projects to be planned and implemented by the local organization. This approach, according to the budget figures, seems to be more vigorously pursued in Manikganj.
Major Program Items
Table 8.2 shows the major program items in the budgets for the three main
sub-projects of BRAC--Sulla Phase II (concluded in 1975) , Sulla Phase III and
Manikganj (both begun in 1976). Health care and family planning clearly constitutes the most important component in all three sub-projects judged by budget
expenditures. The budget for this component has gone up from under 21 percent
of the total in Sulla Phase II to about 36 percent in Sulla Phase III.
It is
comparably high in Manikganj with 29 percent of the total allocation.
A comparison of the budgets of Sulla Phase II and the two other sub-project
budgets indicates a trend tcward a diffusion of the demarcations of sectoral
activities and more emphasis on organizations and groups of the beneficiary
populations rather than separate sectoral activities. This trend is more marked
in Manikganj than in Sulla Phase III, probably because it was more difficult
for Sulla Phase III to depart radically from Phase II patterns than for ManikGanj, a new sur-project.
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Table 8.2
Major Items of Expenditure for
Three BRAC Sub-Projects

Sulla Phase II (Actual Nov. '72-Dec. '75)
Taka

Items
Construction of Corrununity Centers
Functional Literacy
Cooperative Development
Agriculture
Fisheries
Health Care
Family Planning
Field Organization (Salaries and Staff Support)
Head Office (Staff and Logistics)
General Capital Expenses
Totals

Sulla Phase I II
(Budget for Jan. '76-Dec.
Institutional Development (Functional Education,
Village Workshops and Staff Support)
Health and Family Planning
Disadvantaged Groups Programs (Landless,
Women, Fishermen, Loan Guarantee Schemes,
Grants, Staff Support)
Agricultural Development (Seed Multiplication,
Veterinary Service, Staff Support)
Field Organization (General Staff Salaries and
General Costs)
Head Office (Staff and Logistics)
General Capital Expenses
Totals

Manikganj
(Budget for Jan. '76-Dec.
Health and Family Planning
Grants to Local Organizations (Youth, Landless,
Women)
Cooperative Loan Fund
Field Organization (Salaries, except Health and
FP Staff, Staff Support and other General
Field Costs)
Head Office (Staff and Logistics)
Capital Costs (other than Health)
Totals

Source:

BRAC Project Documents.

Percentage

308
825
831
466
460
254
371
301
063
779
658

7.9
11.1
10.4
17.6
3.4
11. 3
9.5
11.S
14.l
3.2
100.0

930 240
2 160 140

15.4
35.9

931 240

15.5

636 080

10.6

794 880
520 992
so 000
6 023 572

13 .2
8.6
0.8
100.0

304
428
400
683
132
438
367
445
545
125
3 871

'78)

'78)
1 136 400

28.7

465 000
500 000

11.8
12.6

880 920
491 000
480 000
--3 953 320

22 .3
12.4
12.2
100 .o
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Functional education and other training ar,d educational activities (including village workshops in Sulla) remain a central element in the two recent sub-projects.
It is not a separate line item in Manikganj budget because
much of the educational activities, as noted above, are to be carried out by
local organizations with BRAC staff support; hence the costs are included under organizational grants and general field organization costs.
The field organization costs in Manikganj are relatively larger than the
others because all staff costs in Manikganj (except health workers) are included under this item, whereas some of the staff costs in Sulla Phase III are
shown under separate program costs. Manikganj actually has, on the whole,
a
smaller paid staff relative to the size of the sub-project.
Overall Size of Operation
Overall size of the BRAC operation is indicated by the total annual noncapi tal expenditure during the financial year 1975-76. The total came to
approximately 4.9 million Taka with t:r.e following breakdown:
Sulla Project
Manikganj Project
Works Program
Jamalpur Project
Shaturia Youth Project
Gonokendro (monthly publication)
Materials Development Unit
Research and Evaluation
Mothers' Club Development
Training Program
Total

Tk l 600 Thousand
l 000
545
130
175
430
400
200
120
300
4 900

The capital assets of BRAC in early 1976 were valued
1.8 million Taka, divided equally between fixed assets in
(on the project sites and land purchased for the training
BRAC head office and the BRAC printing plant) and movable
tal assets in 1976 included the following:

at approximately
the form of land
center, the future
assets. The capi-

Tk

Land
River Crafts and other Vehicles
Camp Houses
Furniture
Office Equipment
Other Equipment and Machinery
Total

922
87
388
109
148
232
l 836

000
000
000
000
000
000
000

The above figures do not include approximately 400,000 taka spent toward
site preparation and construction of the training center and the printing
press building in 1976.
BRAC also received shipment of the printing plant
equipment worth US$117,000 in 1976 which was still to be installed.

~i:
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Dependence on External Sources
BRAC--of which the staff, management and leadership are wholly indigenous--is totally dependent on external support for both the operational
expenses of all of the project activities and for building up the capital
assets. The organization, as we have noted, originated as an instrument for
distributing relief supplies provided by private relief organizations from
abroad; but as its role changed into that of a rural development agency-with sympathetic backing and encouragement of the donors who originally
supplied the relief materials--BRAC remained dependent on the outside donors
for carrying out the new development-oriented activities.
BRAC has succeeded in attracting the support and assistance of a large
number of external assistance agencies of different types which include
secular philanthropy, religious charity, foundations, international agencies,
and government aid agencies.
The most consistent and the largest donors have
been the different branches of Oxfam in U.K., USA, and Canada. The religious
charities include Novib of Holland and Bread for the World of Germany. Inter
Pares of Canada, a secular philanthropy, has also provided funds. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has given support towards establishing the printing press.
United Nations Children's Fund has financed the
publication of the ironthly Gonokendro. The Ford Foundation has given a grant
for carrying out a research and evaluation project.
Overall Cost Feasibility
The cost of the second phase of Sulla, as we have noted, was about Tk 4
million over three years; or about Tk 11 per capita per year for the 120,000
people in the project area. The budgets of Sulla Phase III and the Manikganj
project are of the same order of magnitude (Tk 6 million and Tk 4 million
respectively over ~~ree years with 100,000 people in the BRAC project area of
Manikganj thana) .
The absolute per capita amount of money spent in the projects, given
their scope and objectives, is obviously small.
It may be argued that the
project activities do not directly benefit the total population of the respective areas and, therefore, the denominator in the calculation of per
capita cost should not be the total population of the area. On the other
hand, the same argument is applicable to most rural development prograrr£ includi.ng the government ones. By way of comparison, it may be noted that per
capita government expenditure for the whole country in 1975-76 for health and
family planning was Tk 10.l Since then, the government budget, particularly
for family planning, has been boosted substantially by external assistance.
The proposed population control and family planning bucget of the government
for a two-year plan covering 1978-79 and 1979-80 announced in September 1977

1

However, most of this amount was spent for curative services and medical
facilities in the urban areas.
See Oscar Gish, "The Development of Health
Services in Bangladesh," Institute of Development Studies, University of
Sussex, February 1976.
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is Tk 3,040 million or about Tk 20 per capita per year. BRAC activities
cannot be seen as supplanting government agencies and services, but BRAC
has attempted to fill critical gaps in rural services and institutional
development at costs that appear to compare favorably with the costs of
government programs.
It has been noted in chapter 7 that the organizational approach envisaged for primary health care including family planning, if implemented
successfully, will permit the health care program to be self-financed to
the extent of two-thirds of the cost at the community level. The remaining one-third (about Tk 6) needed from extra-community sources is well
within the range of the growing per capita health and family planning
expenditure of the government, if the government funds are redirected towards the provision of primary health care in the rural areas.
Mobilization of financial, material, and human resources from the
communities for community programs is a principle to which BRAC has been
attaching increasing importance and which it has been attempting to ap~ly
with vigor in the newer projects as the discussion of the institutional
structures in chapter 7 shows.
It is, however, not BRAC's premise that
rural people living in absolute poverty can lift themselves up from their
condition by their own bootstraps without substantial assistance from outside the rural community.
Future Outlook
What is the future resource outlook for BRAC? Is BRAC to be perrnanenly dependent on external sources of support for carrying out its development activities?
It has been noted that in the Sulla II health care program BRAC has
recovered about half of the cost of drugs--the major cost component of
health care--through the insurance scheme. The goal for the third phase
of Sulla is to recover the total drug cost by improving the coverage and
operation of the insurance scheme. The Manikganj project has a similar
eventual objective.
As the third phase plans of the Sulla Project indicate, it is BRAC's
expectation in each project area to develop the local institutional structures to a level that will enable BRAC to withdraw its own personnel from
the project, letting the local institutions manage the development and
service activities with their own resources and such government and outside subsidies as they can attract on their own. The problems and prospects
of realizing this outcome are discussed in other parts of this paper.
Another important step taken by BRAC is to build an accumulation of
capital assets that will provide a core of permanent financial support. To
this end a relatively large printing press is being set up at a total cost
of approximately US$170,000 (site, plant and machinery), which will serve
BRAC's own printing and publishing needs and is expected to generate an annual net earning of Tk 1 million for BRAC. This site will also house BRAC's
head offices, effecting substantial savings in costly rentals.

COSTS AND FINANCES

9 3.

With the establishment of the new Training and Resource Centre f acilities outside Dacca, including residential accorrnnodation for trainees, the
center is expected to devote at least one-half of the training activities to
serving other organizations in Bangladesh and to exact appropriate fees for
these services.
If these expectations are fulfilled, it will mean that BRAC will be able
to maintain from its own resources its organizational existence, support a
core of permanent professional staff, and carry on essential follow-up of
its earlier projects. This will be no small achievement. However, it also
means that for undertaking new development projects or extending the scope
of present activities geographically, BRAC will have to depend on external
sources of support.
This situation does not necessarily portend a bleak future for BRAC.
If
philanthropic assistance from the industrial countries to the poor nations
continues at least at the present level and if BRAC continues to prove itself to be a relatively effective voluntary agency capable of making good use
of resources entrusted to it, it should not have any great difficulty in attracting sufficient financial support.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

The purpose of our review and analysis of the BRAC rural development
activities is to draw appropriate conclusions and lessons about the important questions that inevitably arise in the course of designing and implementing programs to serve the rural poor. As a rural development program
focusing on the disadvantaged groups in the rural population, BRAC's own
efforts to tackle the problems of planning and managing a multifaceted program are expected both to clarify the nature of the issues relating to
these programs and to indicate the approaches to resolving the issues.
The questions that prompted this case study and others in the ICED
series, we might recall, are the following:
How can the individual and fragmented activities be integrated into
a concerted development process aimed at improving the life of
rural families?
How can the usual "top-down" approach of rural programs be reversed and how can the rural people and communities effectively
participate in the programs?
How can the educational processes be effectively used to improve
the performance of the development programs and to enhance integration and community participation?
How can the development programs extend their reach and benefits
to the poor and the underprivileged segments of rural communities?
How can voluntary organizations best utilize their unique advantages and become the precursors and demonstrators of new approaches for larger public programs?
In attempting to arrive at answers to these questions, one cannot help
asking what difference the BRAC efforts have made to the life of the people
in the project area.
As the preceding secticns of this report must have indicated, this straightforward question does not have a simple answer because
the BRAC undertaking is complex, its goals are diverse in scope and quality,
it has been in existence for a relatively short time, and the one-to-threeyear time-scale of the financial donors supporting specific project activities
does not provide an adequate basis for judging the impact of the program. One
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may, however, appropriately point to the factual evidences relating to BRAC
performance in the Sulla Project area where BRAC has functioned the longest
and where, at the time of this writing, one develoµnent phase has been concluded and another phase is well underway. The important indicators of BRAC
performance during the three years of the second phase in Sulla are noted
below.
At the cost of a major share of the total financial resources and over
one-half of the manpower in the project area, the health and family planning
program achieved the participation of approximately 15,000 residents (out of
a total of over 120,000) in the health insurance scheme and reached a level
of about 2,000 (out of an estimated potential number of 20,000) married women of child-bearing age as acceptors of a family planning method. The tangible impact of this service coverage after three years of operation in terms
of health and family planning status of the population appears to be marginal.
Although pre-project benchmark data were not available for comparison, statistical evidences of mortality and morbidity for mid-1975 and derrographic information for early 1976 do not suggest a significant improvement when these indicators are compared with national statistics. Obvicusly, the health care
program has not had the opportunity by 1976 to provide a sufficiently widespread, sustained, and intensive service to make a dent on the health situation. Similarly, the cumulative acceptor figure in the family planning program is not large enough or does not represent a retention pattern of sufficient duration (most being acceptors for less than a year) to mark an impact
on the demographic situation.
About 2,600 project area residents participated in the functional education program and about one-half of this number is reported to have completed
the lessons. We arE not sure, however, what the completion of the course
means in terms of new skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Most of the completers do not appear to have acquired a usable level of reading and writing skills,
nor is there evidence (as far as the implementation of the program in Sulla
Phase II is concerned) that any systematic effort was made to help the learners
make the connection between the lessons and individual and collective selfhelp projects. Methodology and content of the functional education program
was a distinct improvement over the traditional adult literacy efforts, but
during Phase II of Sulla an effective approach was yet to be developed of making functional education truly functional, that is of its having a significant
bearing on the current circumstances and future life prospects of the participants.
The agricultural promotion activities benefited less than 1,000 households,
including 600 farmers in the "support blocks" and 300 landless laborers, although the extent of improvement in the economic status of these households
was not clear from available information. Another 10,000 families were reported to have benefited from the distribution of vegetable seeds and fruit plants
and saplings.
The effort to help improve the status of women through conventional skill
training did not succeed and was abandoned in favor of more systematically organized collective economic and self-help projects through cooperatives and
joint savings.
It was possible to organize only a small number of such group
activities by the end of the second phase of Sulla. BRAC also encouraged the
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formation of more traditional farrrers' cooperatives and assisted in improving
the performance of the existing ones. BRAC's efforts created a finn base for
the extension of the government's Integrated Rural Developrrent Program (centered on a two-tier structure of primary cooperatives and a central association
of the primary societies) to the project area. The cooperatives facilitated
the supply and distribution of agricultural inputs for the members; however,
the total number of beneficiaries was small and thf: cooperative structure was
yet to take a firm root, expand its coverage, and become the main instrument
for agricultural and rural transfonnation that it was intended to be.
It should be noted along with this catalog of achievements and nonachievements that the total time-span of the second phase of Sulla was about three
years (and considerably less for some of the cc.mponent activities), the total
financial resources committed were less than Tk 4 million, and the involved
BRAC staff comprised less than 100 young people--most without any professional
expertise or high level training.
The most enduring achievement of the Sulla project so far is to be found,
not in the quantitative record of performance of the sectoral activities, but
rather in the fact that it brought to the surface various problems of development programs intended to help the rural poor, established a base of institutional structures and experienced personnel, and pointed the direction to be
taken in reshaping and reorienting the program during the third phase of Sulla
and in other new projects. The questions raised above can be fruitfully explored if we look at the BRAC experience in this light--as a continuous striving towards the development of a viable integrated approach for helping the
needy and disadvantaged to help themselves through collective efforts.
The Integrated Development Approach
BRAC recognized the need and significance of an integrated approach and
in pursuing this approach put differe~t rural development components together
in the Sulla Project. However, the resources and manpower committed to
the
project did not permit a sufficient participation of the people in the project
area needing the various services offered by the project. The program management also did not provide for the mutual linkages and reinforcement of
the
different program activities essential for an integrated approach. The result
was a series of parallel sectoral activities with only incidental overlap
to
the beneficiaries.
The program approach taken was an identification of certain general needs
of the population and an attempt to meet them with a number of sectoral activities devised by the prevalent conventional wisdom about what constituted a
rural development program. The needs that were identified (such as basic health
care, agricultural development, functional educatio~, cooperatives and so on)
were genuine enough in a general sense, and a certain number of the project
population undoubtedly benefited from the services provided; but, as we have
seen, the program after three years of operation of its developmental phase has
not brought about a major improvement in the quality of life of a significant
proportion of the population--least of all, in the life of the poorest groups.
Evidently the project activities needed to be tailored specifically to the
needs of specific groups (especially if the purpose was to help the economically weaker and the disadvantaged sections of the community) but also made
flexible enough in different combinations of components for a variety of groups.
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Apparently the assumpticn behind the sectoral activities undertaken was
that the individual participant, in assimilating their separate benefits
would somehow effect an integration of them in terms of his own plan for
managing his resources and improving his socioeconomic situation.
This
assumption was probably valid for those who were economically and socially
in a relatively advantageous po~ition. The sectoral approach (in contrast
to the "people approach") inevitably gravitated towards a norm of operational goals and patterns that benefited the easily reachable and the relatively better-off at the cost of the disadvantaged.
In operational terms, a shift of emphasis from separate sectoral activities to an integrated "people"
approach means that different relatively
homogenous socioeconomic groups have to be identified and organizational
structures developed accordingly. This is the logical approach when the
goal is to help the disadvantaged groups rather than to offer a series of
services for the benefit of the gen€ral public. This is the approach towards which BRAC appears to have moved for the third phase of the Sulla
Project and for other new projects.
Integrated rural development (in contrast to the parallel functioning
of sectoral activities in the same geographical location or the coordination of different sectoral activities through various administrative
devices) requires a focus on the participant population--their circumstances, their own perception of their critical needs, and their preference
and values. The implication of this premise for national rural development
efforts is that, instead of attempting to reach the rural population
with
vertical sectoral programs, a means must be found to form local organizations of homogeneous interest groups and make them serve as the instrument
for integrating and managing the sectoral activities of the beneficiary
population. A strong local government structure, adequately representative of the total rural population, can become a mechanism for coordination
among the network of local organizations and institutions and for mediation
between the local groups and the higher tiers of government agencies at the
regional and national levels.
Since health care and family planning have been implemented in BRAC virtually as one sub-program, a question of particular interest is how this
integration has affected the performance of both health care and family planning activities. One may also ask what the consequences might be for health
care and family planning performance under a more effective overall integration of the different components of BRAC.
We have to admit that a definitive and totally unequivocal conclusion in
this regard cannot be drawn from the BRAC experience.
BRAC obtained certain
results by organizing the health care and family planning services in a particular way, important features of which were the following: (a) the medical
and clinical backup of the family planning services was provided by the health
care staff and facilities; (b) at the field level, special family planning
workers were used for contact with clients and distribution of contraceptives
but they were under the direct and close supervision of th~ paramedics
who
also played an important motivational role regarding family planning;
and
(c) the local people perceived the two activities as related--BRAC's medical
services being the most well-known and widespread of all BRAC activities-and knew that for any medical problem arising from the acceptance of family
planning, they could get help from BRAC medical service.
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We do not know what the results would be if a family planning program were
not backed by the health service, not identified with a multifaceted rural development program, and only had community-based field agents with supervision
and backstopping provided by the family planning organization itself. The government family planning program is run along this line (though, in principle,
maternity and child health care is regarded as a part of the family planning
program), and its performance so far compares less than favorably with the BRAC
program. But because of its many management and logistical problems, the government program, at least at the present time, is not a good example of a "singlepurpose" family planning program and does not provide a good basis for comparison.
While a "proof" cannot be offered on the basis of BRAC experience in favor
of or against a combined health and family planning program or a more integrated
approach, a number of pertinent factors must be taken into account in considering the issue. First, given the evidence regarding prenatal deaths of women and
high postnatal infant and children's mortality, a high rate of births per childbearing age women,and a large family size are themselves serious health problems
as far as the mothers and children are concerned.
Second, it imposes an unaffordable and unnecessary economic burden on poor countries to duplicate the technical
and professional support manpower and support facilities for both family planning
and primary health care. Third, the problem of establishing credibility and inspiring confidence about the family planning program is more easily overcome when
it is offered in conjunction with activities that meet the perceived needs about
health problems.
The basic question, however, is not one of the technical efficiency of the
single-purpose approach (on which ground alone the case for it is argued), but
of values regarding all development efforts--whether the concern is about meeting certain sectoral quantitative targets or improving the welfare of people.
The question needs to be posed in this stark form to get at the heart of the
integration issue, and it needs to be underscored that reduction of population
growth and gaining acceptance of the norm of a small family size are not ends
in themselves.
(It is, by no means, certain that even on technical efficiency
grounds the single-purpose approach is superior.)
In a similar vein, it may be argued that health and family planning efforts
will be better accepted, will have a more sustained impact, and will achieve
goals in line with the preference and the value system of the beneficiary population if implementation of these efforts is made a component of the collective
and organized self-help activities that improve the socioeconomic situation of
homogeneous rural interest groups.
In other words, the health care and family
planning program is likely to be more effective if the rural communities themselves can take charge of planning and managing the delivery end of the services,
.!!:!_ the context Qf tackling othe!_ survival and development problems, with appropriate technical assistance and resource support from the higher tiers of government and other external sources.
Connnunity Participation
Despite the intentions and efforts behind the functional education program
and the formation of cooperatives, community participation was not
a strong
feature of the early phase of BRAC. The sectoral approach it adopted and the
heavy reliance on its own relatively large field organization for management
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and implementation of the sectoral activities undermined the principles of
community participation.
Couanunity participation has many dimensions whjch, in the context of
a program to help the disadvantaged sections of the rural community, might
well include the following:
(a) organizing services in the couanunity on a
connnunity basis and making the services widely and easily accessible;
(b)
contribution by the cotr111unity to the operation and maintenance of the services; (c) participation of the community in planning and management of the
services within the community; (d) community input in overall strategies,
policies, and work plan of the development program transcending individual
communities; and (e) overcoming factionalism and interest conflicts in the
community to achieve broad-based participation, particularly of the disadvantaged groups.
Participation of the beneficiary population in a development program
along these dimensions is essentially a problem of building local organizations and institutional structures in such a way that participation is
a significant and meaningful contribution rather than a token gesture.
This in turn raises the problems of rationale for forming viable local
organizations, the best approcr to l'OC>bilizing people for collective action and creating a "consciousness" about collective or class identity
and class interests, and the best means for building the necessary corrr
petence and capacity for collective action.
In rural societies characterized by peasant farming and large segments
of landless and other disadvantaged groups, creation of participatory institutions and promotion of the participatory process require basic changes
in the overall configuration of the intergroup social and economic relationships. For instance, the participatory institutions must overcome the entrenched factionalism in village communities that are nurtured by powerful
and influential families and groups; break the semi-feudal patron-client
bondage; and give the disadvantaged groups the self-confidence, hope, and
courage that will convince them of their collective strength.
There is need for a clear conceptualization of the participatory process and its goals in a given rural context. A strategy for identifying
and forming the homogmeous interest groups must be determined, activities
must be devised and implemented that are within group capacity but also
strike at the root of their subjugation and deprivation. The educational
process becomes a central element in this strategy.
Ensuring participation in all its dimensions, as the evolution of the
Sulla Project and the plans for other new projects indicate, calls for a
lessening of emphasis on the sectoral approach and building an organizational
structure that, instead of managing the program for the beneficiary population,
permits the growth of the locr.l groups towards greater self-reliance and autonomy. As we have noted earlier, the sectoral approach and an organizational
nx>del that inhibits popular control of the development program tend to go
hand-in-hand; conversely, effective integration and meaningful participation
are like two sides of the same coin.
Finally, the efforts to proroote participation can succeed only with
unambigious connnitment on the part of thE development agency, whether a
voluntary organization or a government department, to serve the interests
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of the disadvantaged groups--the landless farm workers, women from poor families,
young people, small farmers, and rural artisans struggling to eke out a
living
from traditional occupations.
Education
BRAG's program approach is distinguished by the systematic use of varied
educational approaches in support of its objectives. Three major categories
of educational activities in BRAG are:
(a) programs for the beneficiary population with the aim of raising their levels of awareness and understanding
and making them better participants in the development activities,
such as
functional education and village workshops; (b) devices that develop the special skills and competence of specialized program workers, such as paramedics,
village health auxiliaries, family planning workers, cooperative accountants,
instructors for poultry raising, functional education teachers, and so on; and
(c) training for general BRAC field workers and potential youth group organizers.
Given the overall goals of supporting self-sustaining development and helping the rural poor, it was no surprise that the conventional literacy program
launched by BRAC did not serve its purpose. The program was quickly abandoned
and a new functional education approach was introduced.
The new program
was
marked by substantial innovation in methodology, content material, and relevance
to the learner's life. Apparently, even this, a series of prestructured lessons
taught through a relatively standardized pedagogical approach to a group formed
without any specific rationale, was not adequately functional as far as the life
of most of the learners was concerned. BRAC recognized that the functional education learning groups had to be formed with people who had common socioeconomic
interests and that the educational program must be linked more directly and intimately with collective development action.
This is the direction that had been
taken by the functional education activities in the newer BRAC projects.
"Consciousness raising" and engaging in collective self-help action had gained precedence over the traditional goals of acquiring literacy and numeracy skills,
although these were not seen as alternatives.
Village workshops introduced in
Sulla could be described as a form of relatively unstructured functional education without the literacy and numeracy content and reflected a concern about
making the educational program an active instrument for promoting development
action.
The evolution of the functional education program in BRAC suggests that
the lessons and the methodology of the functional education course cannot be
inserted into any situation and expected to promote development, unless the
particular situation permits the formation of relatively homogeneous interest
groups and unless the atmosphere exists for using the educational program to
plan and initiate collective self-help activities.
In the training of health workers and other field-level specialized personnel, BRAG evolved a low-cost but effective formula by shunning the trappings of such conventional training programs as classroom lectures, theoretical
studies, highly structured syllabuses, full-time professional trainers, and
special training facilities.
It relied on supervised apprenticeship in reallife work situations followed by adequate technical support when the apprentices
took independent responsibilities.
BRAC also demonstrated that with continuous
technical backup, people of both sexes, varied socioeconomic background,
and
little or no formal education could be entrusted with specialized development
functions.
Even with the "informal" training approach, a large variety of com-
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petence and skills (such as those of paramedics, shevikas, and LFPOs) could
be differentiated and developed as demanded by the circumstances.
It might be noted that paramedics, with their short informal training,
would probably not be recognized as "paraprofessionals" by government standards, although even they could not be afforded at the base of the service
delivery system--hence anothE:r layer of auxiliaries, the shevikas.
This
raises questions about the manpower policies and training requirements of
government programs that raise public costs and make services out of the
reach of the rural people. An alternative model of manpower development
and utilization deserves serious consideration and trial, one that relies
on practical apprenticeship and relatively intensive technical supervision
as the basic approach for all field level workers of development services.
For the improverrent of skills and r.ompetence of general field level
workers BRAC has moved from an informal
on-the-job learning approach to
a more systematic training program. This appears to be in part the result
of the accumulated BRAC experience in the field that has led to the identification of certain skills and knowledge that need to be developed by all
field workers and for whic~ a training process may be devised. The emphasis on a special training program also reflects a shift in the program
approach away from a large BRAC field organization to a greater reliance
on the leaders of local organizations. The local group leaders are not
full-time BRAC workers and, unlike BRAC's own full-time field agents, are
not under the continuous supervision and guidance of BRAC personnel.
It is evident that the rural development approach of BRAC requires the
field workers--whether full~time members of BRAC staff or members of local
organizations--to acquire basic skills and understand the communication
process, group dynamics, survey and analysis of the local socioeconomic
situation, planning group projects, following through the implementation
steps of a plan and assessing results, and the use of the functional education approach for initiating and organizing collective self-help efforts.
Programs that are relatively large in size or are expanding to new geographical areas and programs that are concerned with developing local leadership and agents of change cannot entirely rely on an informal apprenticeship
approach. A more systematic and somewhat institutionalized training process
becomes inevitable. Any application of the BRAC program strategies in government programs is hardly possible without a well-organized training program
for workers.
What needs to be watched is that the training program, with special
physical facilities and a full-time staff, does not become an artificially
contrived and sterile process removed from the realities that the
field
workers would face in the villages. As for the skills and understanding
required to be developed by field workers, institutionalized training cannot be seen as a full substitute for learning from practical apprenticeship and experience. The training program can at best complement such
learning or prepare the new field workers to benefit more fully from onthe-job experience. The training programs, therefore, are likely to be
effective only under certain conditions:
if the :inherent limitations of the
structured training courses are recognized, a balance is maintained between
institutionalized training and the practical apprenticeship approach, and a
recurrent approach is followed through short intermittent courses permitting
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the field workers to come back periodically to the training center and the
trainers to rotate between field work and training.
In such a scheme, the
training interlude can be the occasion to analyze the collective experience
of the field workers, to examine the applicability of general principles in
specific situations, and to devise new solutions for specific problems.
If the training program for general field workers--as opposed to specific
training for technical skills such as maintaining the books of the cooperative
society or artificial insemination of cattle--is seen as an integral and interacting element of a development program, it would be difficult to offer "prepackaged" courses for the workers of different organizations with varying objectives and philosophic rationale.
There are, of course, certain technical
contents in training "modules" on communication or group dynamics that may be
helpful for all rural development workers. However, as in the case of functional education, the effectiveness of the training of field workers is bound
to be minimized when training as a recurrent process is not linked directly
with the development actions in which the field workers are engaged.
Reaching the Poorest
Poverty, whether defined in terms of a minimum per capita income or access
to a set of basic goods and services, is pervasive in rural Bangladesh.
Onehalf to three-quarters of the rural population, depending on the estimate of income or consumption level considered necessary to rise above the poverty line,
live in poverty.
But among the poor, some are poorer than others. The hardest
hit groups, living virtually on the fringe of physical survival, are the families of the landless farm laborers, the destitute women without able-bodied
males in the family, and members of certain traditional artisan castes (such
as potters, weavers, cobblers) for whom the economic base of the occupation has
eroded because of problems of market, raw materials, and competition from industry.
Despite the avowed concern for the poorest, in the early phase of Sulla
there seems to have been insufficient attention to the differentiation of the
relative levels of poverty among the total population;
the varying socioeconomic circumstances of such groups as the landless laborers, the destitute
women, and the unemployed artisans; and the need for different program strategies for improving their situation.
In the later phase of Sulla and in the new
project activities of BRAC,
there is a much greater awareness of the relative
levels of deprivation among the poor and the need for a sharper focus on the
most deprived groups as reflected in the emphasis on mobilizing functional interest groups for collective self-help activities.
Available evidence, as we have noted earlier, shows that the general development services of BRAC--health care, family planning and functional education--as
sectoral activities (and not integrated with the, collective self-help projects of
homogeneous interest r.roups) have benefited the relatively better-off sections of
the rural population more than the poorest. The agricultural support activities
and the promotion of farmers' cooperatives, for inherent reasons, have also helped
the less poor among the rural population.
Given the fact that cultivable land, the most important productive resource
in the rural areas, is owned and controlled by a relatively small minority that
also enjoys the social, economic, and political power derived from this control,
it is inevitable that the benefits of any general developmert program will be
shared disproportionately by the powerful minority, unless ways are found to con-
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centrate the program efforts on the specific needs of the poorest. A general
development program for improving agricultural production and providing essential social services can benefit the total rural community only if a large
section of the community is not left out of the control and utilization of the
productive resources of the community. This apparertly has been recognized by
BRAC, and its project activities have shifted towards more selective activities
focusing on the rrcst disadvantaged and deprived groups of the rural population.
The selective focus on the poorest groups has its inherent limitations as
long as this happens in the context of existing production and power relationships in the rural community. It will take hard work and imaginative approaches
to make the poorest groups participants and beneficiaries of the social services
such as health care, family planning and education. But with the scarce productive resources (land being controlled by a section of the community and economic opportunities in general being limited), it is difficult to visualize more
than marginal improvement in the economic situation of the most deprived groups.
Insignificant progress on the economic front, in turn, is likely to undermine
the efforts to widen participation in the social services. This is the fundamental reality that BRAC efforts bring to the surface and has to be faced by
all rural development agencies and the national policymakers.
Special Role of Voluntary Organizations
Small-scale development programs managed by voluntary organizations have
well recognized advantages of flexibility and freedom from bureaucracy
that
large public programs normally do not enjoy. Voluntary organizations are also
able to select the scope of their activities, the geographical locations
for
the programs, and their participants to a much greater extent than public programs. Voluntary agencies also tend to attract idealistic and well-motivated
people as paid and unpaid workers in their development activities. All
of
these favorable factors make it possible for voluntary programs to vary program approaches for specific locations and clienteles within the same project,
modify initial plans in the light of experience, and take quick policy decisions when necessary. The evolution of BRAC's program approach from relatively
conventional sectoral activities to a development approach concentrating on the
promotion of local self-help groups on thE basis of the early Sulla experience
is a demonstration of the special strength of the voluntary programs.
This
change came about without the fanfare of formal evaluation studies or
review
missions of international experts--not that systematic evaluation of projects
is unnecessary.
The unique characteristics of the small-scale nongovernment programs make
them good instruments for testing and developing innovative ideas and approaches
that may be difficult to try within the constraints of public programs.
Many
program ideas already applied in the various sub-projects of the multifaceted
BRAC program suggest themselves as good candidates for testing for their potential adoption or adaptation into government programs on a large scale.
Of
course, apart from their inevitable bureaucratic tendencies, the government
programs do not enjoy the flexibility of the voluntary organizations; therefore, straight transplantation of certain elements of the voluntary program
into the government program is almost never advisable.
A practical way of transferring lessons learned in voluntary programs
to government programs would be for the government and the voluntary organization to embark on a kind of "joint venture" in the shape of pilot
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projects in one or more specific locations.
Once the viability of an approach is derronstrated in small-scale programs
and some basic criteria of viability and feasibility (such as compatibility of
objectives between the private program and a nationzl program) for a largescale expansion appear likely to be met, a pilot phase can be initiated on
the basis of close collaboration between the government and the voluntary
organization in a limited area {preferably in a standard territorial unit
of administration, such as a tharca). The objective of such a venture would
be two-fold:
first, to test and develop the specific adaptations and modifications of the approach of the small program inevitably needed for a
national and public program; and secon~, to work out the operational steps
for moving beyond the pilot phase and to use the pilot phase for training and
orientation of the government functionaries in anticipation of further expansion of the approach. The government, obviously, has to be enthusiastically
cormnitted to giving the pilot project a fair trial and to following it up appropriately. The voluntary organizatior, on its part, should be appreciative
of the problems of nationa] programs and large bureaucracies and be willing to
be flexible without sacrificing the essence of its own approach.
Besides being the testing grounc for innovative techniques in integrated
rural development, an equally significant potential role of voluntary organizations is that of an institutional mechanism complementary to the local government structure. The government rural development approach in Bangladesh,
represented by the Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP), visualizes a
strong thana-level development guidance and coordination body composed of
elected representatives and government personnel as the means for decentralizing development responsibilities. As we have noted, it is also BRAC's expectation that a thana-level apex organization representing various primary
cooperatives and organizations in the villages will eventually take over the
support and coordination of local development projects and services, permitting BRAC to dismantle its own field organjzation. Whether this institutional
design for rural development will be effectively established and whether it
will serve the interests of all the rural people including the poorest instead of being captured by the powerful minority will depend on the success
of the efforts to mobilize and organize the local interest groups of
the
deprived and the disadvantaged.
If BRAC, through its projects for "conscientizing" and generating homogeneous interest groups of the poor for collective self-help activities, can
demonstrate a feasible approach for organizing the poor into constituent primary interest groups (and, to a degree, a countervailing political force) for
the local government and local development coordination body, it will be a
far-reaching contribution to building an effective rural development strategy.
The mobilization of the poor for self-help also opens up the possibility of
conflicts between the organized poor and others who would want to retain their
control over the local institutions. The rights and interests of the poor majority cannot be safeguarded without facing this possibility.

LESSON 2
IDENTIFYING DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Understand more thoroughly issues surrounding rural
development through discussion of the BRAC case study.
2. Have better understanding of the history of rural development.
3. Recognize some important issures of problem identification in
specific situations.
Activities
1. Discussion of BRAC case.
(30 min)
a) What were the most important issues discussed in the
case?
b) How did the perspective of the author affect the kind of
information presented in the case?
c) Are there other factors and considerations ommitted in
the case presentation?
2.

Discussion of writing assignments.
(30 min)
a) What was the most difficult/easiest part of the
assignment?
b) How did you feel when you were doing the assignment?
c) How would you improve the assignment if at all?

3. Lecturette-history of rural development since WWII. (20 min)
a) Context of development before WWII.
b) Trends in development of theories and their ramifications
to rural development.
c) Current trends in rural development.
4. Break

(10 min)

5. Simulation in problem identification.
(1 hour)
a) Outsider from class will enter and inform class that they
have been chosen by an outside agency to receive funding for
a project to benefit their community. S/he would like for
them to submit a preliminary proposal on what they will do
with the $100 dollars, the objectives they will achieve,
exactly how the money will be spent, and how they will
evaluate their success. The deadline for budget allocations
for projects of this agency is in one hour so he will return
to receive the proposal then. The rules overning the funds
are that they may only be used to benefit their community as
a whole, that they cannot divide the funds among themselves
and that they must account for how the funds will be spent.
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6. Process consultation
(20 min)
a) discussion on simualtion and issues that arose.
7. Handout Homework number 2 - Observing Others.

(10 min)

Materials required
1. Water and cups.
2. $100 dollars cash.
3. Outsider to play role of development agency official.

(Greg?)

HOMEWORK 2
OBSERVING OTHERS
1. Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Oliver, Education and Community, pp.83-123.
Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, pp. 1-37.
Vogeler, Dialectics of Third World Development, pp.3-25.
Moris, chapter 3, pp.31-46.
·Shah, "The Story of Fire."

2. Write:
In at least two pages describe what you might do to increase
the learning capacity of the people involved in your rural
development problem/issue/topic.
Guiding questions you might wish to consider:
1. How would the aspects of human nature outlined by
Oliver affect your actions?
2. What factors would Rogers deem essential in
determining your strategy?
3. Revise your writing from homework number 1 if you need to.
Make any ammendments to your problem, This is the last
opportunity you will have to change your mind. After this the
commitment has been made and you must see the development process
through to the end of the course.
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The Potentialities of Human Nature

A Radical Critique
of Innovative Schooling
"'

---"-

Donald W Oliver
Harvard University

In this book we are attempting to present a way of looking at
the human species which will emphasize criteria for judging quality
of life and the evolutionary limitations placed on man in his quest
for a positive life. The most basic source of these limitations is in
man's nature itself. In a very direct way man's potentialities are limited by the physical equipment that has evolved with him over the
millions of years life has been transforming itself on this planet. In a
more obvious way this equipment includes prehensile forelimbs, bipedalism, and a highly differentiated central nervous system which is
capable of complex information storage and problem-solving. In a
somewhat less obvious way, man is a species with a large number of
social capacities and tendencies, some of which he shares with his
primate neighbors: temporal biological rhythms, the capacity and
need for physical and emotional attachments, the tendency to create
and teach stable role patterns, the tendency to polarize social life in

jlr<!iutrfi11n Jubllllfrtng aiarpanttrm
2526 Grove Str.et
aerkeley, Colifornio 9.t 70.t
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terms of ingroup-amity-outgroup-enmity, and the need to legitimate
social patterns with cultural rules overtly expressed in cognitive statements and symbolic gesture and celebration.
To move directly from statements about human nature-tendencies, capacities, instincts, or the like-to supporting evidence, illustrations, or social implications short circuits a number of significant
and clarifying analytic categories. We think that man's nature-both
its limits and flexibilities-is expressed in any setting through four
channels or subsystems: environment, culture, social structure, and
personality (see figure 4.1).
These channels suggest a limited set of structured potentials
through which the full range of human possibilities can be described.
It assumes, for example, that male-female dyads, nuclear or restricted
families, full or extended families, bands or villages are natural human social forms each of which has special limiting characteristics. It
is possible to imagine social forms in which males and females relate
promiscuously, or adults and young people relate only casually and
randomly, or adolescent females direct and control all others. It happens, however, that these structures rarely occur.
We assume that the same kinds of limited possibilities occur for
personality, culture, and environment. Regarding personality, for
example, Fromm says:
Freud's clinical descriptions of the oral-receptive, oral-exploitative, and anal
character seem to us essentially correct and confirmed by experiences in the
analysis of individuals, as well as analytical research into the character structure
of groups. (Fromm and Maccoby 1970, p. 13)
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Freud's classification refers, of course, to only one complex dimension of human personality.
Below we shall suggest subsets within these channels. Conceptually it is important to understand that the channels are present and
limiting because of the underlying characteristics of the species. If we
hypothesize, for example, with Wallace (1970), that age and sex arc
related to social hierarchy, we would expect to find this fact represented in social structures (families, communities); in culture (beliefs
about who is in authority); in personality (some types would be predisposed in voice, gesture, and manner to express dominant behavior;
some types would be predisposed to express submissive behavior); as
well as in the way technology is organized. Furthermore, it is critical
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to understand, as the above example suggests, that the channels
through which human tendencies are expressed are interrelated-not
independent. Social structures must take account of variations in
personality; culture tends to reinforce social structure; human technology demands certain types of social structures, and so on. High
quality of life presumably occurs only when the channels are related
in complex ways, for example, when there are sufficiently varied
social forms (including diverse and reciprocal social roles) to include
the full range of human personality types; when the culture is loose
enough to accommodate this diversity but defined enough to give
direction and meaning to people's lives; when technology has created
sufficient economic wherewithal to meet minimal human needs, but
not impose overwhelming amounts of alienating machinery (e.g., factories, office buildings) on human lives. These distinctions are, of
course, commonly made by social systems analysts. (See, for example, Parsons 1971.) Parsons attempts to link subsystems through
which human behavior is channeled with functional requirements of
human societies. His classic set of analytic relationships is summarized in table 4.1. Our own analysis suggests that there is no

Table 4.1
Parsons' Paradigm
Subsystems
Social
Cultural
Personality
Behavioral
organism

Societal community
Pattern maintenance
Polity

Economy
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linked or parallel with only the economic system (what we would
call environment and technology).

Environment and Technology
A basic limiting factor in human society is the level of support
offered by the environment and the extent to which environment has
or can be adapted by technology for human survival and comfort.
What man needs for survival is, of course, problematical, but there
are obvious necessities: food, air, water, shelter, and usually external
energy in the form of domestic animals, wind and water power, fossil
fuels, etc. Beyond these environmental or material requirements,
what man calls poverty is somewhat relative to what his neighbor
has. It is clear, for example, that the early Eskimos lived on the margin of successful adaptation. Minor changes in environmental pressures or technology might lead to extinction or to a serious depletion
of the population. (Their loving abandonment of old people is
legendary.) It is difficult to argue, however, that the Eskimo had a
lower quality of life than, for example, Banfield's Italian peasant
who probably had less environmental pressure (Banfield 1958). The
peasant of Montegrano lives in a marginal environment.

Structural
components

Aspects of developmental process

If all the measures that have been suggested here [for improving the standard of
living] were pursued actively and effectively, there would be no dramatic improvement in the economic position of the village .... Under the best of circumstances, it will be a very long time before the people of Montegrano have enough

Integration

Norms

Inclusion

to eat. (p. 166)

Pattern maintenance
Goal attainment

Values

Value generalization

Collectivities

Differentiation

But at least as important as the stark environmental pressures are the
relative standards of the "good life" which the peasant has in his

Primary
function

Adaptation

head.
Roles

Adaptive upgrading

Source: Adapted from Talcott Parsons, The System of Modem Societies (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 19 71 ) : pp. 6, 1 I.

intrinsic relationship between specific functional requirements of a
society-economics (adaptation), politics (decision making), ideology
(belief and values)-and the societal subsystems discussed here. That
is, we do not see human adaptation, for example, as intrinsically

By the standards of the larger society, the peasant's work, food, and clothing all
symbolize his degradation. It is on this account, as much as for biological
reasons, that he finds them unsatisfying and even hateful. Italians attach great
importance to being mannerly (civile); the peasant feels that he is the very opposite: association with earth and animals, he thinks, has made him dirty and animal-like ....
La miseria, it seems safe to conclude, arises as much or more from social as
from biological deprivations. (p. 65)

Technology is currently seen as the destiny and salvation of
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man's ills, on the one hand, and the undermining of more primitive
conditions for a decent and humane life on the other. There is little
doubt that man has the capacity to create destructive, ugly, and demeaning technology, just as he has the capacity to create destructive
culture or sadistic personality. Moving from intuitive quality-of-life
judgments regarding environment and technology to systematic or
persuasive criteria, however, is difficult. The Goodmans (1960, p.
171) deal with this issue:
SOME ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES FOR THE
MORAL SELECTION OF MACHINES
I. Utility (functionalist beauty)
2. Transparency of operation
A. Repairability by the average well-educated person (freedom)
B. Constructivist beauty
3. Relative independence of machine from non-ubiquitous power
4. Proportion between total effort and utility {neo-functionalist beauty)

Mumford makes a similar search for standards by which to
judge not only the quality but the limits of technology. He sees the
positive limits in terms of what he calls "dynamic equilibrium."
Dynamic equilibrium, not infinite progress, is the mark of the opening age: balance, not rapid one-sided advance: conservation, not reckless pillage. The parallel
between neolithic and neotechnic times holds even here: for the main advances
which were consolidated in neolithic times remained stable, with minor variations within the pattern, for between 2500 and 3500 years. Once we have generally reached a new technical plateau we may remain on that level with very
minor ups and downs for thousands of years. What are the implications of this
approaching equilibrium?
First: equilibrium in the environment. This means first the restoration of
the balance between man and nature. The conservation and restoration of soils,
the re-growth wherever this is expedient and possible, of the forest cover to provide shelter for wild life and to maintain man's primitive background as a source
of recreation, whose importance increases in proportion to the refinement of his
cultural heritage ....
Second, equilibrium in industry and agriculture ....
This state of balance and equilibrium-regional, industrial, agricultural,
communal-will work a further change within the domain of the machine itself:
a change of tempo .... It is not the absolute speed assumed by any part of the
machine system that indicates efficiency: what is important is the relative speed
of the various parts with a view to the ends to be accomplished: namely, the
maintenance and development of human life. (1963, pp. 431-32)

Human Nature
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Both the quality and quantity of man's control over his natural
environment are complex and debatable issues. What seems clear,
however, is that modem societies often use technology and create
environments with little or no regard for the reqi.tirements of man's
underlying nature, aside from what seems comfortable or convenient
in the most superficial way. One might entertain with some certainty, for example, the principle (as the Goodmans suggest) that
technology which obscures or denies man's biological self is potentially dangerous and destructive. Seeing food only in its frozen or
canned state obscures our absolute dependence on the sun for food;
having waste products carted away in trucks or flushed down toilets
and drains obscures the fact that we are intrinsically involved in a
critical life-sustaining ecological chain. This latter iilusion Slater calls
the Toilet Assumption.
Prior to the widespread use of the flush toilet all of humanity was daily confronted with the immediate reality of human waste and iu disposal. They knew
where it was and how it got there. Nothing miraculously vanished. Excrement
was conspicuously present in the outhouse or chamber pot, and the slops that
went out the window went visibly and noticeably into the street •.••
Our ideas about institutionalizing the aged, psychotic, retarded, and infirm
are based on a pattern of thought that we might call the Toilet Assumption-the
notion that unwanted matter, unwanted difficulties, unwanted complexities and
obstacles will disappear if they are removed from our immediate field of vision.
(1970, p. 15)

It is our position that there are environments and technology
which are more and less consistent with underlying human requirements in much more profound ways than the superficial principles of
comfort and convenience. The convenience of the garbage disposal
and the flush toilet, for example, might well be weighed against the
alienation caused by man living with the illusion that he has no waste
products at all.
More important than simple statements we make about the
material environment alone is the differential power of control over
environment and technology various groups within the society exercise and for whose benefit that power and control are used. This, of
course, is the thrust of Marxist thinking. The life one can imagine is a
function of the material surroundings within which one finds oneself.
Marx imagined beyond his immediate surroundings into a projective
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history, a history which had less to do with the tyranny of technology and the human systems which manage them and more to do with
who had the power to control and benefit from the blessings of technology.
More recent analysts of postindustrial society seriously challenge the assumption that science and technology are value free-that
it is only how humans use them that gives them normative significance. It is important to distinguish here between simplistic materialism-the idea that man is simply a conditioned product of his material surroundings-and the Faustian idea that man can be seduced
into styles of life which emphasize materialism, consumerism, greed,
and alienation from his natural sense of human sociality, cooperation, and relatedness to other forms of life and the broad conditions
that sustain them. Man's vulnerability to seduction by technological
and political power is perhaps the most serious threat to a decent
quality of life in the contemporary world. From an evolutionary
point of view, the problem is that man has never developed inhibitory mechanisms which move him to control or limit the size and
complexity of his social and natural settings so they will be consistent with the scale of his hunter-gatherer past, the past within
which much of his adaptive constitution was forged. Control of personal or private property, for example, is minimal for the huntcrgatherer, for there is little to control; there is little surplus wealth.
Likewise, abusive and arbitrary use of political power is limited by
the fact that humans live in small units; all know one another intimately; all share a sense of protective concern for all members of the
band.
The problem of technology, then, is really grounded in man's
paradoxical evolutionary development. He has the technical capacities-as well as an inclination to use them-to destroy the material
and social conditions within which he can feel comfortable or, at
least, adequate. Faced with increasing material wealth and social
power made possible by the control of complex technology, he tends
to create highly stratified societies, for which his hunter-gatherer
past ilJ-equipped him. For, as Lenski notes, "if any single feature
of the life of hunting and gathering societies has impressed itself
upon observers, it is the relative equality of the members" (1966, p.

102).
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Culture
With the exception of our concern for environment and technology, our distinctions between culture, social structure, and personality are much like those developed by Spiro. Spiro sees social
systems (what we would call social structure) as "configurations of
reciprocal roles which are shared by members of a group in virtue of
their inheritance from a prior generation" ( 1972, p. 588). He states
that there are three bases for such social systems or structures: genetic inheritance (as in the case of social insects); roles acquired
through social learning (as in the case of some mammals, including
primates); and roles inherited not through social learning, but which
are symbolically prescribed. This latter potential is almost exclusive
to man.
I would now argue ... that culture consists, among other things, of the norms
which govern social relationships; that these norms are to be distinguished analytically from that system of social relationships which may be termed the social
system of a society; and that both are to be distinguished from personality, by
which I understand the motivational system (including internalized norms) that
characterize individuals. (p. 589)

Very generally, culture would be defined as implicit or explicit
rules which channel behavior. In their most obvious form, they appear as prescriptions or proscriptions. They are, however, surrounded
by belief systems or ideology which rationalize and set the rules in
broader context-value statements, facts, generalizations, law, systematic social theory, philosophy, symbols, myths, history, folktales,
as well as methods for validating and knowing.
If we construe culture as largely language or concept-bound,
then human limits on culture are set by the way man uses language,
symbols, and concepts. There is evidence that he has a universal
grammar (Chomsky 1968). His nervous system is wired in a particular way which limits and determines his logical potential.
He tends toward a dichotomized construction of reality (George
Kelly 1955), and perhaps even toward specific dichotomies such as
good-bad, strong-weak, active-passive. He tends toward metaphor and
analogy which links his experience with the natural phenomena
around him Oung 1968; Levi-Strauss 1963 ). His thinking tends to
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function on a continuum from fluid imagery to sensory messages to
very directed purposeful instrumental thinking Qung).
The language characteristics seen as "human" vary considerably
among individuals. There is, for example, a wide range of ability to
think along the concrete-abstract dimension, or to create imagery in
symbolic terms (e.g., poetry). Piaget ( 1955) has discovered a developmental sequence through which humans ordinarily pass in their ability to symbolize and "think about thinking." There are degrees to
which individual humans internalize culture or rule-systems. For
example, attitudes may be formed and shift because (1) one wishes
to comply with a message source (presumably an authority), (2) one
identifies with the message source, or (3) one has genuinely internalized the meaning and force of the message. Kohlberg and J\faycr
(1972) make a similar set of distinctions in their study of the way
humans handle moral dilemma stories verbally or conceptually.
Moral judgments may have a "preconventional basis" (the rightness
of a position is justified on the basis of force, fear of punishment,
etc.); a "conventional basis" (the rightness is justified on the basis of
group consensus, opinion, or specific rules which maintain order
within the group); or a "postconventional basis" (the rightness is justified on the basis of an abstract principle of justice such as utilitarianism). The extent to which culture is conscious or unconscious is,
of course, a central concern of depth psychologists. Conflicts between culture and personal drives arc presumably often handled by
unconscious coping and defense mechanisms such as denial, repression, overcompensation, and the like.
Universal ideological dimensions of culture have been schematized by Florence Kluckhohn ( 1961 ), and are shown in table 4.2.
Human cultures can also be described in terms of more abstract qualities: for example, comprehensiveness (extent to which potential or
real social behavior patterns are covered by rules, values, or ideology); level of specificity (how detailed and delineated are the rules);
and level of integration (extent to which rules in various behavioral
domains such as work, love, religion, and play, are interrelated).
Judgments about the quality of life which various societies
encourage, allow, or prevent are often difficult if not impossible to
make within the framework of culture as a single dimension of a society. In general, such judgments apply to sociocultural or culture-andpersonality relationships. One might, however, hazard the following
speculations.
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1. Culture which seriously inhibits the normal functioning of
basic human drives is destructive (e.g., rules preventing normal heterosexual relations until ten years after puberty' rules which prevent
outgroup aggression).
2. Culture which greatly enhances the value of behavior which is
difficult for large numbers of people to learn or perform is destructive (e.g., the rule that all humans should have control over reading
and writing complex and abstract language; rules which press for
transcendent levels of human consciousness).
3. Culture which legitimizes human exploitation is destructive
(e.g., rules which allow or require some humans to live in poverty
while others live in luxury).

Social Structure

-._]
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A third analytic component or behavioral channel in a social
system we would call social structure. Social structures can be construed in individual terms as roles or learned behavior patterns which
occur predictably and regularly through time regardless of what individual plays them. Structure can be thought of more generally as sets
of interrelated or reciprocal roles which together constitute institutions. The family might be seen as an institution in which various age
and kinship roles are filled; a factory might be seen as an institution
in which various authority-power and instrumental work roles are
filled.
A continuing source of ambiguity is the extent to which we see
institutions as universal, that is, occurring across different societies
versus the extent to which we see them as the invention of a specific
society or type of society. Families, villages, and cities are often seen
as universals; schools, factories, and offices are often seen as society
-or culture-specific. We make the distinction between general social
forms and specific institutions. We maintain that social forms are universal types of collective behavior which man will generally create
under certain specified circumstances. \Ve would suggest the following, for example, as universal social forms:
Intense dyads (lovers, marriage partners, friends, parent-child)
Nuclear families
Sodalities (work groups, friendship groups)
"Bands," neighborhoods, villages
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Corporate organizations (factories, businesses, offices, sch ooh
etc.)
Preindustrial cities
"Modern" societies
Universal social forms which human societies create can be de
scribed along a number of dimensions, for example, complexit)
basis of cohesion or integration, degree of integration or cohesion
the looseness or tightness of behavior patterns, or the harshness o
leniency of sanctions used to enforce prescribed patterns. In general
more complex social forms use a greater variety of methods of int{
gration or cohesion. We would consider the following mechanisms a
representing man's more important integrative capacities:
Biosocial bonding (heterosexual bonding, cooperative worl
bonding, nurturance-dependency bonding)
Dominance hierarchies
Division of labor
Cultural codes or formal political structures legitimizing and ra
tionalizing dominance hierarchies
Negotiated contracts
The concept of tight versus loose social structures seems to u
especially important because of its relationship to more primitiv,
societies characterized by tribal or band relationships and more mod
em societies characterized by corporate organizations. It is not nece~
sarily the case that communal or tribal relationships are loose o
tight, but rather that they can be, while corporate organizations al
ways tend toward highly bureaucratic structured relationships.
Looseness or tightness of social structures may be characterize•
as: (1) the extent to which roles or role relationships within a socia
system are clear and explicit; (2) the extent to which roles are close!·
related to or locked into a set of reciprocal relationships; (3) the ex
tent to which there are limited categories of people who can pla'
roles (e.g., is the biological father the only person who can play
child's father-role, or can the role easily be played by uncles, olde
siblings, etc.); (4) the extent to which there is behavioral variation o
flexibility within a role; (5) the extent to which there are harsh o
lenient sanctions (and forgiveness) for deviation from role expect2
tions.
The general issue of tight and loose social structures was exam
ined in an essay by Embree (1969, pp. 3-15) in which he compare•
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Japanese and Thai village life. The essay sparked considerable controversy because of the seeming contradiction between social structure
as a categorical characteristic of a social system and the implication
that "tight" equalled "more" and "loose" equalled "less." If social
systems have, by definition, social structures, you cannot have more
or less of a social structure-you simply have different types of structures.
Putting this somewhat academic argument aside, we would
maintain that the tight-loose distinction makes a good deal of sense,
as suggested by our defining characteristics given above. Piker ( 1969,
pp. 61-76), for example, states that role demands for Thai villagers
are loose for a number of reasons:
1. Civil servants are given much paid leave ijob truancy is legitimated);
2. It is difficult to offend someone beyond forgiveness;
3. There are few stable expectations about lifestyles others are
to maintain over the long run (except for ritualized politeness in
face-to-face settings);
J
4. There is relatively open social mobility.
Piker then concludes:
... these findings suggest two conclusions with respect to the correspondence
between personality and the social system in rural Thai society: if such correspondence does in fact obtain, it consists largely, first, of the adequacy of the
sum total of institutions for the expression of those diverse personality traits
that are widespread in the population and, second, of the accessibility of these
institutions to the bearers of diverse personality traits. (p. 74)

Phillips made a related comment on Thai personality:
... cooperative, mutually expectable interaction as we know it in the West does
not "simply take place" in Bang Chan. Rather, there is always the intervening
factor of whether individuals want it to take place .... It is the individual that is
primary, not the social relationship. The assumption is: "If he did not do it, he
must have had his own good reason." (1965, p. 60)

Both writers seem to suggest considerably looser role demands on the
individual personality than in highly organized modem societies.
Schooling in modem societies, for example, makes uniform demands
on very diverse personalities, especially for younger children.
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While the social structure of societies or groups can be described
along such dimensions as degree of integration, basis of integration,
or looseness or tightness of structure, statuses or roles themselves can
be described along another set of meaningful dimensions first developed by Parsons.
[Parsons J uses a set of 5 "pattern variables" to distinguish the aspects of any
social relationship. According to Parsons, each time we act, and in each role in
which we act, we are, in effect, emphasizing one or another of the 5 basic divi·
sions. If a role is specific, our relationship is limited to one particular narrow))
defined exchange; if it is diffuse, our involvement will extend over a wide variet)
of problems or relationships. We stress either affectivity (that is, feeling, emo
tion, and gTatification), or affective neutrality, which mearu we place more em
phasis on instrumental or moral considerations. We manifest particularism whe1
we give special consideration to people because of their relationship to us
whereas if we evidence universalism, we treat more or less alike all who com'
before us in a given status-position. If my treatment of you is mainly on th·
basis of what you are in yourself, in contrast to what you do or have done,
stress quality over performance (ascribed status vs. achieved status). When m·
concern is mainly to advance the goals of the group, I display a coUectivit)
orientation, whereas if I am most concerned to advance my own interest
through our relationship, I stress self-on"entation. Descnbed in these terms, th
relations of husband and wife, and indeed all nuclear family relations, tend to b
diffuse, affective, and particularistic, and reflect stress on quality and collecth
ity-orientation. The relationship between a clerk and a customer would be at th
opposite pole on each dimension. (Inkeles 1964, p. 74)

As Inkeles suggests, Parsons' pattern variables are obviously derive
from an intuitive sense that so-called primary groups (groups wit
sustained face-to-face relationships) are somehow fundamentally di
ferent from secondary groups.
With this level of analytic differentiation, we might speculat
about what characteristics of social structure tend toward high<
quality of life and which tend to diminish the quality of life in h1
man societies. One might ask the following questions:
1. To what ex tent is the availability of primordial social forn
such as the nuclear family, the extended family, sodalities, and smc
communities or neighborhoods a prerequisite for emotional healt
security, and adequate societal integration?
2. To what extent can humans function with reasonable equa
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imity or without great stress in social forms which require competing
types of social integration, for example, in neighborhoods integrated
by sexual, kinship, and sentiment bonding and at the same time in
corporate organizations (stores, offices, factories, schools) where
integration is maintained through cultural codes, centralized control
of sanctions, and negotiated contracts?
3. To what extent can humans function with equanimity or
without great stress in a variety of social forms which are either highly integrated (as a religious commune) or highly fragmented (as suburban life in modem society)?
4. To what extent are societies or social forms characterized as
having tight or loose or moderate social structures conducive to high
or low human stress?
5. To what extent does role diffuseness or specificity or the
looS(ness or tightness of roles lead to higher or lower stress?
6. To what extent do institutions having social forms which mix
primary and secondary characteristics (e.g., schools and small family
businesses) generate greater or lesser stress compared with institutions
which have pure forms (e.g., family, or large corporate business)?
j
.)

Personality
Personality refers to underlying motivational structures or overt
behavior patterns which characterize individual humans. The forces
which shape personality and affect individual behavior are multiple:
human constitution (via inheritance, imprinting, or early biosocial
learning); socialization (learned orientations toward basic human
functions such as work, love and attachment, play, dream and fantasy); the interaction between constitution and socialization, especially during critical developmental periods in the human career; and
finally the press of sociocultural systems (institutions, roles, etc.)
within which the individual always functions.
A central tension in any human society is the fact that culturally defined or general rules, ideology, and roles must be channeled
through diverse human beings. Wallace has described this tension by
suggesting that there are two ways of looking at culture and society:
one as the "replication of uniformity," and another as "the organization of diversity_" From the point of view of the "replication of uniformity":
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the society may be regarded as culturally homogeneous and the individuals will
be expected to share a uniform nuclear character. If a near-perfect correspondence between culture and individual nuclear character is assumed, the structural
relation between the two becomes nonproblematical, and the interest of processual research lies rather in the mechanisms of socialization by which each generation becomes, culturally and characterologically, a replica of iu predecessors.
(1970, pp. 22-23)

From the point of view of "the organization of diversity":
Culture ... becomes not so much a superorganic entity, but policy, tacitly and
gradually concocted by groups of people for the furtherance of their interests,
and contract, established by practice, between and among individuals to organize
their strivings into mutually facilitating equivalence structures. (p. 24)

We are here focusing on human diversity as the central problem
of personality, that is, we need to categorize the major sources of
variation through which different aspects of human nature are channeled. We would suggest two significant categories of variation: ( 1)
the salience and complexity with which different levels (in the
Freudian sense) of personality are expressed; and (2) the differences
in common human characteristics such as age, sex, temperament, talent, etc. Regarding the first type of variation one can imagine that
human personality is constructed as a set of layers:
Cultural values and rules, which rationalize role behavior

t
Learned social roles through which underlying personality
type is expressed

t
Patterned constitutional tendencies interacting with environment (e.g., oral or anal personalities)

t
Universal human strivings (e.g., love, work, meaning)

t
Undifferentiated libidinal energy
Given this model, one can imagine basic human strivings as more or
less crudely or directly expressed, or as more or less refined by social
ized roles or cultural values.
One can speculate that there are archetypal social callings which.
when matched with archetypal personality types, require less role
behavior and are a more direct expression of underlying impulses

JOO
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The clown or buffoon, the reflective teacher, the priest or shaman,
the doctor or healer-all may be an expression of such role
archetypes. When the bland unquestioning personality type, for
example, takes on the work of reflective teacher, we would guess
that the behavior is much more an expression of a highly socialized
role than the underlying need to probe the meaning of his social or
natural world.
Personalities vary in their degree of socialization potential; some
are relatively easily socialized; some are socialized with great difficulty. Relating the concept of socialization potential to quality of
life, one might argue that a higher quality of life is possible in a society in which humans who socialize with great difficulty can select
themselves into roles which are reasonably consistent with their
underlying constitutional tendencies; or conversely, a society in
which those humans who socialize easily are not required to creatively fashion innovative roles. If normal human variation yields
more clowns, buffoons, or comedians, for example, than can be
accommodated in a society (especially where there is the technology
of mass media), and comedians are then forced to become bank
clerks or shoe salesmen (more exacting and highly socialized roles),
presumably there is considerable human stress. Or conversely, if society demands a great many questioning, interesting, and charismatic
teachers who cannot be found, their places must be filled by oversocialized bank clerks.
The second category of human variation includes such characteristics as age, sex, temperament, talents, etc. We might suggest the
following as examples.
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1. Energy level
As Robert White states:
When one assists at the birth of a litter of puppies it is impossible not to see
differences among the new arrivals with respect to activity and vigor. The mother dog notices the differences and may even callously push aside a puppy that
does not meet her minimum standards of responsiveness ..... It is hard ... to
think of high vitality and zest as traits that could be wholly learned if they were
not built into the organism in the first place. Some babies do not display these
qualities and develop in a consistently quieter and less colorful way. ( 1966, pp.

236-37)

2. Sensory-conceptual modes of relating to the environment
There is some systematic evidence and a good deal of intuitive

(.
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evidence that different humans relate to the environment througl
emphasis on different sensory processes. Three strong candidates fo,
"relational modes" are kinesthetic-motor, sensory, and conceptual
verbal. These terms might be defined by considering very talentec
people who express themselves through each mode. Professiona
athletes and dancers have a dominant kinesthetic-motor way of relat
ing. Painters and film-makers have extraordinary sensory sensibilities
Scientists and academics relate in a more conceptual-verbal mode
Obviously any individual is a mix of these (and other) modes of relat
ing, all of which are, to a considerable extent, subject to learning.
3. Interpersonal tendencies
It is possible to make a case for extroversion-introversion as
dominant dimension along which individuals relate to one another
4. Physique and temperament
William Sheldon has probably done the most systematic stud'
on the relationship between physique or body type and tempera
ment. White summarizes Sheldon's work as follows:
Sheldon reached the conclusion ... that temperament could be described as ha\
ing three main components. The first, which he called visaratonia, was represente<
by a cluster of traits such as relaxation, love of comfort, amiability, and a need fo
affection and approval of others. The second component, named somatotonia, wa
characterized by vigorous assertiveness, a love of action, and a dominating bu
somewhat insensitive attitude toward other people. The third component, cerebra
tonia, had as its chief traits a tense vigilance, sensitiveness, a tendency for action t<
be inhibited, and a certain ineptitude in social situations. All three components ar
present in everyone, but in different relative strengths ....
Sheldon seemed to give his components of temperament a more clear!·
constitutional cast when he developed a systematic scheme for the measuremen
of physique, and related visceratonia to a soft rounded physique, somatotonia t•
a solid muscular one, and cerebrotonia to a slender, lightly built frame. {196E
pp. 231-32)

5. Male-femaleness
While there is considerable controversy over the extent to whicl
personality differences between sexes and the masculinity-femininit~
dimension within each sex is biologically or socioculturally based
substantial differences seem universal. Males, for example, seem mor
object- and task-oriented, more aggressive, and have more focuse(
sexual interests. Females appear more people-oriented, have strange
interpersonal needs, seem less openly aggressive, and have more dil
fusely expressed sexuality.
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6. The human career cycle
While it is obvious that infants, children, and old people have
specific, constitutionally-based developmental resources and needs,
there is little systematic information on differences among other
adults at different points in the human career. Erikson (1964) has
suggested that developmental crises occur throughout life, and that
each crisis requires a new integration with previous develop men ta!
problems. We would speculate that the orientation of American society (and of modern societies more generally) is toward construing all
adult humans as equal and interchangeable-hence we become somewhat insensitive to age differences in our public discourse. There is,
of course, a tremendous cosmetic industry which attempts to make
plausible the illusion that everyone is the same age-through wigs,
hair coloring, face lifting, cosmetics, and the like.
We would argue that the essential criterion for quality of life for
personality is the extent to which an authentic self can be constructed and expressed (at whatever age). The primary problem for
the realization of such authentic personalities is the tendency of culture to construct a range of worthy types of people which is more
limited than the normal range of differences which commonly occur
_j within the species. Social roles, moreover, tend to be ordered on a
..L hierarchy of privilege or prestige such that some individuals are constantly tempted to "not be themselves" in order to gain prestige or
avoid discrimination (e.g., the friendly generous teacher who is told
to be tough with rowdy students). In this sense the potential for
authentic personalities within a society is very much dependent on
the range of roles within the social structure, the privileges associated
with these roles, and the definition of these roles by the culture.

Interaction Among Personality, Culture, and Social Structure
Disciplinarians in the various social sciences constantly war over
the relative importance of various subsystems of human society.
Psychologists tend to stress the significance of individual learning,
especially early childhood experience. Anthropologists stress the im·
pact of common culture, often assuming a level of cultural uniformity that defies common-sense experience. Sociologists and social
anthropologists stress the importance of institutions and roles, construing the significance of personality simply as a constellation of
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internalized others; or they assume that different personality types
cancel each other out, and thus account for no great impact on a
society.
This kind of analytic fragmentation leads toward several kinds
of social mischief. First, it leads individual social scientists or
"schools" of social science to grossly oversell the level of reliability
with which any particular analytic orientation or theory can make a
useful contribution to theories of social amelioration. Behavioristic
psychology (Skinner) and more recently developmental psychology
(Kohlberg) are examples.
Second, disciplinary blinders often prevent social scientists from
developing more complex theories which would square better with
the realities of common-sense human experience. A case in point
where disciplinary blinders have been somewhat removed is Fromm's
theory of social character. Fromm (1970) suggests that there are relationships between personal constitution, early socialization experience, and sociocultural press. The socialization requirements which
would allow an individual to achieve authentic love and productive
work, for example, may be very different for the tender-minded, sensitive person than for the aggressive, task-oriented person. And more
importantly, sociocultural constraints in the larger society may prevent one or the other type from achieving an authentic self because
of the press it makes on the primary group environment. Social stratification which places different values on people at different levels of
society (on their work, their lifestyles, their values, their speech, etc.)
may in fact be a way of sorting out people according to their constitutional abilities to adapt to the dominant cultural values and structural constraints in the society. It may then be more realistic to talk
about modal adaptations to a given sociocultural system than to talk
about modal personalities.

Conclusion
We have taken the general position that human nature is channelled through four societal subsystems-environment and technology, culture, social structure, and personality-and that each component or subsystem has natural limits and tendencies which bear on
the quality of life in society. Describing or developing these components is a way of elaborating our position regarding the more general
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limits placed on man by the direction of his own evolution. Regarding technology, for example, man can respect or ignore his own evolutionary connectedness with his natural environment, but if he
ignores it, there is a cost in quality of life. Regarding culture, man
has the capacity to create, understand, and maintain certain limited
kinds of rules, and quality of life is improved if the rules are consistent with such basic needs as personal security and support. (The
cultural rule in this society that all worthy people must have gainful
employment, for example, is probably destructive of quality of life.)
Regarding social structure, man has the capacity to create certain
limited types of social forms which provide stable social roles. When
certain primordial forms are destroyed, such as the extended family
or neighborhood, he becomes anxious and insecure. In terms of personality, broad natural diversity requires a breadth and looseness of
culture and social form.

':'\:
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Our central point is that the concept of channels suggests that
under certain conditions human behavior and institutions f1ow in
some directions more easily than others. The irony of the human
condition is that despite his reflective nature, man often creates destructive environments, cultures, social structures, and personalities,
and thus directs his nature away from its more obvious channels.
And it is for this reason we find the concept of quality of life an
issue at all.
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Figure 5.1
Abraham Maslow 's Hierarchy of Needs

5

Sdf actualization

The Functional Requirements
of Human Society

Truth
Goodness
Beauty
Growth needs*
(Being values)
(Metaneeds)

o;:.,r,

·,J

Perfection
Necessity
Completion
Justice
Order
Simplicity
Richness
Playfulness
Effortlessness
Self sufficiency
Meaningfulness

Self esteem
Esteem by others
Love and belongingness

We have attempted to derive criteria for quality of life by looking at underlying qualities of human nature directly or by looking at
characteristics of channels through which human nature is expressed
in society, such as environment-technology, personality, social structure, and culture. Another way of deriving quality-of-life criteria is
by looking at the functional require men ts of man or society or manin-society. Maslow, for example, has developed what he calls a hierarchy of human needs (see figure 5.1 ).
The functionalists in sociology and anthropology have attempted to develop a similar list of requirements for society. (One
thinks especially of Parsons and Malinowski.) i\fore recently Aberle
et al. ( 1950, pp. 100-11) developed a statement of what they call the
"functional prerequisites of a society." These functional prerequisites include:
106

Basic needs
(Deficiency needs)

Safety and security
Physiological
(Air, water, food, shdter, sleep, sex)
The external environment
Preconditions for need satisfaction
Freedom, justice, orderliness
Challenge (stimulation)

*Growth needs are all of equal importance (not hierarchical)
Source: Frank G. Goble, The Third Force (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970): p. 50.
Copyright 1970 by Thomas Jefferson Research Center.
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I. Provision for adequate relationship to the environment and for sexual recruitment . ... providing for basic physiological needs of enough adult members to
insure reproduction and to man the essential status positions. (p. l 04)

2. Role differentiation and role assignment .... the systematic and stable division of activities. (p. I 05)
3. Communication. No society, however simple, can exist without shared,
learned symbolic modes of communication, because without them it cannot
maintain the common-value structure or the protective sanctions which hold
back the war of each against all. (p. 106)
4. Shared cognitive orientations. In any society the members must share a body
of cognitive orientations which (a) make possible adaptation to and manipulation of the situation; (b) make stable, meaningful and predictable the social
situations in which they are engaged; and (c) account for those significant aspects of the situation over which they do not have adequate predication and
control. (p. 107)

5. A shared. articulate set of goals.
6. The normative regulation of means. That these means must be stated clearly
for the sake of order and the effective functioning of the society follows from
(a) the nature of other functional prerequisites and (b) the anomie that must
result from the lack of recognized legitimized means. First, role differentiation specifies who is to act, while the common articulated set of goals defines
1
i~: what is to be done. The normative regulation of means tells how those goals
may be won. Second, the absence of normative regulation of means invites
apathy or the war of each against all. (p. I 08)
7. The regulation of affective expression.
8. Socialization . ... socialization includes both the development of new adult
members from infants and the induction of an individual of any age into any
role of the society or its subsystems where new learning is required. (p. l 09)

9. The effective control of disruptive forms of behavior.

Whether one focuses on the indi\'idual or the society, we think
it is extremely useful to stress the fact that man is a multifunctional
animal. From this point of view a central element in judging the quality of life in society is the adequacy and authenticity with which the
various essential human functions are performed as well as the extent
to which they are carried on in some reasonably balanced and in tegrated relationship to each other.
Specifically, our list of functions includes the following:
1. Attachment, love, bonding;
2. Adaptation, work, coping;
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3. Renewal, play, sleep, relaxation, fantasy, dreaming;
4. Planning, deciding, conflict resolution;
5. Celebration or acting out of universal events in the human
condition, story telling, drama, sports, dance;
6. Creation of myth and meaning: placing man in relationship
to past and future events or human and cosmic events.
We are not concerned here with an elegant scheme or a carefully
developed rationale to justify our particular functional categoriesany such selection and categorization of "basic human functions" is
somewhat arbitrary. We are concerned that one look at the requirements of society as a whole, as several interrelated functions. As
O'Dea states:
. .. functional theory sees society as an ongoing equilibrium of social institutions
which pattern human activity in terms of shared norms, held to be legitimate
and binding by the human participants themselves. This complex of institutions,
which as a whole constitute the social system, is such that each part (each institutionalized element) is interdependent with all the other parts and that changes
in any part affect the others, and the condition of the system as a whole. ( 1966,
p. 2)

This "unity-equilibrium" viewpoint in functional theory bears
directly on the problem of inventing or maintaining constructive culture. It assumes that there is a limited fund of human energy to be
expended; energy not spent in the fulfillment of one function will
presumably be expended on another. The critical point, however, is
that functional theory assumes that a set of problems are continuously present and must be solved or at least handled simultaneously,
and that when some problems are not adequately resolved, energy
will be diverted to the unsolved problems. If inadequate resolutions
persist, compensatory mechanisms come into play, comparable on
the societal level to adjustive or defensive mechanisms hypothesized
by psychoanalytic theory for individual personality. And like Freudian defense mechanisms, societal compensatory mechanisms do not
really solve problems; they simply expend human energy, often in a
dysfunctional way, so that one has the illusion of successful coping.
At a personal level, for example, the anal-compulsive individual may
reduce anxiety by constantly washing his hands, but the underlying
problem (for example, guilt over unconscious strivings toward sex or
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autonomy) is never touched. Likewise, at the societal level if there is
no adequate meaning system or symbolic ritual to explain or work
through inevitable conditions of human pain (e.g., personal loss of a
friend, climatic catastrophes, sickness and death), unrelieved emotional pain or anxiety may be suppressed by compulsive work. The
work will drain off energy, but the nagging concern over the meaning
of the human suffering will continue in a potentially destnictive way.
For as work itself loses meaning, it may take the threat of survival
itself (through fabricated fears of internal subversion or external con·
quest) to keep the system going. From this point of view war may be
construed as a compensatory mechanism integrating work, celebration, myth-making, and the rechanneling of sexual energy through
aggression, which temporarily staves off the more profound longterm problem of a meaningful life in a less crisis-ridden society. But
like washing one's hands, war "solves" the problem of a meaningful
life for relatively brief periods of time (unless, of course, it is institutionalized).
In a sense the distinction between functional solutions and
dysfunctional compensatory mechanisms is arbitrary. Functional
solutions apply to constructive cultural elements or social institu" tions which allow humans to cope without inordinate stress; dysfunc'·"1 tional compensatory mechanisms apply to cultural elements which
make it possible for humans to live under unnecessarily high stress.
In general we assume as a practical matter that it is possible to distinguish whether the quality of life is enhanced or diminished by alternative functional institutions. Below we attempt to suggest various
analytic distinctions as a way of clarifying this assumption.

Criteria for Successful Functional Solutions
1. Attachment, love, bond1.ng
The quality of human attachments is, of course, a very large
subject in religion, philosophy, psychology, etc. While we might discuss human attachments within the framework of a multitude of
theories, we shall simply suggest Fromm's analysis as one insightful
way to think about human relating. Fromm ( 1970) distinguishes
among the following kinds of interpersonal relatedness:
I. Symbr.otic relatedness: In the symbiotic relatedness the person is related to
others but loses or never attains his independence; he avoids the danger of
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aloneness by becoming part of another person, either by being "swallowed"
by that person or by "swallowing" him. The former is the root of what is
clinically described as masochism. Masochism is the attempt to get rid of one's
individual self, to escape from freedom, and to look for security by attaching
oneself to another person .... The impulse to swallow others is the active
form of symbiotic relatedness and is sadism. It is the attempt to dominate
others, and is rooted in and compensates for deep-and often unconsciousfeelings of impotence and powerlessness. (pp. 7 3-7 4)
2. "Withdrawal-destructiveness: The feeling of individual powerlessness can be
overcome by withdrawal from others who are experienced as threats .... Its
emotional equivalent is the feeling of indifference toward others, often
accompanied by a compensatory feeling of self-inflation. Withdrawal and indifference can, but need not, be conscious .... in our culture they are mostly
covered by a superficial kind of interest and sociability .... Destructiveness is
the perversion of the drive to live; it is the energy of unlived life transformed
into energy for the destruction of life. (p. 74)
3. Narcissism: In this form of relatedness (or unrelatedness) only that which refers to one's ego, i.e., body, sensations, feelings, thoughts, is experienced as
fully real, hence important. The reality outside, while perceived, has no
weight, no importance, because one is not related to it .... the world outside
is perceived without depth or intensity. (p. 75)
4. Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to oneself. It implies
responsibility, care, respect, and knowledge, and the wish for the other person
to grow and develop. It is the expression of intimacy between two human
beings under the condition of preservation of each other's integrity. {p. 76)

Although it is clear that of Fromm's four types of relatedness,
love is the "good" one, the successful one, it should be understood
that an individual is not a caricature of one form of relatedness, but
rather there are blends of the various components within the personality. Our own guess is that within limits humans might bond normally by any of the mechanisms listed.
2. Adaptation, work, coping
To describe work in terms of quality of life is a more fragmented task than to describe human attachment. A variety of criteria, however, come to mind.
a. Adequacy for meeting the burden of survival and the basic
economic needs of a society. It should be understood that adequacy
is construed more in absolute than in relative terms. From our point
of view it means meeting the basic biological needs of the society as
well as biosocial functional needs (e.g., celebration, play). There is,
of course, a delicate line between an absolute definition of adequacy
and a relative definition. Many of the activities of civilization, such as
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building pyramids, museums, universities, etc. allow humans to do
productive meaningful work. Whether or not the absence of these
institutions would make a society's work functionally inadequate,
however, is highly doubtful. We would describe a society that is required to practice infanticide, or to abandon old people, or where
there is highly competitive intraspecific behavior in obtaining food
and shelter, as inadequate in absolute terms. Societies with high
death rates from starvation, malnutrition, and exposure are at the
extreme of negative adaptation.
b. Efficiency, or the relationship between energy expended and
the production of goods and services the society presumably needs.
A low-energy-high-production economy would be considered efficient. {One might make distinctions between expenditure of human
energy versus the expenditure of mechanical energy or the energy of
domestic animals, and suggest that conserving human energy is more
efficient.) The distinction between adequacy and efficiency is obvious: one might have an affluent economy which is either efficient
or wasteful.
c. Authenticity, or the extent to which one can justify a specific
~-: kind of work or adaptation as genuinely related to the needs of hu,_ man survival. While one can make delicate distinctions in the gray
area between the necessities and the luxuries of a society, it is less
difficult to make the case at the extremes. In American society, for
example, farming is probably more authentic work than is embalming; preparing food is probably more authentic than making television commercials.
d. Nondestructive or nonexploitative work. Work can be destructive ecologically, that is, destructive to the natural environment
required for the long-term survival of the species and the planet.
Work can also be destructive in human terms, either physically
(breathing coal dust in a mine), or emotionally {doing monotonous
work on an assembly line). Work might be healthy for the individuals
participating in it, but destructive for other people {building high-rise
"projects" in the ghettos or building barracks to house soldiers training for war).
Another criterion applied to the quality of work might be the
extent to which work done by one group is productive at the expense of other groups or individuals. An extreme example would be
poor Haitians selling blood to help affluent Americans regain their
health.
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e. Fair distn"bution of meaningful work, or the extent to which
monotonous, physically dangerous, or repetitive work is carried out
by one group of people, while others do more meaningful work.
f. Meritocratic dependency. Some members of a society are
more competent to carry out certain tasks than others. In general,
however, elites emerge which combine the resources of political leadership, intellectual creativity, and inclination to act on the world. It
is relatively easy for a society to build stable socioeconomic strata in
which groups on the lower end of the scale depend for direction and
the definition of work on those on the upper end of the scale. Our
hypothesis is that stratified meritocratic societies generate dependency, poverty, and survival anxiety in the lower strata as well as
insensitivity, sadism, and guilt in the upper strata.
g. Flexibility to meet changing conditions, or the extent to
which adaptive institutions can change as human needs or natural
conditions change: for example, to what extent can a modem society
deal with the need to reduce energy use?
Before we proceed to our four other functions, it should be
stated that the first two {often referred to as love and work) have the
most fundamental place in any scheme of human needs or societal
functions. The problem of healthy human attachments, while it can
be construed as a separate functional issue, permeates all other functions. One cannot talk about work or play or celebration without
some sense that they are affected by the various qualities of human
relatedness. We would argue, moreover, along with Fromm, that
while man has no specific set of instincts which guide his work and
personal relationships, his common biological equipment and biosocial history (e.g., long period of dependency) create a limited set of
alternative modes of relating to people and to the world. Thus, while
man is not an instinctual animal with a universal set of behavior patterns, he is also not a plastic animal. His behavior tends to fall into
major slots and can be understood {though poorly predicted and
changed with difficulty) in these terms. The significance of this point
is its relationship to criteria for the quality of life. We assume that
there are a limited number of models through which man comes to
relate himself to people or to work; and that some modes or qualities
are healthier than others.
Fromm ( 19 70), in his theoretical formulation of this issue, for
example, describes a number of streams into which love or work
orientations flow. According to Fromm there are behavioral com-
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plexes which develop as individual members of a society cope with
the problem of establishing stable modes of human attachment (socialization) and work (assimilation). These complexes he calls "social
character" and are defined as the "relatively permanent form in
which human energy is structuralized in the process of assimilation
and socialization" (p. 11). A gross distinction is made between productive and nonproductive characters, loving and nonloving characters. More specific distinctions are then made among various char. acter types or orientations in which qualities of love and work come
together. Those orientations which have the greatest pathological
potential consist of:
Receptive orientation: feels the source of all good (affection,
love, knowledge, material goods) can only be acquired by
having it given-in exchange for being "good," or "ill," or
"in need."
Exploitative orientation: does not produce anything for himself; it must be obtained by taking it from other people,
either by force or cunning.
Hoarding orientation: has little faith in anything new he might
get from the outside world; security is based on hoarding
and saving.
Marketing orientation: has little faith that he can produce anything of value; but he can "sell himself" as in a monetary
transaction.
The productive or healthy orientation is difficult for Fromm to describe. In general, it is a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness
in which the person feels himself to be an actor, an agent in which he
can exercise power in a constructive way. Nor is the power used exploitatively. "The productive person gives birth to his own faculties
and gives life to persons and to things" (1970, p. 72).
While the nonproductive orientations tend toward pathological
or neurotic forms of attachment and work, this is not necessarily so.
We see these various character orientations as common channels or
archetypal modes of relating to one's material and personal surroundings. As Fromm further states (although this is somewhat contradictory to his major premise regarding pathological relating}:
There is no person whose orientation is entirely productive, and no one who is
completely lacking in productiveness. But the respective weight of the produc-
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tive and nonproductive orientations in each person's character structure varies
and determines the quality of the nonproductive orientations. In the foregoing
description of the nonproductive orientations it was assumed that they were
dominant in a character structure. We must now supplement the earlier description by considering the qualities of the nonproductive orientations in a character
structure in which the productive orientation is dominant. Here the nonproduc·
tive orientations do not have the negative meaning they have when they are
dominant but have a different and constructive quality. In fact, the nonproductive orientations, as they have been described, may be considered as distortions
of orientations which in themselves are a normal and necessary part of living.
Every human being, in order to survive, must be able to accept things from others, to take things, to save and to exchange. He must also be able to accept authority, to guide others, to be alone, and to assert himself. Only if his way of
acquiring things and relating himself to others is essentially nonproductive does
the ability to accept, to take, to save, or to exchange turn into the craving to
receive, to exploit, to hoard, or to market as the dominant ways of acquisition.
The nonproductive forms of social relatedness in a predominantly productive
person-loyalty, authority, fairness, assertiveness-turn into submission, domination, withdrawal, destructiveness in a predominantly nonproductive person. Any
of the nonproductive orientations has, therefore, a positive and a negative aspect, according to the degree of productiveness in the total character structure.
The following list of the positive and negative aspects of various orientations
may serve as an illustration for this principle. (1970, pp. 78-80)

Fromm then suggests negative and positive characteristics of
personality which might be associated with three of his major character orientations.
Exploitative Orientation (Taking)

Positive aspect
active
able to take initiative
able to make claims
proud
impulsive
self-confident
captivating

Negative aspect
exploitative
aggressive
egocentric
conceited
rash
arrogant
seducing

Hoarding Orientation (Preserving)

Positive aspect
practical
economical

Negative aspect
unimaginative
stingy
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Positive aspect
careful
reserved
patient
cautious
steadfast, tenacious
imperturbable
composed under stress
orderly
methodical
loyal

Negative aspect
susp1c10us
cold
lethargic
anxious
stubborn
indolent
inert
pedantic
obsessional
possessive

Receptive Orientation (Accepting)

IX:)

y

Positive aspect
accepting
responsive
devoted
modest
charming
adaptable
socially adjusted
idealistic
sensitive
polite
optimistic
trusting
tender

Negatz.ue aspect
passive, without initiative
opinionless, characterless
submissive
without pride
parasitical
unprincipled
servile, without self-confidence
unrealistic
cowardly
spineless
wishful
gullible
sentimental

The most interesting aspect of Fromm's theory from the quality-of-life perspective is its affirmation of the fact of human diversity
at a very basic level of personality. One must take this fact into account in looking at the interface between personality, culture, and
social structure. That is to say, there must be available respected and
worthy roles supported by positive cultural rules and values which
allow the full range of social character to express itself in the society.
While no one is so naive as to suggest that all statuses in any society
are likely to end up equally valued-all human societies tend toward
dominance and leadership hierarchies and humans seem anxious
without them-one can argue ( 1) that all statuses should be seen as
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having essential worth, and (2) that no one will be forced to occupy
statuses and play roles which substantially violate their authentic
sense of self. From this point of view the marketing orientation
might be viewed as either sick or well. A healthy marketing orientation would allow a temperamentally outgoing gregarious individual
to spend time "making himself liked" because that is his own authentic way of relating to people. The person with a pathological marketing orientation-perhaps under the stress of competition and job
success-might lose any sense of authentic self in the process of selling himself.
3. Renewal, play, sleep, relaxation, fantasy, dreaming
The human organism is biologically constructed so that it must
pass through cycles of physical stress and emotional anxiety on the
one hand and relaxation, renewal, and sleep on the other. Although
in Western societies we see the work-rest cycle in terms of a meansends relationship, with a little reflection it becomes somewhat difficult to distinguish the means from the end. One can imagine work as
a nagging distraction from play-fantasy-sleep; or one can imagine rest
as the necessary pause that refreshes so that one can get back to
work. Few would question the fact that play and human renewal are
necessary functions of society; controversy arises over its purposes
and relative place among other functions. Some possible criteria are:
a. Authenticity. Modes of renewal must relate to the developmental needs of individuals: babies, children, adolescents, adults, and
old people have different renewal modes and needs. Contrived or
managed renewal, such as Esalen type experiences, may be more
work than play, and in this sense nonauthentic. Highly controlled
sports like basketball or football, involving adolescent boys, may be
experienced more as work than renewal, and therefore may provide
less play-fantasy-dreaming than classroom activities.
b. Fantasy-participation balance. Renewal carried out totally by
active physical or social play or totally by fantasy-dreaming would
seem inadequate. The working person in a modem society whose
only source of renewal is silently sharing television fantasies, as well
as inventing fantasies of his own through his autistic processes, is
probably missing something.
c. Diversity. Renewal should be diverse enough to meet the
needs of different kinds of people (e.g., verbal play, physical play,
artistic activity).
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4. Planning, deciding, conflict resolution
To some extent society is the spontaneous playing out of complex behavior patterns, some of which are fully learned and some of
which are improvised. Many activities are not spontaneous, but are
carefully directed and managed. Human management requires planning and decision making, and one can search for quality-of-life criteria which apply to decision making.
a. Requirement that decisions be just. A criterion for justice
might be some reasonable balance between utilitarianism (greatest
good for the greatest number) and respect for the dignity and worth
of the individual.
b. Consensuality. A second criterion might be the extent to
which members of a society feel they have some say in how decisions
are made, what decisions are made, and how they are implemented.
c. Legitimation. This is the acceptance by members of the society that decisions are binding on them without force or coercion.
d. Efficiency. This is the relationship between the amount of
energy spent making decisions and the quality of the decisions (in
such terms as utilitarianism or justice).
5. Celebration or acting out of universal events in the human
"\.\
condition, story telling, drama, sports, dance
-l
Celebration is similar to renewal, but its purpose is more integrative, that is, directed toward personal expression and binding of
groups, tribes, or societies to provide security against individual
frailty by dealing successfully with anxieties and limitations. The
celebration of birth, harvest, death (rebirth), marriage, or community
is on the whole positive, although man has invented pathological
celebrations to serve short-run goals (e.g., witch trials and burnings,
mass meetings in Nazi Germany). Quality-of-life criteria for human
celebration are similar to those for human renewal.
a. Authenticity. Are there genuinely shared joys, anxieties, and
hardships? Is there genuine fellowship?
b. Transcendence of man's anthropocentric bias. There are universal elements in the human condition and universal elements in
nature which bind man-in-society to the planet. Transcendent celebrations recognize not only human life but life more generally; the
biological unity of many forms of life and nonlife; man's evolutionary past, bound to other forms of life in a common history (e.g.,
man has salt in his veins because he rose from the sea).

Human Society

119

c. Diversity. Can the diversity of humans in a society (oldyoung, weak-strong, men-women, conceptual-sensuous-kinesthetic,
etc.) find authentic meaning in a common celebration?
6. Creation of myth and meaning: placing man in relationship
to past and future events or human and cosmic events
As O'Dea says, "Culture is the creation by man of a world of
adjustment and meaning, in the context of which human life can be
significantly lived" (1966, p. 3). Both because it is instrumentally
useful (symbols and concepts are tools) and because man has a drive
for a sense of purpose, societies create constellations and systems of
meaning which surround their lives. The loss of meaning leads to
suicide.
While secular thinkers are prone to separate empirical knowledge from religion, both spheres are included in our term ''belief
system." We would argue that modem religion has become trivialized
precisely because it is separated from the common concerns and
everyday facts of life encompassed by instrumental (useful) "true"
knowledge.
Functionalists such as O'Dea state explicitly that the purpose of
religion is to deal with man's need to transcend common human experience. The need for transcendence, according to O'Dea, is rooted
in man's frailty-his sense of uncertainty, powerlessness, and scarcity,
and the consequent frustration at not being able to control these
conditions. Our own view is that man's drive for meaning is rooted in
the nature of the organism itself-man inherently has the capacity
and the need to create and communicate meaning. Most forms of life
exist in conditions of uncertainty, powerlessness, and scarcity, but
few if any have a meaning system in the human sense. Man is driven
not only to ask the ultimate "why" of the human condition, but also to
ask the why of day-to-day events-why did his friend let him
down? why did he injure himself or become ill? Man's life is enclosed
within a web of meaning. From our point of view it is somewhat
misguided to separate out the more ultimate questions as sacred and
call the day-to-day questions secular, especially since the domains of
reality shift about within these two categories. (The nation-state or
the Communist Party may replace the Roman Catholic Church as a
sacred domain.)
O'Dea argues that a major social and cultural development of
the last several centuries has been the secularization of culture.
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We have seen that in primitive and traditional societies religion is a pervasive
matter, and that religious beliefs and rites play an important part in the activities of
various kinds of groups, from the family to occupational groups. We have seen that
in such societies religion tends to provide the over-all point of view-the ideational system or complex of thought-ways-in whose context human experience
in general is understood. (p. 81)

On the other hand, in modem societies this world view has become
fragmented and emptied of strong emotional response, in short, secularized.
Secularization may be said to consist fundamentally of two related transformations in human thinking. There is first the "desacralization" of the attitude
toward persons and things-the withdrawal of the kind of emotional involvement
which is to be found in the religious response, in the response to the sacred.
Secondly, there is the rationalization of thought-the withholding of emotional
participation in thinking about the world. Rationalization implies both a cognitive attitude relatively free of emotion, and the use of logic rather than an emotional symbolism to organize thought. (p. 81)

,.,
One could describe a sacred meaning system for contemporary
-" man, including a sacred attitude toward such ideas as technology and
purposeful progress, and such artifacts as automobiles and electrical
appliances. Moreover, it is doubtful that medieval monks and priests
behaved with stronger feelings about their day-to-day religious beliefs
than do their modem counterparts (e.g., psychiatrists, physicians,
engineers, and television celebrities).
Our point is that man has probably changed as a species very
little over the past centuries. What we call sacred today seems archaic
only because we need sufficient historical distance to understand
what has contemporary spiritual significance. We are embedded in
sacred meanings in contemporary times precisely because man needs
that level or intensity of experience.
Given these general remarks we would suggest the following as
quality-of-life criteria for a human meaning system.
a. Authenticity. To what extent docs our world view authentically describe the human condition on the planet? One might look,
for example, at the contrast between Social Darwinism and Quakerism in terms of the problem of human aggression. Social Darwinism
sees man as an aggressive, competitive, predatory animal and celebrates the fittest who survive. Quakerism sees man as a friendly,
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cooperative animal and celebrates his ability to solve problems of
human conflict through peaceful negotiation. At least superficially,
both would seem inadequate.
b. Range of abstraction. To what extent do beliefs deal with human meaning at various levels of abstraction and concreteness so all
members of a society can share in the meaning? One might take as an
example of this issue the problem of man coming to terms with the
origin of life and the origin of his own species. The most authentic
meaning system currently available is derived from theories of biological evolution and organic chemistry, both of which are abstract
and complex. So most humans live with an archaic belief system
(Genesis, or a similar myth), because no religio-scientific thinker has
bothered to translate organic chemistry or evolution into sufficiently
simple and concrete symbols or meanings so that common people
can share in the more authentic system.
c. Comprehensiveness. To what extent are there domains of human life which are avoided or omitted from a meaning system? For
contemporary man in modern societies the meaning of death, for
example, is quite obscure. Given our dominant orientation toward
technology and science it is somewhat disconcerting that we have so
little to say about human death. It is interesting that technologyscience does have an elaborate meaning system for human healrh and
illness, including countless artifacts and symbols. Perhaps we assume
that keeping people healthy will, in the long run, make them immortal.
d. Level of integration. It is probably safe to assume that a
meaning system which can relate various domains of human action,
at least in some loose way, is going to be more adequate than one
which deals with the human career as a set of fragments. Puritanism,
for example, suggests relationships among human attachment, work,
and celebration. Modem Freudian meaning systems, including the
Frommian analysis in this paper, attempt to relate love and
work.
One can generate quality-of-life criteria by looking separately at
individual functional requirements (as we have), by looking at relationships among various functional requirements, and finally by consideration of the requirements as a whole. In the last category, one
might say that any society or subsociety with a relatively balanced
expression of basic human functions might have a higher quality of
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life than one which has focused most of its energies on one or two
functions. One might consider the decision-making executive, the
playboy, or the compulsive worker as exhibiting pathological lifestyles on a prim a facia basis. One can also look at the whole set of
functional requirements in terms of the extent to which various functions are integrated within common activities. Slaughtering an animal
might, for example, be seen as a religious act {as celebration imbued
with meaning), as an act of human sharing (bonding), and as adaptation or work. Our suspicion is that highly integrated societies tend to
be oppressive because their structures must be so tight and controlled; that poorly integrated or fragmented societies tend toward
insecurity and stress because any single function seems in itself marginally significant and therefore dispcnsible.
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Conclusion
We have presented two schema by which one might describe human communities. It is our hope that through such analyses one
might systematically generate a more complex and holistic set of criteria by which to judge quality of life. One might look, for example,
at the interaction between channels and functions as suggested by
the following matrix:
Channels
Functions

Social
structure

Culture

Personality

Environmenttechnology

Work

Analytic Systems and the Integrity of Human Community
However one looks at human community or society, we assume
that quality of life is derived in some final sense by intuitive, albeit
careful, sustained reflective thinking. In the last analysis, man's
__;,
°"
capacity for human society is a product of a long and poorly understood evolutionary process, while man's conception of his own condition is based on one small evolutionary product, the human mind.
In the words of Hallowell:
Society, culture, and personality may, of course, be conceptually differentiated
for specialized types of analysis and study. On the other hand, it is being more
clearly recognized than heretofore that society, culture, and personality cannot
be postulated as completely independent variables. Man as an organic species,
evolved from a primate ancestry, constitutes our basic frame of reference, and
we find ourselves confronted, as observers, with the complexities of the human
situation that have resulted from this process. Here I wish to consider man as the
dynamic center of characteristic modes and processes of adjustment that are central to a human existence, in order to emphasize the integral reality of society,
culture, and personality structure as human phenomena. It is this integral reality
that constitutes the human situation as our unique subject matter. Our abstractions and constructs, which may be ordered in different ways and for different
purposes and which may vary in their heuristic value, are derived from observations of the same integral order of phenomena. ( 1953, p. 600)

It is to this "integral reality" we must always return for the validation of whatever judgments we make about the sanity, stress, and
quality of life in human societies.

Renewal
Attachment
Meaning
Celebration
Decision making
Conflict resolution
Looking across line one of this matrix, one can ask:
1. Within what social forms or institutions is work carried out?
in families? sodalities? corporate organizations?
2. What is the culture (rules, ideology) of work within these in
stitu tions?
3. What types of personalities are best adapted or least well
adapted for the kinds of work carried on in the society? How is human diversity handled within work settings? Are workers of different
types and statuses segregated (as in a modem corporation)? Do they
work and relate together (as in a kibbutz)?
4. What are the environmental conditions within which work is
carried out (e.g., household industry, factories)?
One might also look at relationships within and among channels
or functions. Regarding channels, for example, one might ask to
what extent the various channels mutually support and reinforce or
contradict one another. A society which carries on human inter·
action in relatively intimate social forms (e.g., household industry)
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yet whose culture stresses impersonalness or distance might well
create dissonance and stress. A society, like our own, which functions within three major social forms-intimate dyads, nuclear families, and impersonal corporate work settings-presumably must create
somewhat contradictory sets of cultural rules. The central myth of
the intimate dyad, for example, is that fulfillment comes from finding the perfect love; fulfillment in the corporate setting comes from
work success.
One might look at the extent to which a society is functionally
integrated; that is, the extent to which several functions are carried
on in common settings, or the ex tent to which several functions arc
at least culturally (ideologically) related. Puritanism, for example,
developed a meaning system which related work (successful work
was considered evidence of grace), celebration (church-related activities), and decision making (elders in the church were seen as wise
decision makers). In the Bruderhof described by Zablocki (1971) virtually all human functions are tied together around a common meaning system, a common culture in an isolated and in ti mate setting.
~Modem societies are comparatively highly fragmented. Celebrations,
~for example, are carried on quite independently and focus on a wide
variety of human meanings: football games celebrate violence, manliness, competition, and discipline; rock concerts celebrate hedonistic
release; quiz shows and shopping malls celebrate material success and
consumerism; school ceremonials celebrate the value of difficult and
often meaningless work.
While we feel that our analytic schema of channels and functions have considerable heuristic value in generating hypotheses
about quality of life, we have a continuing concern about the relationship between quality of life and the potentials, constraints, and
contradictions in the human condition based on the evolutionary
nature of the species. The most focused statement of this concern
might be the extent to which any human society incorporates in its
functions and channels some expression of the human potential
along the primal-modem continuum. (See tables 5.1 and 5.2 for a
summary comparison.)
From an evolutionary point of view, we have assumed that
man's more primal capacities and characteristics continue to make
substantial demands on individuals and societies which, if ignored,
lead to dysfunctional stresses and personal alienation. The central
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Table 5.2
Modern-Primitive Aspects of Human Functions
Work
Pn.mitive

Modern

Visible relationship between work and requirements for survival
Nonuniformity of products; personal relationships between people and products
Less fragmentation of work roles
Visible relationship between division of labor and efficiency;
various parts of a task are visible to all
Tasks tend to be associated with the personalities of people, rather than being seen as abstract jobs
Contribution of various members of society cannot he reduced
to common denominator-money
Work performed with simple tools owned or controlled by
worker

Attachment
Primary bonds are at band or extended kinship level rather than
in nuclear family or to produce corporate work
Long-term bonds, often for life
Tendency toward more diffuse bonds; less intensive, more extensive
Age, sex, and kinship relationships tend to permeate relationships rather than job roles or specialized interests

Relationship between tasks performed and requirements for survival often remains opaque
Products of work are uniform and replaceable
Highly developed division of labor and work roles
Relationship between individual task and other tasks required to
complete a whole task is often opaque
Jobs have abstract requirements separated from the personalities
of individual workers
Value or contribution of individual members of society can be
reduced to a common denominator and expressed quantitatively through money
Work performed with complex expensive tools owned by impersonal corporate groups

Primary bonds are within transitory nuclear family or in job
roles
Geographic mobility leads to short-term bonds
Tendency toward small number of intense relationships
Tendency toward relationships based on common interest, common jobs
Age, sex, and kinship minimized as bases for relationships

Renewal
Spontaneous social relating; fantasy, gossip, small talk
No sharp line between reality, fantasy, and dreaming

Celebration
General participation, often with specialized parts based on age,
sex, and kinship relationships
Often linked to natural cycles: human life cycle, daily or seasonal cycles
Accompanied by music, dance, bodily movement
Related to religious or magical meaning
Embedded in tradition; tendency toward repetitiveness

Organized play; continuing concern with self-improvement or
performing recreation
Fantasy and dreaming demarcated and labeled

Participation by professional performers based on special talent,
competence, and training; large group of nonperformers
act as audience and share experience vicariously
Often not linked to natural cycles; performances based on utilitarian criteria such as size of audience and availability of
talent
Performers active; audience passive
Tendency to celebrate quality of performance rather than religious or magical significance of the celebration
Innovation and novelty valued
Because performances are novel and follow a literate script, they
must be highly managed and practiced
Impersonal relationship between performers and audience

Creation of meaning
Tendency toward description of man-made environment
Embedded in natural environment
Slowly evolving
Rapidly changing
Relativistic; words and symbols seen as abstractions to be manipNonrelativistic; words and symbols intrinsically linked with the
reality they describe
ulated and played with
Meaning only partly in the environment; meaning partly related
Meaning in the environment to be discovered and used by man
to man's sensing equipment and nervous sy!tem
Decision making and conflict resolution
Authority based on tradition, often linked with age and sex
Authority based on meritocratic requirements of instrumental
Strong press for consensus of small face-to-face groups
accomplishment
Sanctioning of emotional outbursts and personal conflict and
Acceptance of authoritarian hierarchy based on impersonal conviolence
tracu
Strong sanctions against personal emotional outbursts; support
of impersonal managed violence and destruction of people
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challenge for creating positive culture in modern society is inventing
social institutions in which primal and modern elements of human
evolution are allowed expression in nondestructive or noncompetitive ways; or in which the modem and primal are integrated within a
common setting.
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DIF'F'USION OF
INNOVATIONS

CHAPTER 1
Elements of Diffusion

Third Edition
To get the bad customs of a country changed and new ones, though
belter, introduced, it is necessary first to remove the prejudices of the
people, enlighten their ignorance, and convince them that their interests
will be promoted by the proposed changes; and this is not the work of a
day.

Everett M. Rogers

Benjamin Franklin (1781)

There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubt/ul of success, nor
more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new order of
things . ... Whenever his enemies have occasion to attack the innovator
they do so with the passion of partisans, while the others defend him
sluggishly so that the innovator and his party alike are vulnerable.
Niccolo Machiavelli

The Prince(l513)
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ONE REASON WHY THERE JS so MUCH INTEREST in the diffusion
of innovations is because getting a new idea adopted, even when it has
obvious advantages, is often very difficult. There is a wide gap in
many fields, between what is known and what is actually put into use.
Many innovations require a lengthy period, often of some years, from
the time when they become available to the time when they are widely
adopted. Therefore, a common problem for many individuals and organizations is how to speed up the rate of diffusion of an innovation.
The following case illustration provides insight into some common
difficulties facing programs of diffusion.

Water Boiling in a Peruvian Village:
A Diffusion Campaign that Failed*

The public health service in Peru attempts to introduce innovations to
villagers to improve their health and lengthen their lives. This change agency
•This case illustration is adapted from Well in ( 1955, pp. 71-103), and is used by permission.
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enjoys a reputation for efficiency throughout Latin America. It encourages
people to install latrines, to burn garbage daily, to control house flies, to
report cases of infectious diseases, and to boil drinking water. These innovations involve major changes in thinking and behavior for Peruvian villagers,
who do not understand how sanitation is related to illness.
Water boiling is an important health practice for villagers and urban
poor in Peru. Unless they boil their drinking water, patients who are cured of
infectious diseases in village medical clinics often return within a month to be
treated again for the same disease.
A two-year water-boiling campaign conducted in Los Molinos, a peasant
village of 200 families in the coastal region of Peru, persuaded only eleven
housewives to boil water. From the viewpoint of the public health agency,
the local health worker, Nelida, had a simple task: to persuade the housewives of Los Molinas to add water boiling to their pattern of daily behavior.
Even with the aid of a medical doctor, who gave public talks on water boiling, and fifteen village housewives who were already boiling water before the
campaign, Nelida's diffusion program failed. To understand why, we need
to take a closer look at the culture, the local environment, and the individuals in Los Molinos.
THE VrLLAGE OF Los MoLINOS. Most residents of Los Molinos are
peasants who work as field hands on local plantations. Water is carried by
can, pail, gourd, or cask. Children are the usual water carriers; it is not considered appropriate for adult men to carry water, and they seldom do. The
three sources of water in Los Molinos include a seasonal irrigation ditch
close to the village, a spring more than a mile away from the village, and a
public well whose water the villagers dislike. All three are subject to pollution at all times and show contamination whenever tested. Of the three
sources, the irrigation ditch is most commonly used. It is closer to most
homes, it has the advantage of being running water rather than stagnant, and
the villagers like its taste.
Although it is not feasible for the village to install a sanitary water
system, the incidence of typhoid and other water-borne diseases could be
reduced by boiling the water before consumption. During her two-year
residence in Los Molinos, Nelida made several visits to every home in the
village but devoted especially intensive efforts to twenty-one families. She
visited each of these selected families between fifteen and twenty-five times;
eleven of these families now boil their water regularly.
What kinds of persons do these numbers represent? We describe three
village housewives-one who boils water to obey custom, one who was persuaded to boil water by the health worker, and one of the many who rejected
the innovation-in order to add further insight into the process of diffusion.
Mrs. A: Custom-Oriented Adopter. Mrs. A is about forty and suffers
from sinus infection. The Los Molinos villagers call her a ''sickly one.'' Each
morning Mrs. A boils a potful of water and uses it throughout the day. She
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has no understanding of germ theory, as explained by Nelida; her motivation
for water boiling is a complex local custom of "hot" and "cold" distinctions. The basic principle of this belief system is that all foods, liquids,
medicines, and other objects are inherently hot or cold, quite apart from
their actual temperature. In essence hot-cold distinctions serve as a series of
avoidances and approaches in such behavior as pregnancy, child rearing,
and the health-illness system.
Boiled water and illness are closely linked in the folkways of Los
Molinas; by custom, only the ill use cooked, or "hot" water. Once an individual becomes ill, it is unthinkable for him to eat pork (very cold) or to
drink brandy (very hot). Extremes of hot and cold must be avoided by the
sick; therefore, raw water, which is perceived to be very cold, must be boiled
to overcome the extreme temperature.
Villagers learn from childhood to dislike boiled water. Most can tolerate
cooked water only if flavoring, such as sugar, cinnamon, lemon, or herbs, is
added. Mrs. A likes a dash of cinnamon in her drinking water. The village
belief system involves no notion of bacteriological contamination of water.
By tradition, boiling is aimed at eliminating the innate "cold" quality of unboiled water, not the harmful bacteria. Mrs. A drinks boiled water in obedience to local custom, because she is ill.
Mrs. B: Persuaded Adopter. The B family came to Los Molinas a
generation ago, but they are still strongly oriented toward their birthplace
high in the Andes Mountains. Mrs. B worries about lowland diseases that she
feels infest the village. It is partly because of this anxiety that the change
agent, Nelida, was able to convince Mrs. B to boil water.
Nelida is a friendly authority to Mrs. B (rather than a' 'dirt inspector," as
she is seen by most other housewives), who imparts knowledge and brings
protection. Mrs. B not only boils water but also has installed a latrine and
has sent her youngest child to the health center for a check-up.
Mrs.Bis marked as an outsider in the community by her highland hairdo
and stumbling Spanish. She will never achieve more than marginal social acceptance in the village. Because the community is not an important reference
group to her, Mrs. B deviates from village norms on health innovations.
With nothing to lose socially, Mrs. B gains in personal security by heeding
Nelida's advice. Mrs. B's practice of boiling water has no effect on her
marginal status. She is grateful to Nelida for teaching her how to neutralize
the danger of contaminated water, a lowland peril as she perceives it.
Mrs. C: Rejector. This housewife represents the majority of Los
Molinos families who are not persuaded by the efforts of the change agent
during the two-year health campaign. In spite of Nelida's repeated explanations, Mrs. C does not understand germ theory. How, she argues, can
microbes survive in water that would drown people? Are they fish? If germs
are so small that they cannot be seen or felt, how can they hurt a grown person? There are enough real threats in the world to worry about-poverty and
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hunger-without bothering about tiny animals one cannot see, hear, touch,
or smell. Mrs. C's allegiance to traditional customs is at odds with the boiling
of water. A firm believer in the hot-cold superstition, she feels that only the
sick must drink boiled water.
UNDERSTANDING

..I;_,
<-')

WHY THE

DIFFUSION

OF

WATER

8oJLING

FAILED.

This intensive two-year campaign by a public health worker in a Peruvian
village of 200 families, aimed at persuading housewives to boil drinking
water, was largely unsuccessful. Nelida was able to encourage only about 5
percent of the population, eleven families, to adopt the innovation. In contrast, change agents in other Peruvian villages were able to convince 15 to 20
percent of the housewives. Reasons for the relative failure of the diffusion
campaign in Los Molinos can be traced partly to the cultural beliefs of the
villagers. Local tradition links hot foods with illness. Boiling water makes it
less "cold," and hence, appropriate only for the sick. But if a person is not
ill, he is prohibited by village norms from drinking boiled water. Only the individuals who are least integrated into local networks risk defying community norms on water boiling. An important factor affecting the adoption rate
of any innovation is its compatibility with the values, beliefs, and past experiences of the social system. Nelida and her superiors in the public health
agency should have understood the hot-cold belief system, as it is found
throughout Peru (and, in fact, in most nations of Latin America, Africa,
and Asia).
Nelida's failure demonstrates the importance of interpersonal networks
in the adoption and rejection of an innovation. Socially an outsider, Mrs. B
was marginal to the Los Molinos community, although she had lived there
for years. Nelida was a more important referent for Mrs. B than were her
neighbors, who shunned her. Anxious to secure social acceptance from the
higher-status Nelida, Mrs. B adopted water boiling, not because she understood the correct health reasons, but because she wanted to obtain Nelida's
approval. Thus we see that the diffusion of innovations is often a social process, as well as a technical matter.
Nelida worked with the wrong housewives if she wanted to launch a selfgenerating diffusion process in Los Molinos. She concentrated her efforts on
village women like Mrs. A and Mrs. B. Unfortunately, they were perceived
as a sickly one and a social outsider and were not respected as social models
of water-boiling behavior by the other women. The village opinion leaders,
who could have activated local networks to spread the innovation, were ignored by Nelida.
·
How potential adopters view the change agent affects their willingness to
adopt his or her ideas. In Los Molinos, Nelida was perceived differently by
lower- and middle-status housewives. Most poor families saw the health
worker as a "snooper" sent to Los Molinos to pry for dirt and to press
already harassed housewives into keeping cleaner homes. Because the lowerstatus housewives had less free time, they were unlikely to initiate visits with
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Nelida about water boiling. Their contacts outside the community were
limited, and as a result, they saw the technically proficient Nelida with eyes
bound by the social horizons and traditional beliefs of Los Molinas. They
distrusted this outsider, whom they perceived as a social stranger. Nelida,
who was middle class by Los Molinos standards, was able to secure more
positive results from housewives whose socioeconomic level and cultural
background were more similar to hers. This tendency for more effective
communication to occur with those who are more similar to change agents
occurs in most diffusion campaigns.
In general Nelida was too "innovation-oriented" and not "clientoriented'' enough. Unable to put herself in the role of the village housewives,
her attempts at persuasion failed to reach her clients because the message was
not suited to their needs. Nelida did not begin where the villagers were; instead she talked to them about germ theory, which they could not (and probably did not need to) understand.
We have cited only some of the factors that produced the diffusion
failure with which Nelida is charged. It will be easier to understand the
water-boiling case once the remainder of this book has been read. We shall
return to discuss lessons learned from the Los Molinas case in future
chapters.

What Is Diffusion?
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Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is ~ommunicated
through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system. It is a special type of communication, in that the messages are
concerned with new ideas. Communication is a process in which participants create and share information with one another in order to
reach a mutual understanding. This definition implies that communication is a process of convergence (or divergence) as two or more individuals exchange information in order to move toward each other
(or apart) in the meanings that they ascribe to certain events. We think
of communication as a two-way process of convergence, rather than
as a one-way, linear act in which one individual seeks to transfer a
message to another (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). Such a simple conception of human communication may accurately describe certain communication acts or events involved in diffusion, such as when a change
agent seeks to persuade a client to adopt an innovation. But when we
look at what came before such an event, and at what follows, we often
realize that such an event is only one part of a total process in which in-
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formation is exchanged between the two individuals. For example, the
client may come to the change agent with a problem or need, and the
innovation is recommended as a possible solution. And if we look at
the change agent-client interaction in a broader context, we may see
that their interaction continues through several cycles, and is indeed a
process of information exchange.
So diffusion is a special type of communication, in which the messages are concerned with a new idea. It is this newness of the idea in the
message content of communication that gives diffusion its special
character. The newness means that some degree of uncertainty is involved.
Uncertainty is the degree to which a number of alternatives are
perceived with respect to the occurrence of an event and the relative
probability of these alternatives. Uncertainty implies a lack of predictability, of structure, of information. In fact, information represents
one of the main means of reducing uncertainty. Information is a difference in matter-energy that affects uncertainty in a situation where a
choice exists among a set of alternatives (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981, p.
64). • As we show in a later section of this chapter, a technological innovation embodies information and thus reduces uncertainty about
cause-effect relationships in problem solving. For iHstance, my adoption of residential solar panels for water heating reduces my uncertainty about future price increases in the cost of oil. We find it useful
to conceptualize the diffusion and adoption of innovations in terms of
a framework based on information and uncertainty. The use of these
key concepts helps us to understand the diffusion of technological innovations as one type of communication process.
Diffusion is a kind of social change, defined as the process by
which alteration occurs in the structure and function of a social
system. When new ideas are invented, diffused, and are adopted or rejected, leading to certain consequences, social change occurs. Of
course, such change can happen in other ways too, for example,
through a political revolution or through a natural event like a
drought or earthquake.
Some authors restrict the term "diffusion" to the spontaneous,
unplanned spread of new ideas, and use the concept of "dissemina•"Information is something which reduces uncertainty. Communication is exchange
of information. Most writers in the field of communication research would have no
difficulty in agreeing with the first definition above. Just as many writers, no doubt,
would like to change the second definition" (Wiio, 1980, p. 18).
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tion" for diffusion that is directed and managed. We use diffusion
and dissemination interchangeably in this book because the distinction often is not very clear in actual practice. And the general convention is to use the word "diffusion" to include both the planned and
the spontaneous spread of new ideas.
But we do find it useful to distinguish between centralized and
decentralized diffusion systems. In a centralized diffusion system,
decisions about such matters as when to begin diffusing an innovation, who should evaluate it, and through what channels it will be diffused, are made by a small number of officials and/or technical experts at the head of a change agency. In a decentralized diffusion
system, such decisions are more widely shared by the clients and
potential adopters; here, horizontal networks among the clients are
the main mechanism through which innovations spread. In fact, in extremely decentralized diffusion systems there may not be a change
agency; potential adopters are solely responsible for the self-management of the diffusion of innovations. New ideas may grow out of the
practical experience of certain individuals in the client system, rather
than coming from formal R & D activities. Originally, it was assumed
that relatively centralized diffusion systems like the agricultural extension service were an essential ingredient in the diffusion process, but in
recent years several relatively decentralized diffusion systems have
been investigated and evaluated, and found to represent an appropriate alternative to centralized diffusion under certain conditions
(as detailed in Chapter 9).
Controlling Scurvy in the British Navy:
Innovations Do Not Sell Themselves
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Many technologists think that advantageous innovations will sell themselves, that the obvious benefits of a new idea will be widely realized by
potential adopters, and that the innovation will therefore diffuse rapidly.
Unfortunately, this is very seldom the case. Most innovations, in fact, diffuse at a surprisingly slow rate.
Scurvy control provides an interesting historical case of how slowly an
obviously beneficial innovation spread (Mosteller, 1981). In the early days of
long sea voyages, scurvy was the worst killer of the world's sailors, worse
than warfare, accidents, and all other causes of death. For instance, of
Vasco de Gama's crew of 160 men who sailed with him around the Cape of
Good Hope in 1497, 100 died of scurvy. In 1601, an English sea captain,
James Lancaster, conducted a kind of experiment to evaluate the ability of
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lemon juice to prevent scurvy. Captain Lancaster commanded four ships
that sailed from England on a voyage to India; he served three teaspoonfuls
of lemon juice every day to the sailors on the biggest of his four ships. Most
of these men stayed healthy. But on the three smaller ships, by the halfway
point in the journey, 110 out of 278 sailors had died from scurvy. The three
smaller ships constituted Lancaster's "control group"; they were not given
any lemon juice. So many of these sailors were sick, in fact, that Lancaster
had to transfer men from the large ship to staff the three smaller ships.
These results were so clear-cut that one might expect that the British
Navy would decide to adopt citrus juice as a scurvy prevention on all its
ships, or at least to carry out further investigations on the effects of citrus
fruit. But it was not until 1747, about 150 years later, that James Lind, a
British Navy physician who knew of Lancaster's results, carried out another
experiment on the ship Salisbury. To each scurvy patient on this ship, Lind
prescribed either two oranges and one lemon, or one of five other diets: a
half-pint of sea water, six spoonfuls of vinegar, a quart of cider, nutmeg, or
seventy-five drops of vitriol elixir. The scurvy patients who got the citrus
fruits were cured in a few days, and were able to help Dr. Lind care for the
other patients. Unfortunately, the supply of oranges and lemons was exhausted in six days.
Certainly, with this further solid evidence of the ability of citrus fruits to
combat scurvy, one would expect the British Navy to adopt this technological innovation for all ship's crews on long sea voyages, and in fact, it did so.
But not until 1795,forty-eight years later. Scurvy was immediately wiped out.
And after a further wait of only seventy more years, in 1865, the British
Board of Trade adopted a similar policy, and eradicated scurvy in the merchant marine.
Why were naval authorities so slow to adopt the idea of citrus for scurvy
prevention? Historians are not able to provide a very clear explanation. But
it seems that other, competing remedies for scurvy were also being proposed,
and each such cure had its champions. For example, Captain Cook's reports
from his voyages in the Pacific did not provide support for curing scurvy
with citrus fruits. Further, Dr. Lind was not a very prominent figure in the
field of naval medicine, and so his experimental findings did not get much attention in the British Navy. While scurvy prevention was generally resisted
for years by the British Navy, other innovations like new ships and new guns
were accepted more readily.
Many other historical illustrations could also be cited to show that more
than just a beneficial innovation is necessary for its diffusion and adoption
to occur. The reader may think that such slow diffusion could only happen in
the distant past, before a scientific and experimental approach to evaluating
innovations was very well accepted. We answer by calling the reader's attention to the contemporary case of the nondiffusion of the Dvorak typewriter
keyboard.
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Nondiffusion of the Dvorak Keyboard*
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Most of us who use a typewriter-and this includes about I 8 million individuals who earn their living as typists-don't even know that our fingers tap
out words on a keyboard that is called "QWERTY," named after the first
six keys in the upper row of letters. Even fewer of us know just how inefficient the QWERTY keyboard is. For example, this typewriter keyboard
takes twice as long to learn as it should, requires twice as long to use as it
should, and makes us work about twenty times harder than we should. But
QWERTY has persisted out of inertia since 1873, and today unsuspecting individuals are still being taught to use the QWERTY keyboard, unaware that
a much more efficient typewriter keyboard is available.
Where did QWERTY come from, and why does it continue to be used,
instead of much more efficient alternative keyboard designs? QWERTY was
invented by Christopher Latham Sholes in I 873, who designed this keyboard
to slow the typist down. In that day, the type bars on a typewriter hung down
in a sort of basket, and pivoted up to strike the paper; then they fell back in
place by gravity. When two adjoining keys were struck rapidly in succession,
they often jammed. Sholes rearranged the keys on a typewriter keyboard to
minimize such jamming; he "anti-engineered" the arrangement to make the
most commonly used letter sequences awkward and slow to use. By thus
making it difficult for a typist to operate the machine, and slowing down typing speed, Sholes' QWERTY keyboard allowed these old typewriters to
operate satisfactorily., His design was used in the manufacture of all typewriters.
Prior to about I 900, most typists used the two-finger, hunt-and-peck
system. But thereafter, as touch typing became popular, dissatisfaction with
the QWERTY keyboard began to grow. Typewriters became mechanically
more efficient, and the QWERTY keyboard design was no longer necessary
to prevent key jamming. The search for an improved design was led by Professor August Dvorak at the University of Washington, who in 1932 used
time-and-motion studies to create a much more efficient keyboard arrangement. The Dvorak keyboard has the letters A, 0, E, U, I, D, H, T, N, and S
across the home row of the typewriter. Less frequently used letters were
placed on the upper and lower rows of keys. About 70 percent of the typing is
done on the home row, 22 percent on the upper row, and 8 percent on the
lower row. On the Dvorak keyboard, the amount of work assigned to each
finger is proportionate to its skill and strength. Further, Professor Dvorak
engineered his keyboard so that successive keystrokes fell on alternative
hands; thus, while a finger on one hand is stroking a key, a finger on the
other hand can be moving into position to hit the next key. Typing rhythm is
thus facilitated; this hand alternation was achieved by putting the vowels
•Further detail on the Dvorak keyboard may be found in Dvorak et al (1936), Parkinson (1972), and Lessley (1980).
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(which represent 40 percent of all letters typed) on the left-hand side, and
placing the major consonants that usually accompany these vowels on the
right-hand side of the keyboard.
Professor Dvorak was able to avoid many of the typing inefficiencies of
the QWERTY keyboard. For instance, QWERTY overloads the left hand; it
must type 57 percent of ordinary copy. The Dvorak keyboard shifts this emphasis to 56 percent on the stronger right hand and 44 percent on the weaker
left hand. Only 32 percent of typing is done on the home row with the
QWERTY system, compared to 70 percent with the Dvorak keyboard. And
the newer arrangement requires less jumping back and forth from row to
row; with the QWERTY keyboard, a good typist's fingertips travel more
than twelve miles a day, jumping from row to row. These unnecessary intricate movements cause mental tension, typist fatique, and lead to more
typographical errors.
One might expect, on the basis of its overwhelming advantages, that the
Dvorak keyboard would have completely replaced the inferior QWERTY
keyboard by now. On the contrary, after more than 40 years, almost all
typists are still using the inefficient QWERTY keyboard. Even though the
American National Standards Institute and the Computer and Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association have approved the Dvorak keyboard
as an alternate design, it is still almost impossible to find a typewriter (or a
computer) keyboard that is arranged in the more efficient layout. Vested interests are involved in hewing to the old design: manufacturers, sales outlets,
typing teachers, and typists themselves.
No, technological innovations are not always diffused and adopted
rapidly. Even when the innovation has obvious and proven advantages.
As the reader may have guessed by now, the present pages were typed on
a QWERTY keyboard.
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I. The Innovation
An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new
by an individual or other unit of adoption. It matters little, so far as
human behavior is concerned, whether or not an idea is "objectively"
new as measured by the lapse of time since its first use or discovery.
The perceived newness of the idea for the individual determines his or
her reaction to it. If the idea seems new to the individual, it is an innovation.
Newness in an innovation need not just involve new knowledge.
Someone may have known about an innovation for some time but not
yet developed a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward it, nor have
adopted or rejected it. The ''newness" aspect of an innovation may be
expressed in terms of knowledge, persuasion, or a decision to adopt.
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Previously we defined diffusion as the process by which (l) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4)
among the members of a social system. The four main elements are the

Figure 1-1. Diffusion is the process by which (I) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of
a social system.

innovation, communication channels, time, and the social system
(Figure l-1). They are identifiable in every diffusion research study,
and in every diffusion campaign or program (like the diffusion of
water boiling in a Peruvian village).
The following description of these four elements in diffusion constitutes an overview of the main concepts and viewpoints that will be
detailed in Chapters 2 through 11.

Among the important research questions addressed by diffusion scholars
are (1) how the earlier adopters differ from the later adopters of an innovation (Chapter 7), (2) how the perceived attributes of an innovation, such as
its relative advantage, compatibility, etc., affect its rate of adoption,
whether relatively more rapidly (as for innovation I above) or more slowly
(innovation III), as is detailed in Chapter 6, and (3) why the s-shaped diffusion curve "takes off" at about 10 to 25 percent adoption, when interpers.on;:ll
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It should not be assumed that the diffusion and adoption of all innovations are necessarily desirable. In fact, there are some studies of
harmful and uneconomical innovations that are generally not desirable for either the individual or his or her social system. Further, the
same innovation may be desirable for one adopter in one situation but
undesirable for another potential adopter in a different situation. For
example, mechanical tomato pickers have been adopted rapidly by
large commercial farmers in California, but these machines were too
expensive for small-sized tomato growers, and thousands have thus
been forced out of tomato production (Chapter 4).

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS, INFORMATION, AND
UNCERTAINTY

_\,)
-~

Almost all of the new ideas analyzed in this book are technological innovations, and we often use "innovation" and "technology" as
synonyms. A technology is a design for instrumental action that
reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships involved in
achieving a desired outcome.* A technology usually has two components: (l) a hardware aspect, consisting of the tool that embodies
the technology as material or physical objects, and (2) a software
aspect, consisting of the information base for the tool. For example,
we often speak of (1) "computer hardware," consisting of semiconductors, transistors, electrical connections, and the metal frame to
protect these electronic components, and (2) "computer software,"
consisting of the coded commands, instructions, and other information aspects of this tool that allow us to use it to extend human
capabilities in solving certain problems. Here we see an illustration of
the close interaction between a tool and the way it is used. The social
embedding of the hardware aspects of technology are usually less visible than its machinery or equipment, and so we often think of technology mainly in hardware terms. Indeed, sometimes the hardware side
of a technology is dominant. But in other cases, a technology may be
almost entirely comprised of in formation; examples are a conservative
political philosophy, a religious idea like Transcendental Meditation,
a news event, a rumor, assembly-line production, and management by
•This definition is based upon Thompson ( 1967) and on personal communication
with Dr. J. D. Eveland of the National Science Foundation. Both stress the uncertainty-reduction aspect of technology, and thus the important role of information, a
view of technology that has not been very widely recognized.
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objective (MBO). The diffusion of such software innovations has
been investigated, although a methodological problem in such studies
is that their adoption cannot be so easily traced or observed in a
physical sense.
But even though the software component of a technology is often
not so apparent to observation, we should not forget that technology
almost always represents a mixture of hardware and software aspects.
According to our definition of technology, it is a means of uncertainty
reduction for individuals that is made possible by the information
about cause-effect relationships on which the technology is based.
This information usually comes from scientific R & D activities when
the technology is being developed, but sometimes a new technology
comes out of practice (even then, it is often subjected to a scientific
evaluation before it is widely diffused). Thus, there is generally an implication that a technological innovation has at least some degree of
benefit or advantage for its potential adopters. But this advantage is
not always very clear-cut or spectacular, at least not in the eyes of the
intended adopters. They can seldom be very certain that an innovation
represents a superior alternative to the previous practice that it might
replace.
So a technological innovation creates one kind of uncertainty in
the minds of potential adopters (about its expected consequences), as
well as representing an opportunity for reduced uncertainty in another
sense (that of the information base of the technology). The latter type
of potential uncertainty reduction (the information embodied in the
technological innovation itself) represents the possible efficacy of the
innovation in solving an individual's felt need or perceived problem;
this advantage provides the motivation that impels an individual to exert effort in order to learn about the innovation. Once such information-seeking activities have reduced the uncertainty about the innovation's expected consequences to a tolerable level for the individual, a
decision concerning adoption or rejection will be made. If the new
idea is used by the individual, further evaluative information about
the technological innovation is thus obtained and uncertainty about
its effects is further reduced. Thus, the innovation-decision process is
essentially an information-seeking and information-processing activity in which the individual is motivated to reduce uncertainty about
the advantages and disadvantages of the innovation (Chapter 5).
For the sake of clarity, we need to distinguish between the two
kinds of information that we have been discussing in respect to a technological innovation.
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1. Software information, which is embodied in a technology and
serves to reduce uncertainty about the cause-effect relationships involved in achieving a desired outcome.
2. Innovation-evaluation information, which is the reduction in
uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences.

The main questions that an individual typically asks in regard to
software information are, "What is the innovation?" "How does it
work?" and "Why does it work?" In contrast, the individual usually
wants to know such innovation-evaluation information as, "What arc
the innovation's consequences?" and "What will its advantages and
disadvantages be in my situation?"

TECH!"OLOGY CLUSTERS

~

One of the conceptual and methodological issues facing diffusion researchers and practitioners is the determination of the boundaries
around a technological innovation. In essence, the practical problem
is how to determine where one innovation stops and another one begins. If an innovation is an idea that is perceived as new, the boundary
question obviously ought to be answered by the potential adopters
who do the perceiving. In fact, this approach is used by diffusion
scholars and by market researchers in "positioning" studies (dcscri bed in Chapter 6). For example, a California study of the diffusion
of recycling found that households that recycled paper were also likely
to recycle bottles and cans, but that many families only recycled paper
(Leonard-Barton and Rogers, 1980a); presumably the two recycling
behaviors represented two innovations that were part of an interrelated cluster. A technology cluster consists of one or more distinguishable elements of technology that are perceived as being closely interrelated. Some change agencies promote a cluster or package of
innovations because they find that the innovations are thus adopted
more rapidly.

CHARACTERISTICS OF h-.:OVATIO'.:S

It should not be assumed, as sometimes has been done in the past. that
all innovations are equivalent units of analysis. This is a gross oversimplification. While it may take consumer innovations like blue jeans

or pocket calculators only five or six years to reach widespread adoption in the United States, other new ideas such as the metric system or
using seat belts in cars may require several decades to reach complete
use. The characteristics of innovations, as perceived by individuals,
help to explain their different rate of adoption.
I. Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as better than the idea it supersedes. The degree of relative
advantage may be measured in economic terms, but social-prestige
factors, convenience, and satisfaction are also often important components. It does not matter so much whether an innovation has a great
deal of "objective" advantage. What does matter is whether an individual perceives the innovation as advantageous. The greater the
perceived relative advantage of an innovation, the more rapid its rate
of adoption is going to be.
2. Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived
as being consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and
needs of potential adopters. An idea that is not compatible with the
prevalent values and norms of a social system will not be adopted as
rapidly as an innovation that is compatible. The adoption of an incompatible innovation often requires the prior adoption of a new
value system. An example of an incompatible innovation is the use of
contraception in countries where religious beliefs discourage use of
birth-control techniques, as in Moslem and Catholic nations.
3. Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as
difficult to understand and use. Some innovations are readily understood by most members of a social system; others are more complicated and will be adopted more slowly. For example, the villagers in
Los Molinas did not understand germ theory, which the health worker
tried to explain to them as a reason for boiling their drinking water. In
general, new ideas that are simpler to understand will be adopted more
rapidly than innovations that require the adopter to develop new skills
and understandings.
4. Trialability is the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis. New ideas that can be tried on the
installment plan will generally be adopted more quickly than innovations that are not divisible. Ryan and Gross (1943) found that every
one of their Iowa farmer respondents adopted hybrid-seed corn by
first trying it on a partial basis. If the new seed could not have been
sampled experimentally, its rate of adoption would have been much
slower. An innovation that is trialable represents less uncertainty to

16

"'-)
\;._')

Diffusion of lnno,·ations

the individual who is considering it for adoption, as it is possible to
learn by doing.
5. Observability is the degree to which the results of an innovation
are visible to others. The easier it is for individuals to see the results of
an innovation, the more likely they are to adopt. Such visibility
stimulates peer discussion of a new idea, as friends and neighbors of
an adopter ask him or her for innovation-evaluation information
about it. Solar panels on a household's roof are highly observable,
and a California survey found that the typical solar adopter showed
his equipment to about six of his peers (Rogers et al, 1979).
About one-fourth of all California homeowners know someone
who has adopted solar equipment (even though only about 2.5 percent
of the state's homeowners had adopted by 1979), and about twothirds of this one-fourth (15 percent of all homeowners) have seen
their friend's solar panels. Solar adopters often are found in spatial
clusters in California, with three or four adopters located on the same
block. Other consumer innovations like home computers or videotape
recorders are relatively less observable, and thus may diffuse more
slowly.
In general, innovations that are perceived by receivers as having
greater relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, observability,
and less complexity will be adopted more rapidly than other innovations. These are not the only qualities that affect adoption rates, but
past research indicates that they are the most important characteristics
of innovations in explaining rate of adoption.

RE-INVENTION

Until about the mid-1970s, it was assumed that an innovation was an
invariant quality that was not changed as it diffused. I remember interviewing an Iowa farmer in 'I 954 about his adoption of 2,4-D weed
spray. In answer to my question about whether he used this innovation, the farmer described in some detail the particular and unusual
ways in which he used the weed spray on his farm. At the end of his
remarks, I simply checked "adopter" on my questionnaire. The concept of re-invention was not in my theoretical repertoire, so I condensed his experience into one of my existing categories.
Then, in the 1970s, diffusion scholars began to pay more attention
to the concept of re-invention, defined as the degree to which an innovation is changed or modified by a user in the process of its adop-
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tion and implementation. Some researchers measured re-invention a~
the degree to which an individual's use of a new idea departed from
the "mainline" version of the innovation that was promoted by a
change agency (Eveland et al, 1977). Once scholars became aware of
the concept of re-invention and began to work out measures for it,
they began to find that a fair degree of re-invention occurred for some
innovations. Other innovations are more difficult or impossible to reinvent; for example, hybrid seed corn does not allow a farmer much
freedom to re-invent, as the hybrid vigor is genetically locked into seed
(for the first generation) in ways that are too complicated for a farmer
to change. But certain other innovations are more flexible in nature,
and they are re-invented by many adopters who implement them in
different ways.
We should remember, therefore, that an innovation is not necessarily invariant during the process of its diffusion. And adopting an
innovation is not necessarily a passive role of just implementing a
standard template of the new idea.
Given that an innovation exists, communication must take place if
the innovation is to spread beyond its inventor. Now we turn our attention to this second element in diffusion.

2. Communication Channels
Previously we defined communication as the process by which participants create and share information with one another in order to reach
a mutual understanding. Diffusion is a particular type of communication in which the information that is exchanged is concerned with new
ideas. The essence of the diffusion process is the information exchange by which one individual communicates a new idea to one or
several others. At its most elementary form, the process involves: (1)
an innovation, (2) an individual or other unit of adoption that has
knowledge of, or experience with using, the innovation, (3) another
individual or other unit that does not yet have knowledge of the innovation, and (4) a communication channel connecting the two units. A
communication channel is the means by which messages get from one
individual to another. The nature of the information-exchange rela- .
tionship between the pair of individuals determines the conditions
under which a source will or will not transmit the innovation to the
receiver, and the effect of the transfer.
For example, mass media channels are often thP most raniri ".nd e"r_
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ficient means to inform an audience of potential adopters about the
existence of an innovation, that is, to create awareness-knowledge.
Mass media channels are all those means of transmitting messages that
involve a mass medium, such as radio, television, newspapers, and so
on, which enable a source of one or a few individuals to reach an audience of many. On the other hand, interpersonal channels are more
effective in persuading an individual to adopt a new idea, especially if
the interpersonal channel links two or more individuals who are nearpeers. Interpersonal channels involve a face-to-face exchange between
two or more individuals.
The results of various diffusion investigations show that most individuals do not evaluate an innovation on the basis of scientific studies
of its consequences, although such objective evaluations are not entirely irrelevant, especially to the very first individuals who adopt.
Instead, most people depend mainly upon a subjective evaluation of
an innovation that is conveyed to them from other individuals like
themselves who have previously adopted the innovation. This dependence on the communicated experience of near-peers suggests that the
heart of the diffusion process is the modeling and imitation by potential adopters of their network partners who have adopted previously
(Chapter 8).

HETEROPHIL Y AND DIFFUSION

An obvious principle of human communication is that the transfer of
ideas occurs most frequently between two individuals who are alike,
similar, or homophilous. Homophily *is the degree to which pairs of
individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes, such as
beliefs, education, social status, and the like. In a free-choice situation, when an individual can interact with any one of a number of
other individuals, there is a strong tendency for him to select someone
who is most like him- or herself.
There are many reasons for this principle of homophily. Similar
•This concept and its opposite, hcterophily, were first called to scientific attention by
Lazarsfeld and Merton ( 1964, p. 23). llC!erophily, the mirror opposite of homophily,
is defined as the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact are different in certain attributes. The term homophily derives from the Greek word humoios, meaning
alike or equal. Thus, homophily literally means affiliation or communication with a
similar person.
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individuals usually belong to the same groups, live or work near each
other, and are drawn by the same interests. This physical and social
propinquity makes homophilous communication more likely. Such
communication is also more likely to be effective, and thus to be rewarding. More effective communication occurs when two individuals
are homophilous. * When they share common meanings, a mutual
subcultural language, and are alike in personal and social characteristics, the communication of ideas is likely to have greater effects in
terms of knowledge gain, attitude formation and change, and overt
behavior change. When homophily is present, communication is
therefore likely to be more rewarding to both individuals. As they become gradually conditioned to homophily, the choice of other homophilous network partners is made even more likely.

One of rhe mos! distinctive problems in the communicalion of innovalions is that !he parlicipanls are usually quire heterophilous. A
change agent, for instance, is more technically competent than his
clients. This difference frequently leads to ineffective communication. They simply do not talk the same language. In fact, when two
individuals are identical regarding their technical grasp of an innovation, no diffusion can occur as there is no new information to exchange. The very nature of diffusion demands that at least some
degree of heterophily be present between the two participants. t
Ideally, they would be homophilous on all other variables (education,
social status, and the like) even though they are heterophilous regarding the innovation. Usually, however, the two individuals are heterophilous on all of these variables because knowledge and experience
with an innovation are highly related to social status, education, and
the like.
•A further refinement of this proposition includes the concept of empathy, defined as
the ability of an individual to project him- or herself into the role of another: more ef-

fective cummunicatiun occurs when two individuals are homophi/ous, unless they
have high empathy. Heterophilous individuals who have high empathy are, in a
social-psychological sense, really homophilous. The proposition about effective communication and homophily can also be reversed: effecrive communication between

two individuals leads to greater homophify in knowledge, beliefs, and overt behavior.

t We shall see in later chapters that individuals oft.en seek network links with others
who are slightly, but not too much, more technically competent about innovations
than themselves. For instance, opinion leaders who are sought for information about
innovations are usually somewhat more innovative in adopting new ideas than their
followers, yet the opinion leaders are seldom innovators, seldom the very first to
adopt. This suggests that there is an optimal degree of heterophily in interpersonal
networks for effective diffusion to occur.
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Time is an important element in the diffusion process. In fact, most
other behavioral science research is timeless in the sense ihat the time
dimension is simply ignored. Time is an obvious aspect of any com·
munication process, but most (nondiffusion) communication research does not deal with it explicitly. Perhaps it is a fundamental
concept that cannot be explained in terms of something more fundamental (Whit row, 1980, p. 372). Time does not exist independently
of events, but it is an aspect of every activity.
The inclusion of time as a variable in diffusion research is one of its
strengths, but the measurement of the time dimension (often by means
of respondents' recall) can be criticized (as we point out in Chapter 3).
The time dimension is involved in diffusion (1) in the innovationdecision process by which an individual passes from first knowledge
of an innovation through its adoption or rejection, (2) in the innovativeness of an individual or other unit of adoption-that is, the
relative earliness/lateness with which an innovation is adopted-compared with other members of a system, and (3) in an innovation's rate
of adoption in a system, usually measured as the number of members
of the system that adopt the innovation in a given time period.

THE INNOVATION-DECISION PROCESS

The innovation-decision process is the process through which an individual (or other decision-making unit) passes from first knowledge of
an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation, to a deci·
sion to adopt or reject, to implementation of the new idea, and to confirmation of this decision. We conceptualize five main steps in the
process: (J) knowledge, (2) persuasion, (3) decision, (4) implementation, and (5) confirmation. Knowledge occurs when an individual (or
other decision-making unit) is exposed to the innovation's existence
and gains some understanding of how it functions. Persuasion occurs
when an individual (or other decision-making unit) forms a favorable
or unfavorable attitude toward the innovation. Decision occurs when
an individual (or other decision-making unit) engages in activities that
lead to a choice to adopt or reject the innovation. Implementation occurs when an individual (or other decision-making unit) puts an innovation into use. Re-invention is especially likely to occur at the implementation stage. Confirmation occurs when an individual (or other
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decision-making unit) seeks reinforcement of an innovation decision
that has already been made, but he or she may reverse this previous
decision if exposed to conflicting messages about the innovation.
Previously we stated that the innovation-decision process is an
information-seeking and information-processing activity in which an
individual obtains information in order to decrease uncertainty about
the innovation. At the knowledge stage an individual mainly seeks
software information that is embodied in a technological innovation,
information that reduces uncertainty about the cause-effect relationships that are involved in the innovation's capacity to solve a problem.
At this stage an individual wants to know what the innovation is, and
how and why it works. Mass-media channels can effectively transmit
such software information.
But increasingly at the persuasion stage, and especially at the decision stage, an individual seeks innovation-evaluation information in
order to reduce uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences. Here an individual wants to know the innovation's advantages and disadvantages in his or her own situation. Interpersonal networks with near-peers are particularly able to carry such evaluative
information about an innovation. Such subjective evaluations of a
new idea are especially likely to influence an individual at the decision
stage, and perhaps at the confirmation stage.
The innovation-decision process can lead to either adoption, a
decision to make full use of an innovation as the best course of action
available, or to rejection, a decision not to adopt an innovation. Such
decisions can be reversed at a later point; for example, discontinuance
is a decision to reject an innovation after it had previously been
adopted. Discontinuance may occur because an individual becomes
dissatisfied with an innovation, or because the innovation is replaced
with an improved idea. It is also possible for an individual to adopt the
innovation after a previous decision to reject it. Such later adoption
and discontinuance occur during the confirmation stage of the
innovation-decision process.
The innovation-decision process involves time in the sense that the
five steps usually occur in a time-ordered sequence of knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. The innovation-decision period is the length of time required to pass through the
innovation-decision process. Exceptions to the usual sequence of
the five stages may occur, such as when the decision stage precedes the
persuasion phase.
For purposes of simplicity, we have restricted our present discus-
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sion of the innovation-decision process mainly to a single individual,
and thus to the case of individual-optional innovation-decisions. But
many innovation-decisions are made by organizations or other types
of adopting units, rather than by individuals. For example, an organization may decide to purchase word-processing equipment on the
basis of a staff decision or by an official's authority decision; the individual office worker in the organization may have little or no say in
the innovation-decision. When an innovation-decision is made by a
system, rather than by an individual, the decision process is usually
much more complicated (we discuss the innovation-decision process
in organizations in Chapter 10).
Nevertheless, time is still an important dimension in this innovation-decision process.

hNOVATIVENESS AND ADOPTER CATEGORIES

Innovativeness is the degree to which an individual or other unit of
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adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than the other
members of a system. Rather than describing an individual as "less innovative than the average member of a social system," it is handier
and more efficient to refer to the individual as being in the "late majority" or some other adopter category. This short-hand notation
saves words and contributes to clearer understanding, for diffusion
research shows that members of each of the adopter categories have a
great deal in common. If the individual is like most others in the late
majority category, he is low in social status, makes little use of massmedia channels, and secures most of his new ideas from peers via interpersonal channels. In a similar manner, we shall present a concise
word-picture of each of the other four adopter categories (in Chapter
7). Adopter categories are the classifications of members of a social
system on the basis of innovativeness. The five adopter categories arc:
(I) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, (4) late majority,
and (5) laggards.
Innovators are active information seekers about new ideas. They
have a high degree of mass media exposure and their interpersonal
networks extend over a wide area, usually reaching outside of their
local system. Innovators are able to cope with higher levels of uncertainty about an innovation than are other adopter categories. As the
first to adopt a new idea in their system, they cannot depend upon the
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subjective evaluations of the innovation from other members of their
system.
Obviously, the measure of innovativeness and the classification ol
the system's members into adopter categories are based upon the relative time at which an innovation is adopted.

RATE OF ADOPTION

There is a third specific way in which the time dimension is involved in
the diffusion of innovations. Rate of adoption is the relative speed
with which an innovation is adopted by members of a social system.
When the number of individuals adopting a new idea is plotted on a
cumulative frequency basis over time, the resulting distribution is an
s-shaped curve. At first, only a few individuals adopt the innovation
in each time period (such as a year or a month, for example); these are
the innovators. But soon the diffusion curve begins to climb, as more
and more individuals adopt. Then the trajectory of the rate of adoption begins to level off, as fewer and fewer individuals remain who
have not yet adopted. Finally, the s-shaped curve reaches its asymptote, and the diffusion process is finished.
Most innovations have ans-shaped rate of adoption. But there is
variation in the slope of the "s" from innovation to innovation; some
new ideas di ff use relatively rapidly and the s-curve is quite steep.
Another innovation may have a slower rate of adoption, and its
s-curve will be more gradual, with a slope that is relatively lazy. One
issue addressed by diffusion research is why some innovations have a
rapid rate of adoption, and why others are adopted more slowly
(Figure 1-1 ).
The rate of adoption is usually measured by the length of time required for a certain percentage of the members of a system to adopt an
innovation. Therefore, we see that rate of adoption is measured using
an innovation or a system, rather than an individual, as the unit of
analysis. Innovations that are perceived by individuals as possessing
greater relative advantage, compatibility, and the like, have a more
rapid rate of adoption (as we pointed out previously in this chapter).
There are also differences in the rate of adoption for the same innovation in different social systems. Clearly, there are aspects of diffusion that cannot be explained only by the nature of individual
behavior. The system has a direct effect on diffusion, and also an in-
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direct influence through its individual members. What is a social
system?

4. A Social System
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A social system is defined as a set of interrelated units that are engaged
in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The members
or units of a social system may be individuals, informal groups,
organizations, and/or subsystems. The system analyzed in a diffusion
study may consist of all the peasants in an Asian village, high schools
in Wisconsin, medical doctors in a hospital, or all the consumers in the
United States. Each unit in a social system can be distinguished from
other units. All members cooperate at least to the extent of seeking to
solve a common problem in order to reach a mutual goal. This sharing
of a common objective binds the system together.
It is important to remember that diffusion occurs within a social
system, because the social structure of the system affects the innovation's diffusion in several ways. The social system constitutes a boundary within which an innovation diffuses. Here we shall deal with the
following topics: how the social structure affects diffusion, the effect
of norms on diffusion, the roles of opinion leaders and change agents,
types of innovation decisions, and the consequences of innovation.
All these issues involve relationships between the social system and the
diffusion process that occurs within it.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DIFFUSION

To the extent that the units in a social system are not all identical in
their behavior, structure then exists within the system. We define
structure as the patterned arrangements of the units in a system. This
structure gives regularity and stability to human behavior in a social
system; it allows one to predict behavior with some degree of accuracy. Thus, structure represents one type of information in that it
decreases uncertainty. Perhaps we see an illustration of this predictability that is provided by structure in a bureaucratic organization like
a government agency; there is a well-developed social structure in such
a system consisting of hierarchical positions, giving officials in higherranked positions the right to issue orders to individuals of lower rank.
ThPir ordrr' ::ire exnt>cted to be carried out. Such patterned social re la-
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tionships among the members of a system constitute social structure,
one type of structure.
In addition to this formal structure among the units in a social
system, there is also an informal type of structure that exists in the interpersonal networks linking a system's members, determining who
interacts with whom and under what circumstances. We define such
communication structure as the differentiated elements that can be
recognized in the patterned communication flows in a system. Previously we mentioned the homophily principle, that most individuals
in a system talk with others who are similar to themselves; a communication structure is thus often created in a system in which homophilous sets of individuals are grouped together in cliques. A complete
lack of communication structure in a system would be represented by
a situation in which each individual talked with equal probability to
each other member of the system. Such a situation might occur when a
set of complete strangers first come together. But regularized patterns
soon begin to occur in the communication network of the system. And
these aspects of communication structure predict, in part, the behavior of individual members of the social system.
The structure of a social system can facilitate or impede the diffusion of innovations in the system. The impact of the social structure
on diffusion is of special interest to sociologists and social psychologists, and the way in which the communication structure of a system
affects diffusion is a particularly interesting topic for communication
scholars. Katz (1961) remarked, "It is as unthinkable to study diffusion without some knowledge of the social structures in which potential adopters are located as it is to study blood circulation without adequate knowledge of the structure of veins and arteries."
Compared to other aspects of diffusion research, however, there
have been relatively few studies of how the social or communication
structure of a system affects the diffusion and adoption of innovations in that system. One explanation may be that, methodologically,
it is a rather tricky business to untangle the effects of a system's structure on diffusion, independent from the effects of the characteristics
of the individuals that make up the system. But let us consider an illustration of system effects, the influences of the structure and/or composition of a system on the behavior of the members of the system.
Our example is drawn from a study by Rogers and Kincaid (1981, pp.
239-240): two Korean women are both illiterate, married, have two
children, and are twenty-nine years of age. The husbands of both
women are high-school graduates, with farms of five acres. One might
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expect that both women would be about equally likely, or unlikely, to
adopt a contraceptive method.
But the two women are different in one crucial respect: they live in
different villages, one in Village A and one in Village B. The rate of
adoption of family-planning methods is 57 percent in Village A, and
only 26 percent in Village B. Obviously, the social and communication
structures of these two villages are quite different regarding the diffusion of contraception, even though these innovations had been promoted equally in both villages by the national family-planning program in Korea. Certainly, we would predict that the woman in Village
A would be more likely to adopt a contraceptive method (than her
counterpart in Village B) because of system effects: Mrs. A's friends
and neighbors are more likely, since they themselves have adopted, to
encourage her to adopt, and the village leaders in Village A are
especially committed to family planning, while in Village B they are
not.
From this example we can see how a system can have an effect on
the diffusion and adoption of innovations, over and above the effect
of such variables as the individual characteristics of the members of
the system. Individual innovativeness is affected both by the individual's characteristics, and by the nature of the social system in which
the individual is a member.

SYSTEM NORMS AND DIFFUSION

The Korean investigation by Rogers and Kincaid ( 1981, p. 249) also illustrates the importance of village norms in affecting the rate of diffusion of family-planning methods. For example, our study of twentyfour villages found big differences from village to village, both in the
level of adoption of family planning and in the adoption of particular
types of contraceptive methods. One village had 51 percent adoption
of the IUD (intrauterine device) and only one vasectomy adopter.
Another village had 23 percent adoption of vasectomy. Yet another
was a "pill village" in which all of the adopters chose to use contraceptive pills. Clearly these differences were not due to the nature oft he
national family-planning program in Korea, which had promoted the
same "cafeteria" of contraceptive methods in all villages for ten years
prior to our data gathering. The explanation for the different contraceptive behavior from village to village had to come mainly from
within each village. One explanation was these systems' norms.
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Norms are the established behavior patterns for the members of a
social system. They define a range of tolerable behavior and serve as a
guide or a standard for the members of a social system.
A system's norms can be a barrier to change, as was shown in our
example of water boiling in a Peruvian community. Such resistance to
new ideas is often found in norms that relate to food habits. In India,
for example, sacred cows roam the countryside while millions of people are undernourished. Pork is not consumed by Moslems and Jews.
Polished rice is eaten in most of Asia and the United States, even
though whole rice is more nutritious. These are examples of cultural
and religious norms. Norms can operate at the level of a nation, a
religious community, an organization, or a local system like a village.

OPINION LEADERS AND CHANGE AGENTS

We have been discussing the influence of the structure of a system on
its members' diffusion and adoption behavior. Now we turn to the
different roles that certain individuals play in a social system and the
effect of these roles on diffusion. Specifically, we look at two roles:
opinion leaders and change agents.
The most innovative member of a system is very often perceived as
a deviant from the social system, and he or she is accorded a somewhat
dubious status of low credibility by the average members of the
system. This individual's role in diffusion (especially in persuading
others about the innovation) is therefore likely to be limited. On the
other hand, there are members of the system who function in the role
of opinion leader. They provide information and advice about innovations to many in the system.
Opinion leadership is the degree to which an individual is able to
influence other individuals' attitudes or overt behavior informally in a
desired way with relative frequency. It is a type of in formal leadership,
rather than a function of the individual's formal position or status in
the system. Opinion leadership is earned and maintained by the individual's technical competence, social accessibility, and conformity to
the system's norms. Much research indicates that when the social
system is oriented to change, the opinion leaders are quite innovative;
but when the norms are opposed to change, the behavior of the leaders
also reflects this norm. By their close conformity to the system's
norms, opinion leaders serve as an apt model for the innovation be-
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havior of their followers. Opinion leaders thus exemplify and express
the system's structure.
In any system, naturally, there may be both innovative opinion
leaders and also leaders who oppose change. These influential persons
can lead in the promotion of new ideas, or they can head an active opposition. In general, when opinion leaders are compared with their
followers, we find that they (1) are more exposed to all forms of external communication, (2) are more cosmopolite, (3) have somewhat
higher social status, and (4) are more innovative (although the exact
degree of innovativeness depends, in part, on the system's norms).
But one of the most striking characteristics of opinion leaders is their
unique and influential position in their system's communication structure: they are at the center of interpersonal communication networks.
A communication network consists of interconnected individuals who
are linked by patterned flows of information. The opinion leader's interpersonal networks allow him or her to serve as a social model whose
innovative behavior is imitated by many other members of the system.
The influence and respect with which the opinion leader is held
can be lost, however, as when an opinion leader deviates too far
from the norms of his or her system. There is research evidence that
opinion leaders can be "worn out" by change agents who overuse
them. Opinion leaders may be perceived by their peers as too much
like the change agents and may therefore lose their credibility with
their former followers.
Opinion leaders are members of the social system in which they exert their influence. In some instances individuals with influence in the
social system are professionals who represent change agencies external
to the system. A change agent is an individual who influences clients'
innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change
agency. He or she usually seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas,
but may also attempt to slow down diffusion and prevent the adoption
of what he or she believes are undesirable innovations. Change agents
use opinion leaders within a given social system as lieutenants in diffusion campaigns.
Change agents are often professionals with· university degrees in
technical fields. This professional training, and the social status that
goes with it, usually means that change agents are heterophilous from
their typical clients, thus posing problems for effective communication about the innovations that they are promoting. However, because of a manpower shortage of professionally qualified change
agents and/or because of a lack of adequate financial resources to
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employ adequate numbers of them, many change agencies use changeagent aides. An aide is a less than fully professional change agent who
intensively contacts clients to influence their innovation decisions.
Aides are usually more homophilous with their average client, and
thus provide one means of bridging the heterophily gap frequently
found between professional change agents and their client audience.

TYPES OF INNOVATION-DECISIONS

The social system has yet another important kind of influence on the
diffusion of new ideas. Innovations can be adopted or rejected (1) by
individual members of a system, or (2) by the entire social system,
which can decide to adopt an innovation by a collective or an authority decision.
1. Optional innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject an
innovation that are made by an individual independent of the decisions of other members of the system. Even in this case, the individual's decision may be influenced by the norms of his system and by his
interpersonal networks. The decision of an individual housewife in
Los Molinas to adopt or reject water boiling was an optional innovation-decision, although this choice was often influenced by community factors, like the hot-cold complex. The distinctive aspect of optional innovation-decisions is that the individual is the unit of decision
making, rather than the social system.
As stated previously, the classical diffusion model evolved out of
early diffusion research, which comprised almost entirely investigations of optional innovation-decisions: the diffusion of hybrid corn
among Iowa farmers, the spread of a new antibiotic drug among medical doctors, and the like. Only in the past decade have we begun to expand the scope of the diffusion paradigm also to include collective and
authority innovation-decisions.
2. Collective innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject
an innovation that are made by consensus among the members of a
system. All of the units in the system usually must conform to the
system's decision once it is made. For example, the voters in some
California cities and counties have decided that all new homes to be
constructed must be equipped with solar water heating, as must any
old home that is resold; the individual homeowner has little practical
choice but to adopt solar panels. On the other hand, once a city
decides to have cable television, each household has to sign up individ-
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ually for this new service. The freedom of choice allowed the individual depends on the nature of the collective innovation-decision.
3. Authority innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject
an innovation that are made by a relatively few individuals in a system
who possess power, status, or technical expertise. The individual
member of the system has little or no influence in the innovationdecision; he or she simply implements the decision. For instance, the
president of a large U.S. electronics corporation some years ago
decided that all of his male employees should wear white shirts and
dark suits; this authority decision had to be followed by every man
who worked for this company.
These three types of innovation-decisions range on a continuum
from optional decisions (where the adopting individual has almost
complete responsibility for the decision), through collective decisions
(where the individual has some influence in the decision), to authority
decisions (where the adopting individual has no influence in the innovation decision). Collective and authority decisions are probably
much more common than optional decisions in formal organizations,
such as factories, schools, or government organizations, in comparison with other fields like agriculture and consumer behavior,
where many of the innovation-decisions by farmers and consumers
are optional.
Generally, the fastest rate of adoption of innovations results from
authority decisions (depending, of course, on how innovative the
authorities are). Optional decisions can usually be made more rapidly
than collective decisions. Although made more rapidly, authority
decisions are often circumvented during their implementation.
The type of innovation-decision for a given idea may change or be
changed over time. Automobile seat belts, during the early years of
their use, were installed in autos as optional decisions by the car's
owner, who had to pay the cost of installation. Then, in 1968, a
federal law was passed requiring that seat belts be included in all new
cars in the United States. An optional innovation-decision thus became a collective decision. But the decision by the auto driver or
passengers to fasten the belts when in the car was still an optional decision-that is, except for 1974 model cars, which a federal law required
to be equipped with a seat belt-ignition interlock system that prevented the driver from starting the engine until everyone in the auto's
front seat had fastened their seat belt. So for one year, the fastening of
seat belts became a collective authority-decision. But the public reaction to this draconian approach was so negative that the U.S. legisla-
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tu re reversed this law, and the fastening of auto seat belts again became an individual-optional decision.
There is yet a fourth type of innovation-decision that is a sequential combination of two or more of the three types we have just discussed. Contingent innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject
that can be made only after a prior innovation-decision. For example,
an individual member of a social system may be free to adopt or not to
adopt a new idea only after his system's innovation-decision. In the
example just discussed, until the 1968 law (a collective innovationdecision by elected legislators representing the public), it was difficult
for an auto owner to make an optional decision to install seat belts. In
a university setting, a professor may not be able to make an optional
decision to use a word processor until a prior authority decision to
purchase the word-processing equipment has been made by the professor's department chairperson.
One can also imagine other types of contingent innovation decisions in which the first decision is of an authority sort followed by a
collective decision. The distinctive aspect of contingent decision making is that two (or more) tandem decisions are required; either of the
innovation decisions may be optional, collective, or authority.
The social system is involved directly in collective, authority, and
contingent innovation-decisions, and perhaps indirectly in optional
innovation-decisions. There is a final way in which the social system
plays a role in the diffusion of innovations: it is involved· in the consequences of innovations.

!CONSEQUENCES OF INNOVATIONS
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A social system is involved in an innovation's consequences because
certain of these changes occur at the system level, in addition to those
that affect the individual. We discuss consequences briefly here and in
an expanded form in Chapter 11.
Consequences are the changes that occur to an individual or to a
social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation .
There are at least three classifications of consequences:

1. Desirable versus undesirable consequences, depending on
whether the effects of an innovation in a social system are functional or dysfunctional.
2. Direct versus indirect consequences, depending on whether the
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havior of their followers. Opinion leaders thus exemplify and express
the system's structure.
In any system, naturally, there may be both innovative opinion
leaders and also leaders who oppose change. These influential persons
can lead in the promotion of new ideas, or they can head an active opposition. In general, when opinion leaders are compared with their
followers, we find that they (1) are more exposed to all forms of external communication, (2) are more cosmopolite, (3) have somewhat
higher social status, and (4) are more innovative (although the exact
degree of innovativeness depends, in part, on the system's norms).
But one of the most striking characteristics of opinion leaders is their
unique and influential position in their system's communication structure: they are at the center of interpersonal communication networks.
A communication network consists of interconnected individuals who
are linked by patterned flows of information. The opinion leader's interpersonal networks allow him or her to serve as a social model whose
innovative behavior is imitated by many other members of the system.
The influence and respect with which the opinion leader is held
can be lost, however, as when an opinion leader deviates too far
from the norms of his or her system. There is research evidence that
opinion leaders can be "worn out" by change agents who overuse
them. Opinion leaders may be perceived by their peers as too much
like the change agents and may therefore lose their credibility with
their former followers.
Opinion leaders are members of the social system in which they exert their influence. In some instances individuals with influence in the
social system are professionals who represent change agencies external
to the system. A change agent is an individual who influences clients'
innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change
agency. He or she usually seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas,
but may also attempt to slow down diffusion and prevent the adoption
of what he or she believes are undesirable innovations. Change agents
use opinion leaders within a given social system as lieutenants in diffusion campaigns.
Change agents are often professionals with university degrees in
technical fields. This professional training, and the social status that
goes with it, usually means that change agents are heterophilous from
their typical clients, thus posing problems for effective communication about the innovations that they are promoting. However, because of a manpower shortage of professionally qualified change
agents and/or because of a lack of adequate financial resources to
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employ adequate numbers of them, many change agencies use changeagent aides. An aide is a less than fully professional change agent who
intensively contacts clients to influence their innovation decisions.
Aides are usually more homophilous with their average client, and
thus provide one means of bridging the heterophily gap frequently
found between professional change agents and their client audience.

TYPES OF )NNOVATION-DECISIONS

The social system has yet another important kind of influence on the
diffusion of new ideas. Innovations can be adopted or rejected (I) by
individual members of a system, or (2) by the entire social system,
which can decide to adopt an innovation by a collective or an authority decision.
I. Optional innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject an
innovation that are made by an individual independent of the decisions of other members of the system. Even in this case, the individual's decision may be influenced by the norms of his system and by his
interpersonal networks. The decision of an individual housewife in
Los Molinas to adopt or reject water boiling was an optional innovation-decision, although this choice was often influenced by community factors, like the hot-cold complex. The distinctive aspect of optional innovation-decisions is that the individual is the unit of decision
making, rather than the social system.
As stated previously, the classical diffusion model evolved out of
early diffusion research, which comprised almost entirely investigations of optional innovation-decisions: the diffusion of hybrid corn
among Iowa farmers, the spread of a new antibiotic drug among medical doctors, and the like. Only in the past decade have we begun to expand the scope of the diffusion paradigm also to include collective and
authority innovation-decisions.
2. Collective innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject
an innovation that are made by consensus among the members of a
system. All of the units in the system usually must conform to the
system's decision once it is made. For example, the voters in some
California cities and counties have decided that all new homes to be
constructed must be equipped with solar water heating, as must any
old home that is resold; the individual homeowner has little practical
choice but to adopt solar panels. On the other hand, once a city
decides to have cable television, each household has to sign uo individ-
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ually for this new service. The freedom of choice allowed the individual depends on the nature of the collective innovation-decision.
3. Authority innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject
an innovation that are made by a relatively few individuals in a system
who possess power, status, or technical expertise. The individual
member of the system has little or no influence in the innovationdecision; he or she simply implements the decision. For instance, the
president of a large U.S. electronics corporation some years ago
decided that all of his male employees should wear white shirts and
dark suits; this authority decision had to be followed by every man
who worked for this company.
These three types of innovation-decisions range on a continuum
from optional decisions (where the adopting individual has almost
complete responsibility for the decision), through collective decisions
(where the individual has some influence in the decision), to authority
decisions (where the adopting individual has no influence in the innovation decision). Collective and authority decisions are probably
much more common than optional decisions in formal organizations,
such as factories, schools, or government organizations, in comparison with other fields like agriculture and consumer behavior,
where many of the innovation-decisions by farmers and consumers
are optional.
Generally, the fastest rate of adoption of innovations results from
authority decisions (depending, of course, on how innovative the
authorities are). Optional decisions can usually be made more rapidly
than collective decisions. Although made more rapidly, authority
decisions are often circumvented during their implementation.
The type of innovation-decision for a given idea may change or be
changed over time. Automobile seat belts, during the early years of
their use, were installed in autos as optional decisions by the car's
owner, who had to pay the cost of installation. Then, in 1968, a
federal law was passed requiring that seat belts be included in all new
cars in the United States. An optional innovation-decision thus became a collective decision. But the decision by the auto driver or
passengers to fasten the belts when in the car was still an optional decision-that is, except for 1974 model cars, which a federal law required
to be equipped with a seat belt-ignition interlock system that prevented the driver from starting the engine until everyone in the auto's
front seat had fastened their seat belt. So for one year, the fastening of
seat belts became a collective authority-decision. But the public reaction to this draconian approach was so negative that the U.S. legisla-
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ture reversed this law, and the fastening of auto seat belts again became an individual-optional decision.
There is yet a fourth type of innovation-decision that is a sequential combination of two or more of the three types we have just discussed. Contingent innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject
that can be made only after a prior innovation-decision. For example,
an individual member of a social system may be free to adopt or not to
adopt a new idea only after his system's innovation-decision. In the
example just discussed, until the 1968 law (a collective innovationdecision by elected legislators representing the public), it was difficult
for an auto owner to make an optional decision to install seat belts. In
a university setting, a professor may not be able to make an optional
decision to use a word processor until a prior authority decision to
purchase the word-processing equipment has been made by the professor's department chairperson.
One can also imagine other types of contingent innovation decisions in which the first decision is of an authority sort followed by a
collective decision. The distinctive aspect of contingent decision making is that two (or more) tandem decisions are required; either of the
innovation decisions may be optional, collective, or authority.
The social system is involved directly in collective, authority, and
contingent innovation-decisions, and perhaps indirectly in optional
innovation-decisions. There is a final way in which the social system
plays a role in the diffusion of innovations: it is involved in the consequences of innovations.
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CONSEQUENCES OF INNOVATIONS

A social system is involved in an innovation's consequences because
certain of these changes occur at the system level, in addition to those
that affect the individual. We discuss consequences briefly here and in
an expanded form in Chapter 11.
Consequences are the changes that occur to an individual or to a
social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation.
There are at least three classifications of consequences:
1. Desirable versus undesirable consequences, depending on
whether the effects of an innovation in a social system are functional or dysfunctional.
2. Direct versus indirect consequences, depending on whether the
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changes to an individual or to a social system occur in immediate response to an innovation or as a second-order result
of the direct consequences of an innovation.
3. Anticipated versus unanticipated consequences, depending on
whether the changes are recognized and intended by the members of a social system or not.

.,__,

Change agents usually introduce innovations into a client system
that they expect will be desirable, direct, and anticipated. But often
such innovations result in at least some unanticipated consequences
that are indirect and undesirable for the system's members. An illustration is the case of the steel ax introduced by missionaries to an
Australian aborigine tribe (Sharp, 1952, pp. 69- 72). The change
agents intended that the new tool should raise levels of living and
material comfort for the tribe. But the new technology also led to a
breakdown of the family structure, the rise of prostitution, and
"misuse" of the innovation itself. Change agents can often anticipate
and predict the innovation's form, the directly observable physical appearance of the innovation, and perhaps its function, the contribution
of the idea to the way of life of the system's members. But seldom are
change agents able to predict another aspect of an innovation's consequences, its meaning, the subjective perception of the innovation by
the clients.

Diffusion of Hybrid Corn in Iowa

We have already mentioned the Ryan and Gross (1943) study of the diffusion of hybrid seen corn as one of the most influential diffusion studies of
all time. Although more will be said about this study in Chapter 2, it is an
ideal illustration at this point because the hybrid corn investigation includes
each of the four main elements of diffusion that we have just discussed.
The innovation of hybrid corn was one of the most important new farm
technologies when it was released to Iowa farmers in 1928, and it ushered in a
whole set of agricultural innovations in the 1930s through the 1950s that
amounted to an "agricultural revolution" in farm productivity. Hybrid seed
had been developed by agricultural scientists at Iowa State University and at
other state land-grant universities. The diffusion of hybrid seed was heavily
promoted by the Iowa agricultural extension service and by salesmen from
seed companies. Hybrid corn yielded about 20 percent more per acre than
the open-pollinated varieties that it replaced, and it was also more drought
resistant and better suited to harvest with mechanical corn pickers. But the
seed lost its hybrid vigor after the first generation, so farmers had to pur-

chase hybrid seed each year. Previously farmers had saved their own seed,
selected from their best-looking corn plants. The adoption of hybrid corn
meant that a farmer had to make important changes in his behavior.
In 1941, Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross (1943), two rural sociologists at
Iowa State University, personally interviewed 259 farmers Jiving in two small
communities. Each of these respondents was asked to recall when and how
he had adopted hybrid corn, and to provide certain information about themselves and their farm operation.
All but 2 of the 259 farmers had adopted hybrid corn between 1928 and
1941, a rather rapid rate of adoption. When plotted cumulatively on a yearby-year basis, the adoption rate formed ans-shaped curve over time. After
the first five years, by 1933, only 10 percent of the Iowa farmers had
adopted. Then, the adoption curve "took off," shooting up to 40 percent
adoption in the next three years (by 1936). Soon the rate of adoption began
to level off as fewer and fewer farmers remained to adopt the new idea. The
overall shape of the rate of adoption looked like an "S" (Figure 1-1).
Farmers were assigned to adopter categories on the basis of when they
adopted the new seed (Gross, 1942). Compared to later adopters, the innovators had larger-sized farms, higher incomes, and more years of formal
education. The innovators were more cosmopolite, as measured by the
number of trips they had taken to Des Moines (Iowa's largest city, located
about seventy-five miles away).
Although hybrid corn was an innovation with a high degree of relative
advantage over the open-pollinated seed that it replaced, the typical farmer
moved rather slowly from awareness-knowledge of the innovation to adoption. The innovation-decision period from first knowledge to the adoption
decision averaged about nine years for all respondents, a finding that led to a
clearer realization that the innovation-decision process involved considerable deliberation by most adopters, even in the case of an innovation
with spee::tacular results. The average respondent took three or four years
after planting his first hybrid seed, usually on a small trial plot, before
deciding to plant I 00 percent of his corn acreage in hybrid varieties.
Communication channels played different roles at various stages in the
innovation-decision process. The typical farmer first heard of hybrid seed
from a salesman, but neighbors were the most frequent channel leading to
persuasion. Salesmen were more important channels for earlier adopters,
and neighbors were more important for later adopters. The Ryan and Gross
(I 943) findings suggested the important role of interpersonal networks in the
diffusion process in a system. The farmer-to-farmer exchange of personal
experiences with use of the hybrid seed seemed to lie at the heart of diffusion.
When enough such positive experiences were accumulated by farmers
(especially the innovators and early adopters) and exchanged within the community, the rate of adoption really took off. This threshold seemed to occur
in about 1935. After about that point, it would have been impossible to halt
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the further diffusion of hybrid corn. The farm community as a social system,
including the networks linking the individual farmers within it, was a crucial
element in the diffusion process.
In order to understand the role of diffusion networks and opinion leadership, Ryan and Gross (1943) should have asked sociometric questions* of
their respondents, such as "From which other farmers have you obtained information about hybrid corn?" The sample design, which consisted of a
complete enumeration in two communities, would have made the use of
sociometric questions easy. But "information was simply collected from all
community members as if they were unrelated respondents in a random sample" (Katz et al, 1963).
Even without sociometric data about diffusion networks, Ryan and
Gross (1943) sensed that hybrid corn spread in the two Iowa communities as
a kind of social snowball. They wrote: "There is no doubt but that the
behavior of one individual in an interacting population affects the behavior
of his fellows. Thus, the demonstrated success of hybrid seed on a few farms
offers a changed situation to those ·who have not been so experimental. The
very fact of acceptance by one or more farmers offers new stimulus to the remaining ones." Thus, the two rural sociologists intuitively sensed what later
diffusion scholars were to gather more detailed evidence to prove: that the
heart of the diffusion process consists of interpersonal network exchanges
and social modeling between those individuals who had already adopted and
those who then would be influenced to do so.
In her study of the invisible college of rural sociologists investigating di ffusion as of the mid-1960s, Crane (1972, p. 74) identified the researchers
who first utilized a new concept and/or methodological tool in studying diffusion. According to her analysis, Ryan and Gross deserve credit for launching fifteen of the eighteen most widely used intellectual innovations in the
rural sociology research tradition. Th is is perhaps another way of saying that
Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross really formed the classical diffusion paradigm.
As such, the hybrid corn study has left an indelible stamp on the history
of diffusion research.

Summary
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated
through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system. Diffusion is a special type of communication concerned with
• SociornC!r_~· is a means of obi ain ing and analyzing q uan! it at i ve data about comm unicat ion patterns among the individuals in a system by asking each respondent to whom
he or she is linked.

i

!

35

the spread of messages that are new ideas. Communication is a process in which participants create and share information with one
another in order to reach a mutual understanding. It is the newness of
the idea in the message content that gives diffusion its special
character, as some degree of uncertainty is thus involved. Uncertainty
is the degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived with
respect to the occurrence of an event and the relative probabilities of
these alternatives. The degree of uncertainty can be reduced by an individual by obtaining information. Information is a difference in
matter-energy that affects uncertainty in a situation where a choice exists among a set of alternatives.
The main elements in the diffusion of new ideas are: (l) an innovation, (2) which is communicated through certain channels, (3) over
time, (4) among the members of a social system. An innovation is an
idea, practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other
unit of adoption. Almost all of the new ideas discussed in this book
are technological innovations. A technology is a design for instrumental action that reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships
involved in achieving a desired outcome. Most technologies have two
components: (I) hardware, consisting of the tool that embodies the
technology as material or physical objects, and (2) software, consisting of the knowledge base for the tool. The software information embodied in a technology serves to reduce one type of uncertainty, that
concerned with the cause-effect relationships that are involved in
achieving a desired outcome. But a technological innovation also
creates another kind of uncertainty because of its newness to the individual, and motivates him or her to seek information by means of
which the new idea can be evaluated. We call this innovationevaluation information; it leads to a reduction in uncertainty about an
innovation's expected consequences.
The characteristics of an innovation, as perceived by the members
of a social system, determine its rate of adoption. Five attributes of innovations are: (I) relative advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) complexity, (4) trialability, and (5) observability.
Re-invention is the degree to which an innovation is changed or
modified by a user in the process of its adoption and implementation.
A communication channel is the means by which messages get
from one individual to another. Mass-media channels are more effective in creating knowledge of innovations, whereas interpersonal
channels are more effective in forming and changing attitudes toward
the new idea, and thus in influencing the decision to adopt or reject a
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new idea. Most individuals evaluate an innovation, not on the basis of
scientific research by experts, but through the subjective evaluations
of near-peers who have adopted the innovation. These near-peers thus
serve as social models, whose innovation behavior tends to be imitated
by others in their system.
Another distinctive aspect of diffusion as a subfield of communication is that some degree of heterophily is present. Heterophily
is the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact are different in
certain attributes, such as beliefs, education, social status, and the
like. The opposite of heterophily is homophily, the degree to which
pairs of individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes.
Generally, most human communication takes place between individuals who are homophilous, a situation that leads to more effective
communication. Therefore, the heterophily that is often present in the
diffusion of innovations leads to special problems in securing effective
communication.
Time is involved in diffusion in (1) the innovation-decision process, (2) innovativeness, and (3) an innovation's rate of adoption. The
innovation-decision process is the mental process through which an
individual (or other decision-making unit) passes from first knowledge of an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation,
to a decision to adopt or reject, to implementation of the new idea,
and to confirmation of this decision. We conceptualize five steps in
this process: (1) knowledge, (2) persuasion, (3) decision, (4) implementation, and (5) confirmation. An individual seeks information at
various stages in the innovation-decision process in order to decrease
uncertainty about the innovation. At the knowledge stage, an individual obtains software information that is embedded in a technological
innovation; he or she wants to know what the innovation is and how it
works. But at the persuasion and decision stages, an individual seeks
innovation-evaluation information in order to reduce uncertainty
about an innovation's expected consequences. The decision stage
leads (1) to adoption, a decision to make full use of an innovation as
the best course of action available, or (2) to rejection, a decision not to
adopt an innovation.
Innovativeness is the degree to which an individual or other unit of
adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than other members of a social system. We specify five adopter categories, classifications of the members of a social system on the basis of innovativeness:
(1) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, ( 4) late majority,
and (5) laggards. Rate of adoption is the relative speed with which an
;nnAVatirrn i<: adontPri by JT)PmberS Of 3 Social SVStem.
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A social system is a set of interrelated units that are engaged in
joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. A system has
strocture, defined as the patterned arrangements of the units in a
system, which gives stability and regularity to individual behavior in a
system. The social and communication structure of a system facilitates or impedes the diffusion of innovations in the system.
Norms are the established behavior patterns for the members of a
social system. Norms are often exemplified in the behavior of the
opinion leaders in a system. Opinion leadership is the degree to which
an individual is able to influence informally other individuals' attitudes or overt behavior in a desired way with relative frequency. A
drange agent is an individual who attempts to influence clients'
innovation-decisions in a direction that is deemed desirable by a
change agency. An aide is a less than fully professional change agent
who intensively contacts clients to influence their innovationdccisions.
We distinguish three main types of innovation-decisions: (1) optional innovation-decisions, choices to adopt or reject an innovation
that are made by an individual independent of the decisions of other
members of the system, (2) collective innovation-decisions, choices to
adopt or reject an innovation that are made by consensus among the
members of a system, and (3) authority innovation-decisions, choices
10 adopt or reject an innovation that are made by relatively few individuals in a system who possess power, status, or technical expertise.
A fourth category consists of a sequential combination of two or more
of these types of innovation-decisions: contingent innovationdecisions are choices to adopt or reject that can be made only after a
prior innovation-decision.
A final way in which a social system may function as an element in
diffusion concerns consequences, the changes that occur to an indiYidual or to a social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of
an innovation.
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Almost every day we hear about Third World problems: overpopulation in the
Sahel of Africa, high energy costs in India, massive urban unemployment in
Brazil, and balance of payments difficulties in the banana republics of Central
America. Yet there is little agreement on what causes and perpetuates these
problems or how they might be eliminated.
The classic fable of five blind Indian gentlemen touching an elephant recalls this
dilemma. Each gentleman feels a different part of the beast, and thinks that he can
identify it correctly. The man who grabs the tail thinks it is a rope; the one who
holds the leg believes it is a tree trunk; the one who touches the side of the
elephant says it is a wall; the one who feels the ear proclaims it is a big leaf; and,
the one who holds the trunk cries it is a snake. A concrete example will illustrate
this dilemma. Consider the world food problem. 1 A hypothetical American
resource pessimist declares: "Soaring numbers of people are over-running available food ·supplies. It seems to me that an acceptable solution to the world food
supply situation is 'lifeboat ethics.' I believe that compassion is a luxury that we
can no longer afford in this era of scarcity. Countries like Bangladesh are 'basket
cases.' Their populations should not be recipients of American food aid, which
will help only to maintain high population growth rates. We must learn to let the
starving die for the survival of the human race." A United Nations adviser pipes
up: "I think that high population growth rates and consequent population
pressure, land fragmentation, poor soils, and unreliable rainfall keep people from
feeding themselves. The best way to stabilize the overpopulation/food scarcity
problem is to provide the poor with the contraceptive means to practice responsible parenthood." A World Bank official adds: "People are hungry because of
insufficient food production. To solve the world food supply situation we must
transform traditional agriculture which is inefficient. The only way to do this is for
rich industrial countries to supply progressive farmers with imported technology,
new seeds, artificial fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and machinery." A Marxist
from Tanzania breaks in: "The cause of hunger is not the tropical environment,
not too many people, not scarcity of available land, not lack of technology, and
not overconsumption by greedy Americans. Every country has the capacity to
feed itself. The real problem is the inequality generated by the world's political
economy. The unequal distribution of global wealth is an historical product, the
end result of the process by which the capitalist countries through colonialism and
neo-imperialism gained control of the global economy. Today the hungry cannot
be fed because of Third World elites and foreign corporations who benefit from the
way things are. The only guarantee of long-term food security is for us Third
World people to take control of our own food resources."
3
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Box A

LABELING/LIBELING THE THIRD WORLD
The yawning chasm between prosperity and poverty in the world has created a
language of its own. Or, is it in fact the rich person, not the yawning chasm, who has
created this language? Author Goran Palm, writing for the Swedish International
Development Authority (SIDA) journal RAPPORT, took a closer look at the vocabulary
we use.
"The developed world" is contrasted to "the Third World." "Industrialized countries"
are contrasted to "'the poor in the South."
UN trade statistics commonly divide the world into three areas or "economic
classes": industrialized countries or developed (Western) countries; developing countries or underdeveloped countries; socialist countries, Eastern bloc countries, or
planned economies.
In addition to North America and Western Europe, the "industrialized countries"
include Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and sometimes Israel. The
"developing countries" are mainly the nearly one hundred nations of Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and Oceania which within the framework of the UN, form the Group of 77
(sometimes identified with the non-aligned states). This latter includes several nations
with certain ties to the Soviet Union or China such as Guinea, Yugoslavia, India,
Tanzania, but also members of the "Eastern bloc." Lastly, the "socialist countries"
include all nations of Eastern Europe except Yugoslavia, a handful of countries in Asia
and a single country in Latin America-Cuba.
This may seem like a good enough preliminary classification but on closer inspection, we find that the first group of countries is the only one to be given an indisputably
positive label. To be labelled "underdeveloped" or to represent a "developing country"
~) is less gratifying. Such labels imply that one is somehow a little inferior or backward,
· that one, say, lives in tribes, worships holy cows, is afraid of contraceptives, doesn't
'1 know one's own best interests.
To be reckoned a member of the "Eastern bloc" or one of the "communist
countries" is not much better. It amounts to being excluded or discriminated against on
political grounds. Such countries are not a part of the "development" and "industrialization" so craved throughout the southern hemisphere.
Labels like "socialist countries" and "planned economies" are in that case more
accurate, but here, too, a different norm is applied to these countries than to the other
groups. They are identified not according to their level of development, but according
to ideology and the nature of their economic system.
If we take industrialization as the criterion, any differences between the Eastern and
Western countries evaporate. A similar lexicographical justice might be extended to all
the countries outside the industrial world. Most of the countries of Latin America,
Africa, and Asia depend on the production of foodstuffs and primary materials for
industry for their livelihood. To sidestep the problem of ideology we may conveniently
categorize the world into "industrialized countries" versus "raw materials-producing
countries."
It is perfectly acceptable to say "industrialized countries" just as long as they are not
contrasted to "developing countries" but to "agrarian" or "raw materials-producing
countries." It is fine to say "socialist countries" as long as _they are contrasted to
"capitalistic countries." Fine to say "underdeveloped" just as long as it is contrasted to
"overdeveloped." The old terminology is perfectly admissible; the problem lies in the
misleading pairs of opposites so frequently used.
Source: "Lexical Lapses on the Line," Development Forum, 6, no. 10 (NovemberDecember 1978): 6.

,,

Different perspectives on the causes of world hunger lead to different solutions
with profoundly different effects on Third World people. If human suffering and
misery are to be eliminated as expediently as possible, then alternative world
views must be understood and the best one must be selected to solve problems of
underdevelopment. The question we invite you to consider is: What perspective
provides the best explanation of the facts of underdevelopment? To answer this
question we will have to become aware of the different theoretical and analytical
frameworks scholars use to argue their cases. And such an awareness can only be
achieved if we go beyond the usual level of learning common in Western
educational institutions.
We can recognize four levels to the acquisition of knowledge. 1 First-level learning involves simple perception of fact. For example, we are hungry and are
conscious of that fact. Second-level learning occurs when at least two facts are
interrelated. When there is a drought we harvest less food per acre, and therefore, the likelihood of huriger increases. When we attain a higher level of
performance within an existing system of understanding we are learning on the
third level. Several options are possible: (I) If there is recurring drought, we can
improve food yields either by planting drought resistant crops or by irrigating
traditional crops. (2) If we choose not to change our traditional agricultural
practices, we will be less well fed. When fourth-level learning is achieved,
we are able to perceive the nature of existing systems and to re-examine
them to discover how new options can be created by improving or changing
the system. If we stay with the overpopulation/food scarcity issue; we can
consider solutions beyond improved food yields if we evaluate the entire agricultural system. For instance, we could consider expropriating prime agricultural
lands which are now used to produce exports crops such as coffee and cotton.
This land could be given back to local farmers who could then produce food for
their own needs instead of depending on purchased food and food aid from the
industrialized countries.
Western educational systems are geared primarily to third-level learning. At this
level, learning in the social sciences is synonymous with status quo theories
supporting existing social systems. Consequently, most scientists stress
techniques that permit them to optimize existing institutions rather than consider a
wide range of alternative paradigms. In fourth-level learning the goal is to move
beyond present perceptions of reality. This point may be illustrated with a simple
problem. Connect the nine points drawn here with four continuous straight lines.

•
•
•

• •
•

•

•
•

In looking for a solution you will find that there is none so long as you stay within
the area limited by the points. But if you move outside the self-imposed square. a
solution quickly springs to mind. (For the answer, see footnote 3 in the NOTES
AND REFERENCES.) Similarly, if we are to understand the nature and causes of
Third World underdevelopment, we must be willing to broaden the basis of our
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enquiry and examine alternative ideologies outside the ones currently limiting our
perceptions of problems and solutions.
Most of us find it difficult to restructure the way we think and learn. Perspectives we hold about the world tend to persist. There is much danger that a
perspective that subtly leads us to see the world in a particular way will prevent us
from seeing the world in a more meaningful way. A drawing by Toulouse- Laut rec
which is a perceptual illusion (Figure 1.1) illustrates this point. Those of us who see
an old woman in the picture have difficulty seeing a young woman, and vice versa.
To learn to see is to impose order on stimuli. The manner in which we impose that
order is determined by our expectations and is therefore value-laden. If everything
were as it seems then there would be no need for science.
In an ideological world value-free positions are impossible to maintain, even in
Agure 1.1

-....__

L
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science. After all, science is as socially conceived and just as subject to bias ar
misinterpretation as all other forms of knowledge in society. To meet the cha
lenge of Third World development problems we must become aware ofalternati'
and competing world views. In order to select the best explanations and directior
for solving Third World problems, we suggest the dialectical approach. Webster
Third International Dictionary defines "dialectic" as "The theory and practice c
weighing and reconciling juxtaposed or contradictory arguments for the purpm
of arriving at truth especially through discussion and debate." Not all theories ca
be compatible with each other, and hence scientists are forced to make difficu
decisions about the adequacy and validity of competing paradigms. By affirmin
one paradigm, another one must be negated. In this way, the dialectical approac
necessarily becomes synonymous with controversy, polemics, and challenge t
status quo theories.
The dialectical approach adopted in this book provides a structure to help yo
determine which arguments are superior in terms of analytical strength and i
terms of your own values. This book was designed as a reader because we wante•
the authors to argue their own cases. To summarize or even to paraphrase th.
authors would prevent you from judging their arguments without distortion an<
bias. The readings have also been selected for their concise and well-reasone•
positions on Third World problems. Individually and collectively, they are mean
to be provocative, and designed to facilitate the evaluation of the presuppositions
the explanatory power, and the implications of alternative theoretica
frameworks.
Analytically, the readings reflect three general perspectives: conservative
liberal, and radical.• These three paradigms rest on different assumptions abou
human nature, normative values, and social authority, and they employ differen
concepts to describe the nature and causes of underdevelopment. 5 A discussion o'
the major components of each paradigm will help you to begin to choose the
perspective which you find most convincing.
ANALYTICAL CHOICES
The Conservative Perspective

/

The conservative view of the world is inherited from the ideas of Adam Smith
Ricardo, and their modem-day followers. 8 Conservatives assume that human~
need positive (wage raises) and negative (threats of unemployment) materia
incentives to be productive. They are convinced that a capitalistic free enterprise
economy based on competition and maximizing profits allows egoistic and calculating individuals to achieve maximum personal liberty and material well-being
Individual decision-making units (individuals, households, firms) act freely anc
rationally to produce a harmonious and moving equilibrium by means of market
forces. Consequently, the process of social and economic change is a gradual
cumulative and undirectional evolution. Faith in the efficiency and optimality of
private market mechanisms, especially those of supply and demand, allow~
conservatives to postulate a limited role for governments. Probably, the single
most important function of the State is to maintain social order, that is, provide
national and international law and order through use of police and military forces.
so that capitalism can operate freely. Given this view of the State, conservative~
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Table 1.1
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Alternative Explanations of Reality under Capitalism

Alternative
Paradigms

Human
Nature

Work
Incentives

Unit
of
Analysis

Analysis
Based on

Human
Goals

Nature of
Market
Exchange
Economy

Nature of
Societal
Problems

Role of
State

Social
Change

Conservative

Humans are
naturally
unproductive
and individualistic

Essentially
material:
1) positiveraise in income
2) negativeunemployment

Individuals:
persons or
companies

Classical and
nee-classical
economics:
competition and
individuals
maximizing
profits

Maximum personal liberty
and material
well-being

Harmonious
state of
equilibrium:
created by
supply and
demand forces

1) Individuals:
lack of rnotivation, unrealistic
demands, cut·
lure of poverty.
racial inferiority
2) Government
interference in
the economy

Ideally. only
police power to
maintain law
and order so
that the market
can work freely

Gradual change
results from
individual interactions in the
market place

Liberal

Humans are
naturally
unproductive,
but of goodwill

Essentially
material:
1) positiveraise in income
2) negativeunemployment

Individuals
and groups
in society

Keynesian
economics:
competition and
individuals
maximizing
profits with
government
assistance

Individual
equality and
social justice
(equal oppor!unity)

State of
equilibrium,
achievable with
government in·
volvement in
the economy

1) Monopolistic
tendencies in
major economic
sectors
2) Insufficient
and inappro·
priate govern·
ment programs

Police power
and offsetting
inadequacies in
the economy
whenever basic
human needs
and social
justice are not
achieved

Rapid change
through governmen! actions

Humans are
naturally
productive and
cooperative

None really
necessary;
socially
valuable
rewards

Classes in
society

Marxist
economics:
labor theory
of value,
theory of
surplus value,
theory of
class struggle
and revolution

Social equality:
from each
according to
one's ability, to
each according
to one's need

Contradictions
and crises of
production and
consumption;
exploitation of
workers; irra·
tional allocation
of natural and
human resources

Private ownership of resources; production for
profit rather
than for human
use; alienation;
class conflict;
unequal regional developmen!

Police and
economic power
is used to
maintain and
enhance capi·
ta Iism

Revolutionary
change through
mass movements to transform society's
structure and
values

t-->

-

.._, Radicals

hold that government involvement in the economy usually causes more problems
than it solves. They argue that many national and international problems are due
to government interference and that the solutions to these problems lie in fewer
government regulations and programs. Finally, conservatives believe that social
change occurs gradually through the free actions of individuals in the market
place.
The conservative approach to Third World development rests on two points.
First, more participation by Third World countries in the world market economy,
not less as some socialists argue, will assure faster and greater economic growth.
Second, difficulties of economic growth can be traced to internal obstacles in the
environment and culture (Table I. I). The most dominant theory conservatives use
to assert that underdeveloped countries will benefit from more interaction in the
world economy is Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage. Ricardo wrote,
"It is quite important to the happiness of mankind that our enjoyments should be
increased by a better division of labor, by each country producing those com-

modities for which by its situation, its climate and its other material or artifici<
advantages, it is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the commodites r
other countries .... Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each countr
naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficia
to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with th
universal good of the whole." Ricardo illustrated his trade theory by means of.
two-nation labor-cost model. The theory holds that it is in the best interests c
underdeveloped countries to exchange more labor for less. According to conse1
vatives, this unequal division of labor works to the advantage of all, for it permit
each country to make the best use of its natural resources, stock of skills, an
infrastrnctures. Moreover, any deviation from free trade sacrifices efficiency an
reduces world outputs and income. An example of a contemporary Ricardian i
Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State. At the Seventh Special Sessin
of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. he said, "Comparative advar
tage and specialization, the exchange of technology and the movement of capita
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the Third World

the spur to productivity that competition provides-these are central elements l
efficiency and progress. For developing nations, trade is perhaps the mo·
important engine of development" (Table 1.2).
Despite the advantages of free trade, conservatives recognize that many Thir
World countries have not yet developed. They explain this by considering intern:
obstacles in the form of local environments and indigenous cultures. The tropic:
environment, in particular, is viewed as a major obstacle to progress. Soils ar
poor and fragile; rainfall is unreliable; and numerous endemic, debilitating di·
eases reinforce low levels of productivity. Above all, conservatives hold that th
traits of individuals, rather than international market forces, prevent the ac
vancement of people in underdeveloped countries. They account for the lack c
development on the basis of backward cultures: traditional religious belief,
values, and habits of life, insufficient incentives and entrepreneurialship, igno:
ance of science and technology, and unstable political systems.
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Under~,.dnding

The liberal view of the world did not attract much attention until the depression •
the 1930s. Keynes' General Theory analyzes the causes of unemployment ar
discredits the conservative belief that the capitalist economic system is sel
righting. He did not think that a modem capitalist economy would sustain a hif
enough level of investment to maintain full employment. While advocating goemment control of the level of economic activity in the national interest (sta·
capitalism), he advised that the economy in general be left free to respond to tt
decisions of welfare-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing producer
Keynes presented an alternative to socialism. His theory, which permitted go•
emment to borrow and spend money to prevent economic depressions, did n•
amend the conservative paradigm to any great degree. It was designed less to alt•
market exchange economies than to preserve and revitalize them.
Like Keynes, liberals of the present day do not launch a thorough-going critiqt
of either the conservative theory of human nature or the capitalist system (Tah
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I. I). Indeed, liberals share with conservatives the view that humans are naturally
unproductive, and they share a faith in the capitalist system. Unlike conservatives, however, they place great emphasis on the goals of individual equality and
social justice. To achieve these goals. government legislation and programs are
necessary. Although liberals criticize inequality of opportunity based on wealth,
position, and power, they understand that certain inequalities are based on
inherited characteristics such as family structure or ethnic culture (e.g. "culture of
poverty"). The State redistributes wealth by taxing the rich to assist the poor,
and, therefore, societal changes can occur more rapidly than under the conservative laissez-faire model. Problems at national and international levels result from
monopolistic tendencies in major economic sectors and insufficient and/or inappropriate government programs. The State must intervene on behalf of everyone
whenever market mechanisms fail to satisfy consumer preferences and provide
basic human needs (e.g. housing. health care. food. and adequate income).
Galbraith's analyses of the industrial state and the affluent society refiect thi-,
perspective (Table 1.2).
Liberals share with conservatives many of the same assumptions about barriers
to Third World development. They believe that traditional values and social
institutions are the prime obstacles to development. and they are convinced that
the town is the gateway for Third World innovations. As centers of innovation.
large towns can transmit modem values and social institutions to smaller centers
and rural areas. Although liberals also employ the "blaming the victim" approach
(see Ryan's article in Section 111) to explain the causes of world problems. they.
unlike conservatives. are willing to provide governmental assistance to the
world's needy. Consequently, liberal governments provide unilateral (e.g. U.S.
~Agency for International Development) and multilateral (e.g. World Bank) foreign
...>:,aid. food aid (e.g. U.S. Food for Peace Program). volunteers (e.g. U.S. Peace
Corps). and military and technical assistance.

The Radical Perspective
Conservative and liberal perspectives are widely accepted by social scientists.
although at present the latter has more followers than the former. 7 They arc not
radical because their analyses do not go to the root or origin of prohlems. Radicals
argue that the dynamics of socio-economic organization (mode of production. to
use a Marxist term) in capitalist societies produce particular kinds of class and
institutional structures. Classes and institutions formed by the capitalist mode of
production explain a particular set of social problems that cannot be solved
without changing the form of socio-economic organization at national and international levels (Table I. I).
Contrary to con<.ervatives and liberals. radical-, assume that humans are natur. ally productive and cooperative and therefore. that material rewards are not really
necessary. They argue that humans are not inherently passive beings at the mercy
of their cultural and physical environments: rather they are active creatures of
their own destiny. If we behave passively. unproductively. or uncooperatively. it
is hecause our economic system demands such behaviors. They reject the libcral's
helief that people can enjoy equality of opportunity in a class society when the
majority produce the wealth and when power is in the hands of the few. In such a
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society, the pursuit of profit by the dominant class shapes all aspects of lif•
including the quality of personal relations. Under capitalism human needs ar
subordinated to the needs of the market place. Only commodities (goods an
services) which have exchange value are produced, while other use value
remain unmet. An illustration: The United States sells (exchange value) most of i·
food surpluses to countries who can afford to buy it rather than distributing fo0
to countries on the basis of need (use value).
Radicals claim that in a market economy the State predominantly serves th
interests of the ruling class-the capitalists-not the workers whose labor pr<
duces more wealth than is returned to them in the form of wages. Marx called th
extra wealth "surplus value." Surplus value (or the product of exploitation) is t ti
difference between the value produced by workers (value of units of lab1
produced) and workers' wage (value of labor power). Marx, in discussing th
labor theory of value, asked: How can one class of people, capitalists, g1
something for nothing? How do they acquire a portion of produced value fr
themselves without contributing any labor in return? Marx defined labor as
commodity, and its value is determined in just the same way as the value of an
other commodity. by the amount of socially necessary labor required to produc
it. This is nothing more than workers' subsistence wages. For example, if laborer
have to work six hours to obtain a subsistence income, then that is the sociall
necessary amount of labor time required to "produce" workers. If workers hav
to work 12 hours instead of six hours to hold a job in a factory, Marx said, worker
create surplus value, or profit for capitalists. Workers labor six hours for therr
selves and another six hours for their masters, and the rate of surplus value o
exploitation is six hours or 100 percent.
Exploitation of workers can be intensified. and the surplus value appropriate
by capitalists increased when employers stretch the working day. If the work wee
were stabilized. employers could expand surplus value by substituting capital fn
labor. Marx argued that the process of introducing even more labor-savin
equipment is inimical to workers. Displaced laborers form a reserve army of th
unemployed. which keeps wages at minimal levels. The existence of a pool r
unemployed workers means that employed workers know that others are availahl
to take their jobs if productivity falls.
The essence of the radical argument is that the engine which drives economi
growth is capital accumulation for its own sake. Economic growth is alway
unbalanced. The capitalist mode of production fails to achieve equilibrium a
claimed by conservatives and liberals because of the contradictory nature o
competitive production. As a result. there are short-run cyclical crises (un
employment and declining rates of profit) which are connected by increasing rate
of accumulation through concentration (the trend toward larger, more efficicn
factories in each industry), and geographical extension (imperialism). Periodi,
crises become more frequent over time. In each crisis big capitalists devour lit ti'
capitalists. and individual capitalism becomes corporate capitalism. Capitali~t
seek larger outputs and bigger profits, and they deploy bigger machines whicl
replace more and more laborers, whose work generally consists of small. in
significant. and tedious operations that are repeated for hours. This expansin1
intensifies the misery and alienation of workers so that increasing class struggl1
charts the course of socio-economic development (Table 1.2).
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From this sketch of Marxist theory, it is plain that radicals argue that inequality
of wealth among classes originates in the capitalist system. Exploitation of one
class by another is based on the private ownership of the means of production.
Irreconcilable conflict between classes is the key to understanding the need for
revolutionary change through mass movements.
Uneven development pertains not only to the unequal distribution of wealth
among classes, but also to spatial dimensions of development: underdevelopment
and dependence. Radicals argue that Third World countries have been underdeveloped first by the development and expansion of Europe, later neo-European
countries (United States, Canada. Australia, and New Zealand), and most recently Japan. The capitalist world economy causes underdevelopment by
generating and reinforcing an infrastructure of dependency which includes institutions, social classes, and processes such as urbanization and industrialization.
Thus dependency is not merely an external matter. Foreign exploitation is
possible only when it finds support among local elites who profit from it. To break
out of dependency and to achieve development, Third World countries must go
beyond capitalism to a collectively owned and collectively governed economic
system. To achieve the goals of socialism different paths may be followed: in
Cuba, Castro used a military approach; and in Tanzania, Nyerere uses an
evolutionary approach (Table 1.2).
It is important to remember that each of the three perspectives lumps a great
many different theories and models together. Traditional social science practices
splitting, the art of ever-increasing articulation of minute theoretical and empirical
details. On the other hand, in this reader we are interested in lumping broadly
similar scientific arguments to facilitate the reexamination of existing theoretical
positions. The labels conservative, liberal, and radical are not so important as the
ideas behind them. Too often we reject views which we understand poorly and
~\

t
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BoxC
THE THREE WORLDS
Westerners divide the countries of the world into three parts: the First World, Second
World, and Third World. The First World includes the countries of Western Europe,
North America, Israel, Australia, New Zealand. and Japan. Some would even include
the Republic of South Africa and Argentina. The Second World is represented by the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Third World consists of the remaining countries
in Latin America. Africa. the Middle East. and Asia. Through the eyes of "the free
world," the Second and Third Worlds are associated with negative and undesireable
trails (Communism and poverty, respectively). while the First World countries reflect
positive and desireable characteristics.
Many Third World people disagree with this ethnocentric view. Mao Tse-lung's
Three World theory categorizes the world's people in very different terms. The
First World consists of the superpowers, i.e. the Soviet Union and United States.
with their negative military and economic influence on the rest of lne world. The
Second World includes the allies of the two superpowers-the remaining industralized countries. The Third World represents the underdeveloped countries and
the hope for the whole world. not the dispair that most Westerners see. In dialectical
fashion. Mao saw Third World "problems" as assets to create a better future for the
masses everywhere.
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libel them by labeling them. We should not dismiss any perspective because of its
label but rather, we should judge it on the basis of its theoretical merits.
These viewpoints are most useful for providing alternative explanations of
Third World problems, not in providing detailed and specific blueprints for the
future. A great deal of dissent exists among the three groups on the specific
directions change should take.
How can we choose among these different perspectives? From a scientific point
of view, this question can be answered easily: That approach which most
accurately and completely explains the past and present realities of the Third
World. The readings are designed to provide an opportunity to answer this
question. From our research and field experiences in Africa, Latin America,
Western Europe, and North America. we are convinced that the radical paradigm
provides the most complete explanation of conditions in the Third World. In other
words, we believe it explains more of reality than the other two paradigms.
VALUE CHOICES
We stated earlier that one deficiency of most Western educational institutions is
that they fail to train students in fourth-level learning-that of seeking solutions
outside of status-quo frameworks. Another deficiency is that most schools fail to
acknowledge the values that are both explicit and implicit in their teachings, and
help students to recognize and judge those values along with their own. Such
learning is essential for a full comprehension of this book and of Third World
issues.
Values Clarification
Comprehensive understanding requires cognitive and affective learning. Determining the analytical power of the readings is part of the cognitive realm; judging
their value content falls both within the cognitive and affective realms. Each realm
is an imrortant and necessary part of each person. We all hold imrlicit and explicit
values on a whole range of issues, which we express in verbal and written
communications and through actions. We need to distinguish between our espoused values and our innermost values, often unknown even to ourselves
without reflection. Among the various approaches to teaching valuesinculcation. moralization, laissez-faire attitudes, and action learning-we find the
values clarification method the most useful." This approach is not concerned with
the content of people's values but with the processes of valuing.
What are the processes by which we develop values and decide what we stand
for, and what we wish to live for? To discover the answer to these questions, we
need to explore the values in our ideas, feelings, choices, and behavior. Hirschenbaum identifies five major valuing processes to achieve this goal (Table 1.3). 9
Feelings have traditionally been avoided in schools, since educators believe
that solutions to human problems are best solved through rational processes. The
denial of feelings, however, deprives us of important information in making
decisions which affect us and others. Our thinking, communicating, choosing, and
acting processes all suffer as a result, particularly since on any given issue, these
may derive from a feeling of which we are unaware. Humans think at variou~
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Table 1.3 The Valulng Process•
I.

Feeling

1.

Being open to one's inner experience.
a. awareness of one's inner experience
b. acceptance of one's inner experience

II.

Thinking

1.

Thinking on all seven levels.
a. memory
b. translation
c. application
d. interpretation
e. analysis
f. synthesis
g. evaluation
Critical thinking.
a. distinguishing fact from opinion
b. distinguishing supported from unsupported arguments
c. analyzing propaganda, stereotypes, etc.
Logical thinking (logic).
Creative thinking.
Fundamental cognitive skills.
a. language use
b. mathematical skills
c. research skills

2.

3.
4.

5.

,.
) . Ill.

Communicating-Verbally and Nonverbally

~

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

Sending clear messages.
Empathetic listening.
Drawing out.
Asking clarifying questions.
Giving and receiving feedback.
Conflict resolution.

4.

V.

Acting

1.

Acting with repetition.
Acting with a pattern and consistency.
Acting skillfully, competently.

1.
2.
3.

2.
3.

(I) Feeling. Try to recognize the feelings you are experiencing as you considc1
each author's arguments. Are they positive or negative feelings?
(2) Thinking. What values can you identify in the articles and how do they
compare with your own values?
(3) Communicating. What clarifying questions would you like to ask the
authors, before you could fully determine their values and your reactions to them?
(4) Choosing. After reading the alternative viewpoints in each topic section.
which perspective most closely matches your values?
(5) Acting. Is the perspective you have choosen one you would be willing to

Some additional questions may help you to develop your own thinking process.
Given what we have said earlier in this chapter on the three analytical
frameworks, you should also be able to answer the following analytical questions
for each selection.

Choosing
Generating and considering alternatives.
Thoughtfully considering consequences, pros and cons.
Choosing strategically.
a. goal setting
b. data gathering
c. problem solving
d. planning
Choosing freely.

~

levels, from memorization to synthesis and evaluation, and they usually progres
as Hirschenbaum says, "to higher, more flexible levels of thinking," given tt
right environment. Ultimately, the level of our thinking will determine the kinds 1
cognitive and emotive decisions we make.
Leaming communication skills is critical in the valuing and understandin
processes. Making clear statements, drawing people out, asking clarifying que·
lions, and listening to arguments empathetically are the essence of basic corr
munication skills. In the values clarification approach, choices are based on free I
choosing from alternatives, after thoughtful consideration has been given to th
possible consequences. 10 Again, the kinds of choices made depend on the earlie
processes of feeling, thinking, and communicating. Existentialists point out tha
we define ourselves through our actions. The more we act on what we feel an1
think, the more we value these particular emotions and thoughts. 11
Hirschenbaum's valuing processes can be applied to the articles in this book
When reading the selections, try to answer each of the following questions.

What overall questions are asked?
What specific questions are asked?
What concepts are used? (e.g. life-boat analogy)
What evidence and/or data are used to answer the questions?
(5) What conclusions are drawn?
(6) Are you convinced by the data and arguments that the specific and general
questions are answered?
(7) Which theoretical framework is employed?
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Moral Development

aFm further information on materials available in the values education field, write the National
Humanistic Education Center, 11 O Spring Street, Saratoga Springs, New York 12866.
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Another aspect of critical thinking is to assess the moral content of arguments.
Koh Iberg presents a developmental sequence of moral thinking which is based on
a long series of studies with children and adults in the United States and was
consequently tested in other countries (Mexico, Turkey, and Taiwan). 12 He has
found that we develop through some or all of these stages in a generally linear
manner as our reasoning matures, and that any moral argument can be assessed by
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Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

Basis of Judgment

Stages of Development

Preconventionaf morar values
reside in ~xtemal, quast-phrsical

Stage I

Basis of Judgment

Concern about self. Obedience lo a powerful authority. Fear of
pun1shmenl dominates motives. One sees oneself as berng

happenings, in bad acts, or in

dominated by other forces. Actions are judged in terms of their

qu.asi-ph~ic.il needs rather 1han in

physical consequences

Stage V· Social contract, legalistic orientation. Wh.u is right is what th
whole >ociety decides. There are no l~I •lxolutes. The
society can change standards by everyone agreeing 10 the
change. Changes in lhe law are u•u•lly m•de for ,..,.son• of th·
\ Free ag·~~~;ent and conrracr
gre•te•t good for the greatest number of people. Where law
is not affected, what is right is a matter of personal opinion
and agreement between persons. The U.S. Constitution is
written in Stage S terms.

persons and sr.andards.

Stage II

~/

8

One-way concern about another person (what he/she ran do
for me, how we can agree to act so f will benefit.) The bds1c
motive is to satisfy my own needs. I do no! consider the nC'l•d\
of rhe other person, un/e<;.s I 1h1nk 11 will benefit me ro do so

~/~ts,~,'<1

vJ
Stilge fll Concern about groups of people, and conformity to group
norms There is a two-way refatronship (we are good to l'Jrh
olher) Morive is to be a "nice guy/gal,' to be accepled
~Heci1on plays a strong role.

Con\'ent1onal moral values reside

in performing good or right roles,
in ma1nta1n1ng the conventional
order, and 1n meeting others'

8--~~
Self

e<pe<lalions

Group
\j

")

t·)

/

~-ts,
~

/

!{,
/

l:o
I

'

ci:::1

~'~

\

Stage IV Concern for order in society Honor and duty come from
keeping the rules of the society. The focus is on preserving the
society (not just obeying, as in Stage I).

\

Society

Stages of Development

Postconventional moral values are
derived from principles which can
he applied universally

~/7

e

its stage of development. According to Kohlberg's research, the basic set of moral
stages are not significantly affected by widely varying socioeconomic, cultural, or
religious conditions. Only the rate at which individuals progress through the
sequence is different.
For Kohlberg. a moral stage does not represent a type of person, but a way of
thinking. People usually use more than one stage of moral thinking for any
particular topic. and certainly employ different stages for different topics. In other
words. people are rarely morally and intellectually consistent. Kohlberg points
out that at each stage individuals see themselves as being "honest," "fair." and
"descent," within their own terms of reference. Consequently. moral judgments
are. first. judgments of value. not of fact. They are also social judgments about
people. "Third. they are prescriptive or normative judgments, judgments of
ought. of rights and duties. rather than value judgments of liking and preference. " 13

'

A

\

I

I

\

~'~ __ ,..,./7

Oemorra11c agreement on
rights, sundards,
ch.ange

Stage VI Universal ethical principles. What is right is a decision of one"
con>cience, based on ideas about rightness that apply to
everyone (all nations, people, etc.). These are called ethical
principles. An ethical principle is different from a rule. A rule i~
specific (Thou shalt nor kill). An elhical principle is general
(All persons •re created equal). The m05t importanl elhical
principles deal wilh justice, equality. and the dignity of all
people. These principles are higher th•n any given l•w.

Univr-rul principks of 1us11ce for all
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Kohlberg identifies three levels, each with two stages, of moral development
(Figure 1.2). 14
(I) At the preconventional level individual decisions are based on physical
power and physical consequences (punishment and reward). Stage I moral
thinking corresponds to "might makes right" and "survival of the fittest."
Avoidance of phyiscal punishment and unquestioning obedience of power are
valued for their own sake. Morality does not play a large part in a person's life.
Stage-2 behavior conforms to obtain rewards and have favors returned: "Look
out for number one" and "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Fairness
and reciprocity are evaluated only in concrete and pragmatic ways.
(2) Within the conventional level of moral development, identification with and
maintainence of the dominant social order prevails. At this level, two stages
emerge. Stage 3 is the "good boy, good girl" or a limited conformity orientation.
Morality is seen in terms of helping and pleasing a limited group of people whose
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well-being and approval is valued. At this stage stereotypical images of conventional wisdom or "natural" behavior determine moral thinking. Stage 4 is a
law-and-order orientation. Right behavior consists of confonning to fixed niles,
respecting established authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own
sake.
(3) Postconventional or autonomous moral thinking rests on moral values
which are valid apart from the authority of the groups who hold them and apart
from one's identification with these groups. In Stage 5 social contracts expressed
in legal terms are the guiding principle. Laws are understood to be constitutionally
and democratically agreed upon, yet individual opinions can differ with established laws and practices. Hence, emphasis is also placed on changing laws to
serve greater social needs. This is the official morality of the United States
government and the United States Constitution. Stage-6 persons behave according to "self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensivenes'>.
universality, and consistence." Abstract and ethical principles, such as the
Golden Rule, are dominant, not concrete moral ones, like the Ten Commandments." For Stage-6 persons the sole purpose of morality is to serve fundamental
life goals, such as freedom. justice, equali1y. happiness. and self-respect. Moral
values are means to maximize ultimate life goals for one's self and for humanity.
Gandhi. Socrates. Thoreau. and Martin Luther King are among the relatively few
people to attain Stage-6 moral thinking.

'·

~-

\ '\

Moral thinking and judgments are complex and diverse. To better understand
and appreciate Kohlberg's stages of moral thinking, a concrete example might be
helpful. 16 Let us use our earlier example of world hunger. The possible responses
given below might be those of middle class North Americans.
Since no coercive force exists to make people help the hungry of the world.
Stage- I people fail to be interested in the topic. However. if such people perceived
an invasion from a hungry country as a possible retribution, they would be willing
to send food aid. Stage-2 people do not consider the needs of others unless they
benefit from such actions. If we want fuels and minerals from a particular Third
World country, we will then provide food assistance. If. on the other hand. they
have nothing that we want. there is no reason to help them.
In Stage 3. other people's points of view are usually taken, regardless of
individual self-interest for the sake of social self-interest. Individuals recognize
shared social interests and expectations with particular groups, such as religious
organizations. Going along with the group facilitates social approval, and being
called a "nice" person. By giving food aid, the United States will be seen as a
"moral nation" or a "Christian country." Others might phrase it as "the White
man's burden" to help the less fortunate nations. If the group that people identify
with does not believe in food aid (such as the John Birch Society). they will gain
social approval by not supponing assistance !o the Third World.
Stage-4 people have a societal identification which is defined by and restricted
to absolute rules which come either from government or God. Any proposals to
expand current policies and practices to help the hungry are rejected because of
the strong adherence to "law and order." In religious terms, God may command
us to help starving people; in legal terms. the United States should provide food
assistance if Congress mandates it. On the other hand. we may not help the hungry
ofa particular nation because we have a defense treaty with their political enemy.
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Stage-5 people believe that the rules identified by Stage-4 people are no
absolute and can be changed to reflect a particu Jar universal issue. A Stage-:
person may believe that the world's hungry should be fed regardless of our curren.
laws. and would support legislative change. But a Stage-5 person could also argut
that we should not feed the hungry ofa particular nation because their govemmen1
is communist. Stage-6 people deal with a holistic range of universal ethical
principles-justice, equality, and freedom, including freedom from hungerwhich allows them to change current laws, and also obligates them, wher,
necessary, to break the laws through civil disobedience. Stage-6 people would be
willing to support private agencies who send food to a country with which the
United States was at war. 17
Each of the three analytical perspectives can operate at this highest stage of
moral development. Conservatives would make voluntary, individual donations tc
local churches or to world organizations, such as CARE or UNESCO. Liberal~
would want the government to tax the population at large so that "giving" would
become official policy and not dependent on the occassional good intentions of a
few persons or organizations. Individually, then, liberals would do all the things
conservatives do, plus help lo mandate and subsequently, to expand, foreign aid.
particularly food relief. At Stage 6 radicals would add yet another layer of
activism; boycotting certain companies like Nestle for selling formula milk to poor
mothers in the Third World, and/or contributing resources and energy to organizations such as the World Council of Churches or national liberation groups in
various Third World countries. At this stage radicals would work towards major
global stnictural changes to eliminate the root causes of hunger for all times.
Research on the age and stage of moral development shows that under current
conditions in the United States, moral maturity stabilizes by late adolescence and
early adulthood. between the ages of 16 and 25. Indeed, very little moral growth
occurs after age 25. In their research Kohlberg and Kramer found that l3 percent
of the 25 year olds used preconventional levels (Stages I and 2) of thinking; 51
percent used conventional levels (Stages 3 and 4) of thinking; and 35 percent
adhered to postconventional (Stages 5 and 6) moral thinking. Relating these
findings to the three analytical frameworks presented earlier in this chapter, we
would argue that although all three perspectives can be found in several of the si.x
stages. each perspective by its very definition would tend to be concentrated more
at some stages than at others. The moral content of the conservative framework
corresponds largely to Stages I, 2, 3, and 4; the liberal perspective is concentrated
mostly in Stages 3, 4, and 5; and the radical framework tends to be located in
Stages 5 and 6.
In a culturally universal sense, Kohlberg's stages lead toward an expanded
conception of moral judgment. At each stage. the same basic moral issue i'
defined, but at each higher stage this definition becomes differentiated. more
integrated, and more universal. This is illustrated by an experimental study."
Undergraduate subjects were ordered by an experimenter to administer increasingly more severe electric shock punishment to a stooge victim in the guise of a
learning experiment. In this case. the principles of justice involved in the Stage-5
social contract orientation do not clearly prescribe a decision. The victim had
voluntarily agreed to participate in the experiment and the subjects had contractually committed themselves to perform the experiment. Only Stage-6 thinking
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clearly defined the situation as one in which the experimenter did not have the
moral right to ask them to inflict pain on another person. Accordingly, 75 per cent
of the Stage-6 subjects quit or refused to shock the victim as compared to only 13
per cent of all the subjects at lower stages.
Kohlberg maintains that individuals comprehend all stages up to their own, but
not more than one stage beyond their own. And significantly, they prefer this next
stage. Moral development can be facilitated by identifying people's moral stage
and through subsequent reinforcement and discussion expose them to the next
highest stage.
Perry provides further evidence of personal intellectual and ethical development. 19 He shows that college students develop from positions of "simple
dualism" (e.g. good vs. bad) through various stages of"relativism" to final stages
of "commitment in relativism." Perry found that students did not remain in the
second stage. characterized by kaleidoscopic possibilities, for more than a year
before proceeding to some kind of affirmation of values or escape from further
growth. at least for awhile. The dialectic approach used in this book encourages
students to take risks. to explore the meanings of explanations, and to dare to
make commitments to clarified values. Simultaneously, teachers need to provide
support and encouragement to students regardless of their stages of intellectual
and moral development. Clearly, for educators to facilitate cognitive and affective
learning processes, they need to realize that "it is no longer tenable for an
educator to take the position that what a person does with his [or her] intellectual
skills is a moral rather than intellectual problem and therefore none of the
scholar's business. " 20
~>
You are therefore urged to determine your own stage of moral development in
response to the selected readings and to analyze carefully your objections to the
moral stage presented in the readings. In the introduction to each section, only the
analytical differences will be outlined; the ideological and value statements arc left
for readers to determine. Hopefully, teachers will assist students in this task.

t

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
In the next article, the Third World is defined and delineated. Through text and
maps Buchanan shows that the countries of the Third World are distinctive from
the industrialized countries. Although he uses data from !he 1950s and 1960s, his
statistics are merely illustrative and later data would make little difference to the
dimensions of the problems discussed. The Third World still has the same
characteristics Buchanan identified almost two decades ago: low rates of GNP per
capita, calorie and protein intake; high rates of employment in the farm and
tertiary sectors; and high rates of urbanization. illiteracy. infant mortality. population growth, and resource exports.
How can these conditions be explained'l In which directions do the solutions
lie? One way of answering the above questions is to consider a number of
empirical topics. The remaining readings have been grouped under six possible
causes of Third World underdevelopment. Each section has several articles which
reflect alternative points of view. Although each perspective tends to stress
certain causes and omit others, among the six topics the three analytical perspectives present a vast range of explanations (Table 1.4).
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Authors In the Reader Grouped by the Three Paradigms
Topic Sections in the Reader

Alternative
Paradigms

Climate
and
Resources

Cultural
Traditions

Plantation
Agriculture

Population

Tourism

Conservative

Huntington

Heston

May and
Plaza

Hardin

Bond
and
Ladman

Liberal

Hodder

Harris
Ryan

Beckford

RitchieCalder

Britton

Radical

Szentes

Dorfman
and
Mattelart

Tobis

Commoner
Harvey

Perez

Imperialism

Galtung
Chilcote
Harvey

Environmental factors are discussed in Section 11. The emphasis on the
environment to account for underdevelopment is a characteristically conservative
approach. Although the older climatic determinism is now out of fashion, particularly among geographers, many liberal social scientists still consider the presence
of tropical climates and the absence of certain natural resources in a country to be
of major importance to its economic development. In the radical paradigm.
environmental conditions are essentially irrelevant to explain the present level of
development.
In Section Ill cultural traditions in the Third World are examined as possible
causes of underdevelopment. Anthropologists, geographers, psychologists. and
economists have written about the inferiority of "non-western" cultures to
explain the lack of incentives and institutions that allow nations to prosper. The
blatant racism of the past is now modified to blaming the victim, which is another
important conservative concept in explaining Third World poverty. To cite one
specific example: many of India's population and food problems are often linked
to the Hindu practice of revering cattle. The conservative approach sees this
non-western religion as a barrier to economic progress. The liberal perspective, on
the other hand, argues that the Indian sacred cattle practice performs positive
functions for small-scale farmers, but it fails to examine the national and international economic institutions (e.g. landlordism, money lenders, merchants, and
international oil companies), which radicals argue can best explain India's
underdevelopment. Disney comic books in South America still show evidence of
racism and cultural imperialism, which facilitates the exploitation of these Third
World people.
Developments in agriculture are of utmost importance to Third World people
because so many work in this sector and so many are hungry. In Section IV one
aspect of this vast topic is examined. Colonial rule provided the means for
Europeans to establish plantation agriculture. The conservative viewpoint argues
that plantations were and remain beneficial to tropical countries and foreign
countries alike. The profits of foreign companies were and are more than offset by
providing local employment, social services, taxes, and the transfer of technol
ogy. But the liberal perspective points out that while plantations enhance private
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commercial interests, they distort, if not retard. the national development of Third
World econQmies. From the radical perspective plantations have had and continue
to have mostly negative consequences. Colonialism with its plantation crops
underdeveloped these countries and this process explains Third World poverty.
For most Westerners the single most important cause of problems in the Third
World is the high rate of population growth. In Section V the ideological basis for
the scientific study of the relationship between population and resources is
exposed. Three specific approaches to "overpopulation" can then be assessed:
lifeboat ethics (conservative); family planning programs (liberal); and political and
economic revolutions (radical). From the conservative perspective, the world
already has too many people, all of whom cannot be fed. Some will have to perish.
The liberal perspective agrees that the population/food supply relationship is
unbalanced. but Third World and First World governments can temporarily
alleviate these problems with food aid and permanently solve overpopulation
through birth control programs. Within the radical paradigm several kinds of
explanations exist. but they all agree that "overpopulation" is the result of
exploitation. The poor have large families because this is their best way of
safeguarding their survival. Furthermore. such large families are only perceived as
overpopulation when they exist at the poor end of the economic distribution.
Social scientists have also considered Rostow's stages of economic growth, and
the role of transnational corporations and foreign aid to explain underdevelopment. The capitalist analysis concludes that poor countries are only at a lower
economic stage than rich countries at the present time, and that eventually the
current poor countries will develop, if they follow the Western model of economic
growth. While geocentric mining, manufacturing. and service corporations diffuse
U modem technology and provide revenue for national development, foreign aid
;;· may actually do more harm than good in the short-term and long-run.
)
The liberal perspective prefers to curb some of the more blatant abuses of
multinationals, such as bribing and blackmailing foreign governments and avoiding their full share of taxes. This viewpoint sees foreign aid from industrial
countries in conjunction with multinational corporations as the means of helping
developing countries. The radical view is fundamentally different. Marxists
maintain that underdevelopment is caused by the exploitative relations between
capitalist and Third World countries in the past and in the present. Hence.
transnational corporations take advantage of their monopoly position to extract
more capital in the form of profits from underdeveloped countries than they
invest. Indeed, foreign aid, like multinational and international trade in general.
benefits the donor countries more than the recipient countries, thus perpetuating
the economic and political power of privileged elites in the Third World. The
length of the original manuscript precluded the inclusion of reading selections for
these topics. Since Rostow's stages of economic growth. the debate about
multinationals, and foreign aid are well known, we decided to exclude these topics
in favor of a less recognized topic-tourism.
Tourism is another path towards economic development. Or is it? In Section VI
the conservative perspective holds that tourism avoids many of the problems
associated with mineral and luxury crop exports. Foreign capital and ideas
provide the necessary engine and steam for development. The benefits of internat;onal tourism, from the liberal viewpoint. go to multinationals and Third World
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elites. The indigeneous populations gain only seasonal and menial jobs and Jo,t
their culture and resources in return. From the radical perspective tourism i·
another form of exploitation and imperialism. which drains and concentrate~
Third World wealth primarily among the elites of the First World.
In Section VII the radical paradigm employs the concept of imperialism as a
primary explanation for Third World material poverty. To account for global and
national inequalities, the radical analysis. depending on its specific formulation.
employs such concepts as center-periphery relations. dependency. and the theory
of capitalist accumulation. Within both the conservative and liberal framework-;.
the importance radicals place on the concept of imperialism is discounted. The
conservative perspective dismisses the concept altogether and its value in explaining current Third World conditions. The liberal perspective sees no casual
correlation between capitalism and imperialism. hut it does recognize that governments use their political and military power to expand geographically.
Before reading the articles. we recommend that you tum to the awareness
exercises in the Appendix. The first exercise allows you to compare your own
view of the Third World with those of others. In Exercise 2 you can assess your
knowledge ahout some of the attributes of underdeveloped countries. The remaining exercises help you to get in touch with the ideological nature of description and explanation with reference to Third World issues.
Table 1.5

Concepts and Terms Used by the Three Paradigms for the Six Topics

Topic Sections in the Reader
Alternative
Paradigms

Climate
and
Resources

Cultural
Traditions

Plantation
Agriculture

Population

Tourism

Imperialism

Conservative

Liberal

i

l

Radical

Starting with Section II, we suggest that you note the important concepts and
terms presented by the three analytical perspectives under each of the six
substantative topics. The completion of Table 1.5 will allow you to choose intelligently the analytical framework which provides the best explanation of Third
World underdevelopment.
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(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comrany. 1977).

.!6

lrwvvu..:tion Iv""" rteadi11y,;

2. Based on

3.

k

.eories of Gregory Bateson.

~

,:·;

~i'

lf

")

,-
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with values education, see Alan L. Lockwood. "Values Education and the Right to
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ONCE upon a time a man was contemplating the ways in which
Nature operates, and he discovered, because of his concentration
and application, how fire could be made.
This man was called Nour. He decided to travel from one community to another, showing people bis discovery.
Nour passed the secret to many groups of people. Some took
advantage of the knowledge. Others drove him away, thinking
that he must be dangerous, before they had had time to understand how valuable this discovery could be to them. Finally, a
tribe before which he demonstrated became so panic-micken that
they set about him and killed him, being convinced that be was
a demon.
Centuries passed. The first tribe which bad learned about fire
reserved the secret for their priests, who remained in affluence and
power while the people froze.
The second tribe forgot the art and worshipped instead the instruments. The third worshipped a likeness of Nour himself, because it was he who had taught them. The fourth retained the
story of the making of fire in their legend!: some believed them,
some did not. The fifth community really did use fire, and this enabled them to be warmed, to cook their food. and to manufacture
all kind! of useful articles.
After many, many years, a wise man and a small band of his
disciples were travelling through the lands of these tribes. The
disciples were amazed at the variety of rituals which they encountered; and one and all said to their teacher: 'But all these procedures arc in fact related to the making of fire, nothing else. We
should reform these people!'
The teacher said: 'Very well, then. We shall restart our journey.
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By the end of it, those who survive will know the real problems
and how to approach th.cm.'
When they reached the first tribe, the band was hospitably received. The priests invited the travellers to attend their religious
ceremony, the making of fire. When it was over, and the tribe was
in a state of excitement at the event which they had witnessed, the
master said: 'Does anyone wish to speakr
The first disciple said: 'In the cause of Truth I feel myself constrained to say something to these people.'
'If you will do so at your own risk, you may do so,' said the master.
Now the disciple stepped forward in the presence of the tribal
chief and his priests and said: 'I can perform the miracle which you
take to be a special manifestation of deity. If I do so, will you accept
that you have been in error for so many years?'
But the priests cried: 'Seize him!' and the man was taken away,
never to be seen again.
The travellers went to the next territory where the second tribe
were worshipping the instruments of fire-making. Again a disciple
volunteered to try to bring reason to the community.
With the permission of the master, he said: 'I beg permission to
speak to you as reasonable people. You arc worshipping the means
whereby something may be done, not even the thing itself. Thus
you are suspending the advent of its usefulness. I know the reality
that lies at the basis of this ceremony.'
This tribe was composed of more reasonable people. But they
said to the disciple: 'You arc welcome as a traveller and stranger in
our midst. But, as a stranger, foreign to our history and customs,
you cannot understand what we are doing. You make a mistake
Perhaps, even, you arc trying to take away or alter our religion.
We therefore decline to listen to you.'
The travellers moved on.
When they arrived in the land of the third tribe, they found
before every dwelling an idol representing Nour, the original firemaker. The third disciple addressed the chiefs of the tribe:
Th.is idol represents a man, who represents a capacity, which
can be used.'

'This may be so,' answered the Nour-worshippers, 'but the penetration of the real secret is only for the few.'
'It is only for the few who will understand, not for those who
refuse to face certain facts,' said the third disciple.
'This is rank heresy, and from a man who does not even speak
our language correctly, and is not a priest ordained in our faith,'
muttered the priests. And he could make no headway.
The band continued their journey, and arrived in the land of the
fourth tribe. Now a fourth disciple stepped forward in the 'lSSembly
of the people.
'The story of making fire is true, and I know how it may be done,'
he said.
Confusion broke out within the tribe, which split into various
fa<.•1vuS. Some said; 'This may be true, and if it is, WC want to find
out how to make fire.' When these people were examined by the
master and his followers, however, it was found that most of them
were anxious to use firemaking for personal advantage, and did
not realize that it was something for human progress. So deep had
the distorted legends penetrated into the minds of most people
that those who thought that they might in fact represent truth
were often unbalanced ones, who could not have made fire even
if they had been shown how.
There was another faction, who said: 'Of course the legends are
not true. This man is just trying to fool w, to make a place for
himself here.'
And a further faction said: 'We prefer the legends as they are, for
they are the very mortar of our cohesion. If we abandon them, and
we find that this new interpretation is useless, what will become of
our community then?'
And there were other points of view, as well.
So the party travelled on, until they reached the lands of the
fifth community, where firemaking was a commonplace, and
where other preoccupations faced them.
The master said to his disciples:
'You have to learn how to teach, for man does not want to be
taught. First of all, you will have to teach people how to learn. And
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before that you have to teach them that there is still something to
be learned. They imagine that they are ready to learn. But they
want to learn what they ima9int is to be learned, not what they have
first to learn. When you have learned all this, then you can devise
the way to teach. Knowledge without special capacity to teach is
not the same as knowledge and capacity.'
1:#:1

Ahmed el-Bedavi (died 1276) is reputed to have said, in answer
to the question: 'What is a barbarianr:

'A barbarian is one whose perceptions are so Insensitive that
he thinks that he can understand by thinking or feeling
something which can be perceived only through development and constant application to the striving towards God.
'Men laugh at Moses and Jesus, either because they are
utterly insensitive, or because they have concealed from
themselves what these people really meant when they talked
and acted.'
According to dervish lore, he was accused of preaching
Christianity by Moslems, but repudiated by Christians because he refused to accept later Christian dogma literally.
He was the founder of the Egyptian Bcdavi Order.
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LESSON 3
INTERVENING AND MOTIVATING WHO FOR WHAT?

Learning Objectives
The participants will:

1. Discuss issues surrounding the problems of intervening and
motivating people.
2. Recognize factors that could be considered in an effective
intervention that motivates people to participate in development.
3. Better understand the complexity of intervention of outsiders
in the development process.
Activities

1. Discussion of homework assignments

(30 min)
a) what aspects of human nature most affect people's
inability to learn or change?
b) what are the ways in which people do change?
c) why should people in rural areas of the third world
change at all?
d) how should the directions of change be determined?

2. Lecture - Carmen Deere
(1 hour)
Factors to Be Considered in Rural Development Intervention
3. Break

(15 min)

4. Discussion with Carmen Deere

(30 min)

5. Triads
(20 min)
Discussion of each participants problem/issue/topic and
factors they should consider in solving/addressing it.
6. Process Consultation
(20 min)
a) what dimensions did the learning environment have in
today's class?
b) are there any problems that you feel need to be
discussed? positive, negative aspects of class that you want
changed now?
7. Handout Homework 3 -

Affecting others

Materials Required

1. Water and cups.
2. Flip chart and newsprint.
3. Carmen Deere and any materials she may require.
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HOMEWORK 3

AFFECTING OTHERS EFFECTIVELY

1. Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Korten, pp. 1-52.
Chambers, chapters 1 and 2, pp.1-46.
Heilbroner, Economics Explained.
Hewes, Rural Development: World Frontiers,
Hyden, pp. 39-92.

pp.58-81.

2. Write:
In 3 to 5 pages develop guidelines/considerations for
effective intervention and motivation of rural communities.
You may wish to discuss the structural pre-conditions that
may be necessary to implement your guidelines.
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DEVELOPMENT SIGNIFIES A

great deal more than increased farm output. Farming may be conceived as a series of activities carried on by individuals on a particular
piece of land to achieve a material objective; rural development not
only includes increased farm production but also connotes a continuous social and political process among rural people ceaselessly reaching out toward a better life. It is possible to increase farm production
without imprO\·ing rural society. Thus in the United States vast increases in farm output were achieYCd at the same time rural progres~
ceased because American rural society ceased to exist.
The situation in the LDCs is very different from that in America;
there are large metropolitan regions, but none of these is presently
able to engulf a large portion of rural society. Instead LDCs continue
, to confront the need to increase farm production and achieve rural
development. However, for the most part these rural people ha\"C
not been able to improve the quality of their own society nor to partic·
ipate in the political life of the country.
In the Latin-American democracies the rural political power structure is largely a matter of status, and since most rural people have
little or no status they are largely disenfranchised. In the newer countries of Africa and Asia numerically small political elites rule because
there is no one else to do the job. Thus political life in the LDCs
tends to evolve as an oligarchic process. Political action in some of
these governments is limited to infighting among members of the
elite, and resulting coups d'etat sometimes become a means for effecting meaningless changes in personnel.
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Apparently L'ltin-Americans have never been able to solve the
political dilemma posed by the conflict between democratic political
fonns and an extremely status-conscious, prestige-oriented social order.
The problem of overcoming the political limitations imposed by a
colonial past stilI persists among the newly independent countries of
Asia and Africa. In the latter case the changing of the guard was
negotiated primarily between elites on both sides. Then, faced with
the staggering task of governing a newly independent country, the
new leaders depended on an incumbent bureaucracy to keep the
country going while they sought to consolidate and expand their
leadership. But this effort did not create a broader political power
base; it simply organized, more efficiently perhaps, those already in
positions of power. In the rural areas these were larger landholders,
religious leaders, and merchants who by one means or another maintained political and economic control of the rural masses. In any
event the traditional hierarchical controls of caste ;me! tribe went
largely unchanged, and the bureaucracy went on functioning in the
colonial tradition-the only way it knew.
There were occasional improvements. In some places and at
some times some rural people in some LDCs enjoyed some material
benefits from improved farming. But it is not apparent that rural
people as a whole have participated more fully in policy decisions
affecting them. It is questionable whether LDC rural development
connoting continuous forward movem<."nt of the rural masses has
made any significant gains.
In the LDC capitals the terminology of government and political
affairs is speciously modern and the component parts of up-to-date
government seem to be in place. In this congenial atmosphere it is
quite easy for an observer to be lulled into believing that all is done
that can be done. The verbiage and the terminology one hears are
similar to what one has been trained to accept. Although perhaps
only superficially, many of the LDCs are organized along proper democratic and parliamentary Jines, and tables of organization have a
familiar appearance. In some respects several of the LDCs seem even
more politically progressive than their European or American protoaypes. At least formally, these countries are committed to planning as
a central tool of government, whereas the United States prefers the
opaque profundity of annual Presidential messages on the state of the
union and the national budget, and somehow Britons find solace in
backward-looking reports of Chancellors of the Exchequer and Chairmen of the Board of Trade.
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l\fost of the LDCs accept the need to use the powers of go\'ernment to direct, control, and guide national economic affairs. At least
their intentions in this respect seem clear, and this is much to their
credit despite substantial lags in performance. On the surface then,
one might conceive that the LDCs are in pretty fair political shape if
their adherence to democratic forms, their acceptance of the use of
planning. and their adoption of an interventionist role of government in economic affairs are accepted at face value.
Unfortunately all this applies only in the capital at the center of
government and not at all or only to a ,·ery limited extent in rural
areas among rural people. It is not that these governments have not
tried to reach rural people; they have. In India and Pakistan real
effort was put into the systems of Panchayat Raj and Basic Democracy
designed to achieve grass roots political expression. But neither of
these has yet demonstrated ability to deal effectively with the traditional centers of rural power, and the same may be true of the Ujamaa
Village program of Tanzania. l\fany LDCs find it nearly impossible
to deploy an adequate field staff to carry out their policies. Moreover,
in a number of these countries, despite lip service, many of the elite
are hesitant to unleash the latent political power of rural people.
The result has been few organs and routines for effectively mobilizin~,
and expressing rural political judgments. A political chasm exists,
with leaders and bureaucrats on one side and a vast voiceless rural
population on the other.
This is particularly true of the planning process, accepted and
endorsed by most LDCs as essential to the conduct of their affairs.
0l';pite the trappings and apparatus of planning, LDC government~
lt:ive not inherited or created the means for effectively involving rur;il
people in the process. At best the plans of LDCs arc prepared and
reviewed by technicians (often expatriate technicians), so whatever
satisfaction LDC elites may obtain from plan preparation and promulgation should be muted by realization that these documents are
not plans in anv real sense. Since they do not represent a political
consensus, there is no certainty that they will or can be implemented.
They remain simply recorded exercises in economic, statistical, and
financial projections and extrapolations representing possibilities, not
probabilities.
~
The architects of LDC gO\-crnment are in a predicament. \.They t
haYe opted for policies dependent on wide political involvement but j
have been unable to create the institutions linking the center to rural
communities. To put it another \1·ay. LDC leaders have not yet
found a way to decentralize political power. They have attempted to
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find a substitute by sending large numbers of gO\·ernment people into
the rural area to tell people of their good intentions. However, the
task of training such cadres has proved time-consuming and costly, and
it is doubttul that these government newcomers have been accepted
by the people. More likely these agents are taken into camp by the
existing power structure and never achieve significant liaison with the
people. Although the LDC authorities genuinely desire rural political participation, they have not been able to reconcile themselves to
use tactics of political agitation and organization somewhat along the
lines used by trade unions and perhaps similar to methods used in
China.
Those arrangements for working with rural people that have
been attempted have not resulted in strengthening the governments
of the Third vVorld. Indeed the continuing turmoil testifies rather to
basic political weakness. Since the bulk of those populations is rural,
this weakness reflects a serious lack of solidarity among rural people
and between them and the nation. While the weakness of fledgling
nations is comprehensible, less reassuring is the persistence of attitudes
and policies sustaining elites but reinforcing political weakness and
inhibiting development. The time may have come for the LDCs to
recognize the political strength accruing to the nation from forth·
rightly yielding to the rural constituency powers, enabling them to
participate effectively in formation and execution of development
programs.
This commentary is not original; 137 years h;!Ye passed since
Alexis de Tocqueville described what he conceived to be the political
dynamics of rural New England. Whether he was correct in his in·
terpretation of the New England scene is less important than his suc·
cess in demonstrating how a vigorous political unit composed of free
individuals could contribute to national strength and solidarity. In
today's terms Tocqueville's description is a political model.
Examination of the mechanics of LDC government operations
reveals the lack of availability of functions presented in Tocqueville's
model. Instead, a small political leadership and an imperfectly functioning central bureaucracy seek to run the entire country, although
they lack local support and cannot depend on responsible citizen per·
fonnance in the rural hinterland. Unfortunately neither the history
nor the traditions of many of these nations provided for free local
political expression. Being unaware of this gap, the new leaders did
not perceive the need to create these political precincts. Instead they
tinkered with existing local power structures and the inherited ad·
ministrative units in the hope that somehow these could be cobbled
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into a semblance of valid political institutions. But these local power
structures represented not equality and free association but the exact
opposite. Too often they were instruments of petty despotism operating on the custom-sanctioned ethic that the weak existed for exploit:ition. Indeed the entire rural landscape in many regions came close
to constituting a mosaic of political fiefdoms ruled by men strongly
opposed to the very democratic principles promulgated by the elites
and stated as the foundations of new national constitutions.
"'hile Tocqueville's model may never have existed in real life
(and, if it did, is nowhere significant in today's American political
life), his concept or something close to it may be apropos of the transformation of LDC rural institutions to further the ends of rural development.
One of the aspects of the New England village emphasized by
Tocqueville was the broad assignment of public duties among the
citizens. These included almost the entire spectrum of local government-taxes, police, records, finance, public instruction, the poor,
roads, weights and measures, and parish committees. Administrative
authority, vested in elected selectmen, was strictly limited by the requirement for referral to village meetings of any changes or proposals
for additional undertakings. Another ;ispcct was the ease of making
new proposals whenever small groups in the community wanted to
make them. The system provided a broad distribution of power; the
right of public participation in review and proposal was important,
but more important was the wide opportunity to participate in
managing community affairs. The result was to elicit maximum
citizen interest and wide distribution of power, and at the heart of
this structure was universal personal freedom and equality. 1
In contrast, Myrdal and others indicate that in many LDC rural
communities authority and the use of power are restricted to a small
group attaining its prerogatives through birth, caste, tribal affiliation,
or wealth. Central government tends to deal with this group; its
representatives ally themselves with this leadership and so become a
part of the traditional establishment. As a result, community undertakings are involuntary for most of the participants and have the
features of forced and therefore unwilling contributions. Most of the
community generate nothing of public significance on their own 'initiative. Instead each family draws into itself, seeking to avoid as
much as possible any contact with authority.~
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ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERS

So far, our discussion of the political and administrative impediments to rural development has emphasized relations between rural
people and government. Other impediments flow from specific attitudes of LDC political leaders and government officials toward agriculture, natural resources, and the environment. These attitudes influence decisions in rural development; their effects are emphasized by
Stefan Robock who, in his discussion of natural resource development
in the northeastern Brazil SUDENE program, points to the political
aspects of large natural resource undertakings, particularly among
top echelon political leaders.~ In order for major development to start
at all, strong support must be provided by national leadership. However, this support evolves through political negotiation possibly calling
for sacrifices of technical principles and even of some objectives. Thus
the SUDENE program as finally implemented represented important
compromises. Roback concedes l11at a later evaluation of the program
may support its wisdom, but he suggests that the inten'ening political
struggle was very costly. It seems likely that, in the political bargaining, hopes for rapid development were encouraged; in order to satisfy
these, important longer-range benefits had to be subordinated.
Political leaders can be tough bargainers; they also seek at times to
avoid issues involving direct confrontation. When the opposition is
strong and well organized and proponents arc not, political common
sense dictates that issues be soft-pedaled even though basic principles
of social equity are sacrificed. Politicians with records of supporting
lost causes do not stay long in office. Probably such considerations are
responsible for long delays in changing existing LDC land tenure
arrangements and instituting broad agrarian reform. \Vhile these
changes and refonns are generally recognized as essential to rural
modernization and progress in many of the LDCs, exploitation is
most extreme where landed interests are strongest and best organized
and small farmers and tenants are poorly organized and led. The
oppressed do not constitute a viable base for enlisting leadership support. So, short of revolution, the land tenure and agrarian reform
issue is not likely to emerge as a major issue at the national level. If
it does, it is very likely to be subjected to crippling compromise.
The urban-industrial populations in LDCs are probably confused
or uninformed about agrarian reform and the associated rural political
issues, so these issues have not become clear-cut national issues. There
is no national climate for rural reform, and political leaders have not
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displayed the slalesmanship necessary lo raise the issue lo its real national significance. As Hiram Phillips sees il, the need is for a sense
of national direction. 4 The least that conscientious political leadership
could do is to evaluate the strength-overt and latent-of opposing interests and determine those aspects susceptible of remedy. Such leaders
could support widespread study and debate of this pressing national
issue, and from such activity more a blc leadership might arise. Ho\1·e\ er, ne\\' LDC political leaders have not been willing to incur even
the minimal risks of such encouragement.
When LDC political leadership is willing to sacrifice major
long-term de\·elopment goals for less important short-term advantage
and is further unwilling to incur even minimal risks for important
reforms, what can be said of its real objecli\·es? One interpretation is
that the entire universe of rur;1l development, natural resource management, agTiculture, and the environment has no priority in the
panorama of the LDC political elite. The most generous interpretation of this perspective is that the foremost LDC political concern has
to be immediate national survival. This paramount responsibility
focuses attention on political management and enforces a short-term
pragmatic view. The immediate demands of today :ind tomorrow
must take precedence over potentials of next season, next year, or the
next five or ten years. Unfortunately the time span of cyclical movements of natural events-seed time :ind harvest, plant and arboreal
growth, farming, environmental transition, and rural development-·
correspond to "God's time," not to man's.
It can also be noted that politicians ;ire seldom held accountable
for natural disasters or environmental dam;ige, even if these events
could have been prevented or mitigated. No one seem5 lo be answerable when schistosomiasis appears on Lake Nasser and in the
canals below the Aswan Dam. No heads roll when lands in the Indus
Basin and northern India are gradually lost to salinity because of
bacl irrigation practices. In the Soviet Union dissident writers may
go to jail, but there arc no reprisals when enormous areas of improperly used lands increasingly become "dust bowls." Soil damage
causes abandonment of farmland in Asia, lhe :"•fiddle East, North
Africa, and Central America because of inadequate safeguards; but the
unhappy farmers seek no political sacrifices. Since there are no penal-.
ties, problems of population grnwth and food supp! y are reflected in
\·astly complex environmental consequences."
Related to their pragmatic concern for immediate problems is
the preoccupation of LDC leaders with nation building. This preoccupation is probably due to the recent arri\'al of these nations at in-
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dependent statehood or because their administrations rest on very recent coups d'etat. In the view of the new leadership, their challenge
is not development but rapid accomplishment of vertical political
integration. \.\'. David Hopper, long a close student of the development aspects of newly emergent states, says:
The problem of creating a state out of a colony and molding
its people into a nation is a problem which is uppermost and
foremost. . . . The rationale of locating steel plants or the ration;ilc of bringing in reforms or not bringing in reforms, as the
c;ise may be, is a rationale within the framework of a political
structure . . . . The issue that faces the political elites as a paramount issue is not only the retention of their own power, but
the retention of their own power is very much dependent upon
creating a vertical integration of the nation. of breaking out the
disassociated units, the villages, the rather independent separate
groups. of breaking these and combining them into a nation.6

Jn Hopper's terms, politically important developments in the
LDCs are those with fast payoff in national prestige and leadership
credit. The Green Revolution might ha\·e been long delayed had not
it' promise coinciclecl with the Indian drought of the mid-60s and
the accompanying threat of starvation. Thus political motivation
concentrates leadership attention on the trappings of power and partlv
accounts for the initial emphasis on large-scale industrial plants and
monument;il public works rather than on rural development.
Alll\.11'.'ilSTRATIVE ARRAl>'GF.MF.l>TS

In the organizational structure of LDC government administration functions, rural development, farming, natural resources, and
environmental matters are placed in junior-grade ministries. This
administrative pattern is not unique with the LDCs; it is more or Jess
universal. The ranking government services are those concerned with
foreign affairs, national defense, fiscal affairs, economic policy, commerce, and industry. For example, in the United States farming,
forestry, fisheries, and land and water use are responsibilities delegated
lo administrative echelons al least one step below cabinet level. This
is also the case for rural development, rural social problems, and
rural education.
Among the richer nations this govemmemal pecking order may
not be immediately critical, but in the case of the LDCs the junior
rank accorded services responsible for rural development reinforces
their inferior political role. And this is not the end of the matter;
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these less glamorous ser\'ices, standing apart from the trappings of
central power, may then develop their own separate power structures
in combination with rural political and economic interests, and these
interests will likely be selfish and \"cry conser\'atiYe. In time this semisyndical relationship flourishing in semiobscurity develops its mrn
objecti\'es and priorities. It becomes exclusiYc, monopolistic, and difficult to penetrate or evaluate.
The professional staffs of these particularistic go\'ernmcnt structures are in a strategic position. They have been trained in n:1rro\\'
specialized fields; since the sole profession a I outlet for this training is
in these governmental institutions, these officials come to hz1\·e a
dominant role in the conduct and content of the training institutiom.
Ultimately, professional recognition in these fields depends on sen ice
in and for the specialized structure. Since there are \'ery fe\1· career
opportunities outside these services, the institutions have a monopoly
of skills in these fields. So it becomes increasingly difficult to establish
any objectiw informed insight or oversight of the work performed by
these bodies or for any informed criticism of their operations or policy
to arise.
\_)
Organizational discipline within these specialized services is made
\N
more severe because of the lack of outside employment opportunities.
..:j
It is extremely difficult to transfer to higher-ranking ministries; the
kind of people who become foresters, soil scientists, and agronomists
\·ery seldom aspire to become cabinet ministers or members of Parliament. \\That may be important to such individuals is security, followed
by improYed professional status and recognition within the institution.
However, these rewards are determined not entirely by professional
excellence but probably more by conformance to the conventions of
the syndical power enclave. One of these conventions requires avoidance of conflict or controversy with syndical allies. Another requires
that any differences that may arise be settled "within the family"';
thus there may be a tendency to reYcal Yery little of the inner workings
of the enclave to the public and to closely guard and closely edit public
utterances. Indeed this diffidence applies not only to the public and
the communications media but also to other ministries and the Parliament.
An inevitable consequence of this organizational discipline is lo
defeat and frustrate independent professional judgment while encouraging a protective and conservati\·e service morale. At the same
time that these services become less capable of perceiving the general
public interest they tend more and more to become the instruments
of the special political and economic interests of the syndicate. In
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these circumstances the objective of these services is not the welfare of
of the great mass of the rural people but the overriding desires of the
syndical allies.
FUNCTIONAL DISPERSION OF GOVERN:\!ENT SERVICES

Complicating the effects on rural development of low political
and administrative rank are those arising from inappropriate separation of government functions. Here we encounter administrative patterns, in developed as well as developing nations, defying any system
of logical arrangement but receiving almost universal acceptance.
Everyone accepts the concept of an integrated environment, but
everywhere the government services for environmental problems are
so badly dispersed and fractionalized that a major effort has to be
mounted to achieve coordinated action.
The LDCs had the opportunity of a voiding the illogical functional arrangements of developed nations with respect to development,
use, and control of natural resources and the environment, but many
of them repeated the schizoid pattern. Now very commonly one finds
among the LDCs that irrigation is a responsibility of one ministry
and agricultural development of another. In some countries not only
are agriculture and irrigation administratively separated, but also
rural development is divorced from agricultural cooperatives. In
Panama an agricultural component at the National University performs some agricultural research functions quite separate and apart
from similar research functions of the Ministry of Agriculture also
administering agricultural training institutions. Ethiopia has a Ministry of Land Reform separate from the Ministry of Agriculture; a Ministry of Community Development conducts rural community development projects; irrigation is still another administrative entity. India
and Pakistan place irrigation development in one ministry and agriculture in another. In a number of LDCs the functions of farm
credit are separate from those of agricultural development.
Not only does this atomization of function make for administrative problems, it is also very expensive. Seemingly these administrative disfunctional arrangements would call 0111 for reorganization in
the name of efficiency, but this does not happen readily. However.
very wisely India did merge its separate ministries of Cooperative and
Community Development with its Ministry of Agriculture some years
ago. One suspects that more of these reorganizations are not effectecl
because of political considerations, particularly the resulting reduction in attractive patronage opportunities or the embarrassment of
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forcing some incumbent politician out of a comfortable post. Then
too, the alliances these specialized units may ha\'e formed represent
forces able to cause considerable political disturbance. Certainly in
the United States considerations such as these ha\'e set at naught for
nearly half a century efforts to reorganize into more efficient patterns
those administrati\'e units of the federal government responsible for
administration of natural resources.
Among the LDCs the situation is aggn\';ited by bureat1cratic
jealousy and competition among UN affiliates such as betwern the
Food and Agriculture Oragnization and the International L1bo11r
Organization. Thus in one country the ILO may attempt to promote
its concepts of rural cooperatives under the aegis of Commt1nity DeYelopment in one ministry at the same time that FAO pushes a similar
operation as a function of the Ministry of Agriculture. This is not
fun and games for the target country, for the effect is to confuse tlte
development effort and to intensify wasteful and inefficient cleplorn1cnt
of scarce LDC resources.
QUALITY OF ;\.D~II:'>ISTRATI\'E PERSO:\':\'EL
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The quality of personnel in the go\·ernment services of the LDCs
and their attitude toward that service greatly affects the perform;rnce
of government functions. In turn, the quality of personnel attracted
to these services is affected by the career opportunities they afford. It
is only natural then that the secondary rank of go\'ernment ministries
concerned with rural development and the administration of natural
resources does not make these sen·ices attractive to abler people.
More ambitious, brighter, and better-trained young people seek careen
in the higher-ranking services. Moreover, placement in these sen·ices
usually means that one will work in the capital city with all its comforts and amenities while enjoying the status conveyed by high-ranking
service, and among the LDCs these are extraordinarily important con~iderations.

In a number of LDCs the process of career selection begins at :rn
early age. In order to qualify for entrance to the higher-ranking sen·ices one must have attended the prestigious universities at Calcutta,
Bombay, Manila, Monte\'ideo, Addis Ababa, or their equivalents. But
only the select can afford to attend these institutions. Thus to many
young people the agricultural colleges and other institutions t~aining
for careers in rural areas represent second choices. Those who fail to
meet the higher academic requirements of the prestige institutions or
1d10 cannot afford them turn to these less prestigious schools. Thc1e
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candidates may not be as interested in farming, in rt1ral people, or
in the natural cmironment as in achieving a degree of status attached
to higher education and ultimately the security of a government jobalbeit one of >econclary rank. Thus it frequently happens that incli\'icluals who begin this kind of career are not from rural areas and
have no previous connection with farming or farm people. And so
the system works as a selection process, automatically routing to professional work in the junior ministries many who accept such careers
not out of preference or interest but out of necessity or lack of alternative.
Reinforcing this process is the general low esteem for the rural
sector and its affairs by the elites of these countries. 'Vhile land ownership-particularly abstentee ownership of large estates-may convey
prestige, farming itself is considered to be a distinctly inelegant occupation. Hence those who work with farm people may suffer humiliation;
their social status suffers and so does their self-esteem. In these circumstances many individuals devote much energy to wrangling transfers from posts in rural areas to the seat of government.
In the end the government workers in rural development services
are not highly motivated toward their work. l\fany of them are serving
time waiting for retirement or a possible but unlikely transfer out of
rural areas to a larger city and a desk job. Their own status preoccupation inhibits sympathy for their clients and the desire to understand
rural people. These officials tend not to be innovati\·e but rather to
reduce the scope of their activities to routine tasks requiring neither
initiative nor energy. Jn the field they receive little support or communication from upper echelons, so they lead an isolated existence.
As newcomers to the village scene they find it difficult to achieve acceptance among their rural clientele and are frmtratecl in efforts to
initiate meaningful relations enabling them to demonstrate new agricultural techniques or to make helpful suggestions for improvement
of fanning practices. Sometimes they are denied materials essential
to performance of their duties, such as new tires for bicycles or replacement of worn-out batteries for radio receiving sets. Sometimes
funds enabling them to travel to higher headquarters are lacking so
they cannot even report their needs. Their own youth and inexperience put them at a dis.1dvantage in rural societies where age is equated
with wisdom. Eventually these representatives of the central government lapse into indifference and inertia.
This kind of arrangement lacks valid local institutions for the
formulation and expression of local will. It was precisely this vital
element of local expression plus the native genim for organiz..1tion that

70

\,
\_t\.·,

-i.

CllAPTER

1

made the Japanese Land Reform Program of 1946-51 an outstanding
success-a success due almost entirely to the vigor and enterprise of
locally elected Village Land Commissions vested with full responsibility for decision and action. vVith this impetus their work and sense
of responsibility succeeded in transforming in a few short years a centuries-old feudal land tenure system into a new egalitarian system
dominated by small independent landowners. The role of the central government and its agents was advisory and infomlalive. No one
at the time thought much about it, but the commissions-both in the
manner of their formation as freely elected bodies and in the distribution of their responsibilities-seem in retrospect Lo have followed
very closely the Tocqueville pattern. vVhat followed was a tremendous release of energy directed toward realization of local objectives.
Of course this analogy is subject to the reservation that Japan was
not an underdeveloped nation. Yet, given the circumstances prevailing nationwide at the end of the war involving dislocation, wide dn·astation, and disruption plus the universal acceptance of feudal principles and traditional organization, the situation was much closer to
today's LDCs than to the developed countries.
The revolutionary change in Japanese rural society consisted in
endowing local communities with an instrument for full self-expression with an equal opportunity for every individual, regardless of
economic or social status, to have a hand in formulating community
decisions. In this system government people appear in a new role.
Their advice and assistance gain authority by endorsement of these
local bodies. Thus officials do not appear as an arm of the central
power. ln the Japanese experience their work had meaningful content; what they had to contribute was something everyone wanted,
and they became identified with the communily. 7 Community motivation became their motivation; their progress and recognition was
the result of their success in meeting self-determined village needs
and in helping to solve village problems.
As the rural sector achieves success, political power accrues to i l.
with a corresponding accretion of prestige and rank. In this process
the agricultural and rural institutions become politically powerful
and influence national policy. As the rural sector gains power and
prestige, the careers of rural civil servants become more attractive and
abler people seek to enter the service. Moreover, 'these recruits increasingly come from a rural background and share the aspirations of
rural people. This is the process to be set in motion by LDCs in their
efforts toward rural development.
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ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Many LDCs have adopted central planning for achieving development and growth and for allocating national resources. vVhether
LDCs use central planning or more occult procedures, all of them in
common with universal practice make some kind of estimate of the
amount of central resources to be deployed for development purposes.
Jn all these forward projections governments reveal their intentions
toward the rural sector. At this point decisions are made about the
extent of steps to redress the inadequacy of rural infrastructure and
amounts of central resources intended for feeder roads, rural electrification, irrigation works, schools, storage facilities, regulated markets,
extension services, manpower training, and research. It is also at this
point that qualities of vision and imagination of the administration
personnel are most important and the need to upgrade the quality of
the administrative services is most keenly felt. At a recent joint OECD
Development Center /World Bank seminar on rural development,
several participants expressed the view that before improvement in
rural development procedures could be effective the en tire status of
rural affairs would have to be improved. 8
At the outset of the planning process the effect of lower rural
rank-order would mean lower allocations to rural development items.
This was the case in India, at least through its third Five-Year Plan
(1960-65). I noted this trend in 1964 in a study for USAID outlining
a strategy for long-range assistance for rural India. Observing that
under the third Five-Year Plan the proportionate share of resources
proposed for Agriculture and Rural Community Development was 14
percent compared to 24 percent for Industries and Minerals, 22 percent for Irrigation and Power, and 20 percent for Transport and
Communications, I commented:

India's very substantial efforts to achieve planned and balanced economic development have probably been less effective in
the agricultural sector. From First Plan to Third and looming
over Fourth Plan formulation and perspective planning through
1976 is the largely unresolved problem of adequately quantifying
agriculture's base, potentials, and proper role in the nation's sustained economic growth. Inability to organize an economical
sound approach to sectoral development of agriculture inevitably
weakens economic planning and perspective for all other sectors.9
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E\'eri if the o\·erall amounts allocated for rural deYelopment
among the LDCs were adequate, there would remain the equally irnporLllnt function of programming and scheduling the investment 1!011·
to rural de\'elopment. It is in the performance of funding functions
that heavy demands on skill and training are imposed. Even if these
are present, they have to be organized properly in an effective administrati\'e structure, and here too weakness is encountered. Thus neglect
of the rural deYelopment role in government places a double handic.1p of less-qualified personnel and poorly articulated organization on
the planning function. It was the latter handicap that attracted
comments from participants in the 1972 OECD/lBRD seminar:
It seemed to many of the par11c1pants that the existing organization of the administration in many countries was a major
obstacle to adopting an integrnlcd approach and tl1e evidence
provided by l\[r. Mule from Kenya on this point was oE particular
interest. A large measure of agreement was also reached on the
need to devise organizational arrangements which would enable
decision-making to be really decrntrali:ed. (Emphasis added)IO

Those familiar with the planning function understand the heavy
demand it imposes: it takes acute, detailed, and intensive effort suotained over long periods to fit together in proper sequence the components of a balanced scheme for rural development. \Vhen these
burdens are placed on inadequately tra)ned staff, the result may be
sloppy planning and poor implementation. This performance is not
so much the fault of those engaged in the task but rather in the bias
resulting in establishing a second-rank standing for go\'ernment work
in rural development. As time passes and these workers gain experience, perfonnance may progressively improve. Still the lag is expensive for the nations and for their rural constituencies.
In our concern with planning we should not lose sight of the need
to link plans closely to implementation. Thus planning for rural development and the execution of these plans arc a continuous process.
Plans, to be effective, must comprehend an awareness of the capacitv
of the executing agencies to carry them out. Moreover, no plan is so
good that it does not have to be modified continuously during implementation stages. On the other hand, if implementation is laggard or
careless, no plan can succeed.
Past experience has shown that e\'cn the most wrll-concei\'cd
and well-designed schemes flop :it the implementation le\'cl. Se,·-
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era! reasons are adduced for this: lack of enthusiasm on the part
of top political and administrative leadership and/or its inability
to transmit the same to middle and local level of leadership; redtape. archaic administrative procedures and general ineptitude
and inefficiency of the administrative machinery at lower levels;
economic and political vested interests which are indifferent to
the schemes which are of no direct benefit to them. Numerous
cases have been noted in which funds allocated to such schemes
arc di,·erted to schemes which benefit the better-off.! I

It was such a combination of sloppy planning and indifferent
execution that resulted in a failure of Ethiopia's second Five-Year
PLm (I %3-68) to meet its agricultural objecti\'es when government
capital expenditures for agriculture were only 42 percent of planned
objecti\'cs. 1 ~ The explanation seems to be that planners overestimated
the performance capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and possibly
also the availability of resources. One specific shortfall was a threeand-a-half-year delay in establishing the important Agricultural Research Institute with a subsequent failure to implement research programs. More generally those departments of the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for extension services, agronomy, education, training,
statistics, ri,·cr surveys, and the Cadastral land survey were unable
to meet pbnned goals because of insufficient funds. Recurrent expenditures (used for the payment of salaries) for the ministry as a
whole were only two-thirds of planned levels.
Several factors- probably worked in combination to create this unhappy record. One is the likelihood that funds, originally allocated
to the Ministry of Agriculture, were diverted to higher-ranking ministries. Another possibility is that personnel to staff the se\'eral programs were una\'ailable; some regular staff may have transferred to
other ministries and recruits in the process of in-service training went
to other jobs_ The overall cause of the poor performance was the low
ranking of the Ministry of Agriculture plus bad planning practices.
In any event, the encl result was a deplorable shortfall in the progress
of rural de\'elopmcnt.
Sometimes conscientious planners may be misled by inaccurate or
erroneous data. This in turn may be the result of neglect of rural
statistical reporting services. Also the newer LDCs may not have been
in business long enough to accumulate sufficient time series data to
justify using them as a base for extrapolations. This deficiency may be
aggra\'atcd by the bias inherent in syndical loyalties (referred to above)
taking the form of overstating organization performance capacity in
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the interest of making one department or bureau "look good." \Vhen
these distortions get cranked into a plan there is bound to be a break·
down, because the plan simply cannot work.
Something like this happened in the case of Tanzania's first FivcYear Plan ending in 1969. Almost from the outset it became apparent that the departments concerned with rural development could not
carry out their assignments. 13 A second cause of near failure was a
substantial underestimate of national population and rate of population growth. This error led to further miscalculations of per capita
income, saving, and capital formation. As if this were not enough,
progress was further impeded by an acute shortage of trained manpower for the rural program and a major overestimate of foreign ex·
change flows. However, what distinguishes the Tanzania situation
was the careful supenision enabling the government to detect thc1e
error.; and the resiliency of the leadership in makin~ the ncce5>:1n
difficult midstream adjustments to offset what otherwise could h.1, c
been a real disaster.
A further critical element in planning for rural development is
the degree of understanding of the proceS5 of rural de,·elopmen t possessed by planners. This quality of perception is manifested in the
o\·erall development strategy and in the priorities and emphases of
the accorded plan components. From this standpoint it is not so much
whether rural planners are right or wrong in selecting component'
for rural development but rather how they conceive the total de' c].
opment process as evidenced by the choices they make in allocating
resources. Do they see that process as systemic unity where all cornpo·
nents are related? If they do not perceive this unity, it is likely that
the flow of development investment will be atomized in smh a fashion
that there is no coherent integration of dewlopment. John P. Lewis,
who was familiar with Indian planning procedures, caJled attention
to the blithe disregard by planners of demographic concentrations in
the Indian rural landscape in contrast to what he conceived to he the
critical importance for development of planning of these clusterings
because they provided a central focus for administrative, political, :ind
economic activity.B
In more specific terms, neglect of the systemic aspects of rural development tends to permit uncoordinated programs for the location
of processing plants, warehouses, supply depots, marketing point~.
fertilizer mixing plants, and feeder roads. If these components are
located without respect to other components, the paramount advantage of maximizing development complementaries is lost, as is the opportunity to break through the isolation and stagnation of small
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villages. According to E. A. J. Johnson, this lack of coordinated
planning effort is due to poor training of planners aggravated by
political incentives to dole out projects in a political pork-barrel
fashion.I~

If the central plan for rural development becomes a collection of
separate undertakings, the corresponding investment flow will be irrational. Thus installations constructed "out of phase" with the development process or located inappropriately will be underutilized or
completely unused. "Whereas Lewis and Johnson view these planning
miscues as a result of poor training, ignorance, indifference, or political
expedience, our thesis inclines toward the view that these shortcomings have their origin in the low ranking of rural affairs among
LDC governments.
1'01.n1cAL SYSTEMS

AMER 1 c A.
Throughout Latin America, by one means or
another, programs of land reform have frequently been initiated
and usually stifled or sidetracked through the political maneuverings
oE large landowners and their allies. Yet it is generally agreed that
the existing farm tenancy system is largely responsible for low productivit y, rural misery, and a technically backward agriculture. There
haYe been some exceptions to this in Bolivia's insurrectionist land
seizures by tenants, and to some extent colonization in Venezuela has
provided a partial answer to the problem of land reform. Chile's longstalled land reform program might have stood a chance of resuscitation under the Allende regime. But Brazil's situation is characterized
as limited to a few small-scale projects and half measures. The general outlook in Latin America is a frustration of the necessary reforms
to provide dynamic change from the present rural stagnation. 16
Backward agricultural development in Colombia affects the
national economy and is related to the preponderance of rural people
among the nation's poor.1 7 One observer related this situation to deficient le~1denhip not competent to support rural development plan·
ning and operations. ·while more than JOO separate agencies are
engaged in rural development activities, rural stagnation and decline
are universal. Also apparent is a completely inadequate system of
rural education. Since only about 3 percent of those entering first
grade in rural areas will later register for the fifth and final grade,
there is an almost complete absence of rural students among those receiving professional agricultural training. This means that the staffs
of agricultural agencies are made up mostly of people who have had no
LAT 1 N
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personal familiarity with farming or rural life. Consequently an
almost complete Yacuum of interest and concern exists between those
who farm and those who seek to improve farming teclmolog·y ;rnd
rural development. The technical and official group seems primarily
to have been recruited among lawyers, economists, and cnginccn."
A further conclusion is that Colombian taxpayers are unwilling to
support rural education, preferring to support urban public cd11c1tion. Because taxpayers arc usually an elite group, it has been co11jectured that those who financially support government are un\\·illing
to support measures that would give poor people an opportunity to
compete with the young of the powerful elitcs.rn
EA s T
AFR 1 c A. In Ethiopia agriculture and rural dcvclop111ent
suffer the consequences of an old feudal system. Grants of land to
those sen·ing the imperial establishment have preempted large areas.
l\Lmy of the cultivators in the northern and central highland regiom
arc tenants with insecure tenurial rights. ln the late 19GOs Emperor
Haile Selassie undertook sC\'eral measures designed to reform thi.,
system; he established a l\linistry of Land Reform and appointed ;"
l\finister one of his abler administrators. Unfortunately, very lilllc
has been accomplished since these beginnings except for the crc:ition
of a sizable bureaucracy. It appears that while the Emperor lent hi'
personal support and prestige to the reform, the vested po\\·er of IJotl1
his hereditary nobility and the Amharic Christian Church had 'llffi·
cient po\\·er to obfuscate and inhibit action. Parliamentary delays ;rnd
maneuvers preYented passage of basic legislation, disregarding rcpc:tt·
eel imperial insistence on enJ.ctment. These powerful interests \1Trc
also instrumental in securing the ITmo,·;iJ of ;rn able l\Iinister of l .:l!1d
Reform and the appointment of a more amenable replacement.
Among younger Ethiopi:ms, particularly among uni\·ersiLy ~tu
dents, land reform has become one of 3 number of burning political
issues which have aroused their opposition to the Establishment. Up
to the present time this opposition has not achieved significant expression. On the other hJ.nd, there have been rumors of strong repressive police action serving to increase tensions and anti-Establishment sentiment. However, this unrest is probably an urban phenomenon confined largely to Addis Ababa and its environs. Little is knmrn
about fam1er reaction, perhaps because of the substantial amount of
unsettled land in the southern part of the country. There is some evidence of a gradual southward migrJ.tion out of northerly regions.
which may ha,·e been hastened by Lirge ten:rnt displacement as a re·
sult of increasing mechanization.
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Agricultural development in Ethiopia is impeded by the primiti\ c level of farming and lack of means to improve productivity.
Technical assistance to farmers through the extension work of the
l'viinistry of Agriculture is impeded by the low rJ.nking of that ministry.
Extension field workers arc poorly paid and poorly trained. Moreover,
the ministry is handicapped both by budgetary limitations and by the
manner in which budgeted funds are disbursed and is also plagued
by competition from and conflicts with more powerful units of government having peripheral and tangential responsibility for both rural
development and farming.
ln contrast to other countries of the Third \Vorld, Ethiopia seems
to neither fear nor distrust foreign assistance or investment. Under
the prompting of overseas assistance agencies several promising and
forward-looking agricultural projects J.re under way. Large-scale and
succe<,sful foreign-owned agricultural enterprises have been developed;
and Ethiopia has not been unresponsive to suggestions for improve·
mcnt in agricultural administration, organization, trarnmg, and
re,c;1rch. The major uncertainty relating to the widespread implementation of these initial steps is with respect to the highly conserva·
tivc and very powerful elite group whose basic entrenchment in con·
trol of land resources will sooner or later have to be challenged. To
what extent, if any, this confrontation would involve the development
role of foreign entrepreneurs is a matter of speculation.
Socialist Tanzania. under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, has
adopted a unique administrative and political approach to agricultural and rural development based on the principle of rural village'
conceived as communal organizations. Nyerere, as leader of the TANU
party,20 visualizes rural development primarily along political lines.
ln rural areas agricultural technicians work to assist the political arm
of government, the Ministry of Rural Development, in its efforts to
create Ujamaa villages-a form of communal social organization based
on the concept of the indigenous extended family. One might conjecture that this concept is not unrelated to the rural communes of
the Peoples Republic of China and the philosophy of l\fao Tse-tung.
These concepts arc in the process of implementation within a
process of nation building and rapid tramition from previous colonial
status. Thus the Ujamaa principle is making its way among Tan7anian farmers who are mostly small holckrs. These farmers will re·
ceive government assi-;tance encouraging them toward collectivism in
farming operations.
Land reform in its distributive aspect is absent because the Tanzanian Linc! tenure system is apparently not characterized by land·
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lordism or typical tenancy patterns. Thus the poliliG1l and administrative aspects of rural development seem to take the form of indoctrination and persuasion. To the extent possible, government exercises
its power by helping rural people in such a fashion that they find themselves better off within a Ujamaa context.
\Vithin the bureaucracy this means that everyone conforms to
TANU party discipline: T ANU sets the major principles for nalion;il
planning, and ministerial conferences on planning are subject to
party dictates. In the field T ANU policy is continually manifested to
farm advisors and all other government functionaries. Just what effect
this may have on technical and professional personnel in the se\'Cral
ministries is difficult to judge, and just how well the Ujamaa principle
conforms to the imperatives of agricultural technology is still a 11i;1 t
ter of conjecture. But what Nyerere does is lo instill a sense of nationhood among a population historically tribal in outlook. He also
seeks to socialize farming while stimulating it to achieve higher le\·cls
of output.
In contrast to other LDCs, although most of the rural people <'f
Tanzania are very poor and ignorant, they are at least not oppressed
or exploited. On the other hand, evidence that the Ujamaa principle
has or will result in raising levels of production is not apparent. Tanzania has also undertaken several ventur~ in large-scale state fanns.
Opinion on the likelihood of success of these ventures is divided.
Another aspect of agricultural policy with a doubtful outlook is that
of producing food grains at costs above world market prices. Finally,
the continued discouragement of small traders of agricultural commodities in some areas without providing alternate marketing outlets
was not wise. Thus one is forced to the conclusion that short-run
political actions may have doubtful effects, but that in the longer run
Ujamaa policy may be dynamic in raising farm production levels and
improving rural life-sty!~. The contrast may be between production
as a short-run goal and ultimate integrated rural development.
The dominant political party in India since independence
is the Congress Party, and all Indian governments since independence
ha\'e been Congress Party governments; it was the party of Gandhi,
Nehru, Shastri, and Indira Gandhi. \\'hoever controlled the Congress
Party ruled India. Consequently Indian agricultural and rural policy
has been set by the Congress Party. This party has included a great
variety of economic interests; one very important component in terms
1 ND 1 A.
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of establishing rural policy was the farm group, particularly land·
O\\'ners.
The Constitution of India places much power in the hands o{
the several Indian states, including administrative responsibility for
agriculture. BeG1use many of the states are predominantly rural and
agricultural, it is natural that dominant landowner interests should
strongly color state politics. This deployment of political power was
decisive in offsetting the original land reform objectives of the central
government which visualized as a [uncbmental political tenet redis·
tribution of agricultural lands to tenants along with rights to secure
tenure on lands they might rent.
Initial efforts of reform began and largely ended with abolition of
a particular layer o[ rent receivers, the Zamindari. The Zamincbr
system was established by the British in the latter part of the eighteenth century. 21 It was conceived that these functionaries would re·
ceive rent in perpetuity and forward a stipulated amount as taxes.
In time the Zamindari parceled out these rent alloG1tions to others;
in some cases there were as many as 15 or 20 layers of rent receivers
between the cultivator and the last receiver. 22 Apparently this system
did not uniformly cover all Indian states; the relations between
Zarnindar right and land ownership varied in different localities.
It was relatively easy in the period after independence to abolish
the inexcusably exploitive Zamindar system as an example of the
malfunctions of the British raj. And that, to all intents and purposes,
was the extent of Indian land reform. Some states passed legislation
setting ceilings on the amount of land in a single ownership, but from
that point on the record is replete with a tangle of land litigation
and proceedings of commissions 0£ various kinds_ Today both landlordism and tenancy are almost universal throughout India. It is in
this setting that the Green Revolution in India has taken place.
It has been difficult for the central government to exert sufficient
influence over state policy and administration to achieve a national
consistency in implementing its rural objectives beG1use agriculture is
a "state matter." Nearly twenty years ago Paul Appleby reported to
the government of India on this situation:
The Centre is without any real powers in almost the en tire
field of development; its function is the "staff" function rather
than the "line" or "action" function, and its method slows greatly.
and expedites hardly at all. Land policy is related to development of agriculture. but land policy is exclusi,·ely within the field
of state responsibilities. Even farm credit, about which the states
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can never hope to do anything of consequence, is in their field.
And farm credit is important to agTicultural development. The
influence that is associated with Central financial assistance is so
cumbered by an intricate system of multiple reviews hoth in the
states and in the Centre that the Centre often may be said to
rescue the states from trouble rather than stimul;ning the st:ites to
bold, big, new action. And responsibility for all this is so diffus~d
that almost no one knows who can be held accountable for
what.23
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In this context the charisma of Indian leaders becomes the principal unifying force in pushing a progressive rural policy. The formal
structure, the division of administrative power, and the limited
colonial procedures act as impediments to the design and extension of
powers. For this reason the maintenance of personal qualitie' of
prestige and elitism become extremely important aspects of leadership.
But this also means that the reservoir of leadership power cm be
drawn upon only for critical issues. This consideration may expbin
the past unwillingness of leadership to forthrightly challenge entrenched rural land interests. The price for a greatly expanded food
production so vital to national well-being apparently has been to
permit these landed interests to reap major benefits from the Green
Revolution and to risk widespread exploitation of small and wea ke1
cultivators and landless laborers.
The political paradox bet"·een an enlightened leadership and
a backward electorate was due to the political power of conservatiYe
economic interests in local and state politics. Since these intere't'
constituted the dominant power centers, they controlled politic;tl
machinery up to the state level. Their followers, who gave these loci!
power centers control of politic.11 majorities, were the same small
farmers, tenants, and landless hborers who needed relief. The5e oppressed rural people provided the clientele for the wielding of local
power, and this political structure was reinforced by the caste system.
Exploited rural people provided the numerical support to keep their
exploiters in power. Since national and state elections coincided.
consen•ative control of national politics continued, but so did the
frustration of the progressive le;idership. This political procc''' 11·:1'
also causing erosion of the prestige of the Congress Party and grm1·ing
social discontent with a mounting threat of violence and revolt. Efforts
by the Prime Minister to implement !;incl reform were threatened or
brought no response; the response to the government's efforts to enforce a new wealth tax on agricultural property was challenged by
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sever;t! of the ministers and overturned by the Punjab and Haryana
high court.~ 4
Perhaps no one in India perceived what was going on as well as
Mrs. Gandhi or saw better the threats an uncorrected future might
imply. She took a calculated risk, first separating state and national
elections and then setting the latter in 1971-a full year in advance of
the regularly scheduled date. This enabled her wing of the partynow called for purposes of the election the New Congress Party-to go
to the rural areas with a specific call for support of liberal and progressive parliamentary candidates while emphasizing the need to correct social in justices, including unemployment and land reform. She
won an overwhelming victory.
This important political victory opens the prospect of orderly
change in the Indian countryside, but it will still be difficult to achieve
in practice the measures advocated by the Prime Minister. The complex state-central administration arrangement will have to be surmounted, and there may be need for amendment of the Constitutiona step hitherto found infeasible. If the central government can win
and hold the loyalty of the rural masses, the opposition interests may
be forced to a workable compromise.
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One of the reasons for the mystification that obscures
economics is the vocabulary it employs. Not only does it use
common, ordinary words, such as saving or investing, in ways that
are not exactly the way we use them in everyday talk, but it leans on
barbarous and intimidating terms like macroeconomics or gross nation-

al product.
It would be nice if we could purge economics of its jargon,
but that would be like asking doctors to tell us about our troubles in
plain English. Instead, we must learn to speak a certain amount of
economics-that is, to become familiar with, and easy about, some
of the basic terms in which economists tell about our economic
condition.
One of these is that odd word "macroeconomics." It comes
from the Greek macro, meaning big, and the implication is that
macroeconomics therefore grapples with very big problems. It does,
including such problems as inflation and recession and unemployment and economic growth. But that is not what distinguishes
macro from its brother, microeconomics, whom we will meet later.
Rather, macroeconomics refers to a perspective, a vantage point,
that throws into high relief certain aspects of the economic system.
What does the economy look like from the macro perspective? The view is not unlike that which we have gained in the
chapters just past. We look down on the economy, as from a plane,
to see it as a vast landscape populated by business firms, households, government agencies. Later, when we take up the micro
perspective, we will examine the selfsame landscape from a worm'seye, rather than a bird's-eye view, with surprising changes in the
features of the landscape that spring into sharp focus.
The purpose of looking down on the economy from the
macro vantage point is that it allows us to see, more clearly than
from ground level, a process of crucial and central importance. This
is the ceaseless activity of production on a national scale, the
never-ending creation and re-creation of the wealth by which the
country replenishes and renews and expands its material life. This
great central flow, on which we all depend, is called the gross
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national product, often abbreviated as GNP. When TV newscasters
say that GNP has gone up or down, what they mean is that the river
of output has gotten larger or smaller, that we are producing more
or less. Leaming about why production varies is the first task of
macroeconomics.
JV.HAT GNP IS MADE UP OF_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

We start to unravel the question by looking more closely at
the river itself. One thing is immediately clear. The flow of output
arises from the cooperation of the factors of production-from the
efforts of the labor force mustered from the nation's households,
working with capital and land mainly owned by the nation's
businesses, under the rules and laws established by the government. We can literally see the flow of production originating in ten
million farms and factories, offices and agencies, over which we fly.
It is from these wellsprings that the river of national output is
formed.
\:';:-·
As we look down on it, the river seems at first to be made up
~ of an unclassifiable collection of outputs. There are hundreds of
thousands, perhaps millions, of kinds of goods and services in the
stream of production-foods of every conceivable kind, spectrums
of clothing, catalogs of machinery, jumbles of junk. But at second
look, we can see that this vast and variegated output can be divided
into two basic sorts of production. One of them consists of goods
and services that will be bought by households for their personal
use: cars, haircuts, jewelry, meat. We call this branch of the river of
production consumption, and the various goods and services in it

consumers' goods.

·

The consumption branch of our production process is familiar to us. But looking again from our macro vantage point, we can
see that there are goods and services that never end up in any
consumer's possession. Here is a stream of outputs such as machines, roads, office buildings, bridges, not to mention smaller
objects such as office furniture and office typewriters. These goods
are also obviously part of our gross national product, but they are
not consumers goods. We give them a special name-investment
goods or capital goods-and we will soon see that they play a vital role
in determining our economic well-being.
The macro view also enables us to see a rather surprising
thing about the two branches of output. It is that each stream
supports a different part of the economy. The flow of consumers'
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goods obviously goes to restore the working strength and well-being
of the nation's households. Without it, we would perish in a few
weeks. But the investment flow of output also plays a restorative
function. Investment output replenishes and renews the capital
wealth of the nation, mainly owned by its firms and, to a smaller
extent, by the government. The flow of investment output terminates in repairs to and extensions of our system of dams and roads,
assembly lines and warehouses, lathes and drill presses, farm
equipment and apartment houses. If that stream of output dried up,
we would not perish as quickly as if consumer output disappeared,
but our productive strength would soon wither, and by degrees we
would be forced back to the level of an underdeveloped, then of a
primitive, society.
GNP, then, consists of two main kinds of outputconsumption goods and investment goods. The nearly $3 trillions
that gross national product amounted to in 1981, for instance, is
nothing but the total sales value of these two basic kinds of output.
It may help to think of the river of production as passing through
the checkout counters of an immense supermarket. The sales ticket
on each item is run up on a cash register. After a year of ringing up
the checkouts, a total is taken of the tapes. That's GNP for the
year.

A few things ought to be noticed about this GNP. One of
them is that the flow of output through the checkout counter is
comprised of both public and private goods and services. Take the
flow of consumption, for example. Consumption goods or services,
as the words indicate, are goods that we consume or use up, usually
in a fairly short period. Most consumption goods are bought by
private households for their personal use-food or clothing, for
instance, or services such as movie admissions or legal advice. But
some consumption outputs are bought by local or state or federal
governments. Teachers' or firemen's services, for example, resemble
the professional services of lawyers or oil-well fire fighters, but they
are part of public consumption, not private. This is true even though
households in the end get the benefit of teachers' or firemen's
performances: the "person" who pays the bill for their services is
the state.
The same division into private and public can be observed if
we look at investment. Investment goods typically last a long time
and are replaced when they wear out, as in the case with a factory.

66

Macroeconomics

But this is also true of a road or a dam or a city-owned incinerator
plant. These are investment goods, too, but they are public, not
private ones.
It's important to remember that there is an investment
component in the GNP bought by government, because we will see
that investment plays a very important role in determining our level
of productivity. Many people speak of the public sector as if it
consisted only of consumption goods that were used up, rather than
of investment goods that contribute to future output. That's a
misconception, and a serious one.
While we are concerning ourselves about public output, one
further thing should be noted. It is that very large and important
flow of government spending, mainly federal, called transfer payments. As we know, this is a stream of payments mainly for "safety
net" purposes: Social Security payments, unemployment compensation, help for the disabled or disadvantaged, plus subsidies of
various kinds. Federal transfers came to about $280 billions in 1981,
,. equal in size to a little less than 10 percent of GNP.
c.
Yet when we add up GNP, we do not include any transfer
_, payments in it! This is because transfers, as the name indicates, are
payments made for social purposes, not because the recipients
perform a useful service. Here is the difference: when we pay our
deaning bills, we transfer money to someone who has done work
for us. So too, when we pay taxes to help finance schools or fire
departments or even armies, we also pay individuals who perform
services on our behalf. But the portion of the taxes we pay that is
used to provide income to individuals who cannot find work, or are
too infirm to support themselves, or who have reached the age of
retirement, is not a reward for effort. It is a pure transfer payment
-a form of institutionalized social responsibility that has become
part of every advanced nation. It is, in fact, the public equivalent of
private charity. But because no production takes place in exchange
for a transfer payment, such as a Social Security check, transfers are
simply left out when we calculate GNP. The same is true for
gambling outlays, or the buying of stocks and bonds, or disaster
relief. These are all large and important flows of spending, but they
do not reflect the activity of production that GNP sets out to
measure.
When GNP is actually calculated by Commerce Department
statisticians, the river of output is imagined to pass through not one,

The GNP

67

but four checkout lines. One of them rings up the total of personal
consumption expenditures, all of them made by private households.
A second register totals up all the private domestic investment
output of the country, mainly business plant and equipment and
new homes for families. A third checkout line keeps track of all
public output, whether for consumption or investment purposes.
There is really no reason why we do not separate public output into
a consumption and an investment stream, as we do with private
output, and it might help us better understand the government's
place in the economy if we did. But we don't, so school lunch
programs and new subway trackage are put together in one government output figure.
Finally, there is a fourth counter, where we ring up all the
U.S. production that is sold abroad and where we subtract all the
foreign production that is bought here. Usually we sell more abroad
than we buy, so there is an "export balance" as part of GNP, a
rivulet that arises within our shores and wends its way across the
borders.
Thus the GNP figure we read about is the sum of four
separate tallies (involving hundreds and hundreds of detailed
reports and estimates) of our national output. In 1980, for example,
the four tallies were:
GNP, 1980

$billions

Personal consumption expenditure
Private domestic investment outlays
Government purchases
Export balance

1,673

Total Gross National Product

2,626

395
535

23

There is one last matter. In adding up our GNP, government
statisticians do not record the value of every good that is produced,
each time it is sold. If they did, they would have to add up the value
of a bushel of wheat sold to a grain elevator, the grain sold to a
miller, the flour sold to a baker, the bread sold to a supermarket,
and, finally, the loaf sold to a consumer. This would be a much
bigger figure than the value of the final loaf, and yet the value of the
loaf clearly contains the payments that have been previously made
to the baker, the miller, the grain elevator, and the farmer.
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Following along this line, statisticians only keep track of final
goods, not of intermediate ones. As we would imagine, each of the
checkout counters tots up one category of these final goods:
consumer goods, investment goods, government output, and net
exports.
;__~

WHAT DOES GNP TELL US? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

It should be pretty clear by now what GNP consists of. What
is not yet so clear is how important it is. Does the size of GNP tell us
accurately if we are better off or not? Is it good if GNP goes up, and
bad if it goes down?
The answer is yes and no. The yes part is easy to understand. When the value of production rises, more people are likely to
be employed. When the value of total output increases, more
incomes are sure to be received. So there is an evident connection
between the size of GNP and the level of employment and of
national incomes. The size of GNP also serves as a general measure
of the amount of goods and services that we can buy, individually
and collectively. That is why, all things considered, a rising GNP is
always welcome, and a falling one unwelcome.
Yet GNP is also a flawed and deceiving measure of our
well-being, and we should understand the weaknesses as well as the
strengths of this most important single economic indicator.
To begin with, GNP deals in dollar values, not in physical
units. Therefore we have to correct it for inflation. As we know from
our last chapter, trouble arises when we compare the GNP of one
year with that of another to determine whether or not the nation is
better off. If prices in the second year are higher, GNP will appear
higher even though the actual volume of output is unchanged or
even lower. Thus, GNP is an accurate indicator of well-being only if
we can accurately take out the inflation factor in comparing one year
with another. Can we? Well, partly, but not perfectly. There is
always a margin of uncertainty in comparing the "real" GNP of
today with that of yesterday.
A second weakness of GNP also involves its inaccuracy as
an indicator of "real" trends over time. The difficulty revolves
around changes in the quality of goods and services. In a technologically advancing society, goods are usually improved over time, and
new goods are constantly being introduced. At the same time, in an
increasingly high-density society, the quality of other goods may be
lessened: an airplane trip today is certainly preferable to one of
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thirty years ago, but a subway ride is not. Government statisticians
try to adjust GNP statistics for such changes in quality, but obviously there is a margin of uncertainty here too.
A third difficulty with GNP lies in its blindness to the
ultimate use of production. If in one year GNP rises by a billion
dollars, owing to an increase in expenditure on education, and in
another year it rises by the same amount because of a rise in
cigarette production, the figures in each case show the same amount
of growth. Even output that turns out to be wide of the mark or
totally wasteful-such as the famous Edsel car that no one wanted
or military weapons that are obsolete from the moment they
appear-all are counted as part of GNP.
The problem of environmental deterioration adds another
difficulty. Some types of GNP growth directly contribute to
pollution-cars, paper or steel production, for example. Other types
of GNP growth are necessary to stop pollution-sewage disposal
plants or the production of a clean internal-combustion engine.
Our conventional measure of GNP makes no distinction
among such outputs. For instance, the cleaning bills we pay to undo
damage caused by smoke from the neighborhood factory become
part of GNP, although cleaning our clothes does not increase our
well-being, but only brings it back to what it was in the first place.
These problems also cloud the meaning of GNP.
Finally, GNP does not indicate anything about the distribution of goods and services among the population. Societies differ
widely in how they allocate goods and services among their populations: compare Sweden and Mexico, whose total GNP's are roughly
the same; or Sweden and the U.S., whose per capita GNP's are
much alike. Thus to know the size of GNP or the level of GNP per
capita is to know nothing about the social consequences of that
GNP. A rich country may have lots of poverty which it is indifferent
to, or perhaps impotent to correct. A poor country can produce a
few millionaire families: some Indian princes used to receive their
weight in gold from their peoples each year.
All these doubts and reservations (and some others we've
left unmentioned) should instill in us a caution against using GNP
as if it were a clear-cut measure of social contentment or happiness.
Economist Edward Denison once remarked that perhaps nothing
affects national economic welfare so much as the weather, which
certainly does not get into the GNP accounts! Hence, because the
U.S. may have a GNP per capita that is higher than that of, say,
Japan, it does not mean that life is better here. It may be worse. In

.

70

--- . -~ ··~ ~-··_,..,,-

Macroeconomia.

fact, by the indices of health care or incidence of crime, it probably is
worse.
Yet, with all its shortcomings, GNP is still the simplest way
we possess of summarizing the overall level of activity of the
economy. U we want to examine its welfare, we had better tum to
specific social indicators of how long we live, how healthy we are,
how cheaply we provide good medical care, how varied and
abundant is our diet, and so forth-none of which we can tell from
GNP figures alone. But we are not always interested in welfare,
partly because it is too complex to be summed up in a single
measure. fur instance, the indices of health care or crime are better
in Japan than in the United States, but not the index of living space
per person. There are lots of other data that could be consulted.
GNP has the great value of being at everyone's fingertips, and of
being, for better or worse, the yardstick that has become accepted by
most nations in the world. It will remain a central term in the
economic lexicon for a long time to come.
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Why does GNP fluctuate? Accidents of weather or natural
disasters aside, why does the river of production run fast one year
and slow the next? The question begins to take us into the real
purpose of macroeconomic inquiry. Now that we know what GNP
is, we want to know why it behaves the way it does.
A good way to begin is to look once again at the flow of
output-this time paying heed not to the actual production of goods
and services that get tallied by the Commerce Department statisticians, but at the buyers standing at those checkout counters to take
delivery of the nation's production. As we would expect, the
nation's households are gathered at the consumption counter, its
business firms cluster around the investment counter, government
agencies make up the buyers at the government counter, and
foreign firms and individuals and governments wait at the last
counter.
Looking at GNP from this perspective, we see it not so much
as a stream of goods, but as a flow of buying, of expenditure, of
demand. Each and every good that moves along the river of output
is drawn by someone's expenditure for it. Money makes goods
move. As Adam Smith said, "Money is the great wheel of circulation."
Switching our attention from production to buying brings us
much closer to an answer for why the level of GNP fluctuates.
Output fluctuates because the demand for it rises and falls. This is
not the only reason why production varies-droughts and earthquakes, strikes and technical hang-ups, government regulations
may also alter the level of production. Later in this chapter we will
take a first look at "supply side" economics, which emphasizes the
adverse effects of taxation on the incentive to produce. But even the
most determined supply sider will agree that demand-the willingness and ability to buy goods-is essential for the river of produc-
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tion to flow. Thus the way to begin our investigation is by examining
where demand comes from and what makes it rise or fall.

HOUSEHOW SAVING, BUSINESS SPENDING _ _ __
We tum to the first checkout counter, where the nation's
households are queuing up to buy the national output of consumers' goods and services. Where does the flow of household spending come from?
The answer is that it comes in the main from household
earnings-from the wages, salaries, rents, dividends, profits, or
whatever other payments householders have received from the
work they have performed. It also comes from transfer payments,
such as Social Security checks. The flow of spending can be
augmented, at least for a while, if households actually draw down
their savings accounts or liquidate stocks or bonds, but people rarely
do that to buy ordinary consumers' goods. Finally, the flow can be
also augmented by borrowing, so that in any one year some
households will spend more than their current incomes-often the
•:_case when there is an expensive purchase such as a car.
',;;i
Just the same, when we look at the sum total of all
household incomes and compare it with the total of all household
expenditures for consumers' goods, we discover that households as
a whole (as a "sector," economists say) regularly save some portion
of their incomes.• Year in and year out, the fraction is about 5
percent. That is, even after households have borrowed, used their
credit cards and charge accounts and all the rest, they still take in
more money than they lay out.
Hence there is no difficulty in understanding where the
demand comes for the part of GNP that is made up of consumers'
goods. All of it comes directly out of the earnings and transfer
incomes of households, supplemented by their borrowings. In fact,
looking at GNP from the macro viewpoint, the question that occurs
to us is not where consumer demand comes from, but what
happens to the 5 percent of household earnings that do not get
returned to the economy, but are instead saved.
That question turns our attention to the next checkout

*This includes household spending for autos, but not for houses. They are
counted as investment goods, not as consumer goods.
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counter, where investment goods are bought by private business.
Just as the household sector buys its everyday consumption goods
mainly out of its earnings, so the business sector buys its ordinary
day-to-day requirements from the money it regularly takes in from
its sales. We can picture the nation's business as a gigantic household, buying its needed services of labor and its inputs of raw
materials or semifinished goods from the receipts it takes in by
selling its finished output.
There is, however, a critical difference between the household sector and the business sector. It is that the business sector
does not normally save some portion of its receipts. On the contrary,
it spends more than it takes in through its sales. That idea is so important
that it warrants saying a second time. The normal, regular, healthy,
and even necessary behavior of the business community as a whole
is to lay out more money for wages, salaries, raw materials,
semifinished goods, land, and capital than the total amount it takes
in by selling its own output.
When we put it this way, business behavior sounds very
unsafe. How can even the largest corporation afford to lay out more,
year after year, than it takes in from its sales? The answer is that
business does not spend all its earnings. Part of these it too "saves"
as profits, although it may disburse these profits in whole or part as
dividends or as expenditures for capital goods. But over and above
its normal revenues, business takes in additional financial revenues
by borrowing from banks or by selling its stocks and bonds. These
additional resources-the new capital funds it raises-are also
spent, not to pay the regular running expenses of firms, but to pay
for their capital improvements. AT&T does not use the proceeds
of its bond issues to pay the wages of its phone operators, but
to pay for the additions to its phone lines, its new buildings, its
satellites.
Thus the process of saving and investing goes directly to the
central issue of macroeconomics. Household savings are "acquired"
by the business sector to finance the building of new capital goods.
In tum, this becomes a primary means by which we increase our
productivity and thereby cause GNP to increase. Here is the first
explanation of how GNP grows and why it fluctuates. The explanation is important enough to set apart:
1. Gross national product grows because savings are converted into capital equipment.
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2. The savings that originate in the household sector are
invested by the business sector.*
3. GNP fluctuates because the process of transforming
savings into investment is not always smooth or steady.
HOH! THE SECTORS INTERLOCK _ _ _ _ _ _ __

These critical relationships may come as something of an
anticlimax, because everyone knows that saving and investing lie at
the heart of economic grO\vth, even if the process is not often
described so precisely. But there are aspects of the saving and
investing process that everyone does not know, and it is these to
which we should now tum.
Let's begin with saving. We think of saving as putting
money in a bank or in a financial institution of some other kind.
What we do not often realize is that saving has two quite distinct
meanings. The first of these is indeed putting money aside-not
spending it. The second is letting go of resources. As we shall see,
the two aspects have quite different consequences: the first bad, the
second good.
'',
Putting money in a bank or in a new insurance policy or a
new issue of stock has the immediate effect of creating a gap or a
shortfall in demand. The gap arises because some of the earnings
that householders have received from firms or government will not
be returned to circulation as part of the consumption flow. In a
word, saving means not consuming. As we have just seen, this
doesn't mean that those savings remain permanently removed from
circulation. We can picture householders on the consumption
queue, lending or otherwise transferring their savings to the businessmen standing at the investment queue. But until the transfer is
actually made, through the banking system or the stock market or
the purchase of life insurance, saving means only that householders
have taken some of their earnings and decided not to use it for
buying consumption goods.
We'll return in a moment to the question of getting the
money into the hands of the business queue. Meanwhile, however,
*The degree to u·hich the /msincss sector depends 011 the savings of the
household sector varies a good deal from one nation to another. In
Germany and fapan, the dcprndencc is high. In the United States it is 11ot,
a11d /'lisincss fi11a11ccs itself through its 0<<.111 cami11gs to a very considerable
extent.
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we must also understand that saving is more than just a financial
matter. It is also an action that frees labor and resources from the
production of consumers goods and thereby makes them available
for producing other goods.
An illustration may help us see this. Suppose, for example,
that businessmen decided to double their investment spending, in
anticipation of a boom. Or suppose that the government wanted to
double its military spending, in anticipation of a war. It is obvious
that such an increase in the spending of the business or government
sectors would send the price of labor and of other materials shooting
upward, as business and government struggled to get their hands
on the labor force and the materials they needed. That would result
in higher costs, and could start an inflationary scramble.
In fact, there is only one way in which a large increase in
investment or government spending can possibly be undertaken
without such a scramble: the resources and labor they need must be
made available to them. One way in which this can be done is by
taxing-simply taking away spending power from households and
giving it to government. But industry has no taxing power. For
business, the only way that resources can be made available on a
large scale is for them to be voluntarily relinquished by the household sector. We call that process of voluntary relinquishment saving.
(Of course householders may be tempted to give up their spending
by all sorts of inducements from banks or other institutions, but it is
a voluntary, not a forced act nonetheless).
Thus the really constructive aspect of saving is not so much
its financial side, which merely creates a gap in spending, but its
"real" side-giving up a claim on land and labor and capital for the
immediate enjoyments they could produce.
This leads to the last vital link in the chain. The released
resources must now be taken up and put to use by the business
sector. If they are not put to use, the shortfall in demand created by
the financial act of saving will simply hurt consumer sales without
any compensation in the sales of other goods, and the labor and
other resources released by households will stand idle. Thus the
last, most active and creative part of the whole process lies in the
decisions of the business sector to undertake the act of capital
formation. As we will see in our next chapter, this is inherently a
risky and uneven process.
So saving and investment have implications and meanings
less familiar to us than the general recognition that there is a
saving-and-investing process at work. Indeed, there is one unfa-
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miliar aspect that we can now see is the key to how the macro
system works. It is that economic growth takes place through the
coordination and cooperation of the sectors.
As ordinary participants in the economy, we never think of
coordinating our activity with that of anyone else, much less that of
a sector. Nor does any businessman think of cooperating with the
household or any other sector when he undertakes plans for an
addition to his establishment. Nevertheless, it is by such a continuous coordination and cooperation that the system grows-and it is
by imperfections in the interplay of the sectors that it falters.
The interplay can be very simply stated:
l. A gap in demand, in any sector, must be offset by
additional demand in another sector. If this act of coordination does
not take place, there will be a fall in demand, a decline in GNP,
unemployment, and trouble.
2. An increase in investment or in government spending,
assuming there is reasonably full employment, requires that resources be made available to the expanding sector. This can only be
accomplished by taxing or by voluntary saving.
3. If expanding sectors spend more than the savings made
available to them, there will be an upward pressure on the system,
and the possibility of inflation. If the active sectors spend less than
the flow of savings, there will be a downward pressure on the
system, and the possibility of a recession.
Of course this is not the whole story of boom and bust,
inflation and recession. We have not touched on such crucial matters
as money, productivity, or the role of government. But a first
structural understanding of the economy has begun to emerge. We
can see that growth does not just happen, but comes about from a
mutually supportive interaction of the sectors of the system. How
that interaction is brought about and how it can be corrected when it
fails to achieve the right result are the problems that will occupy us
over many pages to come.
THE GOVERNMENT ENTERS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

But we are not yet done with the checkout counter. We have
seen how demand for GNP arises because households spend most
of their earnings and businesses spend most of their own revenues
plus the savings they have acquired from the household sector. But
we have not yet observed what happens at the government checkout station or at the counter where foreigners line up.
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Government first. At first glimpse there is an immediate
resemblance between the government sector and the sector of
business or of private households. Considering government as a
collection of local, state, and federal purchasing agencies, we can see
that the sector buys its goods and services with its everyday
receipts-its tax revenues-just as businesses and families spend
their normal receipts. In an important way, however, the receipts of
government are different from those of households and businesses.
With rare exceptions, government does not sell its outputs, however
useful they may be. Toll roads or the fees for landing at an airport
are exceptions to the general rule that government distributes its
services without charge. Therefore it has to assure its income by
some other means, and so the government simply commandeers a
portion of household or business income. The word commandeer may
seem extreme, but we must recognize that taxes are not like ordinary
charges. A household or a business may refuse to purchase the
output of another household or business, but they cannot refuse to
purchase the output of government. Taxes are a compulsory payment.
On the other hand, it is well to bear in mind that taxes are
also the expression of the will of the electorate, however clumsily
that will may be expressed. Moreover, we should bear in mind that
government provides one absolutely essential service in exchange
for its taxes-a service without which no household or business
could earn a cent. That is the service of the maintenance of law and
order and the protection of property rights. "It is only under the
shelter of the civil magistrate," wrote Adam Smith, "that the owner
of ... valuable property ... can sleep a single night in security."
Thus there is a profound difference between the political
roles of the public and private sectors. But we must also recognize
that there is a striking resemblance between the sectors with regard
to their economic cooperation and coordination. Suppose, for example, that the household sector creates a demand gap by making its
normal savings, and that the business sector, for whatever reason,
fails to offset that gap by borrowing or gathering the savings
through new stock issues and the like. Could not the government
borrow these unused savings and close the demand gap by spending them for
public purposes, such as public investment?
The answer, of course, is that it can. If there is a demand gap
that must be "closed" by investment spending, what difference does
it make if the investment is for a communications satellite owned
by AT&T or one owned by the government, or a rail line owned by
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Santa Fe or owned by Amtrak, or a private utility plant or a public
one, a private factory or a public dam? There is no difference. What
is essential is that the saving of one sector be spent by another, or
that the investment spending of one sector be saved by another.
Of course this is not an end to the matter. There is room for
a great deal of controversy as to which activities the government
should pursue and which it should not. There is room for debate as
to whether the government can safely spend its borrowings for
consumption purposes-Social Security, for instance. There is a
great deal of controversy as to whether the government may
inadvertently "crowd out" private enterprise when it expands its
activities.
So the question of the role of government is not easily
settled. What is easily settled, however, is that the government
sector can play exactly the same investing role as the business sector.
Government can use its borrowing powers just like business to offset
a shortfall in spending elsewhere. Whether it should do these things
is a question we will have to consider further. But it is important to
see that the government, as a sector, can-indeed must\~ coordinate its activities with other sectors. No economist, conserva'.·,: tive or radical, would deny that.
·
One last source of demand should be looked at quickly. This
is the foreign checkout counter, where overseas buyers provide
demand for U.S. output by taking delivery of grain and computers
and jet planes and machinery, and where foreign sellers deliver
coffee and ores and oil and Toyotas to waiting American buyers. The
workings of the foreign-demand part of GNP are more complicated
than those of the other sectors. We will come back to this aspect
later, in Chapter Nineteen. For the time being, we can simply note
its presence, while we concentrate our attention on the three
domestic counters-households, business, and government.
So we have come to see that saving-and-investing-we
hyphenate the process to emphasize its essential linkage-is the key
to economic growth and economic fluctuation. It is the key to
growth because investment is the activity by which we lay down the
equipment that makes us more productive. It is by investment that
Adam Smith's pin factories are built, multiplying by factors of ten
and a hundred and a thousand the material goods that can be
fashioned in an hour of work. Saving-and-investing is also the key
to fluctuation in GNP because the process does not go on at a steady
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unvarying rate, but faster or slower as various factors alter the flow
of saving-or more usually, as they alter the prospects for investment. That is a matter we will examine next.
Last, we can see one vitally important point. Demand is the
immediate driving force of the economy. It is the volume of total
spending-the spending of households on consumption goods, of
business firms on capital goods, of government on its consumption
and investment purchases, and of foreigners on net exports-that
supplies the day-by-day stimulus for our gross national production.
Even supply-side economists, who stress the importance of the
incentive to produce and the dampening effects of taxes, would
willingly concede this point. When demand falters for any reason,
GNP falters, and with it, employment and incomes. Supply-side
and demand-side economists differ, however, as to whether the
demand generated by the normal investment activities of the private
sector, once onerous taxes and regulations are removed, will suffice
to generate sufficient growth. Supply siders say yes; demand siders
believe that government will probably have to play a supportive
role.
That's obviously an important question for later. But it's no
use getting into discussions about supply-side economics until we
understand still more deeply how the household and business and
government sectors operate. That's the agenda to which we now
tum.
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The problem of big business is one of old standing, dating
back to the period just after the Civil War. But recently that problem
has been given a new twist by the appearance of enormous
corporations whose business empires literally straddle the globe
-the multinational corporations. Take PepsiCo, for example.
PepsiCo does not ship its famous product around the world from
bottling plants in the United States. It produces Pepsi Cola in more
than five hundred plants in over orie hundred countries. When you
buy a Pepsi in Mexico or the Philippines, Israel, or Denmark, you are
buying an American product that was manufactured in that country.
PepsiCo is a far-flung, but not a particularly large multinational: In 1979 it was the fifty-seventh largest U.S. company.
Compare it with the Ford Motor Company in 1979, a multinational
that consists of a network of 60 subsidiary corporations, 40 of them
foreign-based. Of the corporation's total assets of $23 billion, over
one third was invested in 27 foreign nations; and of its 494,000
employees (as of 1979), more than 175,000 were employed outside
the U.S. And if we studied the corporate structures of GM or IBM or
the great oil companies, we would find that they, too, are multinational companies with substantial portions of their total wealth
invested in productive facilities outside the United States.
If we broaden our view to include the top one hundred
American firms, we find that two thirds have such production
facilities in at least six nations. Moreover, the value of output that is
produced overseas by the largest corporations by far exceeds the
value of the goods they still export from the United States. In 1974
sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms (which means
their wholly or partially owned overseas branches) came to over
$115 billion. In the same year our total exports of manufactures
amounted to $47 billion, only 41 percent as much as American firms
produced abroad.
Another way of establishing the spectacular rise of interna-
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tional production is to trace the increase in the value of U.S. foreign
direct investment; that is, the value of foreign-located, U.S.-owned
plant and equipment (not U.S.-owned foreign bonds and stocks). In
1950 the value of U.S. foreign direct investment was $11 billion. In
1980 it was over $213 billion. Moreover, this figure, too, needs an
upward adjustment, because it includes only the value of American
dollars invested abroad and not the additional value of foreign
capital that may be controlled by those dollars. For example, if a U.S.
company has invested $10 million in a foreign enterprise whose total
net worth is $20 million, the U.S. official figures for our foreign
investment take note only of the $10 million of American equity and
not of the $20 million wealth that our equity actually controls. If we
include the capital controlled by our foreign direct investment as a
whole, the value of American overseas productive assets may be as
large as $300 billion. In general, something between a quarter and a
half of the real assets of our biggest corporations are abroad.
Effectively, American big business is today world big business.

The movement toward the internationalization of production is not, however, a strictly American phenomenon. If the
American multinationals are today the most imposing (of the
world's biggest five hundred corporations, over three hundred are
American), they are closely challenged by non-American multinationals, as the table below shows. Philips Lamp Works, for example,
is a huge Dutch multinational company with operations in sixtyeight countries. Of its 225,000 employees, 167,000 work in nations
other than the Netherlands. Royal Dutch/Shell is another vast
multinational, whose home is somewhere between the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom (it is jointly owned by nationals of both
countries): Shell in the United States ranks among "our'' top twenty
biggest companies. Another is Nesti~ Chocolate, a Swiss firm, 97
percent of whose $2 billion revenues originate outside Switzerland.
Measured by the size of the Swedish capital invested there, 5ao
Paulo is Sweden's second biggest industrial city!
Indeed, if we take the ten leading capital-exporting nations
together (including the United States), we find that in 1%7 their
combined exports came to over $130 billion, but their combined
overseas production amounted to well over $240 billion. In 1970 an
economist for the International Chamber of Commerce estimated
that total international production-U.S. production abroad, foreign production here, and foreign production in other foreign
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countries-accounted for as much as one sixth of the total value of
all world output, and a much higher fraction of the world output of
industrial commodities. It is greater than that today, although we do
not know exactly how large international production is.
What drives a firm to produce overseas rather than just sell
overseas? One possible answer is straightforward. A firm is successful at home. Its technology and organizational skills give it an edge
on foreign competition. It begins to export its product. The foreign
market grows. At some point, the firm begins to calculate whether it
would be more profitable to organize an overseas production
operation. By doing so, it would save transportation costs. It may be
able to evade a tariff by producing goods behind a tariff wall. A very
important consideration is that it may be able to take advantage of
lower wage rates. And so, gradually, it ceases shipping goods
abroad and instead exports capital, technology, and managementand becomes a multinational.
Calculations may be more complex. By degrees, a successful
company may change its point of view. First it thinks of itself as a
domestic company, perhaps with a small export market. Then it
builds up its exports and thinks of itself as an international company
with a substantial interest in exports. Finally its perspective changes
to that of a multinational, considering the world (or substantial
portions of it) to be its market. In that case, it may locate plants
abroad before the market is fully developed, in order to be firmly
established abroad ahead of its competition.
More and more of the great corporations of the world have
come to consider their "natural" markets to be the globe, not just
their home countries. The struggle in automobiles, in computers, in
telecommunications, in steel, is for shares of a world market. That is
why we find companies such as IBM or General Motors considering
the entire globe as their oyster, not only with regard to the
"sourcing" of raw materials, but to the location of plants, and finally
the direction of sales effort. With modem rapid jet transportation,
instant global data retrieval, and highly organized systems of
production and distribution, the manufacture of commodities is
more and more easily moved to whatever country produces them
most cheaply, whereas their sale is focused on the countries that
represent the richest markets. Thus we have a transistor radio
whose parts have been made in Hong Kong or South Korea or
Singapore, assembled in Mexico, and sold in the United States-by
a Japanese manufacturer! In early 1972-a figure already ten years
out of date, but the best we have-such multinational production
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mE TOP 15 MULTINATIONALS, 19n•

Company
General Motors
Exxon
Ford·
Royal Dutch/Shew•
General Electric
IBM
Mobil Oil
Chrysler
Texaco
Unilever"

Total sales
(billions of
dollars)

Number of
countries
Foreign sales in which
as percent- subsidiaries
age of total are located

$28.3

19%

21

18.7

so

25

16.4

26

30

12.7

79

43

9.4

16

32

8.3

39

80

8.2

45

62

8.0

24

26

7.5

40

30

7.5

80

31

rrr

7.3

42

40

Gulf Oil
British Petroleum"
Philips
Gloeilampenfabrieken"
Standard Oil of California
•Latest available data
••Not a U.S. firm

5.9

45

61

5.2

88

52

5.2

NA

29

45

26

5.1

was estimated to account for between 15 to 20 percent of the gross
output of the capitalist world.
ECONOMICS OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION _ _

Whether or not the multinational boom continues at its past
rate, the startling rise of multinationals has already changed the face
of international economic relationships. One major effect has been a
dramatic shift in the geographic location and the technological
character of international economic activity.
The shift away from exports to international production has
introduced two changes into the international economic scene. One
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change is a movement of foreign investment away from its original
concentration in the underdeveloped areas of the world toward the
richer markets of the developed areas. Fifty years ago, in the era of
high imperialism, most of the capital leaving one country for
another flowed from rich to poor lands. Thus foreign investment in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was largely associated with the creation of vast plantations, the building of railways
through jungles, and the development of mineral resources.
But the growth of the multinational enterprise has coincided
with a decisive shift away from investment in the underdeveloped
world to investment in the industrial world. In 1897, 59 percent of
American foreign direct investment was in agriculture, mining, or
railways, mainly in the underdeveloped world. By the end of the
1970s our investment in agriculture, mining, and railways, as a
proportion of our total overseas assets, had fallen to about 20
percent; and its geographical location in the backward world came to
only 36 percent of all our overseas direct investments. More striking,
almost three quarters of our huge rise in direct investment during
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s were in the developed world; and
the vast bulk of it was in manufacturing (and oil) rather than in
plantations, railroads, or ores. Thus the multinational companies
have been investing in each others' territories rather than invading
the territories of the underdeveloped world. In recent years there
has been a highly visible thrust of multinational investment in
manufacturing facilities in a few poorer nations-big factory investments in Mexico, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea. Nonetheless, these investments are still much smaller than the multinationals' investments in the developed countries.
The second economic change is really implicit in the first. It
is a shift away from heavy technology to high technology industries
-away from enterprises in which vast sums of capital were associated with large, unskilled labor forces as in the building of railways or
plantations-toward industries in which capital is perhaps less
strategic than research and development, skilled technical manpower, and sophisticated management techniques typical of the computer, petrochemical, and other new industries. Our table sums up the
overall shift.
Note the dramatic shift away from Latin America into
Europe and away from transport, mining, and agriculture into
manufacturing, a shift that would be even more accentuated if it
were not still dependent on oil as a major source of the world's
energy. If nuclear power or the fuel cell displace oil within the next
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SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT

Total (millions)

Disbribution by market(%)
Canada
Europe
Latin America
Asia, Africa, Near East

1929
$7,528

1950
$11,788

$213,468

27

30

21

18
47

14
41
15

45

18
16

31

42

'29

22

u

n.a.

8

Distribution by industrial sector(%)
Manufacturing
24
15
Petroleum
21
Transport and utilities
15
Mining
5
Trade
12
Agriculture
Other

8

1980

9

3

7

u

5
6

n.a.
11

two decades, we can expect a still more rapid decline in investment
in the backward areas (especially in the Near East), and a proportionately still-larger concentration of foreign direct investment in
manufacturing.

MULTINATIONAL PROBLEMS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Multinationals have not only changed the face of intematinal economic activity, but also have added considerably to the
problem of controlling domestic economies. Assume that a country
wants to slow down its economy through monetary policies designed to reduce plant and equipment spending. A restrictive
monetary policy at home may be vitiated by the ability of a
multinational to borrow abroad in order to finance investment at
home. Conversely, a monetary policy designed to stimulate the
home economy may end up in loans that increase production in
someone else's economy. Thus the effectiveness of national economic policymaking is weakened. Moreover, it is not easy to
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suggest that monetary policies should be coordinated among countries, since the economic needs of different countries may not be the
same: what is right for one country at a given time may be wrong for
another.
More important, the jealous claims of nation-states who
seek to retain national control over productive activity within their
own borders and the powerful thrust of pan-national corporations
for new markets in foreign territories introduce profound tensions
into the international world. On the one hand, the multinational is
in a position to win hard bargains from the host country into which
it seeks to enter because the corporation is the main bearer of new
technologies and management techniques that every nation seeks.
Therefore, if one country-say, India-refused to give a would-be
entrant the right to come in (and possibly cause financial losses to its
established firms), the multinational may well place its plants, with
their precious economic cargo of productivity, in another country,
leaving the recalcitrant nation the loser in the race for international
growth.
On the other hand, the power is by no means entirely
one-sided, for once a multinational has entered a foreign nation, it
becomes a hostage of the host country. It is now bound by the laws of
that country and may find itself forced to undertake activities that
are "foreign." In Japan, for example, it is an unwritten law that
workers engaged by giant corporations are never fired, but become
permanent employees. Japan has been extremely reluctant to allow
foreign capital to establish manufacturing operations on Japanese
soil, to the great annoyance of foreign companies. But if, as now
seems likely, Japan is opened to American and European capital, we
can be sure that American or European corporations will be expected to behave in the Japanese way with their employees. This will not
be an easy course to follow, since these corporations are not likely to
receive the special support that the Japanese government gives to its
own big firms.
Or take the problem of a multinational that is forced by a fall
in demand to cut back the volume of its output. A decision made
along strictly economic lines would lead it to close its least profitable
plant. But this may bring very serious economic repercussions in the
particular nation in which that plant is located-so serious that the
government will threaten to take action if the plant is closed. What
dictates shall the multinational then follow-those of standard
business accounting or those of political accounting?
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THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD _ _ _ _ _ _ __

All these problems take on a special significance in the
relation between the multinationals and the underdeveloped world.
For the multinationals are now the main conduit between the
dynamic expansive thrust of Western capitalism and the restive, but
still passive, periphery of Asia and Africa and Latin America. This
raises problems of great difficulty. As former Under Secretary of
State George Ball has candidly asked: "How can a national government make an economic plan with any confidence if a board of
directors meeting five thousand miles away can, in altering its
pattern of purchasing and production, affect in a major way the
country's economic life?"
For these and other reasons there is a great deal of suspicion
and unease surrounding the attitude toward the multinationals on
the part of the less-developed countries. And for good reason. There
is something profoundly disturbing in the spectacle of breakfast
foods and Coca-Cola displacing native diets, often to the detriment
of people living at the edge of nutritional safety; of transistor radios
and plastic ornaments pushing aside native entertainments and
adornments; of Hilton hotels towering over squalid tenements; of
ugly and monotonous factory labor driving out peasant and artisan
skills and crafts. Anyone who has traveled in the underdeveloped
world cannot help but be struck by the careless violence with which
the multinationals have uprooted established ways, exposing untrained and unreadied people to the hurricane winds of modem
technology and modem values-and all in the name of profit,
certainly not in that of human development.
And yet it is too easy to wax indignant before we have
thought the matter over. The societies that are being torn apart by
the multinationals have indeed great traditions of solidarity and
stability-if they did not, they would have perished long ago-but
they have achieved their endurance by harsh and exploitative ways
of their own, keeping their lower castes and classes, and their
women, in conditions of severe oppression and ignorance. From
this perspective, the multinationals, for all their ruthless exploitation of naive appetites and docile labor, are also carriers of social
relationships and technical abilities without which the underdeveloped world would remain hopelessly subordinate to the invincible
material and organizational capabilities of the West.
But are there not alternatives to the hegemony of the
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multinationals-more effective ways of transferring technologies
and social skills to the peoples of Africa and Southeast Asia, China
and Latin America? The question really raises for examination the
complex relationship between the core of capitalist nations and the
periphery of the regions into which capitalism has partly penetrated. This relationship, historically of great importance for capitalism,
is now in a period of stress and strain as the underdeveloped world
seeks to loosen its dependency on the West. To explore the problem in depth would take us far beyond the scope of our book.
Moreover, whatever that relationship has been, over the near-term
future there seems to be no workable alternative to the present
tension-ridden mutual dependence of core and periphery. Socialist
governments in all the underdeveloped regions have tried to
institute the process of economic and social development without
recourse to the conduits of capitalist enterprise, but the results have
been disappointing at best and catastrophic at worst. However
inadequate or lopsided the development process may be when it
occurs through the channels of the multinationals, so far it has been
superior to the development that can be conjured up from scratch,
or to the technology and organization that pour in from regimes
such as the Soviet Union. The disrupting effects and the social
deformations that result from connections with IBM or Exxon may
be easier to deal with, in the end, than those of Ministries of
Computer Technology or of Energy.
To make this assertion is not to denigrate the efforts of the
developing countries to create independent socialist governments.
But the practical reach of these governments, for a considerable
period, is more likely to be effective when applied as a corrective to
the abuses inseparable from a dependence on multinationals than as
a wholly independent alternative to them.
The multinationals will therefore occupy a strategic position
in world economic affairs for a long time. Yet in the end, it seems
doubtful that the world will be made in their image of hierarchical
efficiency. There are many things that the multinationals can do
which the emerging nations cannot, but there is one central thing an
emerging nation can do that the multinationals cannot. This is to
command the devotion of huge masses of people. Men and women
will die for the image of their nation, but they will not die for the
profits of a company.
Thus, perhaps what we must say in conclusion is that at this
stage of history, both nation-states and huge corporations are
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necessary. They seem to be the only ways in which we can organize
mankind to perform the arduous and sustained labor without which
humanity itself would rapidly perish. Perhaps after the long age of
capital accumulation has finally come to an end and sufficient capital
is available to all peoples, we may be able to think seriously about
dismantling the giant enterprise and the nation-state, both of which
overpower the individual with their massive organized strength.
However desirable that ultimate goal may be, in our time both state
and corporation promise to be with us, and the tension between
them will be part of the evolutionary drama of our period of history.

LESSON 4

DIFFERENTIATING HELP AND HINDRANCE

Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Discover the dynamics of the helping relationship from the
point of view of the "helper" and the "helpee."
2. Explore the affects of colonialism on rural development
progress in Tanzania.
3. Develop factors that outsiders should consider when initially
becoming involved in a rural development situation.
Activities
1. Simulation - The Nature of the Helping Relationship (40 min)
Participants will divide into partners. The class will walk
over to the Newman Center for a drink. One partner will be
blindfolded and assisted by the other partner from the
moment the class leaves until they return. They will go to
the Newman Center and spend 20 minutes there, talking about
any thing they like. After 20 minutes at the Newman Center
the class returns to the classroom.
2. Discussion of simulation
(20 min)
a) How did each partner feel? How did the helper actually
help and how did the helpee convey when there was enough
help or not?
b) list considerations on newsprint.
(10 min)

3. Break

4. Discussion of Hyden's view of peasantry.
(30 min)
a) How does he view the nature of the helping relationship
between government, colonist and peasant?
b) How does this relationship contribute to the
underdevelopment of the peasantry?
5. Triads
(30 min)
Task - generate list of factors that outsiders should
consider when becoming involved in a rural development
situation, regardless of the sector or task.
6. Process Consultation
a) Observations about this session
b) likes and dislikes of class assignments.
7. Handout Homework #4 Development.

(20 min)

Designing an Approach to Rural
(10 min)

Materials
1. Water and cups.
2. Newsprint.
3. Blindfolds.

HOMEWORK 4
DESIGNING A RURAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

1. Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Hyden, chapters 4 and 5, pp.96-155.
Gurley, pp.5-25.
Korten, pp.162-180.
Chambers, pp. 47-101.
Moris, pp. 47-65.
Gudeman article.

2. Write:
In 3-5 pages develop a design strategy that you would employ
to address your rural development case and justify why you
think your stategy would be effective.
3. Compare and contrast Hyden and Gurley for debate at next
class.
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Rural Development in China
1949-75, and the Lessons
to be Learned from it
JOHN G. GURLEY
The precarious position of the Chinese peasants down through the ages and the
oppressive conditions under which they laboured are too well known to require much
comment from me. One can read at length about their diseases, their illiteracy, their
superstitions and fatalistic attitudes, the natural disasters and periodic famines that all
but wiped them out, in Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), rang (A.O. 618-906), or Sung
(A.D. 906-1279) records, and indeed right down to yesterday.
Nevertheless, the records also reveal, if one examines them closely, an ingenious
peasantry producing a substantial surplus during most of this long period, not of course
for itself, but mostly for the sustenance and pleasures of a few people who made up the
ruling classes-the Emperor and his family and retainers, bureaucrats, landlords,
money-lenders, and military officers. This small but powerful ruling group pumped the
surplus out of the countryside through taxes, rents, interest, corvee labour, enslavement, extortion, and by other means fair and foul. It may well be that, on the average
over these many centuries, one third of what this peasantry produced was taken away
from it for the enjoyment and support of less than two per cent of the population. What
was left to the peasants was usually just enough for their survival, but from time to time
not enough even for that. Undernourishment was common, starvation not unusual.
Let R.H. Tawney, who with much acumen observed the Chinese peasants in the
early 1930s, have the last word:
Exaggeration is easy. Privation is one thing, poverty to the point of wretchedness---«z misere-another. A sturdy and self-reliant stock may grow in a stony soil.
But, when due allowance has been made for the inevitable misconceptions, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that a large proportion of Chinese peasants are
constantly on the brink of actual destitution. They are, so to say, a propertied
proletariat, which is saved-when it is saved-partly by its own admirable
ingenuity and fortitude, partly by the communism of the Chinese family, partly by
reducing its consumption of necessaries and thus using up its physical capital ...
It is true, however, that, over a large area of China, the rural population suffers
horribly through the insecurity of life and property. It is taxed by one ruffian who
calls himself a general, by another, by a third, and, when it has bought them off, still
owes taxes to the government; in some places actually more than twenty yean'
taxation has been paid in advance. It is squeezed by dishonest officials. It must cut
its crops at the point of the bayonet, and hand them over without payment to the
local garrison, though it will starve without them. It is forced to grow opium in
defiance of the law, because its military tyrants can squeeze heavier taxation from
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opium than from rice or wheat, and make money, in addition, out of the dens where
it is smoked. It pays blackmail to the professional bandits in its neighbourhood; or
it resists, and, a year later, when the bandits have assumed uniform, sees its villages
burned to the ground ...
There arc districts in which the position of the rural population is that of a man
standing permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to
drown him. The loss of life caused by the major disasters is less significant than the
light which they throw on the conditions prevailing even in normal times over
considerable regions. 1

I. EXPLANATIONS OF PERSISfENT POVERTY BEFORE 1949
There were of course reasons for the persistence of this deprivation and misery.
The conventional explanation is that, even with the highest efficiency in carrying out the
best-intentioned policies to alleviate rural poverty, the job would have been a most
difficult one for any government. During the past century, for example, successive
governments had to contend with several rebellions, civil wars, the Japanese invasions,
and the continued encroachment of other foreign imperialist powers on the economy.
The argument continues that, when one considers all of this turmoil within the context
of how widespread and deeply embedded poverty was in the society, it is no wonder that
very little was accomplished.
While this argument has some validity, it represents a very narrow view of the
social forces at work in this period. For the disruptive events themselves emanated
partly from the failure of the Chinese authorities to alleviate the poverty. It was a
two-way street. The battles that went on were fed by the rural misery, but these
struggles in turn contributed to further political disintegration and so to a growing
inability of governments to shore up the crumbling base.
However, even with this reformulation, the foregoing is only a part of the total
story. Most of the rest of it has to do with the "best intentions" assumed above. Social
scientists these days usually suppose that all governments really want economic
development, and, if they do not achieve it, then it must be because the problems are
unusually difficult to solve, or that solutions take a rather long time to work themselves
out. Persistence and technical knowledge arc what is required for success. This supposition, however, docs not adequately take account of the class structures of societies, the
often conflicting aims that exist among the various classes, and the class nature of
"success" and "failure". When poverty is looked at from the standpoint of the ruling
classes, it may not be a failure of the system at all but rather a prerequisite for the
continuation of their accumulation of wealth, their privileges, and their social, political,
and economic domination of the society.
This is partly because poverty is often the carcass left from wealth acquisition; or, at
best, it is the stagnant backwaters of society, not yet touched by a development process
that stresses private profit-making and hence efficiency and "building on the best''. But
poverty persists also because it is closely associated with peasant characteristics which
are highly supportive of the existing class structures and hence of the privileges and
wealth of the dominant classes. I refer to the peasants' illiteracy, passivity, obedience,
fatalism; to their lack of awarene~ of the world around them and therefore to their
propensity for mythical and spiritual explanations of personal hardships and disasters;
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to their lack of organization, their willingness to work hard for very little; to their being
easy set-ups for all sorts of manipulation by their "superiors".
A thorough-going programme of economic development, which is spread widely
and reaches deeply into the structure of society, is a dangerous thing to ruling classes,
for it tends to undermine the very attnbutes of the masses of people that nourish the
wealthy and powerful. Such a programme awakens people, and it is often best that they
doze; it mobilizes people for gigantic economic efforts, and such organization can be
turned into political subversion; it sweeps away illusions, but may open their eyes to the
causes of their own oppression.
Furthermore, any serious economic development programme that involves industrialization within an agrarian and commercial society threatens existing class structures
by creating new economic bases from which arise new social classes, and weakens the
economic foundations which support the present dominant classes. Economic
development stin up the society, establishing new classes that compete with the old
order, socially, politically, and economically.
These considerations were applicable to China prior to 1949. The peasant misery
of that country during the century preceding the Communist victory was due not only to
the inherent difficulty, during a century of violence, of raising millions of people out of
abject poverty, but, more important, to the almost complete lack of interest by the
Chinese governments and foreign investors in doing any such thing. The peasants
remained poor in large part because poverty served a purpose; or, at best, because it did
not interfere with the wealthier classes extracting the economic surplus from the
countryside.

II. CHANGES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE SINCE 1949

•

That degrading and humiliating sort of peasant misery is now gone from China,
which is not to say, of course, that a rural paradise has miraculously arisen. Chinese
peasants are still very poor, especially by the standards of industrial countries; the
struggle against nature goes on, and some Chinese peasants every now and then find
themselves on the losing end; and there are still plenty of problems to overcome and
small areas of severe poverty to eliminate.
However, the overriding economic fact about people in China today is that for over
twenty years, for the first time in their lives, almost all have had a decent stanJard of
living in the basic necessities-food, clothing, housing, health care, education, culture,
and recreation. There is no longer starvation; no longer infanticide, cannibalism, selling
children into virtual slavery; no longer blank ignorance. The Chinese now have what is
in effect an insurance policy against pestilence, famine, and other disasters. They have
all risen together; it is difficult to sec that anyone has been left far behind. And the rural
areas are alive with water-control projects, small industries, transportation and communication networks, and plans for everything else that promise fuller lives for the
peasants, who, while not prosperous, are prospering, awake, and optimistic. Some of
the gains of the Chinese economy since 1952 are shown in Table l.
How did this happen? I shall fint present some social and political, as well as
economic, reasons for this rural transformation, reasons which I believe to be basic to
any understanding of what has happened in China. After that, I shall turn to a closer
look at the eronomic policies that have changed the countryside.
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TABLE 1. S<>mt outpUI data of IM People's Republk of Oriluz:
sel«ud yean, 1951-75
(iu million metric toos unless ot.be rwisc specified)
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1952
1957
1959
1965
1969
1975

Grain

Steel

Crude
oil

154
185
16.5
210
220
270

1.4
5.4
13.4
12.S
16.0
26.0

0.4
1.5
3.7
11.0
20.4
74.5

Chemical
fertilizer Cotton

0.2
0.8
1.9

7.6
11.3
27.9

lndustrial
production
i.adell
1957•100

Cemeot

Coal

48
100
173
199
266
.502

2.9
6.9
12.3
1.5.3
18.9
40.0

131
300
220
258
427

1.3
1.6
1.2
1.9
1.8
2.3

66

Electric
power
(m ltwb)

7.3
19.3
42.0
42.0
60.0
121.0

j

h

Sourcu: CIA, Peopk's Rtpublk of CJUM: Handbook of EcoMmic /ru:ticaton, August 1976. The grain
figure tor 197.5 is from US Department of Agrkulture, People's Republic of Chin.a Agricultural Situatio", May

1977, p.3.

m. PREREQUISITF.s FOR THE TRANSmON
The Chinese peasants have been able to improve their lives over the past two
decades because they carried out a revolution of blood and fire, the only way which
enabled them to break the bonds that retarded their economic progress. This violent
revolution was necessary but not sufficient to transform an agrarian society into an
industrial one. The following five developments, however, established a polit1calsocial-economic framework for such a transition.
1. After 1949 the Chinese C.Ommunist Party fashioned itself and a government into
organs that represented the masses and wanted thorough-going and penetrating
economic development for the purpose of improving the lives of almost everyone. This,
perhaps, is the most important thing that one can say in this regard. The Communist
Party did not represent and work on behalf of a small group of merchants and traders, or
a class of landed proprietors and money-lenders, or foreign interests allied with domestic entrepreneurs; instead it gained victory through a nation-wide revolution of peasants against domestic oppression and foreign imperialism, and it continued to be a party
representing the interests of these masses of poor people. That may not be exactly an
economic determinant of peasant prosperity, but there is nothing more important.
2. The government and party proved to be efficient, honest, and well organized in
carrying out its development programmes. Some inefficiencies occurred, some bribes
were taken, and some confusion sown, but on the whole the party and its cadres
performed remarkably well in translating plans into actions.
3. The party demonstrated its ability to mobilize the enthusiasm and energy of the
masses with worthy and inspiring goals; to educate and give good health and improved
nutrition to the people, enabling them to pursue these goals. It li"berated women and
youth from their previous oppression, and liberated most people from debil.itating
beliefs in "ghosts and monsters".
4. Tb.rough land reform, nationalization of industry, and cooperativization in the
countryside, along with good use of monetary and fiscal powers, the government and
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party generated a high savings rate, and with a fair amount of efficiency used the savings
for investment across the board, in heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture.
5. The USSR aided China substantially during the 1950s. The bulk of this "aid"
was Soviet exports for Chinese goods (rather than Chinese securities), but the Soviet
goods consisted of over 150 complete industrial plants accompanied by thousands of
Soviet technicians. Soviet aid was designed to establish, in a short period of time, the
industrial base for a full-scale economic development effort. It remains, despite the
subsequent rancour between the two countries, as an outstanding example of how one
country can help another, if it really wants to.

IV. SPECIFIC POLICIES IN RURAL AREAS: 1949-75
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The developments just described established the general environment in which
specific economic policies were fashioned and carried out for rural improvement. These
economic policies, however, were not neatly laid out in the early 1950s, all ready for
sequential implementation later on. Instead, they have had at times an ad hoc nature;
they have been fought over at the leadership level; and some have oot worked well and
have had to be replaced. But, even allowing for this, the policies in general have
achieved a remarkable transformation in the rural areas.
These policies can be grouped into four categories: land reform (1949-52),
collectivization-communization (1955-9), capital formation for agriculture (196~ 75),
and the alteration of terms of trade between agriculture and industry in favour of
agriculture and the peasants (1953-75). The first set of policies redistributed wealth
and income from the rich to the poor, eliminated the former ruling classes and, by so
doing, raised both peasant consumption and rural savings. The second set of policies
raised output in the rural areas mainly by encouraging better utilization of the labour
supply. The third set further boosted agricultural output by increasing capital goods and
other inputs available to this sector and by establishing small industries almost everywhere in the countryside. Finally, throughout most of the period, the terms of trade
were steadily turned in favour of the peasants by the raising of prices paid by the state
for agricultural products and the lowering of prices of many goods purchased by the
peasants. In addition, the tax burden on the peasants was steadily reduced. Thus, the
masses of peasants initially gained control; their labour was then better utilized;
increasing agricultural inputs were next acquired by them; and they gradually gained
throughout the period by more favourable terms of trade .
The following four sections consider, without much detail, these four sets of
agricultural policies. Section lX illustrates, as an example of some of the above policies,
the transformation of one rural county in China, Tsunhua, located about I 00 miles from
Peking. Finally, the possible relevance of all this for other poor countries is taken up in
the last section.

.

V. THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF LAND REFORM: 1949-52
The primary objectives of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 were to eliminate the
feudal landlord system in the countryside, improve the lives of the poor, and develop
agricultural production as a precondition for the country's industrialization. Land
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reform took not only land from landlords and some rich peasants, but also their draft
animals, farm implements, houses, and grain-and redistributed them all to middle and
poor peasants. Altogether, 300 million peasants received 700 million mou of Jand 1
(about 45 per cent of total arable land) formerly owned by perhaps 10-12 million
persons; of all land redistributed, two-thirds was taken from landlords and one-third
from rich peasants; two-thirds of this land was given to poor peasants and one-third to
middle peasants. Many rich peasants retained much of their land and other assets (but
not their hired labourers) and so, even after the reform, were on the whole still better off
than the middle and poor peasants. Further, since the land reform regulations did not
forbid the resale or the renting of land afterwards, some of the redistributed land
gravitated back to the rich peasants. Landlords, on the other hand, as a class, were
wiped out by mass peasant struggles against them, confiscation, and sometimes
execution.
It is important to stress that land reform was not simply legislation passed and
carried out from above, for it was much more than that. It was a revolutionary
movement involving millions of peasants struggling against their former oppressors,
gaining confidence and understanding in the process, and taking actions themselves
against the landlords which committed them to new lives and new ways, and which
made the entire movement quite irreversible. Keith Buchanan quotes Liu Shao-ch'i on
this as follows:
In carrying out the land reform our Party did not take the simple and easy way
of merely relying on administrative decrees and of "bestowing" land on the
peasants. For three solid years after the establishment of the People's Republic of
China, we applied ourselves to awakening the class consciousness of the peasants ...
We consider the time spent was absolutely necessary. Because we had used such a
method the peasant masses stood up on their own feet, got themselves organized,
closely followed the lead of the Communist Party and the People's Government,
and took the reins of government and the armed forces in the villages firmly into
their hands .... The broad masses of the awakened peasants held that exploitation,
whether by landlords or by rich peasants, was a shameful thing. Conditions were
thus created which were favourable to the subsequent socialist transformation of
agriculture and helped shorten to a great extent the time needed to bring about
agricu Itural cooperation.'
A few results of the land reform are shown in Table 2, which also contains definitions of
terms used above.
The land reform, through its redistribution of rural assets, not only broke the
domination of the landlord-gentry class and transferred power for the first time to poor
and middle peasants, but it also immediately raised the consumption level of most
peasants and at the same time increased rural savings available for investment. These
were results principally of wealth redistribution and not of gains in total output flowing
from land reform, for such gains were not substantial, though there were output gains
that came from the cessation of civil strife and the reconstruction and repair of dikes,
irrigation canals, and equipment. Much of the increase in rural savings was captured by
the state for investment purposes. Thus, land reform contributed in a major way to the
higher investment ratios of these earlier years.
The ratio of net investment to national income rose rapidly from perhaps 1-2 per
cent in 1949 to around 20 per cent in 1953. After that, despite the cooperativiz.ation
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TABLE 2. Some results of Uuid rt:form in ChiNl: 1949-51
Share of crop area owned

Undlords
Rieb peasants
Middle pcaMnts
Poor peasants and
farm labouren
Other

Percentage
of
house bolds

Before reform

2.6
3.6
35.8
57.1
0.9

Avenge aop area O'litlCd

Aher reform
%

Before reform

Alter refonn

"'°"

1"0M

28.7
17.7
3-0.2

2.1
6.4
44.8

116.10
15.81

11.98
26.3-0
18.53

23.5
0.0

46.8
0.0

6.25

12.14

"'

35.15

Soiuu. Peter S<:bran, ~ Dcvelopm.ml of Cltinae Agricidturt:, 1950-1959 (University o{ Illinois
Press, 1969) pp. 21, 22, and 25.
Households were classified by amounts of income and wealth, sources of income, and siu of household.
l..&Ddlords: Owners or land not enpged in labour, who depend oo exploitation for their livelihood-that
is. land rent, mooey-lcoding, hiring of labour, etc.
Rieb peasants: Similar to landlords, except that exploitation chiefly took the form of hiring loog-~rm
labouren and it constituted somewhat lesser shares of their total inccmes.
Middle peasants: Owned ail or 1 portioo of the land they worked, or perhaps none at all. They de pc oded
for a living wholly or mainly oo their own labour.
Poor peasants: Rented land fOf cultivatioo and were exploited by others through rent and interest.
Farm labourers: Owned neither land nor farm implements; depended whoDy or mainly oo the sale of
their labour for their living.
l mc11 of land=one-si.nh of an acre or one-fifteenth of a hectare.

drive in the countryside during 1955-6, the ratio rose very little more until 1958-9,
when communes were introduced. Thus, the initial rapid increase in saving and invest.
ment came in the very early years of the period 1949-57.
Land reform bad much to do with this, for it redistributed wealth and hence income
from the rich to the poor, and much of what was redistributed was captured by the state
in savings, through taxation, profits of state enterprises, differential pricing, and private
savings. The land reform eliminated the lwcury consumption of the rich, raised by lesser
amounts the basic consumption of the poor, and made much of the rest available to the
state for investment.
Victor Lippit bas computed that the income flow to the rural propertied classes, in
rent, interest, and farm business profits, plus net taxes to the state, were as much as 19
per cent of national income, just a decade before land reform.' This income flow, which
was almost entirely consumed, was redirected downward, after land reform, by ruralasset redistribution to middle and poor peasants. From there it found its way into
investment via several channels: self-financed investment in agriculture; increased tax
payments to the state; increased profits of government and private enterprises, which
wholly or partly reverted to the state budget; increased profits of state purchasing
agencies (mostly grain purchases); and increased financial asset holdings of peasants,
which released real resources for investment, financed by borrowed funds from the
banking system. Land reform probably contnouted over one-third of the total savings
in 1952 (and, presumably, in later years, too) to the investment programme.
It bears repeating: the Chinese land reform did not give land to the poor peasants.
It encouraged them to organize themselves to
it, and in the process to crush their
former opprC$SOTS. This was the prerequisite for later socialist development in the
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countryside, for, without it, the old class structures and wealth ownership patterns
would have been regenerated by the persistence of old attitudes and of institutions
favourable to the rich.'
Vl. RURAL COLLECTIVIZATION AND LABOUR
MOBILIZATION: 1952-9
After land reform, the Chinese leaders, in four stages, transformed small private
holdings into large-seal~ communes. The first step was the encouragement of mutual
aid teams, wrucb were units of several households, the function of which was to pool
privately-owned resources in order to compensate for shortages of labour and other
inputs during the rush seasons of planting and harvesting. This was at first done on a
temporary, seasonal basis, the teams being dissolved at the end of the planting or
harvesting period, but later some of the teams were organized on a permanent, yearround basis. These permanent teams were somewhat larger than the others and often
held some capital goods and animals as common property. By 1954 almost 10 million
mutual aid teams, about half of them seasonal and half permanent, were in operation,
and they comprised 58 per cent of all peasant households.
The second stage was the formation of elementary agricultural producers' cooperatives (APCs), some of which were organized as early as 1950 but most of which were
formed in the second half of 1955. They comprised several mutual aid teams of around
30 to 40 households, that is, a village. Land and other capital goods continued to be
privately owned, but these assets were now pooled in the APCs for use according to
annual plans prepared by central management. Peasants were compensated according
to their labour and their contributions of land, implements, animals, etc., labour
however, usually claiming most of the output. By early 1956, almost all peasant families
were in these APCs.
The third stage, in 1956-7, saw the consolidation of elementary APCs into
advanced APCs, each comprising several small villages or perhaps one large village,
varying in size from 100 to 300 house bolds. In the advanced APCs, peasants held title to
a share in the collective equity, and they no longer bad any private claim on their former
holdings of land and other capital goods. Accordingly, net earnings were distributed to
the peasants only on the basis of work done, and the earnings withheld, including those
contributed by capital goods, were collectively owned. The advanced APCs, owing to
their large size, were able to withhold larger percentages of income for collective
purposes. Similarly, the payment of the agricultural tax became a collective obligation,
whereas it bad been an individual responsibility in the elementary APCs.
In the final step, during 1958-9, people's communes were established. The commune, as the Chinese have stated, "is the basic unit of the social structure of our
country, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education and the military. At the same
time, it is the basic organization of social power". Filling th.is out somewhat more, the
communes were organized to provide larger, more efficient units for carrying out
large-scale water-control projects and the building of native-type factories and workshops throughout the countryside. They were organized, moreover, to provide additional labour through the establishment of communal mess halls and other communal
services which released many women from household tasks. The communes also
became the basic governmental unit; they ran factories, schools, banks, controlled their
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own militia; and they served to weaken the patriarchal family unit and, in general,
peasants' identification only with very small groups. Further, a half-wage, half-supply
system was set up, which provided free supplies of many of the necessities to peasants
quite aside from whether they worked or not, the remainder of income being distributed
according to work done.
The communes were quickly organized during the Great Leap Forward, which was
an all-out effort by the Chinese to industrialize rural areas, to build a large iron and steel
industry, to grow record agricultural crops, to raise the education, health, and cultural
levels of the peasants, and to catch up within 1S years to the leading industrial nations of
the world.
The objective is to build China in the shortest possible time into a great
socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science
and culture .... To carry out our socialist construction at a high speed naturally
requires constant readjustment to the relations of production and constant adaptation of the superstructure to the developing economic base. The fundamental
thing, however, is to develop the productive forces rapidly .... The objectives are to
abolish exploitation of man by man, and to build a classless society in which the
difference between city and countryside, between mental and manual work will
disappear and the ideal of"from each according to his ability, to each according to
bis needs," will become the order of the day.'
Within a short time, over 26,000 communes were organized, each containing
around 5,000 households on the average, but the range was from 1,500 to 10,000. The
former advanced APCs became 500,000 production brigades within the communes,
_and the former elementary APCs became 3 million production teams.
To summarize, during the 1950s the basic organizational unit in the countryside
was enlarged from individual peasant households, to mutual aid teams (at first temporary and later permanent), to production teams (former elementary APCs), to production brigades (former advanced APCs), and finally to communes. The basis for the
distnoution of income also changed from distribution according to work and asset
ownership, to distnoutioo according to work only, to distribution according to work and
needs; and, at the same time, the value of a peasant's work points was based on the work
done by increasingly larger groups.
Some of these advances, however, were reversed in the early 1960s, during the
downturn of economic activity, when Maoist ideology waned. Communes were greatly
increased in number and so reduced in size of population; decision-making authority
was moved down to lower units; income distribution by need was de-emphasized;
communal services were greatly reduced; and private incentives in several forms were
restored.
1be enlargement of rural units and the collectivization which accompanied it
during the 1950s no doubt, on balance, raised the standard of living of the masses of
peasants, but the policies probably did not increase by much the economic surplus from
agriculture until the Great Leap Forward in 1958-9. There were both positive and
negative features of this series of rural programmes, but I shall concentrate only on the
principal advantage gained by the economy from the rural policies just described,
namely the fuller and more efficient use of the rural labour force.
Throughout the 1950s, the percentage of the rural population comprising the
labour force tended to decline sharply owing to the rapid absorption of children of
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school age by the school system. However, since children did not work the long hours of
adults or as effectively, this downward tendency was less in actual output than it was in
sheer numbers of workers. In any case, it remained simply a tendency, for it was more
than offset by the rapid growth of women in the labour force during the 1950s as rural
collectivization and communization proceeded.
These rural policies also induced increases in the total number of days worked each
year by greatly raising the number of labour-days for each employed peasant in general
and for each female in particular. The total expansion effect, coming from the increased
employment of women and the greater number of days worked for each employed
person, was extremely large, as can be seen in Table 3. In fact, under normal circumstances, total annual labour-days would have risen by no more than 2-3 billion from
1950 to 1959. Instead, the rise was 29 billion. Furthermore, Peter Schran believes that
even this might well understate the full impact of communization in this regard.

TABLE 3. Rural popu/arion, employment, and labour-days:
1950, 1955, 1957 and 1959
(1)

19SO
19S5
1957
1959

(2)
Total

(3)

(.)
Total
annual
labour-days

1952=100

26.Sb
29.4
41.5
58.4

97.S
108 4
152.8
215.0

(5)
lndcx of
col. (4)

Peasant
population

employed
peasants

Average
annual
labour-days

479.7m
523.8
541.3
539.6

22.6m
243.3
260.3
309.l

119.0
121.0
159.5
189.0

+ 17.S

+ 17.0

+38.S

+12.I

+44.4

-1.7

+48.8·

+29.S

+ 16.9

+62.2

C.ODectivi.z.a ti on,

1955-7
C.Ommuniz.ation,

1957-9

Source. Peter Schran, ~Development of Chwse Agriculrure, 1950--1959, Chapter 3
•1.ocreasc owing largely to increased mobili.utioo of women and the part-time employment of school
children.

TABLE "4,

1950
1955
1957
1959

!Mic~

of the structure of rural emp/oym.eru by labour·days:
1950, 1955, 1957 a/Id 1959
(Total labour-days in 1952 = 100)

TotAI

Fann

labour-da Y'

work

97.5
108."4
152.8
215.0

75.2
83.0
113.4

lSl.7

Subsidiary
work•

19.2
21.0
25.8
29.5

C.Orvee,
basic
construction
3.1

3.9
9.7
12.3

Otbert

0
0.4
3.8
21.4

Sowct. Peter Schrall, op. cit., p. 75.
•lodudcs ,athcri.n' activitie$, domestic handicrafts, administration, professional services, care of private
plots and livestock.
tmctudes coDective alb.in, communal service&, and communal industry.
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The increased labour was employed not only in basic farm work and in subsidiary
occupations, but increasing amounts of it were set to work on large-scale water-control
projects, basic construction, and rural industrial efforts; and much labour was increasingly used for communal services-administration, cultural activities, medical care,
education, etc. These data are in Table 4. Consequently, th.is mobilization of additional
labour-days served to raise not only agricultural input but also capital formation in the
countryside, and it also increased the communal services offered to the peasants.
Instead of fiddling away their time individually during off-seasons, the peasants were
mobilized into large units for community and area projects.
The gains in total labour-days worked, however, did not result in commensurate
increases in total output, for other inputs did not keep pace with labour inputs, and so
resulted in diminishing marginal returns to labour, the additional labour was sometimes
employed inefficiently and at tasks with quite low returns, and there was some loss of
incentives to work hard during 195~9. Nevertheless, total production in the rural areas
did increase considerably throughout most of the 1950s, and capital formation made
some impressive gains toward the end of the period. A few indicators of rural activity
during the 1950s are recorded in Table 5.

TABLES.

So~

Grain output
(millions of
me trk toos)

It
;

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

1~

157
161
175
183

186
250(200)•
270(170).

indicaton of rural activity: 1952-9

Arca of irrigation
(millions of mou)

Gross value of
agricultural OU tput
(billions of yuan)

320
330
350
370

48.3t
49.9
51.6

480

58.3
60.4
67.li
78.3t

520
1,000
1,o?O

55.5

Source. Nai-R~nn Oien, Orine3~ EcoMrnic Stati.stU:s (AJdinc, 1967), pp. 338-9, 289, 364.
•These are Western estimates, which are probably fairly accurate.
t Figures in this column are in 19 5 2 price$_
ffiprei in 195 7 prices.

VII. INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE RURAL AREAS: 1960--75
Adverse weather conditions which lasted for three years(" the worst in a century"),
the pull-out of the Soviet advisers, and disincentives of peasants arising out of the
extremes to which some Great Leap policies were pushed-all of these combined in
1959-{)0, first to reduce agricultural output, including the commercial crops which fed
light industry, then to hit heavy industry as the Soviet advisers withdrew with their
blueprints and expertise. By late 1960 and early 1961, the economy had been damaged
so severely that the Chinese leadership (probably no longer dominated by Mao), in the
face of a decline of national output of around 2~5 per cent, altered its economic
priorities to place agriculture first, light industry second, and heavy industry last. This
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offi~ally changed ~e pri?rities tha~ had b«o established un~er Soviet-type planning
dunng the 1950s, lll which heavy industry was the ceotrep1eu and agriculture was
relatively neglected so far as state investment funds were concemed. 7
These new rankings, however, did not reflect any diminished interest in industrialization. Rather they served notice that the top priority would go to those industrial
pursuits that directly served agriculture, either by producing modem inputs for that
sector or by processing output coming from it. Industries farther out would be
emphasized to the extent that they directly served these inner firms, aod so on.
Increasingly, as the 1960s proceeded, the countryside was expected to establish not
only the small industries that directly served agriculture but also, whenever possible
small basic industries such as iron and steel making, cement making, coal-mining, etc.
By the end of the decade, the economy was better able than it had been to support
agriculture both with the output of large-scale industry in the urban areas and with tens
of thousands of small, indigenous industries throughout the countryside. Thus, the
effort was redirected from the mobilization of traditional inputs (labour, natural fertilizers, draft animals, traditional tools) to the production of modem inputs such as
chemical fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides, small hydroelectric plants, electric
motors, rice transplanters, tractors, trucks, other machinery, and seed-improvement
stations. The agricultural task of the 1960s and 1970s was, in short, to industrialize and
modernize the rural areas.
Some of the results of these policies are recorded in Table 6, where it may be seen
that chemical fertilizers, tractors, and powered irrigation equipment all rose very
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. The table also shows fairly good growth for a few of the
output series that are available.

TAB LE 6. Some agriculrural inpuI.J and outpul.J: Sdected years, 1952,
1965, 1975

Chinese production of outputs

Cbinesc production of inputJ
Oiemica.I
fe rtiliz.e rs
(million
metric
tons)
1952
1965
1975

0.2
1.6

27.9

Tnctors
(thousand
standard
units)

Inventory
of powered
irrigation
equipment
(million
HP)

Grain
(million
metric
tons)

sugar
(million
metric
tons)

2.0
23.9
180.0

0.1
8.5
43.0

154
210
270

0.5

9.5

1.S

NA

2.3

17.0

Proce~d

Soybeans

(million
metric
tons)

C-Onon
yield
(kg per
be~)

234
346
495

Sources: Same .publicatioru as for Table 1.

However, we do not bave enough information to make a confident assessment
regarding the impact of these increasing dosages of modem inputs on agricultural
output. We do not have, for example, data on some kinds of inputs, such as threshers,
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harvesters, and trucks. Fwthcr, we do not know the distribution of the various inputs
among the several crops (wheat, rice, cotton, etc.), nor the changes in land area devoted
to each type of crop during the period. Moreover, the grain output estimates at the
beginning of this period arc uncertain. Consequently, the most that can be said on a
general level is that grain output rose fairly rapidly during the 1960s, apparently
responding to modern inputs in this decade to about the same degree as it responded to
traditional inputs in the previous decade.' It is probably true that, if further institutional
changes and dosages of traditional inputs bad been heavily relied upon throughout the
1960s as they were in the previous decade, agricultural output would have fared much
Jess well than it actually did.
Somewhat more detail, however, can be supplied for chemical fertilizers, which
seem to have been the most important of the modem inputs during the 1960s. The
Chinese leadership did not neglect chemical fertilizers during the 1950s, though after
the downturn of 1959--{)1 they placed much more emphasis on them. The USSR
constructed several complete plants for China in the initial decade, and China imported
machinery to modernize two plants inherited from the pre-1949 period. There was an
increase in the production of these fertilizers from 1952 to 1959. In the ne:tt d~de,
China purchased four complete nitrogenous fertilizer plants from the Netherlands,
Britain, and Italy, which were installed in 1966. She began building her own plants in
1964, and around this time set a goal of one large-scale plant for each of the 18{}-190
special districts and one smaller plant for each of the 2,200-odd counties in the country.
In fact, as things turned out, much of the increase of chemical ·fertilizers during the
1960s came from the medium- and small-scale plants that were constructed throughout
the countryside during this decade. Moreover, China began to import chemical fertilizers in increasingly larger volume, mostly from Japan and Western Europe. By 1970
available chemical fertilizers from both domestic and foreign sources totalled more than
18 million metric tons, whjch was six times the level of 1959.
It is possible to relate only in an approximate way the 15 million ton increase in the
supply of chemical fertilizers to the 70 million ton increase in grain output during the
period 1959-70. Considering the information available on this relationship, it may be
roughly acrurate to say that, during this period, chemical fertilizers contributed between 40 per cent and 55 per cent of the increase in grain output.• While this is not very
exact, it probably does suggest accurately that chemical fertilizers had a substantial
marginal impact on grain output in the 1960s, probably more than that of any other
input. This impact, however, was most likely centred on rice output which is grown in
areas where water is generally available. The impact on wheat and cotton output, grown
mostly in the north where water supplies are unreliable, was undoubtedly Jess strong.
As I noted previously, the countryside bad been industrialized to some extent
during the past decade by the establishment of thousands of small industries under local
authority. 10 These industries produce and repair farm implements and machinery; they
produce fertilizers, consumer goods, insecticides, building materials, rural transportation eqwpment; they process agricultural products and develop power sources. Such
industries have been encouraged by the central government to be as self-reliant as
possible by developing new sources of raw materials from their own areas, utilizing
waste materials and older machinery from the larger central industries, and using
relatively labour-intensive, indigenous methods of production. These rural endeavours
have been fashioned into more or less integrated industrial structures in each locality for
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the prime purpose of serving that area's agricultural needs.
The advantages claimed for these local industries are: (1) they have the abilit)' to
utilize dispersed deposits of material resources; (2) they lower average capital--0utput
ratios and shorten the gestation periods; (3) they have the ability to undertake repairing, maintenance, and processing activities, freeing large-scale capacity for jobs which
the modern sector alone could do; (4) they lower the costs of urbanization and social
overhead capital in general; (5) they have a capacity to create industrial consciousness
among the peasantry; (6) they contribute to national defence; and (7) they ameliorate
the contradictions between cities and countryside.
More generally, this rural industrialization effort has certainly had some measure
of success in expanding employment opportunities in the countryside, in balancing
production geographically, and in raising agricultural productivity generally.
VlO. IMPROVEMENT IN AG RI CULTURE'S TERM.S OF TRADE
The fourth and final programme that has raised living standards in the rural areas is
the change in terms of trade between agricultural and industrial products in favour of
the former. This improvement for agriculture has apparently been fairly constant
throughout the period, as shown in Table 7. By 1957, a given amount of agricultural
produce was purchasing about a third more industrial goods than at the beginning of the
decade. By the early 1970s, this had risen to over a half.
Over the past two decades, the government has several times raised the price at ,
which it purchases grain from the peasants. At the present time, this purchase price is
above the level at which grain is sold by the state in urban areas and in rural areas
devoted mostly to industrial crops. The difference in the prices is a subsidy from the
state to the cultivators of grain. Other agricultural goods have also been purchased at
higher prices. On the other hand, prices of industrial products bought by the peasants
rose very little for a decade after 1952, and the increases in more recent years have been
relatively modest. Indeed, the prices of many industrial products, some of which are not
in this index, have declined markedly. For example, the general price level of medicines
is 80 per cent lower now than in 1950, and most of this drop occurred in the last few
years. "For the same amount of wheat, a peasant can get 70 per cent more salt than at
TABLE 7 Indicators of agricultural welfare gairu, 1950-74
(1)
Agricultural
purchase price
inde1
(1952=100)

1950
1952
1957
1963
1971
1973

82.2
100.0
122.4
154.7
156.2
16-0.0+

(2)
Industrial retail
price~ in ru raJ
areas index
(1952= 100)
91.2
100.0
101.6
114.3
114.0
NA

(3)

(4)

Ratio of
(1) to (2)

Agricultural ta.t
as perccol of
agricultural
crop output

90.l
100.0
120.5
135.3
137.0

NA

NA
13.2
11.5
NA
6.0
5.0+.

Sowces. Dwight H. Perk.ins, Constraints Influencing Oiina's Agricultural Perfonnance, m Joint
Economic Committee, China: A Reassessrrurtl of th< Economy, July 10, 1975, pp. 362-3.
1
Figure is for 1974.
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the time of the birth of the People's Republic, and for the same amount of cotton, be
receives 2.4 times as much kerosene." 11 Prices of fertilizers, fuel, livestock feed,
electricity, and various types of equipment have been lowered.
The last column of Table 7 shows a sharp reduction over the full period of the tax
burden on peasants, which is another indicator of shifting terms of trade in favor of
agriculture.
IX. RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TSUNHUA COUNTY
Some of the agricultural policies which I have discussed up to this point will
perhaps have more meaning if they are shown in actual operation in one rural locality. I
attempt this as follows.
Tsunhua county is one of six counties within the special district of Tangshan, which
is located in the north-eastern part of Hopei Province, about 100 miles cast and a bit
north of Peking. The county, the size of which is about 1,640 square kilometres, has a
population of over half a million, though it has only one town, Tsunhua, the county seat.
The land is mostly hilly, with three mountain ranges and two valleys or plains. The
economic activities of the population are largely agricultural-that is, growing wheat,
kaoliang, millet, other grains, fruit orchards, chestnut trees, vegetables-but there arc
increasing numbers of small industries in the county, and of courSe some people engage
in various sideline occupations. Table 8 records some of the basic economic facts about
the county.
The heart of the county's economy is agriculture, mostly food-grains. Since 1949,
the output of food-grains per hectare has risen more than threefold, or at an average
annual rate of 6 per cent. However, since 1958 the rate has been only 2 per cent; it was
rather stagnant between 1958 and 1969, but recorded substantial increases during 1970
and 1971. The Revolutionary Committee of the county attributed the stagnant period
TABLE 8. Somt tconorrtic statistics of Tsunhua county: I 970-1

Total area
Cultivated area
lrriga ted area

164,000 hectares (or 1,640 sq km)
64,000 hectares
18, 700 hectares

Population
House bolds
Labour for(%

SS0,000
116,000
about 200,000

Communes
Production brigades
Production teams

43 (av. of 12,800 per commune)
691 (av. of 800 per brigade)
2,664 (av. of 200 per tum)

Grain production
Value of gni.o production
Value of industrial production
locome from sideline occupations

3.8 tons per hectare
about 50 million yuan
18 million yuan
22.7 million yuan

Soiucu. Joo Sisurdson, Rural industry- a traveller's view, TM CJUNJ
Quarurly (July-September 1972); Colltietivt Nott.s of visiting economists to
China durin& August 1972, mimeographed by Tbomu Wci.sskopf. Department
ol Eoooomics., Univemty of Michipn.
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to the revisionist policies of Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers, who discouraged sellreliant policies in the county, the building of small industries, and the full use of local
resources. Since 1968 or 1969, however, the leaders of the county have "organized
mass activities to change the backwardness of agriculture, make substantial use of local
resources and rapidly develop local industry". 12
The county has attempted to promote agricultural development by producing its
own cement, chemical fertilizers, and iron and steel for the manufacture of agricultural
machinery and implements, and it bas supported these heavy industries, especially iron
and steel, with profits from light industry and sideline activities. That is, the county bas
attempted to industrialize mainly on its own initiative and using its own resources for
the purpose of raising agricultural productivity and the living standards of the people.
In order to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, and iron and steel, the people of
the county first had to locate the necessary ores and minerals." Initially, we were aware
only of the presence of gold and iron in the hills, but now local people have discovered
23 kinds of ore, helped by the geologicaJ team."" They then set up the iron and steel
plant-first the small blast furnace, then a converter, after that a rolling mill. The iron
and steel aided in establishing the cement factory, and the latter was used largely to
expand water conservancy projects.
The iron and steel plant, however, ran at a loss. So light industry and sideline
activities were developed which made more than enough profits to subsidize iron and
steel. The county planted tens of thousands of fruit trees, for example, then constructed
a small fruit bottling factory with an annual capacity of 250 tons of bottled
fruit-apples, apricots, pears, grapes, peaches, etc. This factory required sugar, so some
peasants began growing sugar beets, and turned out 10 tons of sugar per year. The
factory also needed glass for the bottles and so a small glass manufacturing plant was set
up. The glass, of course, required pure soda, hence, this called for the establishment of a
32-ton per year soda factory. And so on and on. The result is that the county is now able
to produce a complete set of machinery, such as crushers, threshers, oil presses, and
machinery for digging drainage and irrigation systems, for the development of agricultural and sideline activities.
Locaf industries are run not only by the county but also by the communes and
production brigades. At the county level, the aim of national policy is for every county
to have the" Five Small Industries": iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, energy
(coal, electricity), and machinery. Such complete sets were established in one~half of
the 2,200 counties by 1971. Tsunhua was engaged in all of these activities, except that
its electricity was produced outside of the county. In addition, the county runs a
sulphuric acid plant, an electromechanic factory. a plastics factory, a paper-making
plant, engages in mining operations, has a textile mill, does major repairs on agricultural
machinery, processes agricultural and sideline product~.g., flour-milling and
cotton-ginning.
The communes and the production brigades are also involved in small industries.
For example, there is a three-level agricultural machinery repair and manufacturing
network, which 90 per cent of the counties, including Tsunhua, had established by
1971, in which the county does the manufacturing and major repairs in seven plants, the
communes in 37 plants do lesser repairs and assembly, and production brigades do
minor repairs in their 407 shops. The three-levels also engage in processing agricultural
and sideline products. Further"Three-level county, commune, and brigade agricultural
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scientific networks have been rapidly expanded aU over the country [including
Tsunhua) in recent years. One important objective of this is to achieve a rapid seedselection proccs.s which together with modern inputs to agriculture may quickly
increase the yield per unit."" Sideline occupations are engaged in by households,
brigades, and communes, and they include such things as raising silkworms and bees,
quarrying stones and mining ores, making mat bags, growing fruit.
In all of these enterprises, there were 12,000-15,000 of the 200,000 labour force
employed. In the 39 county-run industries, employment was 5,500 in 1971; it was 2,500
in the 71 plants managed by communes; and 5,000 in the industrial units of the
production brigades. 15 These are not large figures relative to the total labour force, but
there are many other workers who are in the industrial sector indirectly. In any case,
employment creation is probably not the main purpose of rural industrialization. For
given the increased school enrolment of children, the fact that it is unnecessary any
longer for older people to remain in the labour force and work, the continuation of
large-scale labour projects in water control and reforestation, the increasing numbers of
people engaged in sideline occupations (in cultural activities, medical services, education, and party work), the movement of millions of people to the north-west and west
and to other relatively virgin areas of the country, and the continued rising demands for
just about every kind of agricultural product-given all these things, there would seem
to be no significant surplus of labour in the rural areas. This, of course, is especially true
during the seasonal peaks of planting and harvesting. Instead, rural industrialization is
for the principal purpose of achieving mechanization in agriculture and hence greater
agricultural productivity. It is also meant to narrow the differences between town and
country, workers and peasants, and to widen the horizons and the abilities of the
peasants.
X. MAOIST DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND ITS RELEVANCE
FOR OTHER COUNTRIES

What possible relevance has China's attempts at rural development for other
underdeveloped countries? To begin to answer this, it is first necessary to specify
exactly what the Maoist strategy for economic development is, within which rural
development is contained. Since this strategy is an evolving one and has already taken
several twists and turns, one cannot be certain of getting it right. But as of now the
over-all development strategy appears to consist of the following steps.
1. Destroy the feudal-landlord-bureaucrat class structure, and redistribute land,
other assets, income, and power to the peasants and workers.
2. Establish socialist relations of production as soon as possible, and use the party
to educate peasants and workers in socialist values and ideals. That is, nationalize
industry as soon as feasible and bring about cooperativization in the countryside
without waiting for agricultural mechanization; begin transforming the superstructure
into a socialist one. 16
3. Establish a full planning mechanism to take the place of market-pricedetermined allocation of resources and distribution of incomes, and go all out for
industrialization, but emphasize those industries having direct links to agriculture.
4. Achieve high rates of capital formation by encouraging savings at aU levels and
the use of the savings at each level for self-financed investment. Encourage rural areas,
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in particular, to produce whatever can be produced by small-scale, indigenous methods
to finance these investments from their own savings, and to manage these industrie~
themselves. Capital goods that can be produced only by large-scale, modem methods
should be financed and managed at higher political levels.
5. Develop and release human energy and creativity by promoting socialist values
("serve the people", selflessne~. collective incentives) over bourgeois values (individualism, selfishness, materialism), by providing health-care facilities everywhere,
educating as many people as po~ible, providing worthy goals that inspire people to
work hard, and encouraging basic decision-making at the lowest possible level.
6. Carry out a continuing revolution at all levels of society, and maintain the
dictatorship of the proletariat.
It seems to me that the Maoist strategy, considered as a whole, probably has very
little relevance to governments of most underdeveloped countries today, for it involves
breaking the power of ruling classes and their foreign supporters, opting for socialism
and eventually communism over capitalism, for full-scale industrialization over tracte,
commerce, and agrarianism, for continuing revolutionary activity over orderly procedures. Since most Third World countries today play more or less subordinate and
dependent roles in the international capitalist system, serving the wealthier countries of
that system with raw materials, oil, cheap labour, or additional markets, for them to
follow China's path would mean first breaking out of this global system and then taking
their chances on an all-out development effort with their own resources plus whatever
aid can be obtained from socialist countries. 17 • This may be a programme favoured by
some classes in these poor countries, but it is hardly a prescription that would be
appealing to their governments and propertied classes. Furthermore, such thoughts are
anathema to the United States, as the leader of global capitalism, the duty of which is to
try to prevent such break-aways through some combination of economic aid, military
aid, counterinsurgency, cultivation of domestic elites, or force. The alliance between
the US, on the one hand, and the propertied classes and elites in the poor countries, on
the other, is a powerful one.
That is the over-all picture. It stre~es that one thing does depend on another in
Maoist strategy, and indeed this is so in any development strategy. To make any
substantial headway, the problem of underdevelopment often bas to be tackled as a
whole, not piecemeal. For example, in the Chinese experience, rural industrialization
depended on the general acceptance of goals other than profits and efficiency. Tb.is
general acceptance in turn was based on the prior inculcation of socialist values
throughout the society, which were reinforced daily by the prior establishment of
socialist institutions, including a full planning mechanism. These socialist relations of
production could be developed only by the prior break-up of the old class structures of
society. And so on.
I have emphasized the holistic view, the Maoist way. I now wish to ask whether
other underdeveloped countries can benefit, to some extent at least, from separate parts
of Oiina's total experience. Some socialist policies should be adaptable to capitalist
developmental programmes.
It is well to recognize at the beginning that many Chinese policies for development
are univerully known and in fact have been acquired by China from the theoretical and
practical work of bourgeois economists and other development experts, as well as from
the experience of the Soviet Union. To this extent, China bas learned from others, and
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there are, of course, no reasons why other countries cannot take advantage of the same
information. I refer to policies of raising capital formation relative to consumption to
attain higher growth rates, of encouraging saving for this purpose through taxation,
financial institutions, and in other ways, of using relative factor supplies to good
advantage, of aiming for developmental government budgets and moderate growth
rates of the money supply, of utilizing aid and trade efficiently, and so on. Much of
China's over-all performance can be explained "simply" in terms of the very high
investment and saving ratios that were attained by 1953-4 and were more or less
maintained thereafter. (Recall, however, that to attain these the old class structures
were overthrown by revolution. That is what lies behind "simply".) And larger shares of
this total capital formation were applied to agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s, which
goes a long way in explaining China's recent gains in rural development. Thus, much of
the story is standard fare, known to everyone.
But, while China has learned much from others, she may also be able to teach a few
things. rll'St, China has demonstrated the importance of industrialization to economic
development; that the large resources initially devoted to iron and steel, machinebuilding, non-ferrous metals, oil, electric power, and chemicals were indispensable in
establishing a base for later advances in agriculture, transportation, consumer goods,
and military weapons, and in freeing the economy from its dependency on foreign
direction and influence. The initial stress on heavy industry, rather than on infrastructure and consumer goods, was made possible only by socialist aid and trade. Despite the
growing bitterness between the USSR and China, no other country has ever received so
much help toward full-scale industrialization as China did during the 1950s. This is
something of a lesson in itself.
Second, China bas shown, especially during the 1960s, how to industrialize without
generating social problems that threaten eventually to blow the society sky high. China
has involved increasing numbers of people, especially in the rural areas, in industrial
activities in order to break down the potentially antagonistic relations between city and
country and between workers and peasants; to spread knowledge of industrial processes as widely as possible so as to promote talent, ingenuity, confidence, and the scientific
attitude among masses of workers and peasants; and to transform rural areas into
self-reliant agrarian-industrial-cultural local economies, which are attractive places to
live in and which can, at least partly, break their dependent relationships with higher
political units, including the state. This is relevant for other poor countries becall54! it
demonstrates a pattern of industrialization that does not generate severe imbalances
between urban and rural areas, between rich and poor, between employed and unemployed or between one region and another. The lesson that many developing countries
arc learning from their own experience is that high output growth rates are often the
"good face" on an increasingly diseased body. Thus, a recent annual report of the
World Bank, after noting the respectable growth rates of many underdeveloped countries, went on to say: "Statistics cooceal the gravity of the underlying economic and
social prblcms, which arc typified by severely skewed income distribution, excessive
levels of unemployment, high rates of infant mortality, low rates of Literacy, serious
malnutrition, and widespread ill-health." The statistics also conceal the growing urban
problems, foreign debt difficulties, social unrest, and much else in many of these
countries. Perhaps the most important message that China can send to other poor
people is that not one item in the above list applies to her.
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The third lesson is the importance of raising work motivation and how to do it.
Capitalist economists have concentrated far too much on how to rcaUocate economic
resources to attain higher levels of national output and far too little on how to get people
rcaUy interested in their work and so willing to exert great efforts to achieve their goals.
I think that China has shown that the latter is much more important than the former;
that people who really want to work completely eclipse the effects of nice adjustments
toward more competitive markets and fine calculations regarding factor inputs.
The Maoists believe that they have inspired and enabled people to work hard by
altering their work environments, changing their incentives, and providing them with
education, good health, and technical training. The first point is that, in capitalist
development, to raise growth rates of national output, it is necessary to do it in such a
way as to rcinforce the existing class structures of society and the values which support
such structures. The pursuit of higher growth rates, therefore, has generally reduced
many human beings to unthinking, specialized, manipulated inputs in the production
process, in which hierarchical structures of capitalists and workers, bosses and "hands",
mental experts and manual workers, face each other in more or less antagonistic
relationships. Such alienated work environments lower the general intelligence, initiative, and willingness to work hard of broad masses of workers, which are the obvious
costs of pursuing growth in the context of such sharp class alignments. the Maoists feel
that the development of people as full human beings, working in a warm, egalitarian,
and cooperative atmosphere, leads to the rapid development of material output; that
the former is possible only in the absence of capitalist or feudal class structures; and that
the latter is desirable only within the context of the former.
Thus, the Chinese lesson, in this regard, is that it is possible to increase greatly the
over-all productivity of peasants and workers by establishing less alienated work
environments. In the absence of full-scale revolution, underdeveloped countries might
benefit from China's experience by questioning their own organizations of work both in
the countryside and in the cities, and by experimenting with other forms. Are existing
organizations efficient from a factor productivity point of view, or are they mainly
efficient in channelling part of the economic surplus to a landed aristocracy or to a
capitalist class? Do work organizations exist to maintain discipline and order or do they
promote energy and initiative? And, if the former, why? Are they designed to set off
one group of workers against another to the benefit of the dominant class and to the
detriment of factor productivity? China may have much to teach us in this regard.
Work motivation in China has also risen, according to the Maoists, because of an
increase in socialist consciousness among the masses of workers and peasants, which
means that collective incentives--thc willingness to work hard for increasingly larger
groups of people without expectation of personal gain-have gained over individual
ones. Maoists believe that people arc inspired and can sec real meaning in their lives
only if they are working for goals worthy of human beings and not merely for their own
selfish, material welfare. Indeed, people throughout China do seem inspired in this way,
for whatever reason, and seem not only completely involved in their present accomplishments but in achieving the plans for the future: "ln two years, we'll have this and
have a good start on that, and then .... " Just about everyone talks this way.
Further, with regard to work motivation, it is necessary to repeat that increasing
numbers of people arc able to work bard and more effectively by being more literate,
having better health and improved nutrition, and having more technical training.
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Finally, the Chinese Communist Party bas developed high motivation among its
own cadres to "serve the people" in honest and incorruptible ways. The work motivation and collective incentives engendered within this large group have been of vital
importance in getting policies translated into proper actions at all levels, in ways that do
not dissipate the intentions of policy-makers. The CPC has for several decades now
demonstrated the importance of having such cadres for the actual realization, as
contrasted to the verbalization, of national goals.
China offers other lessons, too, which there is space only to mention: how to adapt
education to the needs of an industrializing society; that it is not necessary for economic
development to invite foreign capital into the country; the desirability of maintaining
rather stable prices of important commodities over long periods of time; and so on.
The principal lesson, however, is the necessity of breaking out of all dependency
relationships with advanced industrial countries and pursuing the course of selfreliancc, both at the national and the local levels.
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Throughout the book we have .referred tangentially to the implications of
the findings for development strategy. In this concluding chapter, we shall try
to deal with them directly, grouped under three topics. The first topic is the
rationality of villager behavior and its implications for designing local interventions. The next topic deals with the selection and assessment of rural
development programs-if economic growth is a priority goal of rural development, what kinds of programs are most likely to succeed? Or should economic
growth even be the first order of business in rural development? The final topic
deals with an even broader issue: What role can be assigned to the village in
the modernization process?

RATIONAL DECISION MAKING AS AN EXPLANATION
OF VILLAGER BEHAVIOR
The development administrator typically comes to his task needing two
sets of tools. One set involves the content of a development sector, whether it be
agribusiness. preventive medicine, industrial economics, or road engineering. He
needs expertise in some specific activity that is to be conducted. The second set
of tools involves the people who are the intended beneficiaries of this development; for to be successful, it is almost invariably true that a development input
must elicit a behavioral response. People must use the new road-or grow the
new crop, water their fields from the new irrigation canal, or plow with the new
tractor. Good planning and efficient implementation of rural efforts require
therefore that the development administrator understand the mainsprings of
villager behavior. Along with substantive expertise, he must have the tools to
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incorporate features into the development project that will make it work in the
context of the rural population he is trying to help.
In the process of making these plans, however, the development administrator runs into a major barrier-the visible, tangible differences that separate
him from the villager. The anthropological legacy on this subject is especially
rich and intricate-it provides detailed accounts of the often radically variant
belief systems, economies, social conventions, ceremonies, and eccentricities
of major and minor ethnic groups around the world. But the very "other-ness"
of villagers that feeds the anthropologist's interest in village life can be an
impediment to the development administrator who designs interventions in the
village during modernization . The peculiarities and the points of difference tend
to deflect simple thinking about why villagers behave as they do.
The deflection is entirely understandable. Villagers are different from
"us"-meaning modern urban folk-on a variety of dimensions . The development
administrator and the villager do in fact live in different material and cultural
worlds. The modes of communication across those worlds are not as simple or as
efficient as the ones the development administrator can use with his urban neighbor. Communication breaks down, and misunderstandings are frequent-often
for no cause that the modern visitor to the village can reasonably ascribe to his
own behavior. The "we-they" characterization of the relationship between
modernizer and villager that is so often evident in the literature and in the field
not only is understandable, but is also in many ways an accurate way to look at
the relationship.
Nonetheless, the differences appear to get in the way of the development
administrator's perceptions of his job. More specifically, the we-they split in
which the "we" stands in such an obviously superior position technologically
tends to create in turn a certain condescension when the development administrator tries to assess the reality behind the villager's viewpoint.
The most thoroughgoing form of condescension is the assumption that
villagers-peasants-are so different from you and me in their world view,
motives, desires, and fears that they are a species apart. They are seen as "benighted," to use the old-fashioned word for it. In this context, the purpose of
development is conceived as being to pull them out of their ignorance and
squalor to the level of modern folk. It is a twentieth-<:entury version of the
"white man's burden." It is also perhaps not as scarce a viewpoint as we would
like to believe, even if it is not always put so baldly. Foreign-educated elites in
the developing contries often find this view congenial; so do some Americans.
The result is a development strategy that does things "for" a rural population.
The content of the package and how it is to be delivered are decided through the
wisdom in the capital city. The mode of implementation is management by the
modernizer with the villagers either wholly uninvolved, or serving as a passive
source of labor.
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A second, less virulent form of condescension is what might be called misdirected cultural relativism. The customs and the ethnic peculiaritities of the
villagers are "accepted," but with 2 kind of tolerance more characteristic of a
parent's relationship toward a child than the relationship that exists among
adults who happen to do things differently. The result is a manipulative
approach. The classic example of this occurs when planners attempt to tie the
design or implementation of a development project to some local custom. At its
best, when applied to basic factors like planting cycles, or traditional organization of labor, this is a sensible way to approach local implementation. Too often,
however, it is applied to religious or purely social customs as a way to circumvent village resistance. It is tacitly assumed that a cosmetic change will solve the
problem. The possibility that the villager's resistance is a function of sound
objections that call for a basic redesign (or cancellation) of the project tends tu
get short shrift.
Perhaps the most common form of condescension is the tendency to pay
lip service to the villagers' good qualities. Westerners and often the local government elites in developing countries delight in rediscovering the "shrewdness'' and
"common sense" of the villager. In Thailand-other countries undoubtedly have
analogous situations-they enjoy the forays upcountry and the evenings spent
sipping rice wine with the village elders. They have their favorite headmen, the
ones who helped them pull off a successful project, of whom they speak with
admiration. But this amiable approach, like the more detached ones, can get in
the way of clear thinking about what to do and how to do it in rural development. For along with the good headmen are the bad headmen who did not help
pull off the development official's pet project. Along with the pat on the back
for the good villager go the lectures and admonitions to the villagers who do not
come up to expectations. At the higher administrative levels, these occasional
experiences in the field can lead to stereotypes that have no relationship to
reality. More insidious, the development administrator in the ministry and the
organizer on the ground tend to take on in their own minds the roles of sponsor,
protector, and adviser to "their" villagers. It is a paternal relationship. It has the
virtues of paternalism, but also the ma_ior defect of encouraging a false sense of
role and importance by the people on top. A development official can always
find evidence that he is needed, that these charming, simple people still arc not
ready to get along on their own.
Overall, then, an argument can be made that it is easy for development
planners, implementors, or evaluators to become excessively conscious of the
differences between villagers and themselves. The exotica of the village setting
are too distracting from a much simpler proposition, and the one that is
advanced here: Villagers generally behave rationally. They are no more rational
than the rest of the world-they, like their urbanized counterparts, do strange
things on occasion. But it is proposed that typically villagers count costs and
risks and benefits as thoroughly as they can with the information at hand, and
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that their decisions generally make sense. The aspects of village life which a
alien to the outsider's way of behaving may obscure the outsider's perception <
the calculations at work, but they do not mean that the calculations are n<
rational ones.
We have touched on this theme at a number of points in the book. \\
have suggested that the basic social behavioral patterns of villagers in premode1
cultures can be explained as a rational response to reality. When a villager
living on the ragged edge of survival in an environment of great scarcity, he
justifiably suspicious of anything that upsets a familiar balance-the mo
precarious the balance, the more suspicious he is likely to be_ When survival
not at issue, in an environment like Thailand's, the villager is more open, ar,
social behavior is more trusting because he has some margin for error, for los
Despite the wide gap between the social behaviors of a Thai villager and (fl
example) an Indian one, their behaviors can be seen as sharing a common origii
the reaction of reasonable people to the objective conditions of their enviro1
men ts.
The readiness to adopt innovation draws on the same distinction betwee
scarcity and "sufficiency" village environments. In the scarcity case, we borro·
from George Foster's image of limited fPOd to understand the rationality 2
work: 1
Peasant societies are . . . conservative and backward, brakes on
national economic progress, [not] because of economic irrationality
nor because of the absence of psychological characteristics in adequate quantities. They are conservative because individual progress is
seen as-and in the context of the traditional society in fact is-the
supreme threat to community stability, and all cultural forms must
conspire to discourage changes in the status quo . . . . Show the
peasant that initiative is profitable, and that it will not be met by
negative sanction, and he acquires it in short order.
Decisions to innovate in the sufficiency environment of Thailand were a
gued to have a parallel rationale. When the extra work involved in taking al
vantage of free or low-cost resources were not "worth it" in terms of things t
do and goods to buy, then aspirations remained delimited. When the incentivl
started to appear, aspirations started to expand, and so also did behaviors t
realize them.
Conspicuous rationality was also described as being evident in the chain c
events that make personal investment competitive with civic investmen·
Villagers who find their contributions to civic goods becoming more expensiv
will tend to decrease those contributions. Leaders given a choice between oppo;
tunities for tangible gains in life quality will pursue them; and as things stam
those opportunities are more salient in the personal setting than in the civi
setting.
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When it comes to decisions about what to do and how as a community,
Thai villagers in the sample villages are argued to have made plans and carried
them out with greater efficiency and effectiveness than the government development officials attempting the same kinds of projects. The reason was not that
the government officials were lazy or corrupt or stupid, but that the villagers had
access to knowledge that the government officials did not have, and took advantage of it in simple but very sensible ways.
Finally, when we addressed the question of why government development
and training inputs appear to be effective in sustaining or raising functional
capacity, it was again suggested that rational decision-making is at work: Raise
the job rewards of being a leader, and villagers are more willing to take on the
job.
None of these arguments is intended to convey that villagers are especially virtuous. On the contrary, we contend that they are very ordinary ways for
people and communities of people to respond to stimuli. And that is precisely
the point: There is Jess to the we-they distinction in rural development than
meets the eye.
The first implication of this view for rural development strategy is simple:
The administrator should put himself in the villager's place and ask whether he
as a reasonable man would want to grow that new crop or join the cooperative
or take that injection given the costs, risks, and benefits involved. The trick, of
course, is to make sure that the costs, risks, and benefits arc calculated using
information and experience available to the villager, not to the administrator.
This points to a second and more important implication: In trying to elicit
behavioral response from the village there are sharp limits on what should be
done to change the villager's perceptions of reality without changing the reality
itself. It was common among the development projects in the 41 villages of the
sample that villagers chose not to participate in a project because of a lack of
trust that the promised benefit would actually occur-that by joining the
farmers' group the villager really would be able to buy fertilizer at cut-rate
prices, or that the new rice strain would really work in the local soil. It is true
that one way to deal with this problem is by changing perceptions. The persuasiveness of the right publicity is undeniable. The difficulty with this solution
is that the villager's perceptions are often right to begin with. Governments often
do not have a good track record of delivering on promises. Implementation even
of the best programs often breaks down at the local level. In this regard, the
villager's perception of the odds is likely to be more unflinching than the
develpment administrator's; among the villages of the sample, very few
respondents had missed out on a good thing by taking a wait-and-sec attitude
toward programs that relied on government as5urances about the future. Perspective can also be a factor. If an administrator can claim success on 80 percent of a
certain kind of project, he may have reason for satisfaction. But it may also be
that the individual villager cannot tolerate a 20 percent chance of failure.
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In short, we are suggesting that when villager resistance to a progr;
exists, do not redouble the publicity and persuasion efforts, but instead ta
another look at the real risks and the real costs that the program poses from t
villager's perspective. Ask whether the answer is to take another whack at
typical peasant obstinacy or to change the substance of the opportunity tha1
being offered to him.
The assumption that villagers behave rationally is bound to be wrong
some topics in some cultures, as it is sometimes wrong about all populations.
is also true that the rationality is grounded in the specifics of the local situatic
and the lessons to be learned from the anthropological and sociological lite
ture can be essential for any given country. Here, we simply argue that expla
ing villager behavior is easy-or at least easier-once anomalies in villa1
behavior are assumed to be a reflection of the observer's ignorance of t
reality of the village, not a reflection of strange peasant outlooks on reality. F
the villagers of this study, "rational decision-making" explained the great bulk
the anomalies, very parsimoniously.

PROGRAMS AND PRIORITIES
Village Economic Development
Increasing villager income is a priority goal, often the priority goal, of ru
development programs throughout the world. The discussion of "persor
investment"-in effect, attempts to increase income-and its apparent causes t
an immediate relevance to this objective.
If the villager does indeed react in a fashion that is consistent with t
historical scarcity or sufficiency of his environment, then the obvious first st
in developing an income-increasing strategy is to ask what kind of environmen1
model applies to the local situation.
In the real world, of course, very few nations fall into the extremes
scarcity or sufficiency. Most countries fall somewhere in between the pol<
often, the environment varies dramatically in different areas within a countr
But even if these gradations make it unrealistic to seek for a few "pure" develo
ment strategies, planners can at least be warned against taking seriously glob
generalizations about how the peasant mentality constrains their options. Tl
relevant experiences for a Thai official are those of peasants in parts of Indones
or Malaysia, or other places with a tradition of independent peasants farmi1
productive land. He can easily be led astray if he tries to learn from the expc·
ences among peasants who have been coping with a hostile natural environmc;
or a feudal tenure system. It is just as dangerous to take the lessons learned t
modernizing nations at face value as it is to treat each culture as a unique cas
And because "scarcity" nations dominate the picture, it is likely to be the few
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(though more fortunate) sufficiency nations that draw the wrong conclusions
from others' development experiences.
Exactly what the differences in strategy ought to be is a question that we
can address only partly_ The scarcity case is not informed by the data in this
study. One may speculate that a patient, tutorial approach to income-raising
opportunities is likely to be necessary in the scarcity case. For that villager,
penalties for being wrong are so great and the perceived risks so high that the
initial resistance to change may be very stubborn.
In the Thai case, however, and for some unknown range of sufficiency
environments, the data in this study point to a shift away from community-level
economic development efforts and toward general infrastructure development.
The data for this study have portrayed a village population that is increasing its
entrepreneurial behaviors dramatically, quite possibly at an exponential rate. But
these behaviors were not being discernibly affected by the Thai government's
income-promoting programs at the village level-a finding that, if it holds true.
should have important effects on the budgets of a number of community-level
development programs. The logic that is being used to justify substantial
expenditures and to tie up some thousands of Thai extension workers finds no
support in the data from these villages. Instead, villager behaviors to increase
income appear to have followed naturally from additions to rural resources. in
the form of roads, dams, irrigation, electrification, health services, police
services, and contact with the modernizing outside world. Give the Thai villager
exposure to what is available and the opportunities to take advantage of it, and
rural economic investment will take care of itself-this was the consistent lesson
among the villages in the sample.
Another implied alteration in strategy, and one that is applicable to both
the scarcity and sufficiency cases. involves the framework for assessing the
success or failure of local economic development programs. The most commonly
used measures of program success are what might be called "input verification"-number of bags of fertilizer distributed, number of villages visited by the mohilcdevelopment unit, number of village reservoirs built, and so on. For the 41
villages of this study, these measures would have produced an image of a high
level of income-raising inputs. Because the ultimate measure of success-a real
increase in villager income over time-is exceedingly difficult to measure at the
micro level, a common next step in the analysis is to compare the high level of
local income-raising inputs with macroeconomic measures of agricultural
product. If gross agricultural product is rising (as it is in Thailand), the best guess
of the evaluator has to be that a causal relationship is at work. Certainly there
are no grounds for claiming that none exists.
The kinds of behavior we classified as "personal investment" indicators
provide an intermediate outcome measure for assessing whether that inference is
tenable. The use of it has three strengths. The data can be collected inexpensively at the micro level: Data for the six indicators in the index we used could be
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collected in an hour's visit to a village. The d;ita are objective: Three of the six
indicators in our index employed observational data;a fourth can be determined
by looking at existing records; none of the six requires a subjective judgment.
Most importantly, the data provide a genuine "outcome" measure that tests
whether the logic behind the input is being borne out. The same indicators
cannot be used interchangeably among countries, but the concept would seem to
apply everywhere .2

The Question of Priorities
The preceding discussion was based on the assumption that income groW1h
in rural areas is the top priority. But the scarcity/sufficiency issue also raises the
question of whether it should be so. Unqeuestionably, an India faced with the
prospect of massive food shortages and perhaps famine must think first about
economics. But do countries with sufficiency cultures have to make higher
villager income their top priority objective in rural development? At least in the
Thai case, it is by no means clear that poverty holds first place among the many
sectors in which village life is deficient.
Compared to Western standards of living, of course, Thai villagers are poor,
and villagers would welcome a higher economic standard of living. But if the
question is how village life can best be improved, answers other than higher
income come to mind. Better health care is one-for every case of malnutrition
caused by poverty, how many are caused by ignorance about nutrition? For
every infant death caused by poverty, how many are caused by lack of prenatal
and post natal care?
Or if economics are to be given priority, is growth or distribution the more
important sector? Two of the great advantages that Thailand brought to the
advent of modernization were its high proportion of independent landholders and
its low population relative to arable land. A case could be made that Thailand's
development resources should be focused not on increasing its rural wealth, but
on population control and measures to protect the villager from losing his land.
"Way of life" is another potential competitor with economics, though it is
seldom perceived as such by development planners. It happens that the Thai
people in general, urban and rural alike, believe that they possess certain
approaches to life and personal relationships that are superior to other approaches. Among the Thai elite, there is no conscious intention to let modernization destroy these patterns. In view of this, why not treat the nourishment or
adaptation of them as a subject to be considered in designing development
strategy? It would be an unusual approach for a country to take; it is by no
means a nonsensical one.
Other needs in Thailand could be identified that compete with economic
groW1h for attention. Presumably similar examples could be cited in other
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sufficiency cultures. The point is that although there are few things worse than
starving, there are many things worse than being "poor" in the sense that most
Thai villagers are poor. The governments of sufficiency cultures, like the governments of other developing countries, do not have the resources to give every
problem the attention it deserves. What does set the sufficiency nations apart is
the luxury they enjoy of being able to choose priorities on some other basis than
the simple physical survival of their populations. In the Thai case, it is a luxury
that has not been recognized_
We are not suggesting that a developing nation deliberately avoid economic
growth or higher income for villagers_ There is no intention of arguing that
villagers ought to be guarded from the evils of Western materialism, still less that
it would be possible to do so. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that villager
efforts to increase income have a life of their own once villager incentives have
been activated, regardless of further government encouragement. A pragmatic
argument against concentrating rural development resources on economic growth
could be made on these grounds alone. Why spend scarce resources to encourage
a phenomenon that seems to be accelerating anyway? But that stance misses the
more important possibility that, for a country like Thailand, rural economic
growth might rank well below the top in a rational list of priorities.

"-'
c/::>.

THE USES OF THE VILLAGE

_J

The village is not in favor among development planners. Sometimes it 1s
criticized as being anachronistic, or too small to serve as an effective unit of
administration, or too poor in resources. More often, as we discussed at the outset of the book, the village is simply overlooked. Its deficiencies as a tool for
modernization are assumed. In contrast to this backdrop are two of the key conclusions of this study: that Thai villages possess or are able to acquire a sclfgoverning capacity that is equal to a wide range of tasks, and that unless something is done about it that capacity will deteriorate as modernization continues.
The underlying question is how the village fits into the structure of the
nation-state that each less developed country is struggling to build. Is it assumed
that the eventual product will be an urbanized society similar to those of the
West? Is the village a unit to be deliberately discarded as soon as possible. or
allowed to atrophy as nature takes its course, or deliberately sustained through
government policy?
These questions do not permit prescriptive answers; they are among the
most intensely individual to each country. In the scarcity case, when something
on the order of an amoral-familism moral code has become deeply rooted, it
may be futile to try to work through traditional local institutions. Perhaps
centralization or reorganization of the countryside is the best approach. 13ut
what is characteristic of local government in the scarcity environment is not

necessarily true of local government in the sufficiency environment, as the dis
cussion of functional capacity in Thai villages sought to demonstrate. Thes1
comments based on the Thai case appear to be in order.
The first conclusion, that Thai villages show a remarkable latent ability tc
take care of their own affairs, has implications at two levels. On the operationa·
level, it suggests that developing nations look to the possibility of pushing more
responsibility out the end of the administrative structure, to the village.
Implementation of small-input local development projects is an obvious
use of the village. Too often, village participation in these projects has been
justified in terms of its psychological or public relations effects-the common
(and patronizing) rationale is that the villagers arc more likely to use the input if
they feel they have a stake in it. The tendency has therefore been to limit the
village's real control over the managerial tasks to cosmetic levels. Symbolic
decision-making roles plus the contribution of the village's labor have been
thought to be adequate for generating the desired sense of ownership. The data
from the sample villages point to the far-reaching possibility that real village
control is the best way to get the job done right. If we use the most unsentimental of indices-cost control, appropriateness of design, efficiency in implementation and maintenance-the evidence that the village does better than the
government on small-input local development deserves much closer examination
in the Thai case, and perhaps elsewhere. Even if the village is found to do only
"as well" as the government, the possibilities for reducing the existing drain on
the government's limited manpower resources are obvious.
But beyond using the village to manage its own projects, developing
nations sLould look more closely at questions about where to locate police
powers, juridical authority, tax collection and disbursement, and the other governmental functions that are so widely being arrogated to centralized bureaucracies that are undermanned, underskilled, and too often undermotivated. How
long will it be, for example, before the Thai court system can provide the same
judicial services to villages that village leaders now provide? More importantly,
should it try to do so? Or is it instead desirable to look for ways to adapt and
bolster the traditional system already in place?
As we have attempted to show throughout the study, there are good
reasons for considering the latter course_ What it amounts to is a reevaluation of
the proper structural goals for the government of a developing country_ Unfortunately, the widespread identification of nationbuilding with the development
of centralized and national institutions makes this reevaluation especially difficult. In theory, there is no contradiction between delegating substantial authority to local government and at the same time developing national institutions.
But at least among Thai officials and, for that matter, among most scholars in
the field of political development, even limited autonomy in the hinterlands is
seen as being a hallmark of the premodern state. In historical perspective, that
view is correct. Jt does not mean that centralization of authority is ipso facto
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modern or oesirable. The proposition is that the village is inherently in a better
position than the central government to perform certain important tasks of
governance, sometimes alone and sometimes in tandem with support services
from the district and provincial levels. It is this possibility that makes the
prospective deterioration of the village's functional capacity a potentially tragic
consequence.
Even on a pragmatic level, the deterioration would be costly. In the Thai
case, there were at the beginning of the 1970s some 43,000 villages with some
30 million people living in them. For the foreseeable future, the Thai government will not be ready to take on the burden of the de facto services now provided by those communities to their inhabitants. Insofar as deterioration in
functional capacity takes place, those services will go unprovided. And insofar as
they are not provived, it will mean fundamental deterioration in the quality of a
villager's life for some extended period of time. It is hard to accept that this
must be part of a "successful" modernization process. It is even harder to accept
in view of the evidence that public policy designed to enrich the content of
village government may be effective in halting or even reversing the tendency to
deterioration.
This is the pragmatic argumerit, based on the exigencies facing modernizing governments whose administrative ambitions outreach their current capacity.
But perhaps the long-range possibilities for building upon the village as a base
should be engaging the attention of development planners. It seems particularly appropriate at this particular point in history that a country like Thailand
look to its villages as a continuing focal point for self-government. There is no
good reason to acquiesce reflexively in the consolidation of authority at the
center at the same time when we in the West are casting about for ways to
decentralize units of government that have grown too large and unresponsive,
and at the same moment when communications and information technology are
creating possibilities for combining centralized resources with local authority.
The developing countries bear a number of costs for modernizing after the
West. If there is any advantage in modernizing late, it should be in the possibilities for learning from the West's experience and for traveling on a somewhat
straighter course to points that the West is approaching very circuitously. In
assessing its village heritage, a developing country should consider whether it is
seeing only its society as it has been or also a latent image of what its society
might wish to become.

NOTES
I. George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," American
Anthropologist 6 7 (1965): 310. Emphasis added.
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2. The use of investment as an indicator of development impact and an application of
the theory to the Thai context is described in Robert E. Krug, Paul A. Schwarz, and
Suchitra Bhakdi, "Measuring Village Commitment to Development," in Values in
Development: Appraising Asian Experience, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and
John D. Montgomery (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976).

LESSON 5
LEARNING STYLE

Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Compare and contrast two cases about rural development and
recognize the perspectives from which each was written.
2. Understand the concepts behind Kalb's experiential learning
model.
3. Discuss the limitations of the model and its applicability.
4. Apply the concept of learning styles to assess their
participation in the debate.
Activities
1. Debate on two cases.
(1 and 1/2 hours)
a) allow each side ten minutes to develop strategy.
b) opening statements.
c) have external evaluators to determine winner?
2. Break
3. Lecture -

(15 min)
Experiential Learning Theory

(30 min)

4. Triads
(30 min)
Task - Discuss role taken in the debate. How was your
particular learning style demonstrated in the debate? Were
you silently observing, actively participating? What aspects
did other people consider in the two cases that you had not?
How do you think your learning style affects what you learn?
5. Handout Homework #5 -

Establishing Trust

(10 min)

HOMEWORK 5

ESTABLISHING TRUST

1. Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Letham, Managing Project-Related Technical Assistance.
Lacroix, Integrated Rural Development in Latin America.
Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid.
Hildebrand, "The Sondeo Approach."
Marcotte, "Farming Systems Research."
Chambers, chapter 5, 103-139.

2. Task for the week:
List ten people whom you tend to mistrust. Choose on of
these and engage in activities with him or her to raise the
level of trust between you and that person.
3. Write:
In 3 to 5 pages discuss what strategies you used to
establish trust and the problems you encountered with the
person and with yourself. Relate this to the readings by
analysing what assumptions the strategies of Lacroix,
Hilderbrand, Marcotte and Chambers make about the
establishment of trust in their approaches.
Please make a photocopy to hand in at the next session.
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SUMMARY

Mul1itlisciplinari· ugric11l11.ral research

f<'illlls cu11 u11gl1Ji'nf i11/ornw1io11 011

ogric11l11iral tc·ch11olng_1· lll'l'.l'. In C11atc·111a/11 a r<'!'!//1naissanu· .rnrvcy

f<'0/11

o( tl'n.

equally .1p!i1 he/ween .wcio-<'conomi.1·1s and 1echnologis1s, has heen t1sed 10 asses.1·
farmer cons/rain!s and 1eclinology needs in advance of agriculiural research.
Quanlijied informa1ion and !/t1es1ionnaires are no/ required and 1hc survey Iasis only
one week. The !cam investigated farmer conditions in pairs made up of a social
scicn1is1 and d nalural scienlist. On each offour days the pairing changes. Daily postsurvcy /cam discussions are r<:gardcd as cssenl ial. Each member of the team prepares
a report and these are .finally amalgamated into one joint repor!. Experience has
shown that comhined disciplines can, 1/ \\'ell managed, produce incisive and efficienl
diagnoses of rural conditions and needs and educate the participants in
multidisciplinary 1hinking.

INTRODUCTION

Several characteristics are cr:tical to an efficient and functioning multidisciplinary
effort: first, those concerned must be well trained in their own field: secondly, they
need a working understanding of-and must not be afraid to make contributions
in--0ne or more other field:.. Team members must not feel the need to defend
themselves and their field fro111 intrusion by others. Working together, all members
of the team should view the final product as a joint e!Tort in which all have
participated and for which all are equally responsible. That means that each must be
•Formerly Agricultural Economu. The Rockefeller Foundation, assiiJlcd as Co.:Ordinador de
Sociocconomia Rural, lnsliluto de Ciencia y Tcchnologia Agricolas. lCTA, Guatemala.

42)
Agricu/1ural Administration 0309-58~Xl8ll0008-0423/S02·50 (!)Applied Science Publishers Ltd, England.
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satisfied with the pr,·,duct. given the goals of the team. and be willing and abk to
defend it.
~
Perhaps the mdst critical characteristic required to achieve success in a
multidisciplinary team is this identification with a single product in which all
participate. The product can be complex and involve a number of facets but it sh:rnld
result from the joint effort of the whole team and not contain strictly identifi.,ble
parts attributable to individual team members. Failures of multidisciplinary efforts
in agricultural institutions frequently result because teams are organised as
committees that meet occasionally to 'co-ordinate' efforts, but in which the crop
work is left to the agronomists, the survey to the anthropologists and the desks to the
economists. In these cases there is not a single identified product but, rather, several
products or reports purported to be concerned with the same problem.

·1 FAM Er-FORTS IN AGRIC\11.TURAL INSTITUTI'_<;

In the genera ti on of i;nproved agricu Itur~il technology for small traditional farn;ers,
;i\I rnultidiscirlin;1ry team members must be oriented towards and identified with
·technology' ;1s the ·rroduct' of the te;1m (normally just the agronomists or an!1;~al
scientists identify with the product). All must be willing to consider a wide rang~ of
v;1riables and constraints and not leave these worries only to the anthropologists or
sociologists. Further, all members must be willing to spend some desk time
considering alternatives and their consequences on the clients' goals and not leave tJis
just to the economists. The agronomists should be capable and willing to criticise the
economic or social aspects of the work, and the social scientists, the agronomic
aspects. In turn. these criticisms should be used to improve the product so that all
can be satisfied witl1 the final result.
In most agricultural institutes agronomists (who usually greatly outnumber the
social scientists) are concerned about too much influence from the socioeconomic
group in work at the farm level. This is manifest in resistu.nce by agronomists to
identifying too closely with the farmers (even with those on whose land they conduct
trials). It also surfaces with respect to the evaluation of technology. The agrono1.~:st
is much more comfortable if a final evaluation follows the farm trial phase of the
work where he. himself, makes the evaluation. The agronomist, then, decides if a
technology is 'good'. If, later, the farmer evaluates this 'good' technology and d.:x:s
not accept it, the agronomist considers it a problem for the extension service, or of
poor infrastructure. of low prices, or of lack of initiative on the part of the farn:er
himself, but not a problem for the agronomist, who has produced what he considers
to be a 'good' product. In this situation. evaluation by the farmer is equated with
influence by socioeconomists, who dare ask the farmer his opinion and who woJld
tend to take into consideration more variables, including the present weaknesses in
infrastructure, the price level, the farmers' capabilities, etc., in the development uf a

('()Ml\ININ(; DISCIPLINES IN RAPID APPRAISAL: Tiff SONDEO APPROACH

425

technology SO th;Lt the rroduct or the tc;1m's efforts COuJd be LISed immediately
without the need to await the development or other ra~ets of the sector.

THE SONDE(/: t\ TEAM RAPID SlJRVl:Y Al'l'IHlt\Cll

The Sondeo is a modified suryey technique develorcd by the Guatemalan Institute
of Agricultural Science and Technology, JCT A. as a response to budget restrictions.
time requirements and the other methodology utilised. to augment information in a
region where ;1gncultural technology generation ;md promotion is being initiated.
In order to understand the 1:1ethodology. it is first necessary to understand how
ICTA is org<rnised at the regi,J;ial level. Each of the regions in which the Institute
functions has a Regional Director who is the representative of the Director General
of the Institute and of the Technical Director. Within the region. each area in which
work is being c;1rried out is in charge or ;i 'Sub-regio1ul dclcg;1Le'. ;i tech11iei;i11 who
has a minimum amount of administrative responsibilities. All the technicians, from
whatever discirlinc or rrogramrnc. who work in the ;1re:1. arc rcsronsiblc to him.
This multidisciplinary team is usually comprised of >Orne or all of the following:
plant breeders. pathologists. a socioeconomist and approximately four general
agronomists who are the Technology Testing Team This group, backed up by the
national Co-ordinators of Programmes (corn, beans. etc.) and Support Disciplines
(socioeconomics, soi I management) are responsible for orienting and conducting the
generation and promotion of technology in the area. The work includes basic plant
breeding and/or selection on the (usually small) experiment station in the area, farm
trials, tests by farmers of promising technology, evaluation of the acceptability of
the technology tested by farmers and economic production or farm records
maintained by farmers with ti1e help of the technicians. In order to provide the
original oriel)tation to the team. the Sondeo. or reconnaissance survey, is conducted
by members of the Technology Testing Team who are going to work in the area,
sometimes personnel from an appropriate Programme, and a team from
socioeconomics comprised of one or more of the following: anthropologists.
sociologists, economists, agricultural economists and/or engineers. Usually, there
are five people from socioeconomics and five from the Technology Testing Team
who form a ten-man Sohdeo team for an area.
The purpose of the Sondeo is to provide the information required to orient the
work of the technology generating team. The cropping or farming systems are
described, the agro-socioecon0mic situation of the farmers is determined and the
restrictions they face arc defined so that any proposed modifications of their present
technology are appropriate to their conditions.
If ICT A is to work in an area that is not previously defined, such as by the bounds
of a land settlement or an irrigation project, one of the objectives of the Sondeo is lo
delimit the area. This is done by first selecting the predominant cropping or farming
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system used by potential target !'armers in the <trea and later determining the area i:1
which this system is important. The reason that an homogeneous traditional or
pn.:sc11I cruppi11g ur hrn1i11g systc111 is used is th:1t it is this system th:1t ICTi\ will k
modii'ying with rn.:w \lr improved technology. Hcncc. having a well dclincd.
homogencous system with which to work simplilies the procedure or generating anJ
promoting technology. The premise on which the selection or an homogencOll\
cropping or farming system is based is that all the farmers who presently use it havr
made similar adjustments to a set or rcstrictions which they all face and. since they
made the same adjuotments. they must all be facing the same set of agro·
socioeconomic conditi.:ins
As well dS delimiting the drea of this homogeneous system, the tasks of the Sondeo
team are to discover wl~at agro-socioeconomic conditions all the farmers who us~
the system have in con .•non and then to identify which are the most important ir.
determining the present system ;ind therefore would be the most important to
consider in any modifications to be made by the team in future. Finally, the enJ
product of the Sondeo is to orient the first year's work in farm trials and variety
selection. It also serves to locate future collaborators for the farm trials and for the
farm record projects.
Because the farm trials are conducted under farm conditions, during the first yec.r
they provide an additi0nal learning process into the conditions that affect th-:
farmers and are invaluable in acquainting the technicians with the realities of
farming in the area. The farm records-which are also initiated in the first yearprovide quantifiable technical and cost information on the technology being used by
the farmers. At the end of the first year's work, then, the technicians have not only
been farming under the conditions of the farmers in the area, but they also have the
information from the farm record project. For this reason, it is not necessary to
obtain quantifiable information in the Sondeo, which is not a benchmark study.
Quantifiable information for impact evaluation in the area is available from farm
records which increase in value each year.
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THE SONDEO PROCEDURE

The primary purpose uf the Sondeo, then, is to acquaint the technicians with th~
area in which they are going to work. Because quantifiable information is not
needed, the Sondeo can be conducted rapidly and no lengthy analyses of data are
required following the survey in order to interpret the findings. No questionnair~s
are used so farmers are interviewed in an informal manner which does not alienate
them. At the same time, the use of a multidisciplinary team serves to provide
information from many different points of view simultaneously. Depending on th<!
size, complexity and accessibility of the area, the Sondeo should be completed in
from 6 to 10 days at a minimum of cost. Areas of from 40 to 150km 2 have been
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studied in this period of time. The following is a description of the methodology for a
six-day operation.
Day 1

The first day is a general reconnaissance of the area by the whole team as a unit.
The team must make a preliminary determination of the most important cropping
or farming system th<it will serve as the key system. become acquainted in general
terms with the area and begin to search out the limits to the homogeneous system.
Following each discussion with a farmer. the group meets out of sight of the farmer
to discuss each one's interpretation of the interview. In this way, the team members
begin to become acquainted with ;1ow each other thinks. Interviews with farmers (or
other people in the area) should be very general and wide ranging because the team is
exploring and scarchingjiJr an un/.:nown numher ofun/.:no1rn elements. (This does not
imply. of course. that the interviews lack orientation) The contribution or point of
view of each discipline is critical throughout the Sondeo because the team does not
know beforehand what type of problems or restrictions may be encountered. The
more disciplines that are brought to bear on the situation. the greater is the
probability of encountering the factors which are. in fact. the most critical to the
farmers of the area. It has been established th~1t these restrictions can be agroclimatic. economic or socio-cultural. Hence. all disciplines make equal contributions to the Sondeo.

Day 2
The interviewing and general reconnaissance of the first day serve to guide the work
of the second day. Teams are made up of pairs: one agronomist or animal scientist
from the Technology Testing Team and one person from socioeconomics who
work together in the interviews. T:-ie five teams scatter throughout the area and meet
again either after the tirst half-day (for small areas or areas with good access roads)
or day (for larger areas or where access is difficult and requires more time for travel).
Each member of each team discusses what was learned during the interviews and
tentative hypotheses are formed to help explain the situation in the area. Any
information concerning the limits of the area are also discussed to help in its
delimitation. The tentative hypotheses or doubts raised during the discussion serve
as guides to the following interview sessions. During the team discussions. each of
the members learns how interpretations from other points of view can be important
in understanding the problems of the farmers of the region.
Following the discussion, the team pairs are changed to maximise interdisciplinary interaction and minimise interviewer bias and they return lo the field
guided by the previous discussion. Once again, following the half-day's or day's
interviews, the group meets to discuss the findings.
The importance of these discussions following a series of interviews cannot be
over-stressed. Together, the group begins to understand the relationships
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encountered in the region, delimits the zone and starts to define the type of rese;.reh
that is going to be necessary to help improve the technology of the farmers. O<her
problems-such as marketing-are also discussed and, if solutions are required,
relevant entities can be notified. It is important to understand the effect that these
other limitations will have. if not corrected. on the type of technology to be
developed so that they can be taken into account in the generation process.
During the second day there should be a notable convergence of opinion and a
corresponding narrowing of interview topics. In this way, more depth can be
acquired in following days on the topics or increasing interest.

n111·3
This is a repeat o( day 2 and a lw;t ys 1ncl udes a change in the makeup of the le .1ms
;11'ter c;1ch discussio'n At le;1st ;1 minimum of four interview-discussion cycles is
nccess;1ry to complete this part or the Sondeo. Ii' the area is not too complex, these
cycles should be adequate. Of course. if the area is so large that a full day is required
!'or interviewing between each discussion session.then four full days are required for
this part of the Sondeo.
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Before the teams return to the field for more interviews on the fourth day, cach
member is assigned ;1 portion or section of the report that is to be written. T~.en.
knowing for the first time for what topic each will be responsible, the te;::ms,
regrouped in the fifth combination. return to the field for more interviewing. for
smaller areas, this also is a half day. In the other half day, and following ancther
discussion session, the group begins to write the report of the Sondeo. All members
should be working at the same location so that they can circulate freely and di::;cuss
points with each other. For example, an agronomist who was assigned the secti0.1 on
maize technology may have been discussing a key point with an anthropologist and
needs to refresh his memory about what a particular farmer said in a brief discussion
with him. In this manner the interaction among the disciplines continues.

Day 5
As the technician3 are writing the report, they invariably encounter point~ for
which neither they nor others in the group have answers. The only remedy is lo
return to the field on the morning of the fifth day lo fill in the gaps found the 'day
before. A half day can be devoted lo this activity, together with finishing the writing
of the main body of the report.
In the afternoon of this day, each team member reads his written report tu the
group for discussion, editing and approval. The report should be read from the
beginning just as it will be when finished. As a group, the team should approve
and/or modify what is presented.
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The report is read once again and. following the reading of each section.
conclusions are drawn and recorded. When this is finished. the conclusions are read
once again for approval and specific recommendations are then made and recorded
both for the team who will be working in the area and for any other agencies that
should be involved in the general development process of the zone .
The product of the sixth day is a single report generated and authored by the entire
multidisciplinary team and should be supported by all of the members.
Furthermore, after participating for all six days with each other. each member
should be able to defend all ~he points of view discussed, the conclusions drawn and
the recommendations made.

THE REPORT

To a certain extent, the report of the Sondeo is of secondary value because it has been
written by the same team that will be working in the area. Most of its value lies just in
the fact that they have written it. By being forced into a situation where many
different points of view had to be taken into consideration and coalesced, the
horizons of all will have bten greatly amplified. Further, the report can serve as
orientation for non-participants, such as the Regional Director or the Technical
Director, in discussing the merits of various courses of action. However, it is also
obvious that the report will appear to be one written by ten different persons in a
hurry, which isjusl exactly what it is It is not a benchmark study with quantifiable
data that can be used in the future for project evaluation; rather, it is a working
document to orient the research programme and that served one basic function in
just being written.
The exact format and content of a report of a Sondeo will vary according to the
area being studied and the nature of the crops or livestock enterprises included. The
following is a brief description of an outline of a report recently completed in one
area of Guatemala where grains and vegetables were of primary. interest (see
Chinchilla 1).
1

s for
is to
:·day
·iting

Purpose
Describes the reason the Sonedo was undertaken and the dates.

o the
ri the
>rove

Homogeneous technology
Describes the principal characteristics of the technology regarding the crops of
interest found within the limits of the area and the important differences outside the
area that changed the nature of the cropping system and defined the limits of the
area.
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Description of the delimited area
Geographical Lmits. altitude. soils and other important features, including :i map
drawn with the boundaries as precise as possible.
Land
Land tenure and farm size were important restrictions in the cropping syste:n and
were described. :

Labour
General labour availability and periods of scarcity and the specia' tasks
performed by women in the homogeneous system were described.
Capital
The capital Aow in the traditional system which provides the funds for inves'.ing in
both the basic grains and the vegetables was described and the poor functioLing of
the small farm credit system was noted.

Corn
The most important components of the corn production system were des;:ribed.
Beans
The role beans play in the system and their lack of general importar:;:e was
discussed.

Vegetables
The production system and the marketing of vegetables were described.
Livestock activity
The special importance of livestock and of the livestoclc-crop interaction was
discussed.
Conclusions
Conclusions for each of the above sections were drawn with special emphasis on
their meaning to the future work of ICTA.
Recommendations
Those relevant to !CT A and to other organisations in the public agricultural
sector as well as the private sector.
Because one of the principal purposes of the Sondeo is to guide the efforts of the
resident Technology Generating Team, some of the important recommendations
from this Sondeo are elaborated below. These recommendations obviously guide
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the type of technology which will be included in the farm trials and requested from
the experiment station in support of farm trials. Specific treatments to be included
and the cxrcrimcnt;il designs lo be used arc generally left to the team members and
the national Programme <ind Discipline Co-ordinators to determine.
( l) Maize is the most important subsistence crop in the area. The farmers tend to
think in terms of a fixed minimum quantity required for the family and the animals.
Because of the competition of the vegetables for labour and capital, low technology
.
.
.
I
.
.
.
.
.
1s used 111 the maize and, frequently, land 1s substituted. This must be considered in
the mix of technology generated.
(2) Cropping systems must be devised that rotate or intercrop vegetables with
maize, but not at the cost of1educing maize production. It is also necessary in these
systems to realise that most of the capital and labour will be utilised on the vegetables
and not on the maize.
(3) Jn vegetable technology, priority should be given to disease control and
fertilisation.
(4) Even though beans are an important subsistence crop, given the importance of
vegetables and the shortages of funds for research, it is recommended that little
emphasis be given to beans in this area at the present time.
(5) Because of problems with the small farm credit programme, it is recommended
that the technology to be generated should not be based on the hope of such a
programme in the short run

CONCLUDING REMARKS
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The disciplinary speciality of each member of the Sondeo team is not critical so long
as there are several disciplines represented, and, if the Sondeo is in agriculture. a
significant number of them are agriculturalists. At least some of these should also be
from among those who will be working in the area in the future. The discipline of the
Co-ordinator of the Sonedo is probably not critical, either, if he is a person with a
broad capability, an understanding of agriculture (if it is an agricultural So.ndeo)
and experience in surveying and survey technique. However, the Co-ordinator must
have a high degree of mulridisciplinary tolerance and be able to interact with all the
other disciplines represented on the team.
The Co-ordinator, in a sense, is an orchestra director who must assure' that
everyone contributes to the tur1e but that, in the final product, all are in harmony. He
must control the group and maintain discipline. He arbitrates differences, creates
enthusiasm. extracts hypotheses and thoughts from each participant and ultimately
will be the one who coalesces the product into the final form. It is perhaps not
essential that he has prior experience in a Sondeo, but it would certainly improve his
efficiency if he had.
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SUMMARY
Despile ejforis of !he 1960s and 1970s, such as capital and technology /rans/er
and high yielding varie1ies of lhe Green Revolu1ion. undesirablt· social and
f_Conomic changes persist and in mos/ cases have accelera·t~d. One of 1hc
current merhodolo!;ical approaches Iv anaty2ing and solving agricultural
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INTR.ODUCTION
With the onsel of 1lw 198(h decade came the increasing realization that
world food securily needs were not being met. Despilc the increased
agricullural production accompanying the much acclaimed capital and technology transfer programs of the 1960s and the high-yield plan I breeding of the
Green Re\'Olution in lhc 1970s, undesirable social and economic changes
persist and in most case_~_ha_ve__ <!~lerated. These programs have hcen
associa1cd wi1h ·r;::;:~a"iiT<lisplacement, ~gJ;;ised.scale thresholds beyond 1he
reach of self-sullicicnl farmers, and l'yrther ine~itablc distribution of
~illth. In many counlries farmers left the land due t-;;-~-n-inahility to make
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prohlems, farming systems research. i.\ l't1cou11teri11x the santt' frustration.\
and lack <!{SUC<'t'.\.\ U.\ II.\ 1hn1r('tital fOfl'fWll/Cr.\. ii I.\ 1hc CO/l[('l/f/Ull of th/.\
fhlfltT that unleJ.\ FSR '·' arf/( u/aJt•d 'H"ith if.\ puli1ical <'.~·<!1101111 and un
e11fI;htt'1u·d 1w1tonal .. ax:il:i~/!~ff~?.. po(icy cfc:~·/Fncd tt ith ~:~it 11 di 11111
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profits, were drawn 10 cities seeking dwindling nppnnunities or
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were made l<rndless farm laborers as high-tech, capital-intensive agricultural
production expanded both in scale and market dominance. Furthermore, in
many instances, increased yields either have no! kept pace wilh population
growth, which has contributed to declines in pcr__C!!P.iJfl_ a_gricul~ral
pr()duct_0n, or were ~()_t<:li~t_ri~uti;d t() hungry and even starving populations
via the marketplace or international relief efforts. That there is continued
poverty and ~~~~i~.ti()n b.egs the ~a_sc; fo_!_i!_ .critical loqk at the
international agricultural development strategies and their articulation with
exis!i~£-r§0:1cal ~concimies.
. - ...
Concurrent with this realization was the advent of a new buuword and
methodological approach 10 analyzing agricultural problems: farming
systems research ( FSR). (Theoreticall}') the incorporation of small, selfsuflicicnt farmers into a hollQ__~ategy combined with the modern
technological research centers of national .;gricultural systems (NAS) would
provide heretofore undiscovered directions for solving the problems.
In this paper, it is argued that FSR, ~makiOEslaim~_()_f_be~n_g_holistic;'
ignores the Jl..Q.J.i!ical~Qn()rn.Y _and clas~s_t!ucture within which recommendations are made, and therefore, fails tl) acc(;u;;·1 r;;;:-·the-ci:lnsiderahle
disarticula1ion--bei-we-~n_th('. r_ealities of the politic-~I economy and the
produ_ction goals ofon-farm FSR research. In short, FSR proponents fail to
take into consideration the international, regional, and naliona~nd
fiscal policies that militate against their recommendations. Furthermore.
given the closed systemic character of FSR models, such consideration is
problematic. It is proposed then. that this failure to consider critical
exogenous factors is in par! !he product of FSR 's theoretical heritage in
'svs1cms' and functionalist an;1lvscs.
I1 "co11cluded 1h"1 u11less the in lcrcsls of those al !he ho11om of rurcil S(lci;1I
s1ruuures. for which !·SR. programs have hcen designed. arc consis1e111 with
the class 1n1cres1' ol 1lwsc rna~ing 11;111011;11 policv decisions. disarl1cula1io11
"ill occur cat1'lllt'. JSR. 10 e\c111u;illv Lid 10 rnccl i1s objeclJ\·c,
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Agricultural Research Centers. the historical and intellectual limitations of
FSR's forerunners have been incorporated into its methodolog!cal
7
approach.
~
__.,.,..,~it·r, .~H.., ,
Another critique is that o~n which the scientistic approach to
problem selection and solving 1s analyzed. It is argued that the individual
problem-so~in[_ tc~n_iq~es ~nd ap_J2r~a£_h~s heretofore selected have
inadequately considered the resource, political, and socio-economic
~vironments within which the ~s (aiidSOiutjons) occur.
It is our contention that a complete understanding of these criticisms first
requires a discussion of the theoretical framework from which FSR
emerged. The remainder of this section will examine the conceptual origins
of FSR as a means for analyzing its theoretical and consequently its
practical limitations.
According to its proponents, FSR, as an approach to agricultural research
and development,· ... views the whole f~nn as a system and focuses on (I) the
interdependencies between the components under the control of members of
the farm household and (2) how these components interact with the physical,
hiological. and socioeconomic factors~ under the household's.cOnlrol'
(p. I 3). 21 Its primary aim is to increase the productivity Oltfie farming system
through improvement and development of relevant technology and
complementary governmental policies. An implicit assumption is that in
so~spccified manner the developed alternative technologies will
increase total productivity and that such increases, in turn, will yield a
corresponding increase in wealth, most. if not all, of which will be retained hy
the producer.
---:~---·--=~
Whik the political hcrita[!c of FSR ha' hccn discussed 1'·1-' the thcnrc1ical
~(
hni1agc remains 10 be cxplic<JICd. Among the social sCJL'llCL",. lh1' her11;1gc"
\.f-. .,_,,
firmly anchored 111 the as'11111p1ions of func1ion,tlism. which has its rools in
0
the vcork nf Emik Durkhe1111
The discipline of sociolo[!y. in <lll effort IP c:1pture some of 1he soaring
kg11imacy of ·science·. has adopted 1he quan1i1ativc assump1iom in\' ..L-corpora1ed 1n 1he 'cicn1ific method-- thus ma kin[! cL11ms 10 he a social
science. 9 Durkheim's innovative methodological work. which rested upon
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systems research and devdopmcnl) has come under cri · ·
for its limited.~.,•~
: co.uld be quant11<ll1vely measured-:--s1milar to the b1olog1.cal. and rnorgarnc
application within the political-economy perspecti •e. Oasa and Swanson,
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1... soences. The. attenda.nt assumpho.ns of soentific empmc1sm. were thus
in a critique of FSR's limited ;rnalytical framework, ave exp JCatcd its
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both Talcott Parsons, and his contemporary biological science counterpart
Ludwig van BerrnlantTy, into the current farming systems method. 1 '- 24
It was von BertalantTy's contention that phenomena such as species, solar
systems and galaxies cannot be fruitfully viewed as mechanistic macro
objects merely obeying deterministic laws of motion. He proposed an
alternative mode of analysis in which such phenomena were nested among
and within one another rather than disaggregating into randomness. His
new paradigm allowed for the development of theories, systems theories, as
they deal with specific phenomena such as organisms, populations,
ecologies, groups, societies and the like. In 1947, von Bertalanffy wrote:
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·... there exist models, principles and laws that apply to generaliud
systems or their subclasses irrespective of their particular kind, the
nature of the componenl elements, and the relations of "forces"
between them. We postulate a new discipline called General System
Theory' (p. I l ). 24
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This paradigm necessitated a transdisciplinary synthesis which included
general phenomenological aspects of organismic systems such as hierarchical order, trends towards higher organization, differentiation into
s~s. and progressive centralization. In recognition of the validity of
Aristotle's statement 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts', and
recognizing that the popular mechanistic approach ignored this wisdom,
von BcrtalantTy argued·
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'Since the fundamental character of the living thing is its
organization, the customary investigation of the single parts and
processes cannot provide a complete explanation of the vital
phenomen;i. This investigation gives us no information about the
c1lnrdination of its parts and processes" (p.11). 24
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Since agricultural rcse;trch in general. and FSR practitioners specifically.
have hccn criticized for not taJ.-ing ;idvantagc of ·systems' concepts in
ddining physic;tl, biological and social phenomena. H:trt and George" h:ne
developed a systems model in the von lkrtalantTy tr;1dition (sec Fig. I). This
model illustrates a hierarchical system that includes hoth vertical and
horizontal system interactions such that functioning suhsystems' outputs
serve as inputs for others. It should be noted that this is not the only FSR
model that is utilized. However, it is one of the models utilized in a collection
of readings by· ... the leading practitioners in FSR'. 22
The General System Theory presented by von Bertalanffy rests upon the
assumption that such a system is both a model with universal traits and a set
of elements which are interrelated among them selves and their environment.
This model of interrelated parts is (I) hierarchical, (2) tends toward higher
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organization, (3) includes differentiation into subsystems, and (4) requires a
progressive centralization, and by inference, reductionist analyses. In so far
as FSR 's proponents claim to be articulating a 'system', it would appear that
it is a 'system' within von Bertalanffy's paradigm. FSR's proponents do
attempt to theoretically assess the entirety of the farming 'system' as it
impinges on the primary unit of analysis-the farm household. Both human
and technical 'elements' and their internction are observed from a systemic
perspective. Concern for determining any interaction among the technical
elements is internal with respect to the environmental endowments and
constraints .. With regard to the human element there is additional concern
over exogenous and endogenous factors. Furthermore, in recognition of the
complexity of the farm household decision process· from a systems
perspective, the analysis hy necessity becomes general and interdisciplinary
in its conceptual formulations.
Clearly, such an approach provides an opportunity to 'systematically'
examine the target population from multidisciplinary perspectives. Such a
view. it is argued, provides necessary information beyond the scope and
capability of a narrow focus on the target population. For example. a policylevel price change may have critical implications for the individual farm
household, and yet as an exogenous variable, the farmer may know nothing
of the change or not be in a position to be proactive, but reactive. Thus. the
FSR team should be able to broaden the research perspective and provide
leadership for 'positive' change.

\)
~

CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE
ILl\1ng identified FSR\ ·svstcmic' hcrit;igc it is now possible to examine

tw" this heritage bo1h directs its paradigm;itic research agenda and limib its
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scope of in4uin An initi;il criti4uc. then. should bc metathcoretical.
According 1<1 I Li henn;" 7 and Rad111tzl-.y.' 7 c111p11ical sociology is a
technical appro;ich which views action as rational in a limitcd means-ends
rationality. Such a positivist approach tends to proceed through stages of
increasing rationalizatio~
In the first stage, conveniently labeled 'technologies', models such as FSR,
are constructed with specific variables emanating from the technical
members of the participating sciences. The second stage, referred to as
·9ecisiou._t.he..ory', involves the making of choices among the various
technologies under consideration. Since particular technical interests of the
FSR 'team· mediate the choice of technique, the values ofthese<'fechnic1ai}f>
are autom<llically included. Within the third stage, 'game ttu:Dry', the rules of
analysis are schematized and operationalized. At this point the values of the
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technicians are accepted as given, and th~reby become domain assumptions
of the model. In the fourth stage, the c~,rnctjcaHy gyided (or automatically
controlled) techniques are automated, and decisions are made by computers
which have been programmed to accept the value premises of the
technicians. The analysis is accepted as scientific and therefore value-free
and rational. Radnitzky (p. 327) 17 asserts:
The idea that man conducts his fate rationally to the extent in which he
uses social techniques and even the very employment itself of such
techniques is cybernetically steered.'
Therefore, given such an instrumentalistic view of scientific theory, action
may be economically rational and efficient with respect to ends. However,
the ends themselves are never questioned or criticized.
Structural Functionalism's theory of development-modernization
theory-neatly flts this type of rationalization. The problems selected and
the research methods employed incorporate the assumptions of this
'scientific' approach. FSR is a conceptual offspring of modernization theory
and therefore is subject to its ~sand limitations. In FSR particularly,
the majority of the work that has been accomplished has been a historical.
procedural, and scientistic. This has impacted upon its approach, its process
of problem selection, its operationalization, and ultimately its conclusions.
A contradictory consequence of this process is that the technicians not
only trust their model's conclusions to be unbiased, but, by acting on these
conclusions through technical policy recommendations, they consciously or
unwittinglv assume that science can provide technTca! solutions
fundamentally socio-ecom)mu:andpOTit!Calprohlerns Thus, the conclusions reached often recommend yield incrqscs. irrigation systems.
;dternati\'e technologies, and market de\'clnpment. assuming that impro\'cments "·ill benefit societies in encral. Despite three dec;idcs of development
effort
1rected hv various forms of modernization th.1'.Qry, hum:q1
i1~1i~cration~~ sta~·at.!£n~"'1xl s~~~1,;i_cgu;dit·i~ cont11~1e to exist.
and worsen, thus begging the case for a higher !err.I of....a.rtiG!latiQ.n~ Thi;
alJSruati~~cres:QfanaTySls that ha;e th~ p-otential o!i_ncor o at n • the
best of FSR are the various perspectives-embodied by th~c:!:r~it~ic;:·~~~Y:,;?
A common criticism of critical approaches i~· th-at they are no proactive.
i.e., they offer incisive critiques but lack praxis. While such criticism tends to
be more polemical than true (the early theorists of Western Marxism were
also social activists) Radnitzky offers a way of combining the research
dimension of FSR with the assumptions of political economy. While
quantitative sociology concerns itself with making societal phenomena
visible, critical sociology concerns itself with· ... what we ... must do, viz. the
planning and shaping of the future' (p. 343). 1 7 Thus. in addition to producing
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empirical knowledge, there is also a cri1ical task to historically situate the
information. II is this addi1ion, the criti ue or reflexivity, throu h which
social science can achieve an adequate self·un erslanding. 'Empirical
knowledge can be utilized for social lechnologies and hence be indispensable for ra1ional administration; criticism-especially of ideologies-<:an
contribute to a rationalization of practical questions about ends' (p. 319). 17

THE CASE FOR DISARTJCULATION: THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
The preceding theoretical orientation perhaps is best employed in de
Janvry's 4 analysis of development policies in Latin America. His principal
concern is to explain the inabili1y for development lheories and programs to
reconcile efliciencies of production al lhe micro-level with efficiencies of
production al the macro-level. That is, how are international and national
policies disarticulated with development efforts at lhe micro-, or householdlevel. Afler carefully discussing 1he historical conlext of Latin American
development de Janvry describes the inherent contradictions of these
multiple-level development policies.
de Janvry's critical focus rests upon 'cheap food policies' and their
inherent tendency to be disarticulated with household-level development
strategies despite their intention to enhance production capacities and
thereby increase family income. de Janvry (p. 39) 4 proposes that there are
three dimensions to this contradiction:
'(I] cheap food policies that suppress the price of food; [2)
concessional imports; and [3] technological change and the development of capitalism in agriculture. Each of these is in turn contradictory:
che"p food policies imply the stagnation of domestic food production
a-. modernization of agriculture is m;1de unprofitable; food imports
incrca-.e the stress on the ha lance of payments; and the development of
capitalist agriculture marginalizes pca-.ants and accekrntes the
liquid<Jtion of functional dualism.'
Each of these contradictions is in evidence in the case of the Dominican
Repuhlic, especially in terms of the national policy of suppressing
agricultural prices in order 10 make food cheaper for impoverished urban
workers. The artificially low price aimed at p<icifying the urban poor has the
effect of shifting the surplus-value created by the producer to the consumer.
Thus, while the urban consumer might be temporarily.satisfied, assuming
there is an income to purchase the subsidized food, the low price garnered by
the farm producer has the socio-economic and political consequence of
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eliminating the marginal, limited-resource farmer and therefore of
accelerating rural to urban migration. In the Dominican Republic, the urban
population has increased from 30 per cent in 1960to 53 per cent in 1982 (this
does not include the 900000 Dominicans in New York Cityl. This rapid
influx of new labor primarily contributes to even higher urban unemploy·
menl rates and federal welfare outlays. Presently, unofficial estimates of
unemployment in the Dominican Republic exceed 40 per cent. This cheap
food policy has facilitated the internal economic contradictions that
traditional! have had the consequence of creatin more landless laborers
with no place to ply their uns 1 e non arm labor. Ironically, then, a cheap
rood policy that was supposed to pacify is laying the foundation for major
~i?I upheaval and political repression.
Concessional imports also have played a contradictory role. Imports from
the United States in the form of food and feed grains have steadily increased
since the J950s 6 This policy has tht1 tendency to exacerhate the low
commodity price policy for the marginal producer as well as to deplete
federal revenues. Typically, policies that subsidize consumers for imported
commodities (I) Qecrease the~tity of domestic production, (2) tend to
t!:i!nsfer surplus-value from the producer to the consumer and middlemen
(similar to the cheap food policy), and (3) £!!!!!_e a loss in production
efficiency (p. 195). 13 Unsurprisingly, it is the contention of critical theorists
such as de Janvry 4 and Robinson 18 that food self-sufficiency must take
ereeminance over self-reliance.
'From every point of view-political economic :rnd bumane~·the
first necessity for the third world is to increase production of h"sic
foodm1[s ... Production of food is the most effecti\'C form of irnpPrt
saving investment. For a country with a deficit in its halancc of
payments to import food means th:il it is b<,rrowing in order to cat. The
debt remains tu be paid ;1fter the food has been c;11c11· (p.132). 1"
A further man1fcstalion of this concessional lr'1de conlrad1etio11 "the
Dominican Republic's enormous internation~il debt. The deht that remain'
lo be paid in the Dommican Rcpuhlic has escalated since the assassmat1on
of Trujillo to almost impossible proportions From virtually nothing in
1963, the debt has risen to 3 billion US dollars in 1985. Fully 25 per cent of
the traditionally unstahle export earnings, almost exclusively from
sugarcane. is required to service the debt ( 18.7 per cent in 1982;"' estimated
25 per cent for 1985 11 )
This problem is compounded hy the International Moneury Fund\
(IMF) policies required of dehtor nations. The main elements imposed by
the IMF on aid seding countries are: (l) reduced expenditures through
restricted credit and increased interest rates; (2) control over price support-.,
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subsidies or wage rate; and 0) pressme not to impose tariffs, trade licenses,
and multiple exchange rates that favor exports over imports_ The IMF
insists on de\'aluation of currencies in lieu of these policies_•~ 'Where the
main exports are raw materials in inelastic demand [e.g., sugarcane), this
fails to increase foreign earning and it pours oil on the fires of inflation at
home· (Robinson. p. 98)_ 1 8
The consequences arc all too familiar. Low prices are maintained,
production growth fails to keep pace with demand, more food is imported,
and the nationalcurrencyisdevalued(from SI DR peso= SI US to3to I in
one day), thus further eroding export earnings. Predictably, despite the
cheap food policies, destabilizing urban riots and general unrest followed
the most recent IMF negotiations.
Export policies also may undermine domestic food production. It might
he expected that exportation of sugarcane, and winter produce, such as
cantalopes and tomatoes, provides US currency and employment and
therefore on balance improves the 'general' well-being_ In point of fact,
unfa\'Orahlc terms of trade resulting from 'monopolistic' conditions
c~rizc the Caribbean sugarcane market. RoElinson's 1k analysis of the
winter produce industry provides an excellent comparison for sugar and
winter produce production in the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, the
primary import country, the US, controls the amount of sugar pem1itted
into the country hy simultaneously setting quotas and very high support
prices, which protects the indigenous US sugar industry. The support price
has been about $0- J 9 per pound-as compared to $003 fort he world price.
The high US government price is designed to support the historically
concentrated LIS "'~<tr industry and not the sugar industries of the
Carihhean B:"ni. Come4urnth·. with the decline in demand for sugar in the
l'S (111 p:trt due to the development of sugar synthetics and suh>titutcs) and
the dcepcninl' fisctl crisis of the federal government. concessiom in the suµ:ir
prngr<im h:I\ c come at the cxpemc of the Caribbean natiom. Since 1982, the
Dnminic:111 Republic suµ:1r4uota has been cut frorn 447000 tons to 27XOOO
tons in 19Xh The 11 "ul/ S11cct )011rnal (p. 1) 2 ' has reported the following
concerns of Carl<" Morales Troncoso, the Vice President of the Dominican
Rcpuhl1c·

·us suµar policy has hecn ··catastrophic'"_ He estimates that the
region\ sug:n producers have lost at least $JOO million in export
earnings since 1984 because of the quota cuts.'
The domestic agriculture crisis is evident in the inability of the Dominican
St:1te Sugar Council to pay 8000 small- and medium-si1ed growers, which
has n"ulted in the layoff of hctwec1L7QOQQ LQ_ !()()()(~rm workcrs--thus
cx:iccrh;itin!-' the O\ercrowding in Santo Domingo's slums. 2 '

In the competition for export markets such as sugar, the inability of
countries like the Dominican Republic to control supply has led to a steady
deterioration in the terms of trade between producing countries and sugar
importers. 12 - '8 The deterioration of export earnings is further complicated
by the unstable social conditions within the Dominican Republic. As the
major source or hard currency income, the production of exportable
agricultural crops like sugarcane and winter produce is actively encouraged
by the government This policy forces the producers of exportable
agricultural commodities into direct competition with the domestic food
production sector for productive land. As the major share of cultivable land,
and eventually even marginal land, has been transferred to the production of
these export commodities, production of domestic food has declined.
Consequently, the country becomes increasingly less able to sustain its own
food needs. and thereby further threatens its internal food security_
Finally, with respect to technological changes that facilitate the increasing dominance of capitalist formations in agriculture, the liquidation of functional dualism is accelerated. de Janvry refers to functional
dualism as the relationship between capitalist agriculture and a quasicommercial/subsistance farming sector, in which the smallholding sector
contributes to capital accumulation in the capitalist sector. According to de
Janvry, subsistence agriculture is the 'ultimate embodiment of contradictions of accumulation in the disarticulated economies' (p. 39). 4 He contends
that it is functionally beneficial for the capitalist agricultural sector to
coexist with a s allholding fam1 sector which rovides chea labor and
cheap food That is, the sma olding sector provides a necessary labor pool
for periods of peak labor demand as well as cheap food which helps to
maintain lcrn· labor costs_ However. as the forcmentioned contradictions
unfold. the smallholding sector hc·conies increasingly marginal. Conscq urn ti\'. as srn:illholders 4 uit production. this sector can no longer serve the
function of pro\'iding cheap labor and cheap food for the commercictl
agricultural sector, and thus is steadily un<ihlc to contribute to capital
accummulation in the capitalist sector_

FSR's SYSTEMIC SHORTCOMINGS
These contradictions suggest that for deyclopment efforts to be successful.
all levels of policy, at a minimum must not he disaqjculated with one
another. Even within a systems-like perspective this disarticulation can be
explicated_ Figure 2 presents an overly simplistic idiographic description of a
hierarchical model, hut one that we feel succinctly advances our purpose, i.e ..
to demonstrate disarticulation, even in a systems framewor~- However. as
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Gcn<...'r;.il systems hicran:hical model (Marcollc)
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opposed to the tendency for system theorists to work within the framework
of a closed model, this heuristic model is open. Once again we will use the
example of the Dominican Republic to illustrate disarticulation.
The N;nional Agricultural System (NAS) is responsible for implementing
miliondl agricultural goals and objectives. The resulting policies are
supposed to he articulated through regional organizations such as the
research stations and extension service. In a closed systems model, these
ohjccti,·es would he oper;itionalized through local institutions into cropping
patterns al the farm level. However, there are at least two points at which this
network is disarticulated. First, the type of research performed at the
regional levels is market-commodity based (usually field crops). It is
performed on single crops grown independently rather than on intercropping systems. Replications and results of the regional research ;ire not
commonly done in on-farm trials. Therefore, generalized regional research
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often is not applicable at the household-level. 20 Second, while the stated
policy may be to increase food production for consumption, the realities of a
cheap food policy include inherent disincentives to maximize local
production.
A fully articulated agricultural system aimed at improving the income of
smallholders through research that increases total productivity not only
would have to be supported by regional research centers that reflected
smallholder 'farming systems', but also would include national market
policies aimed at helping smallholders retain the increased surplus-value
anained through increased productivity. However, as already noted, IMF
and concessionary trade policies militate against such agricultural
objectives. Rather, they support export crop production, such as sugarcane,
which is highly concentrated and employs large quantities of nonDominican labor, primarily Haitians.
FSR models do not take into account even the possibility of
disarticulation between its goals Tor greater production at the household
level and the policy imperatives at the international, national, or regional
levels. This inability to account for disarticulation, as described earlier, is in
part a consequence of its functionalist tradition's tendency toward
reductionism. Reductionism refers to a mode of analysis in which the
properties of complex wholes, whether molecules or social organizations,
are explained only in terms of the parts of which each is composed. In brief,
'reductionism is the claim that the compositional units of a whole are
ontologically prior to the whole that the units comprise ... (such that] there
10
is a chain of causation that runs from the units to the whole' (pp. 5-6). Hart
and George's (p. 47)" FSR model, presented in Fig. l, provides an apt
example.
The principal 'prior ontological assumption' is that the primary objective
is increased productivity of the 'farming system'. An ancillary aS>tm1ptio11 is
that such an increase will accomplish the goal of impn"cd vi<ihili1v and
social well-being of the farm household. Consequcntlv, th<' primary
objective is simply increased productivity. These assumptions also retlccl the
assumptions of most agricultural schoob and colleges of the West. 2 This is
certainly an ubiquitous assumption among FSR proponents The following
citation from Caldwell (p. 22)' is representative:
'As Norman 11 states'. "The primary aim of I the Farming Syste111s
Approach to research) is to increase the overall producl1\ity of the
farming system -therefore, hopefully the welfare of individual farming
families." I would suggest that our challenge is to move beyond
"hopefully". Certainly we cannot assume
that, "Tal\e care of
agricultural income and tht· household will take care of ihelf"'
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The assumption is that increased productivity will produce incraised
agricultural income even though the household will not necessarily take care
of itself. Such a seemingly unassuming position has the consequence of
directing on-farm research toward the maximization of production within
the agronomic and knowledge limits of the farming household. Oasa and
Swanson 14 have argued that the history of technologically induced increases
in productivity. whether among advanced industrial or third world societies,
is quickly ofT-set by unfavorable terms of trade between producers and
markets. Hence, it is unreasonable to assume that increased productivity
leads to increased agricultural income for farm families.
Furthermore, by focusing on the most elementary parts of the farming
system-which in Hart and George's model 8 are 'a crop' or 'an animal'FSR practitioners are following a reductionist mode of analysis. Given the a
priori assumption of'increased productivity' within the context of particular
crop and animal agroecosystems, it is taken for granted that the
'improvements' in the agroecosystems will articulate with the socioeconomic subsystem, even though there is no apparent reason for making
such an assumption in the model. Changes in the most elementary part of the
system, then, are considered to 'cause' the desired change at higher levels of
aggregation.
Hart and George's model also does not address how the increased
productivity of the 'farm system' will interact with either 'market credit and
information center· or with 'non-agricultural systems' which compose the
'region', nor how the efforts of the farmers to incorporate FSR
recommendations are articulated with international or national agricultural
policies. It mus! be cone! udcd, therefore, that independenl aclion to increase
produclivity al !he farm level will percolale 'upward' !hrough the
hinarchical S\'Slems model and ultimately 'improve· !he well-being of the
region. Once ag;1in. thi'. is an example of !he inherenl reduc1ionis1 cha racier
of !he model.
The Han and George model leaves unassessed, then,jusl how much either
endogenou' or exogenous socio-economic conditions inleract wi1h efforts lo
increase plant and anim;;I productivity. Such interaction, it is lefl for us to
surmise, mus! occur in a proverbial 'black box' that is so characteristic of
olher types of sys1ems analysis models where key points of articulation are
!cf! unexplica!ed. 19 Indeed, even among social scientists, ii has been all too
common to !real ·1echnological phenomena as events transpiring inside a
black bm' (p. vii) 19
Finally. the assumpl10r1' of !he Hart and George model ul!irnately rest
upon the undesirahk as>umption of technological deterrninism.~· Simply
slaled. the model must a5'ume that technologic;il changes induced 1hrough
on-farm research to increase pi<lnt and animal productivity will ;ichieve the
14
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desired social change. All we have to do is tinker with technology and we can
change social organization. The converse is, of coune, that changing the
organization of society as a means of achieving social goals is problematic,
since traditionally, development programs haye sought to emeliorate
deteriorating social conditions and therefore maintain the socio-economic
and political status quo.

BRINGING FSR BACK lN
This last observation provides a departure point for recovering the research
aspect, that is, the information-gathering dimension of FSR while
discarding its functionalist/reductionist development dimension. It is our
contention that atherin information on the h sical, a rono~d
socio-economic characteristics of sma -producer armmg systems is
essential for any agricultural development effort. This assumption, no doubt,
appears to be quite familiar since it also underscores much of the thinking
among FSR advocates presently. However, as we have argued above, such
research must not be disarticulated with existing fiscal, financial, and
development policies of the country as is the case currently where FSR is
being implemented. How, then can FSR be brought back into development
policy as a mode of research and not as a development policy per se7
Contrary to implicit assumptions of current FS R advocates, changing the
soci~anization must be a necessary aspect of development policy.
Simply changing the technology or increasing smallholding productivity is
not enough. Increased prodyctjvjly, whether via new technologies or
olherwise, and the value created mus! be reiained by the producer. In order
for this to occur, the terms of trade between the producer and the markel
must be made more favorable to 1he producer and consistent with 01her
national development policies, such as those for non-agricultural workers.
Therefore. !he national development policies. including fiscal, export trade.
fi~l, and internal trade policies, must be geared t-;;;;;rd the goals of
simultaneously improving the well-b~i_ri_g of both urban and rural residents.
Many development theorists and agricult~raladrninistrators would argue
that social change beyond simple reforms-such as those usually offered by
FSR proponents-is not a serious attempt at praxis. However we would
counter that by simply following unaniculated development policies that
are highly associated with particular nationalist or c_!i!.ss ~
amounts to nothing more than an effort to milintain the~\ qu~
existing political economy (class) relationships. The s1atus quo 1s, as always,
nothing more than an ephemeral snapshot in a con1ia1111m of social change.
It is a small wonder that such great amounts of scarce national and
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international development resources are spent on its maintenance.
Furthermore, there are recent examples where dramatic political economy
changes have occurred in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It is quite
possible that within the fragile political contexts of these nations it may be
easier to articulate national and local development policies such that the
information on agronomic, physical, and social characteristics of
smallholders can he of importance.
The point here is, however, th~by itself, even under more favorable
political economy conditions, remains nonetheless, a means of gathering
necessary scientific information and not a development policy. This
statement in no way depreciates the value of the information generated by
FSR. As w·th any information, its use will tend t
eHect the class, and its
inherent values, in power.
us, this statement is consistent with our concern
that such information be articulated within the context of the larger political
economy. Furthermore, even within such a context, FSR as a research
strategy continues to be guided by the values and development assumptions
of its practitioners. The difference is that the research agenda is set by
policies in which there is full articulation. This docs not mean development
strategies that utilize FSR will be any more successful. Development will
always remain a difficult task.
Efforts intended to produce bottom-up development, regardless of how
well-intentioned, fail when left unarticulated with the larger political
economy. To the extent FSR is viewed as a development strategy
independent of the prevailing political economy-any political economy-it
is likely to fail. FSR is not a development strategy pt·r se. but a methodology
for collecting necessarv agricultural information. It is the utilization of this
information hv the agricultural administrators which will provide for
cnlightened p<1l1c1cs ;ind, thus, development with equity.
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INTRODUCTION

1.
After World War II the emphasis of public development efforts was
on capital investment projects, in line with prevailing development theories.
The
creation of
physical capital, as
engine
for the
"big
push"
(Rosenstein-Rodan), or to bring about the "take-off stage" (Rostow), was seen
as the basis for economic growth and its attendant accumulation of wealth. It
was further supposed that the wealth, accumulated principally at the socially
and economically better off layers of society, would "trickle down" to the
poor. Although earlier attempts had been made to address the poor directly,
notably with the community development concept of the SO's; and although
doubts about the exclusive focus on capital formation had been voiced,
notably by Viner in 1953 and by Tinbergen in 1958, it was not until the early
70's that governments started to redirect their focus from the formation of
physical capital to certain aspects of the promotion of human capital. The
main reason for this shift in focus was the belief that "trickle down" did
not occur, or at least did not occur to the extent and with the speed
previously assumed. As a result, attempts to create wealth were now combined
with efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of the development
effort.
2.
Early projects with a poverty orientation, such as the Puebla
rural
development project in
Mexico, were
purely
equity
oriented,
concentrating on increasing production, and hence income, among poor farmers.
However, it was soon realized that equitable growth required providing social
services. In practice this meant a shift away from financing hardware towards
"new style" projects which, although still strong in financing capital
investment, also included components to satisfy "basic needs" and to supply
social services.
3.
With respect to lending to agriculture, the focus upon poverty and
the emphasis on the development of human as well as physical capital, led to
the concept of integrated rural development projects. These projects are
concentrated efforts that bring to a specific rural area a basket of goods
and services including social and infrastructure components. This concept
had, by 1973, been developed and tested in various parts of the world, by a
number of development
institutions, including the World Bank. Between 1969
and 1973J)the Bank authorized an average of only 3 of these multi-sectoral
projects
yearly; constituting about 9% of all its agricultural projects,
and representing less than 6% of its total lending to agriculture. During the
years from 1974 to 1979 these annual averages had risen to 9 multi-sectoral
projects,
representing almost 12.5% of all
agricultural projects and
accounting for about 11% of all lending to agricu25ure, almost double the
average percentage of the 5 year period prior to 1974 •
4.

projects
profound

The shift from fairly well defined and definable engineering-type
to the far more complicated and uncertain "new style" projects, had
consequences for the promoting and implementing
institutions,
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inc luu ing for the World Bank. By the nature of the work done, these
institutions were mainly staffed by engineers and economists; professionals
whose operating methods and philosophy are dominated by fairly rigorous
analysis. Now, these same people were confronted with the necessity to
understand the motivations of people in alien cultures, they had to adapt
implementation of project components to the wishes of recipients of the
supposed benefits, they had to contend with personal and inter-institutional
rivalry in the member countries they worked in, they had to understand and
appreciate the risk to the beneficiaries of adopting recommendations that
often looked good only on paper. With respect to the implementation of the
projects, they had to contend with a large number of components, each dealing
with a particular economic or social aspect of the multi-task project;
components that were unrelated and whose simultaneous development created a
totally new problem of inter-agency coordination. While success or failure of
most engineering type projects is rather uncontroversial, success or failure
of a new style project, combining economic and social development goals, can
become a
subjective judgement, often
related to moral and political
convictions. Not surprisingly, there is disagreement about whether certain
projects, and indeed the whole concept of integrated rural development,
should be called a success or a failure.In short, human development proved to
be vastly different and often much more frustrating than building a bridge or
an irrigation system. The shift in emphasis has thus led to much uncertainty
and discussion in the institutions involved as well as to much soul searching
and frustration among their staff. This process of adaptation to a new
development philosophy is on-going and appears far from finished.
5.
The following report tries to make a contribution to understanding
and hence to future design of "new style", integrated, rural <levelopment
efforts in Latin America, and to the adaptation of the institutions involved
for the task they have set themselves. The degree of participation of
beneficiaries
in design and implementation of integrated rural development
projects is a special line of inquiry that has been followed throughout the
report. The work is based on an extensive literature survey, complemented by
field research in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico.
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B.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

6.
Agricultural development generally tries to raise agricultural
production and productivity and is of a technical nature. It is similar to
other efforts to develop physical capital as a means for economic growth. The
construction of irrigation works, land clearing, the supply of agricultural
credit, the support for agricultural research and extension, etc. are all, by
themselves, technical aspects of agricultural development. Rural development,
though, by definition is oriented more toward benefitting primarily the poor.
Hence,
in a narrow interpretation, rural development
is
agricultural
development among the poor segment of the rural population. Raising the poor
(usually small) farmer's production and productivity requires not only the
traditional efforts of agricultural development, but includes other specific
aspects related to the nature of the clientele as,
for instance, the
provision of health services to increase work capacity; the provision of
education, to increase comprehension and absorbtion of new knowledge and of
extension, to increase
technical skills, etc.
This aspect of
rural
development, as a direct result of working with the poor, makes rural
development synonymous
with
human development.
Thus, the fundamental
distinction between pure agricultural and rural development is the emphasis
on physical capital development for the former, and human capital development
for the latter.
It is this Jistinction that is often over looked and that has
created
much
frustration,
particularly among
the
practitioners
of
agricultural development. Most institutions,
including the
World Bank,
entrusted rural development, when that became a dominant part of prevailing
policies in the early 70's, to their specialists in agricultural development.
These latter were technicians, mostly agronomists, agriculturalists, and
economists who were trained and experienced in "old style" agricultural
development projects. For many,
the new style rural development projects
represented nothing more than a shift in target population, i.e. towards the
poor. The concomitant fundamental change in the nature of the work done was
net always perceived.
7.
Early in the discussion about rural development, policy makers
realized that agricultural development activity among the poorer segments of
the population was probably not sufficient and argued to include other than
purely production related components in rural development projects. For
instance, social services and infrastructure related components were proposed
on the basis of expected synergism between the different components. Further
arguments to include other than production related components were based on
equity considerations, t.e. more on moral than on economic grounds. Finally,
some project workers,
familiar with the early years of the new style
projects, say that the attempt to meet "basic needs" was justified as an
effort to channel the increased income of small farmers, resulting from
productivity increases,
into socially useful forms of expenditure. Without
this paternalism, it is alleged, the extra income would be largely spent on
frivolous forms of entertainment.
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8.
The rest of this chapter will deal briefly with : (1) client~le of
rural development, i.e. the small farmer; (2) the history of efforts at rural
development, and (3) the institutions involved in this particular facet of
economic development.
1.

The Smal 1 Farmer

9.
Rural poor are regarded as a single target group for rural
development efforts, as if this group constitutes a homogeneous mass of rural
population, but poor rural societies are at least as diverse as the better
known urban societies. There are landless laborers, seasonal workers and
sharecroppers at the lower end of income distribution. There are small
farmers with production insufficient, or barely sufficient, for their own
subsistence. And there are small farmers with a marketable surplus which
contributes to total family income. Apart from groups directly linked to the
land. and its production potential, there are small
entrepreneurs and
tradesmen either itinerant or located in rural towns. The primary target
population of rural development is the small farmer, and the other groups
will benefit only indirectly from most rural development projects. It is
sometimes argued that "integrated" rural development project must include all
rural poor, but in practice attention has generally been focussed on the
existing small farmer, since to help the others would usually require
sweeping social and political changes (land reform, etc.).
10.
The definition of a small farmer is difficult, because of the
diversity of natural endowments for agricultural production. A definition of
small farmer cannot simply be related to the area of land owned or worked on.
It cannot be related solely to the type of production obtained or even to the
absnlute level of income generated. For the practical purposes of defining a
target population for rural development, the small farmer should best be
defined relative to his production and social environment. The lower limit of
small farmer should be the farming family who has sufficient resources to
produce just enough for its own subsistence. This may include production of
an occasional surplus in order to generate the cash, or to barter, for
products not produced on the family farm. Defining the upper limit of
"smallness" is more difficult. There is enough diversity among
rural
conditions to make it impossible to determine in general terms an upper limit
to the definition of "small farmer",
i.e. an upper limit to the type of
farmer that should benefit substantially from rural develo§~ent in Latin
America. However, following the reasoning of Morss, et. al.
the "largest"
small farmer can be defined relative to the "smallest" small farmer. The
largest farmers still eligible to be included would be those whose production
techniques do not differ principally from those used by the smallest farmer.
A typical example where this condition applies is much of the highland areas
under the integrated rural development programs in Colombia. In many parts of
the areas under the project, farming is very intensive using multi-cropping
systems on often very steep hill slopes, exclusively manually worked. This
applies to small as well as to larger farms
in these areas. The largest
farmer included under this definition would face essentially the same risk as
the smallest farmer when adopting new techniques,
inputs or crops. In other
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the willingness and ability
to take chances with respect to
agricultural development should be more or less the same for the entire class
defined as "small". Finally, the largest "small" farmer
should not cultivate
significantly more land than the average farm in the area.
11.
It is our experience that the definition of small farmer is more
difficult on paper than his, or her, identification is in the field. There is
a certain kinship, a certain class identification, among those farmers who
manage to subsist fairly well. This class tends to define itself and its
members.
It automatically
excludes
the very poor, who may work as
sharecroppers or as seasonal workers on the small farmer's property. On the
other hand, those belonging to the small farmer's class are not considered
peers by larger land holders in the same area, i.e. by those whose holdings
are substantially larger than the average around them.
12.
The extensive literature on small farmers offers some extreme
positions on whether the small farmer acts economically rational or not. The
views range from seeing small farmers as fatalistic,
favoring luck over
knowledge and
as being subject to severe community pressures against
innovation, to the view that the attitude of traditional producers towards
production, and
particularly changes )in
production can be
explained
4
satisfactorily by profitability alone.
A more temperate view holds that
small farmers are rational, but fear innovations because of the high risks
they usually entail for a subsistence farmer. They are generally more
knowledgable than external experts about the reality of their existence.
Proponents of this view often contend that the real problem lies in the
nature of modern technology and in the institutions promoting it rather than
with the small farmer, as the new technology makes the farmer highly
vulnerable and
dependent
on
fluctuating markets and on ~nstitutions
5
controlled by non-farmers and not accountable in case of failure.
13.
It would appear that the latter view is the most realistic. Small
farmers in any specific area have usually survived there for generations and
have accumulated a rather solid body of - maybe instinctive - knowledge about
the possibilities, limits and risks of cultivation in the particular region.
Living relatively close to the subsistence level, the risk of experiments for
them is very large
it can easily spell starvation if things go wrong. This
element is often overlooked when schemes are promoted which seem to involve
fairly reasonable risks compared to the expected returns. One such case, in
~h_ich risks were
actually calculated is the Caqueza project in Co~. This
project, aP early integrated rural development pilot project in~amarc~,
initially assumed that low corn yields found in the area were due to a lack
of knowledge about modern production techniques on the part of the farmer.
However, after two years of on-farm experimental work,
in which the farmers
cooperated and in which it was shown that the new techniques could more than
double their corn yields, farmers by and large still refused to adopt the new
technology. Further analysis of production data showed that the recommended
technology required tripling the traditional value of inputs, with nearly all
of this increase in the form of cash outlays at the time of field preparation
and seeding. Furthermore, project personnel calculated that the increase in
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cash cost, associated with the recommended new production technology, was not
offset by a commensurate return. Each dollar invested in the inputs under the
new technology returned only $2.44, while each dollar of invested inputs
under the old technology, i.e.
for seeds, fertilizer and pesticides returned
$3.75. Still, increased cash requirements and reduced returns for each dollar
spent appeared to be insufficient reason for the almost total rejection of
the new technology. After al 1, it could also be calculated that counter
balancing the diminished returns to cash were increases in land returns by
155%, increases to labor by 73% and increases in returns to total investment
by 13%. Furthermore, production per hectare increased by somewhat over 200%
and net returns rose by 253% under the new technology. On balance then the
technology offered was clearly profitable. Subsequently, a production risk
calculation showed that the risk to be incurred by the farmer in terms of
dollars per hectare was three times as high for the recommended new
technology as
it was under traditional production methodology. In spite of
the substantially higher net returns of the new technology, the risk per
dollar net return was still 50% higher under the new technology than it used
to be. It was cone luded that the farmer's percept ion of risk was an
important, and maybe the decisive factor in his decision of whether to adopt
or not to adopt the new technology.
14.
Another factor that influences small farmers'
attitude towards
changes, such as suggested new production approaches, are group and community
pressures. Small farmer communities often face
distinct socio-cultural
inhibitions against personal accumulation of wealth;
they may be subjec~ to
income
leve 11 ing mechanisms
such
as
re 1 igious and extended
family
obligations. This can strengthen their determination to remain at the
subsistence level of the community rather than rise above it. The previously
mentioned study by Morss, et. al. suggests that such local sanctions against
innovation
or accumulation have been important in a number of rural
development projects, as have social,
including family, obligations, and
strong preference for
leisure. Thus, the small farmers' willingness to adopt
recommendations for new production techniques depends not only on his
estimates of possible risks, but also on complex, subjective considerations,
resulting from the socio-cultural climate in which he lives.
15.
The small farmer in most Latin American countries is particularly
vulnerable with respect to marketing his excess production.
Marketing
cooperatives are still rare, particularly among small farmers. Examples
abound, where either unscrupulous management or strong differences of opinion
among members led to premature abandonment of cooperatives. As a reJult, most
small farmers depend upon the itinerant trucker merchant ("rescatista") to
sell their marketable surplus as well as to buy production inputs and
household goods. It would be wrong to assume that the trucker merchant system
is monopolistic, high cost and inefficient. To the contrary, it is often
difficult to see how any other system could collect products for a market
from widely scattered small producers with a poor or non-existent feeder road
system and totally inadequate public transportation. It is often argued,
particularly by those who advocate low food prices for poor urban consumers
that the profit margins of intermediary traders are excessive. This is
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system to prevent monopoly pricing. Nevertheless, better price tnformation
system strengthen the bargaining hand of the small farmer vis-a-vis the
trucker merchant and could result in an overall decrease in profit margins of
the latter.

16.
There 1s often a paternalistic relationship betwe!n the small
farmer and the trucker merchant who buys up his occasional surplus production
and supplies him with his occasional requirements for inputs and household
goods. This paternalistic relationship works both ways. The trucker merchant
depends to a certain extent on the small farmer as a source for products to
be sold. The small farmer depends upon the trucker merchant in times of
distress, particularly as a source of credit. It is a relationship that is
similar to that between a tenant farmer or sharecropper and the land owner,
his "patron". As a matter of fact, in Brazilian rural development projects in
the northeast where the project entity, a public sector institution, had
acquired land from large land holders,
this same ins ti tut ion was then
expected by the small farmers to assume the old paternalistic role 0f the
patron as part of its responsibility as a land owner.

17.

Sudden changes in existing production and marketing patterns can
lead to precarious situations. A number of rural development projects,
notably those in Colombia, have been quite successful
in
increasing
production of the small farmer population in their areas. However, this
created over-supply and actual
inability to sell the increased production in
some instances. In most of these cases, public sector institutions engaged in
marketing functions have been unable to find outlets for the surplus
production of the small farmers of these areas.
18.
The small farmers' excess production that goes to market ts mosr.ly
in the
form of food for direct consumption. These are precisely the food
items whose prices are often controlled by governments
in order to keep
inflation down and in order to appease urban cons11mers. This puts an cidded
and institutionalized burden on the marketing problem for the small farmer's
output.

19.
Finally, while agricultural production is emphasized as the main
source of small farmers' income in monetary terms and in kind, the value of
their agricultural production is typically only somewhat over 50% of the
total income of the average poor rural family in Latin America. The remainder
is derived from other activities of various members of the family, such as
trade and wage labor.
If an integrated rural development project results in
overall increased economic activity, the smallholder family not onlv benefits
directly through increased production of its own, but also indirectly through
increased income from its non-agricultural activities.
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2.

A Brief History

20.
Efforts at rural development are not new. An early international
rural development exercise, and one that can be seen as the predecessor of
current programs, was community development.
Its decade of growth and
prominence were the SO's, although the origin of the term can be traced to
the 30's when it was used to define community participation in municipal
planning in the United States. In 1948 the term community development was
first used officially in relation with rural development efforts,
in what
latter came to be called developing countries, by the British Colonial
Office. Community development as proposed then was
intended to help the
British Colonies in Africa to prepare for independence by improving the
territories' economy and by strengthening local government. Upon British
initiative a number of fairly modest national community development efforts
were launched in British territories
in Africa ahout 1950. The first large
community development program was
initiated in India in 1952 with support
from the Ford Foundation and the United States Foreign Economic Assistance
Agency. Soon thereafter the concept was accepted by a number of countries
worldwide, as well as by the United Nations system. Primarily as a result of
promotion and financial support by the United States, community development
experienced phenomenal growth in the decade of the SO's.
21.
However, the varied experiences which led to the formulation of
the concept of community development were related more to social goals
functions and to political objectives than they were to economic development.
Hence,
the prevailing ideology underlying the concept and approach of
community development was biased towards social welfare and politics, with
matters of economic development and growth having secondary priority. The
strong support for the community development concept in the SO's by the
United States was rooted in the international political situation of that
era. Essentially, community development was seen by its advocates as the
free world's response to totalitarianism. A central theme in the cold war era
of the SO's was that the free world, and
in particular its developing
nations, faced a double threat from international communism with military
agression, and the possibility of internal subversion through communist
inspired agrarian movements. It was then still believed that military and
economic assistance would be sufficient to counter these threats. The
community development concept was seen, both by th2 United States and the
United Nations as a democratic means to bring about economic, social and
political development. The
long term objective of community development was
to build stable, democratic nations. With this background and origin,
community development was described as organization, education and social
action in,
for and by the community.
It was designed to encourage self-help
efforts to raise standards of living and to create self-reliant communities
with an assured sense of social and political responsibility. The development
of infrastructure and social services and P.ven the increase in production,
i.e. economic development, were seen as somewhat
incidental to the basic
political motive of community development. Community development thus, as far
as the developing countries were concerned, was of alien origin, and was to
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further objectives that, at best, were not directly related to their day to
day problems. Furthermore, it was political i:l an imposed way, it did not
plan for revolutionary changes in the existing political and economic order.
22.
Mostly through massive support by the United States and later on a
somewhat more modest scale by the United Nations,
the community development
movement saw some spectacular growth in the early SO's. By 1960 more than 60
nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America had initiated national community
development programs. India's much vaunted community development program
launched in 1952, gave the movement an added legitimacy. Actually, until
about the mid-SO's the Indian program served as a prototype for national
programs in other Asian countries. Where national community development
efforts were being implemented, usually a large new
bureaucracy
was
established to administer the program and to coordinate its components,
executed by various technical ministries and regional offices. At the field
level, the community development activities were usually initiated by posting
a specially trained civil servant, the "multi-purpose village level worker"
into a community or village. These village level workers were generally
secondary school graduates with several months of pre-service training in a
community development institute. He, or she, was supposed to guide and assist
villagers in identifying their needs, and translating those needs into action
programs. For doing that the village level worker was· supposed to have skills
in a variety of subjects ranging from village organization to technical
matters of agriculture and the supply of health services. These generalists
were supposed to be assisted by specialists from central offices.
23.
There were very limited and sporadic efforts made to recognize the
stratification of most
rural communities and the
resultant different
interests ranging from those of the landless laborer to those of the
commercial farmer. The village level worker often identified easiest with the
local elite and thus alienated the majority of the population. Consequently,
there was little attention given to assuring that benefits from community
development programs actually acrued to the rural poor. Realizing this, the
majority of the rural poor did not respond to the community development
approach.
24.
Compounding this problem was
the widespread internal conflict and
animosity within the major United States agencies that supported development
and provided technical services. Conflicts, which permeated the foreign aid
agencies were essentially ideological battles pitting generalists against
specialists, social scientists against te:hnocrats. Finally, by the early
60's,
these bureaucratic battles were won by the bureaucratically better
entrenched technical services' personnel who were less abstract, and some
would say more practical, in their perceptions of economic development. As a
corollary of this, community development agencies in developing countries
were merged into long established ministries of agriculture or internal
affairs, if not totally abolished.

25.
battle,

Probably because of the nature of the victors in this bureaucratic
the criticism most often heard,
in retrospect, of the community
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development movement lS that its programs were inefficient in reaching
economic goals. This criticism is voiced in spite of the fact that economic
goals never had priority with the movement, since the evolution of the
community development movement went from social welfare and public works to
cooperatives, to organizing local government and finally to some technical
support for agriculture.
26.
By the early 60's a number of large community development programs
were being discontinued, including the well known Indian program. It is fair
to say that by 1965 the community development movement had ended. The two
ma1n reasons for the rapid decline of the movement appear to be the sharp
reduction of interest in the topic in the United States, and diminishing
financial support for it, and the realization of leaders in pr inc i pal
developing countries that community development failed to achieve stated
objectives. A fundamental
reason for
the ineffectiveness of community
development as a concept of rural development was that it did not, and was
not
intended
to
change Lhe basic structural barriers to a general
acceleration of economic growth since it did not promote growth among the
lower levels of society. It also remained an alien movement in most
developing countries, directed and financed by foreigners.
27.
We have described the community development movement, its growth
and decline in some detail because of the striking parallel between this
concept and the concept of integrated rural development, which we will
discuss in the following chapter. The era of community development was'
followed, in Latin America, by a period of institutionalized agrarian reform.
Land reform, thP large scale exchange of ownership of land between different
social classes, hds a long history in Latin America. Early attempts at land
reform were the result of severe social inequities and came about after
violent revolutionary action outside the institutional framework of the state
and society. This was generally true of revolutionary land ~eform movements
up to the early 60's. The land reform movements of 1917 in Mexico are
probably Lhe best known of this era of land reform.
28.
By
the early 60's, governments throughout Latin America felt
increasing pressure to increase production and agricultural exports in order
to meet food requirements of the growing urban populations on the one hand
and to meet foreign exchange requirements for industrial development on the
other. As a result,
land reform movements were institutionalized as a means
to rationalize and improve agricultural production. This new motivation for
land reform was supported by secondary motivations such as the Cuban
Revolution, which increased the fears of extremist agrarian movements in many
countries, by a desire to stem the flow of rural poor to the cities, and by
the political pressures that originated from the Punta del Este Charter of
the Organization of American States in 1961. Based on the ideas of Raul
Prebisch the Punta del Este conference established a development policy for
agriculture based on a combination of agrarian reform and support for
technological
improvements.
In
most
Latin
American
countries
the
institutionalized agrarian reform of
the 60's was accompa ied by the
formation of a number of public sector institutions, to deal with and to
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assist the newly landed farmers.
29.
Redistributive land reforms in general have been most successful
if they were exercised against the remnants of feudalism. They have been less
successful if they were promoted against large land holdings which were
either under-utilized or condemned because size limits were imposed on land
ownership. The former type of land reform, directed against outdated social
structures could generally find broad political support. The latter, directed
against sometimes strong opposition of the landed elite has generally been
less successful in redistributing land from large land holders to small and
medium scale rural farmers. Land reform is often seen as a pre-condition for
effective rural development since increases in production require land
ownership by the rural poor which is assumed to be the only means to provide
a sufficient motivation to increase agricultural production.
30.
With the possible exception of some Central American countries and
parts of Brazil, elimination of estates as a justification for agricultural
reform has been exhausted in Latin America. Thus, agrarian reform based on
transfer of land ownership that aroused little political opposition was
finished by the end of the sixties. Further agrarian reform would have
implied redistribution of land ownership away from increasingly strong
sectors of society. This did not happen, and as a result, by the early 70's
the
agrarian reform movements 1n
most Latin American
countries had
essentially come to a halt. From then on attention became focused on the
concept of integrated rural development as a means to foster economic growth
among the rural poor and a way to achieve a more equitable distribution of
the fruits of economic development.
3.

The Institutions

31.
Public sector institutions engaged in rural development work both
at the international and national levels are mostly staffed with planning and
evaluation personnel who are trained primarily in economic analysis. These
economic (and financial) analysts are supported by technical specialists,
mostly agronomists and agricultural subsector specialists. The distinction
between agricultural development and rural development is often unclear for
these specialists who work on both types of projects.
32.
Local implementing agencies often are staffed, at least at the
decision making level, by persons with administrative and professional
experience in other institutions of the public sector. Because of the nature
of the work undertaken, the staff of agencies involved in rural development
tends to be from ministries of agriculture, agrarian banks, or agrarian
reform institutions. Many people at the decision making level in such Latin
American institutions have been educated in either Europe or the United
States. Functional key personnel such as those dealing with agricultural
extension, technical assistance, and agricultural credit are often only
accustomed to work with
medium and large scale farming. Policies and
operational methods of many institution~ in Latin America were developed in

- 12 Europe and in the United States by similar institutions which, however, work
for a different clientele. Principles and methodologies employed there were
designed for the economic and social reality of the countries concerned. For
instance, agricultural extension, technical assistance or credit as supplied
to the highly technified and well capitalized producer of commodities in the
mid-western part of the United States are vastly different from the methods
that should be employed to supply the same goods and services to a
smallholder in Colombia operating a multi-crop production system producing
partially for his own subsistence and partially for an uncertain home market.
Thus, a problem faced by the practitioners of rural development is that
national institutions often have neither the personnel and the operational
methods for the real task at hand, nor the
inclination to adapt their
methodologies to the needs of the small farmer. Local institutions often
continue to promote unsuitable technologies such as mechanized mono-cropping
systems with
capital intensive use of inputs developed for extensive
commercial agriculture,
instead of trying to develop systems to enhance the
efficiency of the traditional multi-cropping systems that use a minimum of
purchased inputs and employ a maximum of family labor. Only recently and
sporadically are public sector institutions in Latin American countries
coming to realize that technical assistance and supply of credit should be
specific to the demands of the small rural farmer clientele.
33.
Hence,
it is gradually recognized that redirection of funds for
development towards the rural poor in new style projects will require changes
in the evaluation and operational capacity of donor as well as natiqnal
implementing organizations. These institutions must be better geared to
respond to local needs while building local social and technical capacity.
Unfortunately, many institutions both international and national, are under
pressure not to effect these necessary changes. Most institutions have to
meet short term goals and pressures for
immediate results are very strong.
Timing and amount of funds committed for disbursement are used as
internal
yardsticks to judge professional performance. Such emphasis on short term
results makes it difficult to adapt evaluation and implementation procedures
to local requirements, and often prevents the institution from moving beyond
an ad hoc relief and welfare approach to poverty. A corollary is the bias
toward
project as
against program
funding. Projects can be clearly
circumscribed, they are
by
nature
bound to
specific deadlines for
implementation. They have expected start-up costs and emphasize technical
facilities and equipment over the development and funding of capacities to
sustain the operation and to maintain it after the project has disbursed its
funds. By the nature of the institutions, and the way they operate, their
professionals are not rewarded for being responsive to local conditions nor
for contributing toward the development of local institutional capacities.
Personal initiative of competent and dedicated staff of these organizations
occasionally produces efforts in that direction, but they remain fragmented
and individual and are, as yet, not institutionalized.
34.
The emphasis on short term results, on meeting deadlines, on
disbursement of funds,
leads to a strategic approach of institution building
that is equally short term and is often meant to serve mainly the direct
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interests of a specific project. These interests are then equated with the
interests of the main institutions supporting the project, rather than with
the project and its beneficiaries proper. As a result, special project units
are established, using special incentives to lure personnel away from the
more permanent institutions of the public sector, undermining the latter's
potential for sustained long term action. Pressures to move large amounts of
money put emphasis on projects and project components that are capital
intensive. The administrative overhead, in terms of professional time to be
spent per dollar disbursed can thus be minimized. Effective work with the
rural poor, though, would require a much higher ratio of staff to dollars
disbursed and obtaining achievements takes much longer than experience with
capital development projects would suggest.
35.
The
large international donor agencies, in line with commercial
practices, emphasize the "sales function" of their professional staff. As a
consequence,
the
largest portion of operational budgets go to project
identification, preparation and appraisal; to the efforts necessary to making
the loan. Resources spent on
project supervision and
evaluation are
notoriously limited and are under constant pressure to be reduced even
further. This tendency is against the expressed wish of many field personnel,
who welcome the multiple and broad based experience of most staff members of
large international organizations, as well as their political neutrality in
the country concerned. They appreciate the continuity that
international
agency personnel can bring to public sector institutions that have a high
turnover of personnel. But again,
it is most often because of personal
initiative by dedicated and competent individual staff that the consistent
support
is given.
This
type
of
more
intensive
effort
is
not
institutionalized, and is in effect continuously threatened to be diminished,
mainly for reasons of cost. Institution building results cannot be quantified
and easily shown as "output".
36.
There are large numbers of non-governmental agencies engaged in
one or another aspect of rural development. Often,
these organizations are
based on personal initiative, drive and ambition of a charismatic leader who
ts following his, or her, own vision of human development. Sometimes these
organizations are established by other agencies or institutions such as
churches, unions, and even political parties. Generally, the non-governmental
organizations are small and their impact is
limited both geographically as
well as substantively. For that reason and
for reasons of questioned
effectiveness,
non-governmental organizations
are
often
dismissed as
inefficient agents
for rural development
by the
larger public sector
institutions. However, given
the
immensity of
the
problem of rural
underdevelopment, and the relatively limited impact that the massive effort
of international agencies ;rnd national public sector institutions so far have
achieved, it does not appear justified to omit any possible resource in
mounting efforts at
integrated rural development. Many non-governmental
private agencies engaged in rural development
in
Latin America receive
international support
from large donor
organizations with
social and
developmental philosophies similar to those of the particular organizations
supported.
With respect to
rural
development,
relief
and
welfare
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organizations
with
religious
backgrounds
and
politically
oriented
institutions left of center, mostly from European origin, are the main
institutional supporters of private efforts at rural development in Latin
America. The type of rural development activity in which the non-governmental
organizations are engaged is more oriented toward community development and
to a mediator role between the rural poor and the services of the public
sector than is the case for most large scale rural development projects
supported by international donors and the main national public institutions.
One of the reasons for this somewhat different emphasis is the origin of many
of the non-governmental agencies, in relief and welfare work, before their
relatively recent reorientation towards productive efforts as a basis for
rural
development.
Thus,
although both
public and
non-governmental
institutions see rural development as a combination of production related
activity and relief, the public sector institutions, today, tend to emphasize
agricultural production while this emphasis only begins to emerge among the
non-governmental institutions.
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C.

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT

37.
The discussion of rural development contained in this chapter is
sub-divided into two parts : the first deals with the concept and major
issues, the second with observing integrated rural development projects and
interviewing both project personnel and clientele in Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador and Mexico. The synthesis at the end of this chapter leads to the
suggestions made subsequently in the last chapter of the report.
1.

The Concept

38.
The concept of integrated rural development is often considered
vague, particularly in academic literature, either because the philosophy is
considered unclear, or because the concept is considered too confused to
serve as a practical strategic tool. Field experience shows, however, that
the practical application of the concept is less vague than it is often
considered to be. Most practitioners use the term "integrated" as describing
the fact that this type of rural development projects tries to integrate a
number of otherwise unrelated components, each of them addressing one aspect
of rural underdevelopment.
It is generally agreed that the various components
of the projects can be sub-divided into three main categories : components
related to agricultural production, components related to social services,
and infrastructural components. Among the first category, those directly
related to agricultural production are agricultural credit, extension and
technical assistance, input supply, and marketing assistance. The most
frequent social components are education and health. Among infrastructure
components,
road construction tends to
predominate,
followed by
the
construction of potable water supply systems, irrigation works and rural
electrification.
39.
By definition then,
integrated rural development projects are
those that try to bring a basket of goods and services, consisting of
production, social and infrastructure components to poor rural areas. Not
only the operational implications of the concept appear to be fairly clear to
its field practitioners, but the reasons for integrating a number of
otherwise unrelated components appear
to
be agreed upon. Often, the
justifications advanced for including social components are based on moral
convictions, i.e. that the rural poor have an innate right to social benefits
such as health and education, partly because they are supposed to be
available to poor urban dwellers. For other practitioners the inclusion of
social components
in rural development projects is justified if these
components contribute to the effectiveness of production related components,
as e.g. when a healthier farmer is able to work harder and hence produce
more, or when a better educated farmer ts able to absorb more fully the
benefits of new technology. Finally, there are those who do not see a
justification for the complexity entailed in combining a number of unrelated
components
into one project. Mostly this view can be found among the
traditional practitioners of agricultural development,
i.e. among those who
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do not distinguish between rural and agricultural development.
40.
The most temperate view of integrated rural development, and a
consensus that can be reached with most practitioners is based upon seeing
components as complementary to the basic objective of a project. It is
generally agreed that the basic objective of rural development projects is to
bring about an increase in production and productivity of the small farmer
rather than welfare. It can then further be agreed that other components be
brought into integrated rural development projects only if and when needed to
support the major objective. But often project design simply follows a
blueprint approach. Overzealous
project designers include
the largest
possible number of components, and their implementation is fixed with time
frames and deadlines, based on scant information about realities in the
project area. Typically, agricultural credit and technical assistance are
found as production components; health and education as social components;
and road construction as an infrastructure component. Projects designed with
such a standard set of components, coupled with rigid implementation and
disbursement
schedules,
lack
the flexibility
necessary to fit
the
complementary components to the local situation.

41.
However, the less rigid and least bureaucratic of international
organizations allow project design and implementation timing to be adjusted
during the
life of the project, based on its particular requirements. As a
matter of fact, the majority of projects require such adjustments in their
original design. Many projects are extended beyond the usual five year
implementation period. These actions are usually taken to adapt the reality
of project implementation to project design, i.e. to increase complementarity
between components to reach an optimum combination of project activities.
42.
Most integrated rural
development projects rely on existing
sectoral agencies of the public sector to implement the various project
components. The ministry of agriculture will be responsible for technical
assistance and extension, the ministry of health for the health component,
public works iOr road construction, etc. Usually, there 1s a project
directorate responsible for day to day management of the project and,
particularly, for the coordination between the various sectoral agencies.
Difficulties associated with these coordination activities have become the
best known, and most widely commented on management problem of integrated
rural development projects.
2.

Issues

43.
The following are the major issues identified in discussions with
project personnel, with
beneficiaries and with other practitioners of
integrated rural development. They are either related to the projects proper
or to the institutions that promote or implement the individual projects.
44.
a.
IRD, Does It Work? - The answer to this loaded question 1s
a qualified yes. Integrated rural development appears to work but often not
exactly as
it was
intended
to, particularly 1n the early
years of
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implementation. It does not produce quick results. Underperfonnance with
respect to meeting deadlines, pace of disbursement of funds, and problems
with project management have led to many frustrations for those responsible
for project design and supervision. Much of this frustration is related to
both the in~5itutions promoting the projects and the concept of the projects
themselves.

45.

The complexity
and the required technical sophistication of
project design effectively exclude the target population from participation
in project formulation. Thus, technocratic outsiders are making decisions
about problems and their solutions. The resulting project is usually in line
with prevailing national policies and project objectives are couched in terms
of
national development and production goals, contributions to export
potential and the like. The requirement of bankability leads to stereotyped
project formulation, anticipating what financing institutions want to see, by
personnel trained in standard evaluation procedures by the same banking
institution. This procedure atrophies the effort of project evaluation as
well as the generation of creative ideas and unusual solutions. On the
contrary, preparation/appraisal reports tend to become rigid implementation
manuals.
46.
The dichotomy between
project
design
and the
reality of
implementation is quite obvious in most projects. Uncertainties, absence of
real knowledge about the area targeted, and the inexperience of the proj~ct
personnel almost invariably lead to an initial period of a few years when
tangible achievements are minimal. In those projects that ultimately can be
considered successful, this initial period is used,
in essence, by well
motivated and dedicated project personnel as the real project preparation
stage, in the sense that during this initial stage of project formulation,
decisions can be made about what can and should be done in terms of project
components in the particular area. This initial period is used to establish a
rapport between the project personnel and the intended beneficiaries, which
may lead to a certain level of beneficiary participation.
47.
The fact
that time
tables,
deadlines
and
implementation
expectations are often unrealistic, is recognized by some of the larger donor
organizations whose supervisory personnel shows flexibility and willingness
to adapt the project's planning to the realities of implementation. Funds are
shifted between components, deadlines for certain components are extended,
the inability to implement certain components 1s accepted, and often,
projects are extended beyond the usual five year implementation period.
However, there is a gap between these lessons from the field and project
evaluation and
approval procedures.
There is a
certain
inertia in
institutions to adapt themselves to the operational requirements of a new
concept. As a result, influential members of the institutions blame the
concept of integrated rural development for many of the frustrations that
actually originate in their own institution's slowness of adaptation.
48.
b.
Beneficiary Participation - The client~le of an integrated
rural development project participates not only in the project's benefits but
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- 18 also in some decisions about and within the project. In the early stages of a
project, however, there is usually little or no dialogue between project
personnel and the intended beneficiaries. Project personnel, new to the area,
know neither the social structure nor the politics of the society it has to
deal with. The inhabitants of the area tend to regard these new arrivals in
the light of their previous experience with public sector personnel, i.e. the
police, the tax collector, and, in some countries, a local politician. Under
such conditions meaningful beneficiary participation in project evaluation
and design is difficult to establish. A
second reason why extensive
representative participation does not take place is related to the structure
of rural society. Rural society is stratified with very poor layers such as
laborers or sharecroppers, intermediate layers such as small land owners and
tradesmen, and elites, such as large land owners or village notables. It is
unrealistic to expect within a rural project sudden democratic decision
making by a heterogeneous population which normally does not do that.
Finally, universal representative beneficiary participation conflict with the
motivations of the bureaucracy of some donor agencies. Committing money for
disbursement is the key to their career and full participation by project
beneficiaries would typically imply that the project would be implemented at
the people's pace and scale, because project personnel would have to struggle
with the population's learning processes. As a result, project design would
have to be more conservative, project implementation schedules would have to
be lengthened and discounted cost benefit analysis would come out much less
favorable than if stricter controls of a project are assumed.
49.
Basically, integrated rural development
projects are service
delivery efforts, and beneficiary participation normally is limited to
decisions about how to do things and to sharing in the benefits of the
project. Decisio~about what to do are mostly made by project staff, who are
responsible for the money-~pent. This separation of responsibility between
the project personnel who decide essentially about what to do, and the
beneficiaries who participate in how to do it is not really an unrealistic or
unfair separation of responsibilities. After all, in most deprived rural
areas it is quite easy to see what can be done:
in essence anything that
would contribute to economic and social well being of the population and to
an equitable distribution of the fruits of development. Usually, a number of
ideas and pet projects have been around for a long time. Thus, drawing up a
list of actions that could be taken is easy. The problem is to establish
priorities, given the financial constraints faced by the project. Project
personnel, not directly involved with political considerations in the area
can by and large be considered better placed to decide on political and
economic trade-offs. But participation by the population in how to do things
is important for two reasons. First, it will bring to the project the
particular expertise and knowledge of the rural population with respect to
general conditions and natural phenomena in the area. Second, decisions about
how to implement certain project components may generate enough popular
interest and a sense of participation to induce long term involvement
necessary for the maintenance of works and for the continuation of progress
achieved.
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50.

c.
Coordination of Project Components Problems
with
the
coordination of activities of the various sectoral agencies participating in
a project have plagued almost all integrated rural development projects. When
discussing coordination problems, reference is mostly made to horizontal
coordination,
i.e. integration of usually independent services in order to
secure a unity of purpose and joint action. Management problems arise because
separate budgets are involved and bureaucratic power struggles arise as the
various institutions mobilize their political backers 5~ win jurisdictional
and legal arguments. As Judith Tendler has pointed out
these institutions
act rationally from their perspective. Tendler distinguishes between strong
and weak institutions in general, and with respect to rural development in
particular. Strong institutions are those that generate revenue or have
strong
supporters lobbying for their
interests, such as construction
companies who support the interests of public sector institutions responsible
for rural road construction. Strong institutions also can often garner a
strong political constituency in the form of influencial elites in the area.
Weaker institutions on the other hand are those that do not have their own
revenue base,
strong
supporters
or strong constituents. Institutions
supplying rural health and education are typically weaker than institutions
supplying production related services, such as the ministry of agriculture or
the agricultural bank. Strong agencies will want to play a central role in
the project, and will often have enough political backing to obtain that
role. Weaker
agencies, perceiving their subordination to the stronger
institutions, will be disinclined to participate in the project. They will
prefer to concentrate their effort on activities that are completely within
their control. This has been typically the case with the health components in
integrated rural development projects.
51.
Problems of vertical
coordination,
i.e.
intra-organizational
integration and problems of integration of a project with national policies
are much less frequently discussed. Integrated rural development can of
course be more successfully implemented the fewer the coordination problems
and the stronger the national commitment to this type of development effort.
Project implementation will be facilitated when national development policies
articulate the necessity to coordinate efforts, including a requirement for
the various institutions to collaborate in the effort. Also, projects will
run more smoothly when there is an appropriate organization within ministries
to support integrated rural development at the field level.
52.
The history of integrated rural development in Colombia provides a
good example of the importance of top level commitment to a rural development
policy. The Colombian integrated rural development program started with
modest pilot scale projects in the early 70's. By 1975, the results of these
pilot projects had become sufficiently known and appreciated for the newly
elected President Lopez Michelsen to give it his strong personal backing. At
that point, the concept of integrated rural development was made part of
national development policy; major international organizations, the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and AID were invited to cooperate,
while the president extended substantial personal efforts to develop a
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nation-wide program. Recognizing the potential problems of coordination
between the various agencies that were supposed to cooperate in this national
effort, Lopez Michelsen personally secured their collaboration.
53.
Three factors should be kept in mind in designing and implementing
integrated rural development projects. First, the more a project is perceived
as being strictly local, the less opposition it will create at the national
headquarters
level
of
major
institutions.
This
factor
suggests
decentralization of programs, i.e. the transfer of certain powers and
functions to local authorities and the selection of projects for fairly small
areas. Second, coordination of efforts between personnel of sectorally
different institutions is usually better at the operational level 10 the
field.
Inevitably, personnel of such institutions working in the same
geographic area will be in frequent contact with each other. Unless there are
strong
personal dislikes, this personnel will discuss common problems
encountered in their respective work and find ways to accommodate each other.
Higher echelons in the institutional bureaucracy will increasingly have
other, and often conflicting interests and coordination efforts will be
influenced more by unrelated issues. Third, the role of overall coordinator,
and sometimes mediator, is best played by an institution which does not have
a direct functional responsibility. A staff type agency, such as a national
planning office or a development ministry are better equipped to perform the
coordinating role than, for instance, the ministry of agriculture or a
ministry of public works. A staff type agency is particularly appropriate if
it has budgetary responsibilities, such as national planning offices often
have. The power of the purse is a very strong motivator
to enlist
col labor at ion.
54.
The attempt to solve the coordination problem by creating entirely
new autonomous implementation units has not been very successful. The idea to
create a new unit for project implementation was the logical consequence of
the frustration of early project designers and supervisors. Their experience
lead them to
regard existing institutions as inefficient, technically
incompetent, understaffed and philosophically conservative with respect to
the ideas behind the new rural projects. Thus, they saw clear administrative
advantages in establishing a brand new unit. This was particularly so if they
could find like-minded local professionals to manage and staff such a unit.
However, experience has shown that these new administrative units operate
only as long as they have the financial and administrative backing from the
international agency, through the project under their responsibility. Almost
nowhere have these new administrative units been able to survice in the local
political and bureaucratic establishment. As a result, these project units
were disbanded after the project was completed, or when disbursements
stopped.
55.
The best place for the coordination unit is in an independent,
existing, government agency at the highest possible level. Colombia has done
that from the inception of its nation-wide program for integrated rural
development, by plaB~ng the directorate for this development in the national
planning department • Ecuador has recently established a "super" ministry
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responsible for all of the country's 17 integrated rural development projects
in its current five year development plan in order to have a non-sectoral
agency responsible for coordination of its integrated rural development
program. However, the disadvantage of this new ministry is its newness; it is
not part of the bureaucratic establishment of the country, and does not have
any particular clout, other than that resulting from the channeling of
finances for the various projects.
56.
d.
Impact and Clientele - Integrated
rural
development
is
targeted on a clientele called "rural poor", which is very ill-defined. The
lack of definition of "rural poor" has been exacerbated by the need to focus
projects on farmers who have a production potential, because integrated rural
development is supposed to be development, and not welfare. Thus, many
analysts failed to recognize the complexity of the structure of rural
society, the target clientele. Subsequently, and as a corollary, they often
fail to recognize that only a fraction of the population has production
potential, in the sense desired for integrated rural development projects.
The twin results of a vague definition of the client have been a very limited
impact of integrated rural development projects, as compared with the efforts
extended, and a bias with respect to benefits extended, i.e. towards farmers
with highest production potential. By definition, the latter tend to be those
who were somewhat better off from the beginning. For instance, national
Brazilian statistics indicate that the country's entire POLONORDESTE program,
the major development program in the Northeastern part of Brazil, has reached
not more t~jn approximately 100,000 poor rural families directly in more than
10 years.
The
same source estimates that the area covered by the
POLONORDESTE program contains
approximately
three
million rural poor
families. Consequently, the direct program reached approximately 3% of the
rural poor. Even if one assumes that there ts a multiple of indirect
beneficiaries, total coverage is modest.
57.
Focusing exclusively on those who have a production potential
excludes landless laborers, and in effect, most sharecroppers. Although the
latter are often included as potential beneficiaries of agricultural credit
under integrated rural development projects, societal and institutional
constraints may prevent their
participation. For instance, under
the
Colombian
Integrated
Rural
Development
Program,
sharecroppers
are
specifically included as potential beneficiaries of agricultural credit.
However, the program's administrator, the agricultural bank, requires a land
lease document as proof of a sharecropper's production intentions. In the
period of a~rarian reform,
in the 60's, such land lease documents were often
used by sharecroppers to claim title to the land worked on. As a result,
written proof of sharecropping contracts to-day is extremely difficult to
obtain from a Colombian land owner. Consequently, most sharecroppers are
excluded from agricultural credit, one of the main benefits under the
integrated rural development project. Since other benefits such as home
improvement loans and loans to extend rural electrification to a property,
are tied to production credit, sharecroppers under the Colombian program are
effectively excluded from the direct benefits of the entire program. In
Mexico, more than 60% of agricultural labor is landless; in Colombia about
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40% of agricultrual labor is landless. These portions of the rural poor
remain excluded from the direct benefits of integrated rural development
projects, since they have no production potential, although they benefit
indirectly from such components as health, education, construction of rural
roads, and from secondary effects such as an increased demand for labor,
coupled with higher wages. Also, a sharecropper who works under an agreement
to obtain 50% of production, will see his share increase in line with total
production increases brought about by the project. As a matter of fact, the
indirect benefits of integrated rural development projects for those at the
lower levels of the rural society provide a strong argument to include social
and infrastructural components in rural development projects. It is precisely
these components that benefit the poorest of that society.
58.
e.
Size of Project Area - Many
integrated rural development
projects are
large,
covering vast, varied,
and heterogeneous areas.
Population, both in type and density, as well as agricultural and other
activities can vary considerably from one area of the project to the next.
Field experience suggests that it is more effective to limit a project to a
general farming district that is homogeneous as far as its type of population
and agricultural production potential is concerned, i.e., project boundaries
should be based on ecological or economic conditions
rather than on
administrative divisions. In functionally or socially homogeneous areas,
problems tend to be similar in the entire area, and the same number and type
of components can be brought to bear in an integrated rural development
effort. In fact, many nationwide projects tend to get divided into area
specific sub-projects over time. The Colombian integrated rural development
program distinguishes internally between, for instance, the project parts in
Cundinamarca or in Antioquia. Actually, there is so little interchange
between the various sub-projects under the nationwide program that they
function as individual and independent projects.
59.
f.
Monitoring ara)Evaluation - Following
definitions
in
a
recent World Bank publication
monitoring is here defined as the provision
and
use of
information to
enable management to assess progress of
implementation and to take timely decisions to make sure that progress is
maintained according to schedule. Evaluation is defined as the process that
draws on the same data, generated by the monitoring system, to help explain
trends, effects and impact of the project.
60.
Monitoring, evaluation and interchange of ideas between projects
are generally weak in Latin American integrated rural development projects.
There are surprisingly few publications relating objectively the experiences
of integrated rural development. And even those publications that are
available, repeatedly mention that cost figures, production data and other
quantitative information are not available. This leads to the conclusion not
only that monitoring and evaluation are not reported, but that there is also
a lack of systematic documentation, collection of data, etc.

61.
It is not surpr1s1ng that evaluation and monitoring are not done
systematically, since they are highly political and may affect future funding

I

~~

Jl
l

- 23 -

and employment prospects of personnel engaged in these activities as well as
of those being monitored and evaluated. More generally, there is no tradition
in Latin American societies of objective reporting that could underpin
systematic
monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation is more of a public
relations effort than an information gathering exercise. As a result, little
is known about the objective successes and failures of projects and little
agreement can be reached in this respect with regard to specific projects.
What some call successes, others will call failures, both opinions based on
subjective and intuitive interpretations of actual or imagined events. Human
development efforts such as rural development are particularly prone to such
confusions about what constitutes success or failure since many intangible
benefits
and costs can be counted and interpreted quite differently,
following personal, subjective viewpoints.
3.

Field Experiences

62.
The following sections relate field experience in four countries,
highlighting different approaches to defining and implementing integrated
rural development projects. These observations are based on visits which
focussed on discussions with both clients/beneficiaries and by interviews of
institutional staff, politicians, etc. both at the local and national
(capital city) level.
a.

Brazil

63.
Integrated rural development projects can be found ln different
parts of Brazil; in the northeast,
in the state of Minas Gerais,
ln the
frontier areas of the northwest and in the state of Paran~. The best known
and still largest program of integrated rural development projects is located
in the Northeastern part of the country, called POLONORDESTE. As of the
middle of 1982, the POLONORDESTE program comprised 43 different integrated
rural development projects covering a geographical area corresponding to
slightly more than half of the northeastern part of Brazil and concentrating
a variety of investments and services in geographic areas that are selected
largely on the basis of their agricultural potential.
64.
An overriding impression of the Brazilian experience is that it is
not a program at all. Rather, Brazil has a large number of projects that are
unrelated, without systematic communication or exchange of experience beween
them. There are several reasons for this fragmented development. First, the
Brazilian integrated rural development projects are identified, organized,
and actually implementt~) by the states. Although the development agency of
the Northeast, SUDENE
, is supposed to play a coordinating role, in effect
that role is very limited. The second reason is related to the origin and
method of financing. Project funds, particularly for
the Northeastern
projects depend on yearly central government budgets. Experience over the
last 10 years has shown that such funding varies substantially from year to
year, while the way in which it is made available to the operational level is
rather complicated. In the Northeast, for instance, resources for production
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related components are channeled through the Ministry of Agriculture, which
makes them available to
its Delegates in each state. The extent of
cooperation by the Delegates of the Ministry of Agriculture in the integrated
rural development projects in their state depends entirely upon the goodwill
of the Delegate proper. Resources for social components are channeled through
the Ministry of the Interior. This ministry, in turn, makes the funds
available to the finance secretariat of the state in question, which then
turns funds over to the particular project. The project directorate is
responsible for administrating the funds for the various components under the
project.
65.
Administrative units established specifically for the operation
and management of projects often have no legal status and their personnel is
delegated to them from a variety of other institutions in the public sector.
Administrative procedures are cumbersome and dedication of such personnel to
work in the integrated rural development project is sometimes questionable.
For instance, the funds for the payroll of one of the largest and oldest
project management units, in the state of Bahia, have to be distributed to
the various institutions from which its personnel originates, which use these
funds to pay the salaries. As a result, there is much confusion, delays in
payment and
dissatisfaction among
the
personnel.
The administrative
establishment of the individual states tends to ignore the projects when they
are not directly involved and funding comes from Brasilia. As a result, state
funds that otherwise would have gone into areas where integrated rural
development projects are operating, often go to other areas in the st~te.
Moreover, once disbursement stops, projects tend to peter out.
66.
However, there are exceptions, as
in the state of Minas Gerais.
That state deals directly with international organizations, such as the World
Bank, and funds major parts of its integrated rural development programs from
state resources. As one practitioner observed: "in the Northeast you deal
with projects in poor areas in poor states, in Minas Gerais you deal with
projects in poor areas in a rich state." Differences between management and
administration of projects in the Northeast and in Minas Gerais are in
consequence quite large and fundamental. In Minas Gerais there is a much
stronger
commitment
among
the
local
political
and
administrative
establishment with respect to integrated rural development. As a matter of
fact, in the 1982 elections for governors, all three candidates in the state
of Minas Gerais pledged their support for the integrated rural development
programs of the state. There are also differences at the operational level
between the projects in Minas Gerais and in the Northeast, differences that
may relate to the different administrative structures as well as to the
conditions in the areas. By and large, the personnel of projects in the
Northeast would like to see the projects have fewer components, in order to
be less complicated to implement. In Minas Gerais, on the other hand, the
higher echelons of the integrated rural development program administration
would like to increase the number of components available for any one
project. Personnel in Minas Gerais appears to be gravitating to a notion of a
state-wide program to support a large number of small, area-specific,
integrated rural development projects. The overall program should have a
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maximum number of potential
of any particular project.

components available to serve the specific needs

67.
An occasional complaint is that project areas are chosen mainly
for political reasons, rather than for developmental potential, and if the
developmental potential is considered, it is judged more on technical
grounds, i.e. with respect to agricultural production potential, than it is
on social grounds. These criticisms reflect the problems of an approach that
seeks to combine economic and social objectives. A more frequent complaint
comes from project personnel in a number of states: that the projects are too
large, and hence too heterogeneous with respect to population, physical
structure, land holding, climate, and agricultural production. They would
like to see smaller projects, but have not yet arrived at the notion of a
programatic approach supporting
a number of
smaller,
area
defined,
sub-projects.
68.
In spite of the political, administrative and budgetary problems
the actual development of many projects in Brazil is impressive. A main
reason is the dedication of personnel in charge of field operations. Mostly,
these are young graduates from local colleges, socially conscious men and
women who have found a constructive way to vent frustrations with their
society and yet make a contribution to it. These young people realize at the
start that they do not know very much about the task at hand or about the
people they are supposed to work with. So they go out and try to learn.
Generally, teams of up to 10 project workers wi 11 spend at least a month·
living and working among the target population, collecting sociological
information and beginning to build a bridge between themselves and the rural
families. The information gathered during these initial exercises is used to
gain a sociological insight into the area they deal with and, particularly,
to identify possible associations or groups that either have a natural
cohesion or that could be formed.
69.
However, what these young project workers have in enthusiasm and
dedication, they often lack in practical experience. This is particularly
noticeable in such components as,
for
instance, extension and technical
assistance to agriculture. Given their natural inclination, and sometimes
their educational background in the social sciences, they emphasize community
development. This lead to organization and increased social awareness among
the target populations and also to
a certain measure of beneficiary
participation. As such, this type of project personnel and the way they
operate are quite appropriate and beneficial for the first phase of an
integrated rural development project,
i.e. the
phase of learning and
developing a rapport between the project personnel and the target population.
However, the subsequent phases of tangible production achievements tend to be
rather weak. As a matter of fact, project personnel complain about the
complexity of having too many components to be integrated in these projects
and, what they call "extension work" tends to relate more to social,
community development than to agricultural production. Furthermore, this
emphasis on the societal aspects of development leads to a neglect of other,
somewhat more remote and technical aspects such as the introduction of more
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energy, simple post harvest processing techniques to reduce spoilage, or
aspects of storage and marketing. Project personnel often appears to be
ignorant about technical aspects of rural life, particularly about those that
are not usually found in their immediate surroundings. Hence, the lack of
tangible,
physical achievements
in
those
projects may
we 11
become
increasingly frustrating, unless efforts are made to upgrade the technical
capabilities of project implementation personnel.
70.
Recurring
operational problems are
related to the
erratic
availability of agricultural credit, which reflects the financial budgetary
problems mentioned above. Availability of credit is most often cited by the
small farmer himself as the major benefit accruing from the integrated rural
development project. Thus, it is most detrimental for overall project success
that credit availability at, for instance, the Bank of Brazil's local office
is unpredictable and haphazard. A variety of reasons are usually given for
the frequent lack of funds, depending on who one talks to. Some blame local
branch managers of the banks as not being sympathetic to the project, or to
the plight of the small farmer. Others contend that central authorities have
not made funds available to the local level for onlending to small farmers,
etc. Both observations probably apply to the situation, although to a degree
varying from region to region.
71.
Other problems arise fairly often from land tenure arrangements
and marketing
bottlenecks. Since secure land ownership is the
major
precondition for obtaining credit from commercial sources, the sometimes
vague tenure/ownership arrangements in rural areas have created problems when
ownership was not "regularized", i.e. when farmers either did not have a
written title to their land or,
if they had a title it was not registered.
Therefore, several projects (Rio Grande Do Norte, Paran.4) have separate "land
titling regulations" components. With regard to marketing, efforts to improve
the situation for small farmers in project areas have been ineffective,
mainly because marketing was left to public sector institutions which are not
well equipped to perform such functions, especially if they are established
in competition with, or even to replace, traditional middlemen. Bureaucratic
procedures are not easily adapted to dealing in mostly perishable goods which
have to be bought, transported and sold in a short time and at a profit.
72.
Finally, there are a number of private projects that merit
attention. The largest and oldest private rural development project in Brazil
is a 60 year old project in the Northern part of the state of Paran.4. It has
developed over 1.3 million hectares of virgin land, founded 6 major cities
and 57 minor ones, sold approximately 50,000 farm properties, with an average
size of about 30 hectares, ranging from 12 to 73 hectares to small farmers,
and sold over 75,000 urban residential plots. The total population of the
project's area is now several million.
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73.
Early attempts at development of the Northern areas of Paran~ i.e.
around 1910, were based on a model that had been successful in the
northeastern part of the state of Sio Paulo and in parts of the state of
Minas Gerais. This was based on opening large tracks of land for plantations
growing coffee. The early settlers in Northern ParanA realized that they
needed more financial assistance in order to be able to extend transportation
infrastructure, particularly railroads, to the area, and so to relieve their
relative isolation. One of their efforts to attract additional investments
into the area was to contact a British technical mission visiting Brazil in
the early twenties. This mission was looking for lands to establish cotton
cultivation, similar to the then very successful cotton growing undertaken by
the Sudan Syndicate. Expected high fertility, low land prices and the
expectation of rapid appreciation in price of the land because of the
construction of a railroad, led to the purchase in 1925 of more than 1
million hectares in the Northern part of the state of Paran~ by British
investory. The original intention, though, to grow cotton, was a complete
fiasco for a variety of technical reasons. The company had to abandon efforts
in that direction and decided instead to attempt colonization of the land
acquired. As a first step the company bought, in 1928, the railroad company
Slo Paulo-ParanA. Also, in preparation for subsequent land sales, the company
went to great lengths to assure correct and unassailable title to the lands
acquired. It went so far as to pay several times for certain tracts of land
to various interests that claimed ownership. In retrospect, the firm title to
the lands acquired by the company and subsequently sold to small holders has
proven to be one of the cornerstones of their successful development.
74.
The
British company's
development philosophy
was radically
different from the large plantation-style development practiced in that part
of Brazil at the time. Its plans were based on concurrent urban and rural
development and on linking the area with major domestic and export markets.
With respect to the latter, the purchase of the railroad from Slo Paulo, and
its gradual extension into the project area was a crucial factor. The
company's basic development plan for the undulating terrain was to build
roads over the crests of the hills, with the properties, like fishbones from
a central spine, extending downwards along the gently sloping terrain towards
the rivers in the valleys. Concurrent urban and rural development was
achieved by planning major cities at roughly every 100 kilometers on the main
penetration roads and minor towns at intervals of 10 to 15 kilometers. The
unit size of rural properties to be sold was kept small intentionally, in
order to achieve a high density rural population, able to support and use the
growing transport and urban infrastructure. A green belt was conserved around
cities as well as around towns, in order to settle small producers of
horticultural products, chickens and eggs, to supply the city and town
populations with their daily needs. The average rural plot sold was a narrow
strip of land of approximately 30 hectares, extending from the road running
along the crest of the terrain to the river at the bottom of the valley. At
the higher elevations, close to the road, coffee was planted. This is
generally the area least affected by
frost. The
farmer's residence,
horticultural plots, and stables for small livestock were built at the lower
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parts of the property, close to the river. Water was obtained either from
tube wells or from the river. In the early 30's, the period of the company's
major expansion, 30 hectares of land in that part of Brazil was sufficient
for a small farmer family to be entirely independent. The reason was the
existence of one secure cash crop, coffee. Throughout the 30's and the 40's,
Brazil's federal policy with respect to coffee prices and support for coffee
was crucial for the development of many colonization projects.
75.
The price of the land
must have been affordable to a large
segment of the Brazilian and foreign migrants that moved into the area, given
the briskness of sales during the initial period of major expansion.
According to personnel of the still existing development company CMNP
(Companhia Melhoramentos Norte do ParanA), at least 50% of the ultimate land
buyers started out as rural laborers, saving to buy their plot. Currently
land is resold, often for the third or the fourth time, at prices of
approximately US$1,000 per hectare.
76.
The company has always done everything necessary to support its
one and only objective: sell land. Nevertheless, the combined actions taken
by the company add up to what today might be called an integrated rural
development project. The company also built and operated hotels, saw mills,
brick making plants, etc. at the places of intended ·urban settlements. It
built the complete water supply systems for most of its cities; it donated
land and even building materials for churches, hospitals and government
offices, but it never maintained for its own exploitation any of ~he
auxiliary services that were established as an aid to land sales in the first
place. The company never found it necessary to supply social or even
production
related
services on
its
own account: health, education,
agricultural extension, etc., since the public sector supplied those services
from the moment they were required. For instance, MaringA, a major city in
the heart of the company's area, and the current location of the company's
headquarters, was incorporated as a municipality only 4 years after the first
house was built, i.e. in 1947. From that moment on it was eligible for the
usual state and federal support to municipalities and was also able to
develop its own tax base. Its current population is well over 300,000.

I
I

77.
The CMNP has been a fully Brazilian owned company since its
acquisition in 1944 from the original British interests. Most of its 500
share holders are company employees. Its current executive field director,
headquartered in MaringA, was hired by the company as a railroad engineer in
1932. In 1975, the company had 22 senior personnel with more than 30 years of
service. Its total staff currently numbers approximately 1,500. Realizing
that the company finally would run out of land to sell, it was decided, about
10 to 15 years ago, to diversify into other ·activities. As a result, the
company now owns and operates 17 farms in ParanA and in the state of S~o
Paulo. The company has the largest cattle herd in the state of ParanA and is
an important producer of one of the states current major cash crops,
soybeans. Furthermore, the
company has diversified into a number
of
industrial ventures. Moreover, CMNP has been looking actively into the
possibility of acquiring a large tract of land at today's frontier, in the
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78.
Criticisms heard today about the type of development such as the
one pioneered by the CMNP, and later copied by a number of other developers,
is that the properties sold by the company are really too small. Furthermore,
the high level of sub-division has led to erosion, and to pollution of the
rivers along which the settlements have been made. The counter argument of
company personnel is that the original plan and philosophy of the development
were based on economic conditions of the twenties. In particular, coffee was
then the most profitable crop and the clients could afford only relatively
small areas of land. In other words, the type of development was dictated by
the reality of economics of the time and by the type of client catered to.
However, now conditions have changed. Coffee is no longer as profitable in
this area as it used to be. Through erosion and through lack of maintenance
of fertility, the land has become gradually poorer. Erosion and pollution
problems, as well as the gradual deterioration of soil fertility may be
blamed partially on a lack of continued involvement by the company and in
part upon a lack of vigorous enforcement of existing laws by the public
sector. For instance, all title deeds contained a covenant that 10% of the
land of each lot had to be kept in woodlands. This restriction, meant to
combat erosion, was never enforced, either by the company or by public sector
authorities. Pertinent farmer training and well focused extension work might
have helped to maintain soil fertility by different agricultural practices
and by correct application of fertilizer.
79.
Current developments on these tracts of land after a generation of
farming has taken place, are three-fold. First, there is a tendency to
aggregate adjacent plots. Farmers sell off to their neighbors and move onto
lands further inland, particularly in the Matto Grosso. With the money
obtained from selling their plot in northern Paran~, they can buy a
substantially larger area in current frontier developments. Second, the type
of products grown on the best lands are changing. Instead of coffee, one can
see increasingly
wheat, soybeans, some other beans, and even castor beans.
The third type of development is that the poorer lands are gradually taken
out of intensive farming and put into extensive livestock production. Thus,
on the one hand, it would appear that the original small holder development
of CMNP is gradually evolving into an area of medium to large scale
properties, because it is suffering from a deterioration in quality due to
erosion and pollution, and therefore shifting gradually from intensive
farming to extensive cattle production. On the other hand, this development
managed to ~pen up more than a million hectares of virgin land, settled about
50,000 small holders, and was instrumental in the development of an entire
urban base with various industries, without any public sector subsidy.
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This volume was inspired by the spate of official evaluations of
development assistance programs commissioned in the late nineteensixties.1 The reports echoed, in milder form, much of the criticism
directed at development assistance for some time by aid receivers and
others. 2 I agreed with most of the criticisms, which are summarized
below. Yet the remedies proposed by official and nonofficial commentators reflected a perception of the world of development assistance that was, to my mind, incomplete. Certain problems seemed to
go unnoticed. Some organizational features were judged undesirable
which, in my view, seemed desirable. Many of the proposed changes
seemed certain not to produce the desired results. What seemed
missing, in brief, was a sense of the organizational setting in which
assistance decisions took place~lwant8cft08;Je~-~rtE..ediS~Or;-;f
development assistance by"fooking at theO~gani~tT;n from.inside its
own walls, to show how.the cirg·anization~I ~nvironment h~"~on
tributed to the outcomes described i~~i~i~Y and _trno7tidal reports.
Most of the criticism of development assistance can be summed up
in ~categ~~i-;;;;·(ii.. assistancidoo
fakes ihe form oT~'iill"eces
sarily l~rge capital projects, overly intensive in equipment and
.foreign exchange; (2) the technology of such projects has often been
too sophisticated to be absorbed by developing-country institutions;
(3) the design and execution of financed projects has too often coin-

'O'ften.
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cided with the interests of developed-country firms in the business of
exporting consulting services and equipment; (4) in the case of U.S.
bilateral aid, legislative and administrative requirements have been
imposed which make the program look more like an attempt to subsidize U.S. exports than an effort to assist less-developed countries to
grow; (5) the "ugly American" 3 type of professional is a final contributor to the problem, because of his tendency to think that his
country's way of doing things is best. These problems have long been
more vigorously described by some aided countries as donor-country
hypocrisy, export dumping, "gravy trains" for donor-country consUTting and exporting forms. imperialism. or neocolonialism.
Bas~d ~f1..thes~ dL?gnoses, it is usually prescribed (1) that a larger
share of development assistance be channeled through multilateral
institutions in order to cleanse it of the political and business interferences of a bilateral program; (2) that liberalization of donorcountry trade policy be considered essential to any aid program
promoting growth in the less-developed world; (3) that donorcountry institutions make diligent attempts to learn how to simplify
technology; (4) that procedures for evaluating a proposed project be
streamlined and improved in order to select projects and project
~\' designs better suited to the priorities and resources of the aided
country; (5) that better technicians be hired, and that aid-giving
institutions train them in the special techniques of development
assistance; and lastly (6) that developed-country technicians attempt
to be less "ugly."
What distinguishes my study from the above discussions is my
pdrtr1rya+ufth!f0rganizatfonal environment as playing a central role
in determining the content of development assistance programs. I see
organizational factors as responsible for outcomes that are usually
considered the result of other things - policy directives, political
pressures. employee training, project analysis techniques. Other discussions, for example, explain how better analytical techniques improve t,he quality of project selection. This study, in contrast, focuses
on th{overriding influence exerted on project selection by the way in
which organizational output gets defined. Whereas other studies
focus on the constraining effect of policies imposed by the legislative
and executive branches, this study looks at the way in which the
: organization adapts to such constraints and how this adaptation gets
incorporated into organizational behavior. Whereas other studies
stress the problem of insensitive technicians and the need to recruit
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and train better ones, this study explores how the organizational
environment itself attracts the insensitive technician. Whereas other
studies question the political motives behinq development assistance, this study explores the possibility thaf genuine motives get
crossed up by the needs of the organization to gain control over its
environment. This study, in short, analyzes assistance programs in
terms of the deterministic nature of their
task, task environment.and
- -· ..
..
.
---·-·
organizational design. 4 It attempts to find the organizational rationality that lurks behind much of the behavior of development assistance
organizations.
The difficulty of tracing today's development assistance problems
back to these organizational factors explains to a certain extent why
critics have singled out other, more visible causes: bureaucratic inefficiency, pressure by developed-country manufacturers with equipment to sell, political payoffs, underdeveloped-country irrationality,
technical competence, or masked neocolonialist motives. Most such
explanations, unlike those relating to the organizational setting,
point to highly visible groups who have been known to behave on
other occasions in the criticized way. These explanations fit in with
theories, accepted in one quarter or another, about how certain types
of groups or countries behave. I do not deny the value of these
explanations, but suggest that they have been hit upon first because
they are more visible and correspond to existing analytical ap~
proaches to organizational and political behavior.
!
Some of the problems outlined above belong solely to the U.S.!
bilateral program and its executor, the.Age-~cy for Internati~·nal be-;
velc:iQment (AID). The attempt to explain AID's p~oblems~'ft~-~"'Zenters \
on th~ ;-~bje~ti~nDnhat aiencytOthe p'ressures. (;f p~'ivat~-~terest ':
groups and to poaching by other ioveriiment entities. Most-public !
sector entities, however, are subject to some form of external buffeting, so that this explanation does not tell us enough about this particular organization. One wants to know more about how the organization dealt with such assaults - in short, how it coped with the/
normal pressures of the bureaucratic scene. 5
/
Equally fragmentary is the finding that AID's bureaucracy was
insensitive, overlarge, and un~~tive. That is how burea{icr~cies
often turn out to be. 6 Indeed, when adaptive and innovative behavior
d~es occur in an organization, it is often analyzed in terms of the
organizational characteristics that enable the entity to overcome the
lethargy and resistance to change that is inherent in any bureaucra--·-~-
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cy. 7 One wants to know, then, how and why the innovators and
risk-takers in AID were kept from playing their role. Did the agency's
environment spurn them? If not, there is even more reason to be
curious about why the forces of lethargy and resistance prevailed.
AID started out with some characteristics unusual for a public
sector-Eureaiicracy. This.endowment, unnoted by evaluators, seemed
particulaily ·suited to a ta;k like-development assistance - a task that
was far outside the range of the typical functions performed by most
public sector bureaucracies. In fact, the U.S. organization may have
started out better fit for the ta'SK ·at hand than the less-mali_gned
multilateral agencie_~ - the Int~rnational Bank for Reconstruction
and D~v~I~pment (IBRD). the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), and regional banks such as the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB). The disappointing performance of the U.S. agenc;y, in
sum, was particularly interest\n&: g{ven the fact that it had .started
with a better than even orga11izational chance for success.
In observing AID from within, one is taken with the intricacies of a
bilateral foreign aid organization subject to the slings and arrows of
the rest of the government to which it belongs. Only after a time does
it become apparent that many of the more important "bilaterallycaused" problems of U.S. foreign aid are prevalent in the multilateral
organizations as well. This is surprising not only because the problems seem such an obvious result of bilateralism but because "multilateralization" has been proposed for some time as one of the most
potent methods for improving the quality of U.S. foreign assistance. It
is supposed to rescue the donor organization from the undermining
influences of U.S. political and national security goals, U.S. business
pressure on the design of projects and decisions, and congressional
hostility to foreign aid. Yet, if a certain type of problem behavior is
found in a!ly assistance organization, regardless of its remoteness
from national entanglements, then the vaunted multilateralization
does not necessarily make inroads on some of the criticized problems.
The intent of this inquiry, then, is twofold: to explore the unique
character of the Agency for International Development as a public
sector organization, and to analyze certain problems which, although
most visible in the highly bilateral context of one particular agency,
turn out to afflict other types of development assistance organizations
as well. The first three chapters concentrate on the bilateral AID. The
next three extend the discussion to phenomena pervading both bilateral and multilateral organizations. The IBRD, or World Bank, has
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become the most significant lender of development assistance funds
in the nineteen-seventies, and the IDB is the largest and oldest of the
regional development banks. Though of lesser significance, the
UNDP is brought into the discussion partly because of the excellent
description of its organizational environment in the Jackson Report,
revealing that it was characterized by some of the same organizational
problems that occurred in IBRD, IDB, and AID. Though the UNDP
differs from these other organizations because it specializes in technical assistance and feasibility studies, it plays an important role as
supplier offinanceable projects to these organizations and, despite its
differentness, has experienced remarkably similar organizational
problems.
The IDB is a unique hybrid of multilateralism, bilateralism, and
regionalism. Unlike the IBRD, it is staffed in large part by recipientcountry technicians, which introduces politics into decisionmaking
in a way that is distinct from both AID and IBRD. Unlike AID,
moreover, the IDB's contributors are multinational, although all are
within the Western hemisphere. Since its largest contributor is the
United States, moreover, the organization is subject to AID-like bilateral forces; but these for.ces are much less intense and determining
than those involving AID.
The differences between IDB, IBRD, and UNDP - and the way
these differences relate to t1le'ir1unding" arra.i-igements - are discussed at length in the literature. 8 I treat all three organizations as
"multilateral" - even though their differences may describe them
better than their shared multilateralism - because I am interested in
certain behaviors usually considered bilateral. At the same time, I
point out their differences to show that certain organizational traits
occur across a quite varied array of institutions dealing with development assistance.
A good part of the thinking in this book grew out of my association
with the Latin America program of AID, particularly in Brazil, in the
late nineteen-sixties. Much of the illustrative material reflects that
association. The book, however, is not about AID's Latin America
program. It is an attempt to say something general about development
assistance organizations, based on a learning that could only have
taken place through close involvement with one part of a large organization. During and after my AID-Latin America years, I had considerable exposure to AID programs in other regions, and to other
assistance organizations, which provided an opportunity to check my

6

INTRODUCTION

perceptions. Where possible, I have incorporated supporting material
from the literature of these other programs and places, though I have
not attempted to prove my analysis with systematic data from other
countries and other organizations. I have enlisted my experience to
concretize and enrich the argument and to lead the reader up to
propositions that might otherwise seem preposterous.
Since my original experience with AID, its appropriations and
personnel have been on the wane, while the IBRD has moved in the
opposite direction. Between 1967 and 1974, the IBRD's loan commitments quadrupled, rising from $1.1 billion to $4.3 billion. During the
same period, the funds appropriated for U.S. foreign aid declined by
20 percent, from $2.1 billion to $1. 7 billion. Correspondingly, AID cut
its personnel by half, from 17,600 direct-hire Americans and foreign
nationals in 1968 to 9,400 in 1974. At the same time, the IBRD more
than doubled its professional staff, from 734 to 1,752. 9 As a result of
these transitions, the discussion of AID in the following three chapters may be more relevant to the IBRD than would have been the case
some years ago. At the same time that AID starts to retreat from its
decentralized system of resident field missions, for example, the
once-centralized IBRD begins to look with more favor on the idea of
establishing such missions. Other changes have been taking place in
development assistance organizations - whether they are waxing or
,_ waning - such as the new concern with employment generation and
income distribution. I have discussed these processes of change in the
text wherever they enhance or modify my original argument.
Finally, most of the decisionmaking discussed in the book refers to
project lending - though program lending receives explicit attention
on pages 96 and 97. The IDB does not make program loans, and most
IBRD activity is concentrated in project lending, with less than 5
percent of its 1974 commitments in program loans. 10 Though program lending has accounted for as much as 50 percent of AID's
development lending, its share has decreased since 1969 to less than
10 percent of the proposed budget for fiscal year 1975. Sector loans
have also become important in AID, accounting for 50 percent of the
program in 1974 and 90 percent in 1975. 11 Although this approach
represents a significant attempt to plan at sector rather. than project
levels, the sector loan is, to a certain extent, no more than a new way of
grouping individual projects for presentation purposes. In that sector
loans consist of a package of discrete projects, then, what is said here
about project lending applies to sector lending as well. Similarly,
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technical assistance activities are relevant to my discussion in that
they are often directed toward generating applications for project
financing. I concentrate on project lending, therefore, because it accounts for the major part of resources committed and a more than
proportionate number of personnel. As a result, the project loan has
had much more influence than the program loan in structuring the
environment of development assistance organizations.

Chapter Two

THE TASK AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL FIT
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ThE NATURE OF THE TASK

THE TASK AND THE
ORGANIZATIONAL FIT

1

The U.S. foreign aid agency was a quite special case of public sector
bureaucracy. It had a decentralized structure and small familylike
field missions, in combination with a remarkably present-oriented
personnel system. All this contributed to an organizational environment that permitted considerable mobility, informality of communication and decisionmaking, and easy access to the top. This type of
environment, in turn, was suited to organizational tasks which, like
development assistance, tend to require a more than average amount
of adaptive and innovative behavior. Certain features of AID's structure and personnel policies, then, seemed to have endowed it with a
high probability of success. This unusual combination of organizational characteristics, along with an equally unusual task, has not
attracted the attention of the analysts of organizations and bureaucratic behavior.
Although the agency's organizational environment was more conducive than most to adaptation and innovation, criticism of its performance has often focused on its unadaptive and uninnovati ve behavTof.The reason the agency's performance fell short of its seeming
fitness for the task is the subject of the next three chapters. This
chapter describes the special nature of the demands made by the
development assistance task on a public sector institution and the
almost inadvertent aptness for that task of AID's organizational
design.

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the work of a
foreign aid agency is its differentness frg_~ that of.othf!r g_overnment
bureaucracies operating abroad. ()_f o_th~r_m()[lt:JY~SPJJildlug-bureauc
racies at home. Like other public works entities, for example, AID has
to spend money on highways and housing. But the typical highway or
low-income housing project it finances will turn out wrong if done
"by the book." The highway will fall apart long before the end of its
service life because of lack of maintenance and vehicle load control
practices in the aid-recipient country. Poor people may move into the
housing project only at gunpoint, because that way of living seems so
alien. Yet the foreign aid agency is held accountable if the highway
falls apart or if the hotising pr~ject r~mains unoccupied. At the same
time, the agency may be just as censured for using proc~dures that
strayed, in the interest of innovation, from standard technical norms.
Although the uniqueness of the foreign aid agency's task has been
recognized and UllderStOOd,t the. Qfganuational en vifonm.ent .that
such a task requires has never been specified. Nor has it been understood how the organization's inability--to provide such an environment can contribute just as much to its ineffectiveness as can the
pressures of outside interest groups, the insensitivity of the ethnocentric technician, and the restrictiveness of the legislature. When a
task is different from most, and relatively new, there will be little
technique to deal with it. The literature on the subject will be limited,
the accumulated experience within government will be sparse, and
the capacity of other government entities to carry out their normal
watchdog functions will be meagerly developed. The routine response as a form of bureaucratic action will not work as well as in
most large organizations. Familiar problem-solving techniques and
activities will often be insufficient to carry out the task. The problem
may require not only untried techniques of solution, but may first
have to be sought out and defined-a kind of searching that is alien to
much professional training in the developed world. 2 The task of
development assistance, then, involves not only "doing." An essential portion of it has to do with learning. 3
· Because of the peculiar nature of the development assistance task,
tb.ewritten word'\vnrnave special importance within the organiza-·
ti~r°i~-Written chronicles of the agency's experience and analysis of
what has been done will be needed much more than in a home-based
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bureaucracy, where sure prescriptions for well-defined problems
abound and where a general literature on how things work is usually
available. Hence the agency's own writing will be an important
medium through which a body of knowledge will be built up concerning the task at hand - knowledge that will help the organization
to be less dependent on the erratic appearance of individual innovation.
The special character of the foreign aid agency's task requires that
the organization have the proper atmosphere for groping without too
much idea of what willrCsult~ f_CJ_r straying!ram-frfed ifrid true solutions. and for struggling to escape from customary ways of thinking
about things. The agency will need a number of bureaucrats with a
penchant for this type of behavior; and an organizational environment will have to exist to which such types are attracted, in which
they can make cohesive and informal groups. and in which they are
able to gain power.
Although all this may seem obvious, its practical implications are
direet1y contrary to the argument used to justify the responsibility of
developed countries to aid the less-developed world. For I have been
saying that the atmosphere of a development assistance agency has
much in common with that of a less-developed country starting out
on the path of development: wide gaps in experience and knowledge
of the problems confronted and a corresponding maze of bureaucratic
procedures that seem to provide an essential protection to the
bureaucrat from the uncertainty and opaqueness of the world about
him. Making things even more difficult for the assistance technician
or administrator than for his recipient-country counterpart is the fact
that the former lacks the native person's feel for what will work and
what will not. Regardless of such difficulties. however_. development
assistance was established on the premise that the developed world
possessed both the talent and the capital for helping backward countries to develop. Development know-how was spoken about as if it
were like capital - a stock of goods capable of being transferred from
its owners to the less privileged. 4 But development knowledge is not
simply a stock with transferable properties. The peculiar nature of the
development task makes knowledge a product of the transfer experience itself..
This augmented definition of development assistance - where the
transferred resource is both input and output of the transfer process
-- makes it difficult to provide as clear a rationale for the assistance as

underlies the commitment to transfer capital. For knowledge that is
still to be learned cannot, by definition, be more abundant in one part
of the world than in another. 5 The difficulty of reconciling the
rationale for development assistance with the need of the assistance
organization for learning space can perhaps be attributed to the fact
that our culture "does not contain concepts for simultaneously thinking about rationality and indeterminateness. " 6 In practical terms,
this difficulty has constituted a significant impediment to allowing
these organizations to grope as much as they needed to. In order to
maintain credibility with Congress, public watchdog entlties~a-nd
in vest ors (in the case of the inultilatercil .banks)' th~ orgariiZation
could not admit that it often had to thrash around fo~ ~~Tutions.
Conversely, the pat technical solution was often slapped on a problem
that might require another, less charted approach-sometimes in an
inadvertent retreat from the uncertainty of less tried and true
techniques. 7
A result of the difficulty of accepting and putting into practice the
augmented definition of development assistance is that when problems arise, they are attributed to the wrong causes -causes that fit the
knowledge-as-stock definition of assistance. If an attempt to transfer a
stock of knowledge to the underdeveloped world does not work well,
the problem is said to result from imperfections in the transfer
mechanism - inadequately trained technicians, counterproductive
bureaucratic procedures, the impingement of forces from without rather than from an organizational environment that does not generate its share of the skill to be transferred.
As a result of th~s narrow definition of knowledgi:_ 4~nsJ~r. the
recommendations that accompany the evaluations of development
assistance seem to be founded on an unlimited faith in the ability of
developed-country man to cope with less-developed-country problems - a faith that is very much a result of the analysis of the failure.
That is, put developed-country man in a streamlined organization,
remove counterproductive outside pressures and legislative constraints, train him to be less ethnocentric, improve the techniques he
must use. give him intense training in these techniques -and he and
his organization will be much better fit to carry out the task at hand. If,
however, a good part of the task is learning and adapting, then a good
part of the burden rests on the organization and not the individual: he
will not be better at development, no matter what his training, unless
the organization is set up in a way that requires learning as an output.
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The rationale behind development assistance, in sum, causes donor
organizations to surround themselves with a protective aura of technical competence - an aura which must be maintained if they are to
survive in their institutional world. This makes it difficult to generate
the experimental environment necessary for their work. It also tends
to result in placing the blame for failure on the wrong thing.

at low levels of the organization and early stages of project design. At
such points, a new idea was more frequently scrapped with "what
would Congress say?" - than adopted with the attitude of "how
could we get this one around Congress?"
The new recruit to the agency was often surprised to sit down at his
first meetings and discover people who were not intrigued \vith the
process of economic development, who were ground down and
exhausted by their bouts with developing-country environments, and
who were not curious about the inner workings of their organization's
successes and failures. They seemed to find a certain degree of comfort and enjoyment in each other's company, engaging in a kind of
friendly griping about the "beneficiary" and his world. The innovator, in turn, was accepted almost with relief by his peers and
superiors, since he could often produce what they could not. His job
description, salary grade, or administrative rank did not matter. His
intrusions into the territory of others would often be requested; or he
would, on his own, step into the vacuum left by tired or frightened
colleagues. 9 What was unique to AID was not a more than proportionate share of the latter bureaucratic type but rather an extremely challenging and frustrating task environment. The faces of AID probably
looked 3.bout the same as those of any large, home-based federal
bureaucracy. It was the world they had to work with that made them
timid.
The agency's decentralized structure and dispersion abroad i.n
independent, familylike country missions also contributed to the
unusual fluidity of vertical and horizontal movement "Yit~i~ th~
organization. It was not simply a matter of the smallness of the
organizational subunits. Their location in a foreign country - often
looked upon by the staff as an alien environment - meant that the
work unit doubled as a kind of social unit. This contributed to a more
casual atmosphere at work, which, in turn, facilitated accessibility. 10
The informality was not necessarily a sole function of decentralization into small independent units. Similar dispersion abroad, in the
embassies of the State Department, produced just the opposite result:
an even more hierarchical environment than in the headquarters
organization in Washington. 11 It was the combination of decentralization with other factors, discussed below, that seems to have produced
the less hierarchical result in the case of AID.
The system of decentralized country missions increased the opportunities for a staff member's mobility not only because of the small,
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The literature of organizations has shown that a certain type of
organizational structure has been most conducive to the accomplishment of a task like development assistance, where "problems
and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and
distributed among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy."8 The organizational structure indicated is decentralized, with
superior-subordinate demarcations blurred: access to supeiiors easy.
and considerable responsibility assumed by subordinates. The environment of AID fits this organizational description well. The agency's
\.~ geographical cil.Si)ersion and small field missions required a decen~
·..,,j tralized structure with considerable delegation of responsibility. Certain personnel policies had the same effect. although they were designed, as will be seen, with other purposes in mind.
The blurring of hierarchical lines in AID was partly a result of
gaping -vacuums of
and power at various points in the
organization. To a considerable extent, the agency was peopled with
organizational types who were self-effacing, back-stepping, and
apologetic. One did not often hear an AID professional express pride
at working for the agency or speak contemptuoc;::;iy of other federal
bureaucracies. (Perhaps the latter is a better measure of an organization's self-confidence.) Professionals at the !BRO, in contrast, would
regularly exhibit amused scorn for the technical competence of their
AID or IDB counterparts. Budget Bureau technicians, too, displayed
an elitist self-confidence in their organization and a disdain for the
abilities of the government entities they were overseeing. In AID, it
was common for some of the brightest and most successful professionals and administrators to let it be thought that they were looking
for positions elsewhere, even when they were making no serious
efforts to leave. They thus managed to withhold their respect from the
agency while continuing to work for it. A good part of the characteristic AID humility expressed itself in relation to Congress, particularly

knowledge-
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familylike nature of the individual unit. Equally important was the
possibility of moving from one mission to the other. The agency's
encouragement of such rotation through its designation of two-year
"tours of duty" made it possible for the staff member who could not
get what he wanted in his own mission to try his fortunes in another
- thereby increasing his expectation of possible promotion or reassignment as a reward for his efforts. The constant rotation between
missions meant that positions were always being vacated and
chances were always occurring to move up. Hence the high rate of
inter-mission and field-Washington mobility removed one disadvantage of the small unit - the difficulty of moving upward, or even
sideward, because of the smallness of the organization.
The high incidence of rotation in AID and the State Department has
usually been noted because of its unfavorable side: moving people
from one place to another just as they are getting to know a country or, perhaps more accurate for AID, allowing them to move. As seen
above, however, the rotations that occurred in the agency were not all
\ "'
~- that arbitrary and Clisa(lvantageous. 12 The employee himself had conc-·i.
siderable interest in moving about, and the most successful ones were
usually entreated by the country mission to renew their tours rather
than rotate. An important aspect of rotation, then, was that it counterbalanced the tendency of a large public sector bureaucracy to offer
little hope for rapid recognition and promotion.
Also contributing to the possibilities for action and power by the
interested AID innovator was the uniquely present-oriented cast of
the agency's personnel system. The legislative authority for AID's
foreign service personnel system (Sec. 625[d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended) - as well as that of its predecessor
agencies - was based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946 as amended.
AID was enabled by the legislation to employ most of its professional
American personnel for overseas service under a rubric little used
until recently by the State Department's Foreign Service - namely,
the Foreign Service Reserve (FSR). This category had been designed
to give the State Department and pre-AID entities the authority to hire
professionals "on a temporary basis ... with such specialized skills as
may from time to time be required" (Sec. 401[3] of FSA of 1946). The
time limit imposed on such employment was two non-consecutive
five-year periods (Sec. 522). In AID's case, however, the time period
was "the duration of operations" of the agency (Sec. 625[d) of FAA of
1961). In effect. this allowed the agency to employ people indefinitely
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without giving them the normal employment security accorded Civil
Service employees (e.g., seniority rights and veteran's preference
during times of personnel reorganizations or reductions), Foreign
Service Officers, or even the FSR officers of the State Department. 13
Moreover, unlike the Foreign Service Officer, the FSR officer was not
required to take rigorous entrance exams.
The orientation of the foreign aid bureaucracy was exactly opposite
to that of the career Foreign Service of the State Department. Because
the same type of criticism has often been leveled at the two groups, as
if they were one, it is useful to clarify this significant difference in
their organizational environment. Unlike AID, the State Department's
Foreign Service is imbued with the atmosphere of an elite career
service. 14 As one would expect in such a service, criticism and innovational behavior suffer because of the young officer's long-run interest in advancing his career. 15 Entry is limited by a tough written
and oral exam. A perio of initial work well below the level of the
young officer's interests, aspirations, and talents is the usual rule. The
initial apprenticeship period is tolerable to the recruit presumably
because his career promises a future of power, prestige, and adventure
- and because his acceptance into this elite corps confers immediate
prestige on him in the eyes of the outside world. 16
AID and its predecessors, in contrast, have always been much less
future-oriented employers, even in comparison to federal bureaucracies without a career orientation like that of the Foreign Service.
AID was created in 1962 in order to, among other things, put together
under one roof some of the previously dispersed foreign assistance
activities of the government - the International Cooperation Administration, the Development Loan Fund, the Food for Peace Program, and the local currency-lending activities of the Export-Import
Bank. The agency's attitudes about personnel corresponded to the
manner in which it had committed itself to development assistanceas if it were a task like the Marshall Plan, something that could be
terminated with success in a five- or ten-year period. "I don't think it
will happen for 10, 15, 20 years perhaps," said the agency's administrator in 1963, in response to a question about whether the program
would terminate after some specified period. "But it certainly will
terminate in many places before then, and it may terminate completely before then. The personnel system that is used must be compatible with the possibility of terminating any part or all of the
program which may not last too long." 17 Of course, the placing of a
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terminal date on the assistance commitment may have been more a
political maneuver on the part of aid proponents than a realistic
assessment of what would happen. Aid proponents were said to have
calculated that Congress would never authorize the funds unless it
was promised that the program would eventually come to an end.
sooner rather than later. 18 Whatever the case may have been, it was
always clear to the agency that its existence would come into question
by Congress as soon as the end of that temporary period came near.
The agency, then. could not honestly promise a long-term career to
its job applicants. Unlike the State Department, it was not interested
in entrance exams. \Vhereas the separateness of the State Department's Foreign Service personnel system was meant to serve the
purpose of creating an elite career corps, the reasons for a separate
foreign aid personnel system were just the opposite: to be able to get
already trained and experienced people fast and at the same time be
free of the Civil-Service-type employment obligations to them. 19
In 1963, more than half of the agency's overseas staff (1800 out of
3300 Foreign Service Reserve positions) had limited-tenure appointments. meaning that they would gain tenure after an initial trial
period of arbitrary length only with the agency's specific approval.2°
Moreover, almost half of the agency's American personnel abroad in
1968 were not direct-hire; they were either on loan from other government agencies or on contract - and hence were employed for
limited periods of time. Finally, the agency did not request authority
to include its personnel in a career system until 1966 because, according to its own rationale, it was engaged in a temporary task. 21 All this
seems rather unusual behavior for a public sector bureaucracy which
has been criticized for having been ossified and unadaptive.
The career horizon of the foreign aid employer and employee, then,
was atypically short. People were expected to perform immediately
and be rewarded immediately. In contrast to the Foreign Service,
there was no time for, or value placed upon, rising up from the bottom
and getting one's experience that way. The employee expected his job
to bestow on him immediately the responsibility and discretion that
his experience merited. People tended to find their levels on their
own - without as much resorting to formal reassignments, promotion, reorganizations, or job redefinitions as in other federal bureaucracies. Those \\'ho could not cope gravitated toward more secure
"paper-pushing" functions, and those who were interested "took
over" very soon after entering. The unusually short-term career hori-
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zon of the agency and its employees meant that the fear of stepping
out ofline, and of what it would do to one's career, did not pervade the
organization the way it did the Foreign Service. At the least, such fear
was not a constraining element for those who were interested in
experimenting or changing existing practices.
The re la ti ve absence of hierarchy and excessive preoccupation
with promotion in AID must have had a positive effect on the agency's
ability to carry out its task. Its overseas technicians, that is, could
perform best if they got out into the culture of the country where they
worked and got to know its people. If they were preoccupied with
rising up in the ranks, however, they would consider it important to
spend more time with those who would help their ascendancy moves
- i.e., other Americans. The type of activity that led to promotion in
the more rank-oriented Foreign Service of the State Department, as
one observer has pointed out, had little to do with the ability to speak
foreign languages and develop social relations with host country
nationals, or with the knowledge of foreign cultures and political
patterns. Specifically, "the important social contacts for the American diplomat who wishes to rise in the hierarchy are those with other
Americans, both important American visitors and members of the
American missions. Too much association with natives is likely to
involve some slighting of this relationship to other Americans, and is,
consequently, likely to retard promotion." 22 AID's fluid environment
and ease of promotion, in contrast, must have been an important
liberating factor, in the sense. that overseas employees would not be
sacrificing so much in terms of career opportunity by spending time
with the people of their host country.
AID appeared to be unique, then, in setting the scene for a dedicateO.riSK-·cnurtfhg corps of technicians Clever e'no~gh t~ -pur-sue 'tlie
gOiiTs.6f their organization and at the same time defend it frnm attempted incursions from the outside. The organization was fitted ~u't ~ith ';
some atypical charaderistics, which seemed, almost fortuitously, just
what was needed for the atypical task at hand. This potenfiarfor
healthiness in the. AID .environment -stands out even more clearly
when contrasted with the analyses of lack-of-innovation problenis in
the future-oriented ranks of the State Department. 23
The State Department, interestingly, resorted more and more to the
reserve category originally used mainly by AID and predecessors,
rather than the more elitist career-oriented Foreign Service Officer
category. In 1959, FSR accounted for 28 percent of the total number of
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new FSO and FSR appointments, and 38 percent in 1961; 24 in 1968.
FSR's were 36 percent of the total number of FSO and FSR staff
members. The Herter Report stated that the FSR category had become
"the primary vehicle for obtaining needed skills at intermediate and
higher professional levels in the State Deparment." 25 Indeed, recent
evaluations of the State Department's Foreign Service recommended
that some of its "creativity" problems be remedied by modifying the
recruitment system in a way that made it look more like AID's temporary foreign service. The State Department Task Force on the Stimulation of Creativity recommended that the department allow officers "to
be released for up to 4 years to pursue brief careers elsewhere in
government and in other professions ... with provision to return to
the Service without prejudice to their careers." 26 An article in the
journal of the Foreign Service Officer's Association recommended the
end of the FSO career service and its replacement with the recruitment of experienced professionals.27 In sum, the State Department's
elite Foreign Service, in attempting to deal with its own lack of
innovation and adaptiveness, was advocating personnel changes
which would make the service more like the non-elitist AID. 28
Although I have characterized the agency's present-oriented personnel system as desirable, most of the attention focused on this
system was of a critical nature. As early as 1962, for example, a report
on foreign affairs personnel concluded that "the failure to establish a
recognized career service and professional status for persons engaged
in foreign assistance work" was the main cause of difficulty in recruiting high quality personnel.2 9 In 1965, the Foreign Service Journal
editorialized: "If there is one agency in the foreign affairs field in
which greater administrative flexibility, unity and order in personnel
matters are required, it is certainly AID. Many officers are on limited
FSR appointment. No permanent appointments to AID's career service have been made since 1961. There is a hodge-podge of personnel
systems with FSO, FSR, FSR (limited), AD (Administratively Determined), and Ci vii Service ratings, derived from a variety of legislative
sources." 30 In 1968, a report commissioned by the American Foreign
Service Association said that the major contribution.of "the able and
dedicated staff of AID and its predecessor agencies" to American
foreign policy was "all the more significant" because this personnel
"has been denied coverage under a stable personnel system." 31 In
1969 the agency was complaining to the Congress that its lack of a
career system and its temporary status were obstacles to recruit-

ment. 32 The agency's rate of turnover was said to be higher than that of
other government agencies -25 percent as compared to 20 percentand this allegedly reflected the general level of employment insecurity.33
The Agency's temporary status was criticized for its effect not only
on staff recruitment and morale but also on the organization's ability
to carry out its unique task. "It is perhaps inescapable," said the report
of a congressional committee evaluating AID personnel administration and operations. "that the hasty manner in which it was necessary
for this country to organize and staff the successive foreign assistance
programs and to continue changing programs and key personnel to
meet changing conditions, would eventually create a large, amorphous, unstable agency, which would provide one of the most serious
handicaps in carrying out the complex foreign assistance programs."34 Likewise, an ex-member of the Nine Wise Men, President
Kennedy's ad hoc advisory committee on Latin American policy,
recounted that the Alliance for Progress operated "as if it were likely
to go out of business at any moment. ... As a result ... it functions
like a disorganized ministry in a poor and backward country." 35 The
author goes on to say that this problem resulted in a lack of the use of
modern management and policy tools and a "shoving into the
background" of the problems of information and research.
The short-term career horizon, then. may not have had as posi_tive
an effect as I have described. It may actually have caused the kind of
job insecurity that prevents the development of adaptive, innovative
behavior- and it may explain to a certain extent why the agency was
not blessed with more of such behavior. Security is necessary to
ensure the potential experimenter that he can take unpopular stands,
sometimes fail. and go out on a limb without losing his io?. Just as
important. such security facilitates the formation of informal groups
within the organization, for employees feel less need to compete-with
their colleagues "when promotions and dismissals depend on
explicit and openly announced standards." 36
Piecemeal organizational approaches and frequent changes, however, do not necessarily bring on the type of inadequate performance
that AID critics have described. After all. stable and long-lived government bureaucracies with secure personnel systems have been
criticized for the same lack of adaptive behavior and experience, but
the shortcomings have been attributed in these cases to excessive
security and stability. The rigidity of the Foreign Service, in the works
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cited above, is seen as a consequence of the fact that it is an age-old
entrenched organization, insulated from the forces of change by the
timelessness of its values and career system.
An example of the potentially positive results of organizational
newness and insecurity is the Latin American experience with autonomous state companies - the so-called mixed companies. The
evolution of this particular organizational form in the public sector
has in many cases constituted a significant breakthrough for government action in developing countries. The mixed company successes,
however, were based on the same organizational characteristics
which were considered to have caused the problems of AID. That is,
the successful mixed companies frequently started out without much
structure or security, made up of the better personnel of the government ministries from which they had broken away. Their ability to
free themselves of particularly cumbersome civil service and procurement procedures was of major importance, especially in that this
allowed rapid hiring and the paying of attractive salaries. The success
of these new organizations, then, was their very newness, their man'-""' ning by persons who had previously worked in the same branch of the
v\ public sector, and their breaking away from the more constraining
aspects of government bureaucracy.
Although the analogy between the mixed company and AID is not
completely fitting, it at least shows that we cannot accept "organizational disorder" and "temporariness" as "obvious" explanations for
the problems of AID. Indeed, one of the reports that criticized the
impermanent nature of AID's personnel system suggested elsewhere
that career stability was probably not a desirable feature for the personnel system of an organization carrying out a task like development
assistance:
The requirements of AID's program preclude a permanent career service
because the needs for specialized personnel abroad change every year.
Better personnel will be obtained by hiring persons for temporary tours of
duty. They will be forced to identify with their profession .... The decisive
reason not to include these specialists in an AID career system is that, in the
main, the career contexts and career loyalties of the best professionals lie with
their professions and the whole range of activities with which those professions are associated. An association with AID, even if it could be made
permanent. would not attract very many of the best professionals to spend
most of their working lives overseas. far from their professional colleagues
and the stimulus of professional association. 37

In addition, it seems that the insecurity of the AID personnel system
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as it existed on paper had not been reflected in the amount of firing
and "removal of deadwood" that one would expect. The Herter Report suggested that the temporary "reserve" designation of AID
foreign service officers was really "a misnomer in terms of its originally intended use as a temporary hiring device" because Foreign
Service Reserve appointments in AID could be made for the duration
of the agency's operations. In the State Department, in contrast, such
appointments were limited to a given period of time. Hence, "a
substantial portion of AID's Reserve officers have been with the
Agency and its predecessors for many years .... Clearly, the Agency
has a substantial nucleus of what amount to career personnel even in
the absence of a formally constituted career service." 38
Any government job offers what might be called informal security
- as opposed to the formal security of being a member of a particular
federal bureaucracy. The civil servant who distinguishes himself in a
government job automatically becomes highly eligible in the eyes of
other government entities. He is noticed and may receive job offers
from these entities, especially if his work involves contact with them.
Thus, if his agency is on the wane, this type of person is usually in an
excellent position to find a good place in another government bureau.
Some agencies are looked upon by ambitious young professionals as a
way to establish their reputations for future opportunities in the
political, business, or government world. AID in particular was considered this way, especially by lawyers, partly because of the high
possibilities for mobility described above. 39
Finally, the AID environment was an insecure one only in relation
to other Civil Service departments. With respect to the private sector,
the AID employee was still considerably more secure. There was a
significant difference, moreover, between the reaction of the ambitious or competent bureaucrat and that of the less competent one to
threatened personnel reductions. The latter lived through such
periods with great fear, much talk of what would happen, and resentment at the insecurity of the work environment. The former, in
contrast, would sometimes even welcome the rumors of personnel
reduction because of the opportunity "to get rid of deadwood," or
they would pay the rumors little heed, secure in the knowledge that
they would not be touched. Or, when the program was threatened
with complete demise, they would joke about the fact that the only
result would be "a changing of acronyms" for the agency- and that
they expected to take the same place in the newly-initialed entity,
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whatever form it might take. 40
In conclusion, one has to look beyond the obvious explanation of
chaos and insecurity in order to find the reasons for AID's problems.
Chaos and insecurity may have been an integral part of an organizational environment that was better equipped than most for coping
with the job of development assistance.

~
\"

THE MISFIT

Certain development assistance problems are commonly explained
in terms of the ethnocentricity of the developed-world technician, his
insensitivity to other cultures, and his inability to meet the challenge
of new situations. This chapter, in contrast, shows that AID's structure
and task environment made it almost inevitable that certain problems
usually attributed to individuals or a culture would have surfaced in
any case as organizational phenomena. The task at hand required an
organizational environment tha.t could produce learning; the organizational level at which learning behavior was required was much
lower, or at different points, than in a more typical government
bureaucracy; and the type of person recruited for these positions was
no different from those recruited for similar-level and similarfunction positions in a home-based bureaucracy, where routine behavior at these levels is more functional.
BOTIOMHEA VINESS

AID differed from home-based government bureaucracies in that a
major input into the program had to come from those outside it: either
the recipient governments or other local borrower groups. This crucial beneficiary input into the production of development assistance
was made at the organization's far-flung outposts - the country
missions - rather than in conjunction with headquarters personnel
in Washington. Recipient-country technicians, in short, usually
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IDENTIFICATION AND DESIGN OF PRTA/i:
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SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES AND APPROACHES

TASK

QUESTIONS AND RELATED ISSUES
I.

Ex.a..ine Co. .itaent and Achieve Consensus on Goals:

A.

Identify Need
Diagnose need for institutional TA

- Recipient and aid agency (or project designers) should jointly
engage in thorough diagnosis of need in order to achieve
consensus that a problem exists and that TA is the best vay to
address it.

Assess appropriateness of technology and
institutional design under consideration

- How much can be done by local staff? Designers should be aware
of the interrelationship between project design choices
(including proposed pace of implementation) and TA required for
their implementation and use. What are the implications of the
project investment for the use of humn, physical. and financial
resources over the short and long term?

Assess short- and long-term development
objectives for the sector or entity

- What is the human resource development strategy for the sector?
- Is the goal to develop national capabilities in all areas of
management or to develop "management autonomy"?
- Should training be provided for the entity only, or the sector as
a 1oihole?
- What are the linkages with larger mndates (e.g •• women in
development, environment, energy)?

Is additional external TA needed?

- Can local skills be tapped from the public or private sector?
Repatriated from abroad?
- Is PRTA duplicating efforts of other multi or bilateral groups?
Is the TA staff already present in the country lot'orking in the
same area? Have results of PRTA in previous projects in the
sector or subsector been taken into account?
- Can TA and training needs be assessed concurrently? Should
training be financed in advance of project execution?

Are there related training needs?

I
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B.

C.

2

of 7

Exaaine Feasibility of the Proposed Assistance
Assess state of the art and
knowledge or expertise available to meet
the TA need

- Can TA .needs be met in terms of the state of the art and the
expertise available, the organizational and political environlm!nt
in which TA will be implemented, and the time frame and cost of
the present project? If expertise is not available "off the
shelf" (e.g., in institutional areas) should TA be provided in
the form of "action research"?

Assess the availability of local skills and
resources to prepare TA proposals and to
manage the assistance, both substantively
and administratively

- When such skills are not available, would recipient staff benefit
from training in how to design and mana~e the assistance? Should
aid agency staff themselves assist, or arrange for other
preparatory assistance?

Assess the feasibility of achieving TA
goals in a single project

- Would the success of TA be enhanced by planning the TA task.a as
sequential parts of a development program, perhaps over a series
of projects?

Assess internal and external factors likely
to have an impact on TA activities

- Considering the organizational, legal, political, financial and
other factors that may affect the success of PR.TA should
designers attempt to use these factors for the project's benefit,
find ways to minimize their possible negative impact, or adjust
TA goals to more realistically reflect the environment?

Achieve Consensus and Commitment About TA Need and Goals
Verify clarity of TA objectives and
agreement of key stakeholders to such
objectives

- State goals (criteria for success) in measurable terms (such as
targets for training), to clarify what is expected of TA
activities, as well as to help 11110nitor their implementation.
- Seek balance between assistance for physical investimrnt and for
institutional or policy improvements.
- Verify that recipient's staff concerned with the TA at the
political and technical levels perceive it as directly lir*ed to
project, sector, or country objectives; do not feel threatened by
the TA; and are prepared to commit staff and other resources
toward its implementation.
- Cross-cultural sensitivity may be required in order to understan:I
how a recipient manifests commitment and what approaches or
methods are lll)St appropriate in seeking coosensus.

I
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II.
A.

Verify absence of other obstacles to TA

- Is there agreement on the cost of TA? Can it be lowered 1
- Is the recipient willing to borrow for TA? Verify that no grant
funds are available from other agencies.
- Ia there agreement on the use of national, rather than expatriate
consultants, where appropriate?

Reinforce COllllitment

- Provide recipient with access to experience of m>re advanced
developing countries.
- Verify that needs for TA were kept to the ainiaua compatible with
project objectives.
- Ensure that TA delivery systeas other than the hiring of
long-tena experts will be considered during TA design.
- Ensure that the aid agency and recipient are prepared to mdify
the TA assignment in the light of iaplementation experience.
- In su11, ensure that TA is identified and designed in a spirit of
partnership and that TA is part of an institution-building and
hu1111n resource strategy, allowing the recipient to learn by
doing.
I
...,,

Design of the Services

0
I

Teras of Reference {TOR)
Specify PRTA tasks in Terms of Reference
(TOil)

- TOR should clearly specify their objectives, desired outcomes,
the task to be performed, its time fra11e and cost, am the
reporting requirements. However, TOR should not be overly
detailed, especially in the c:ase of institutional and policy
studies, and may need to be phased, so as to allow consultants to
prepare m>re detailed proposals once in the field. Verifiable
interim outputs may be desirable.
- Well-prepared TOR are flexible am negotiable, within reason.
- Specify assistance needed to help recipient launch i•pleentat ion
of study or policy recommemationa.
- TOR should indicate the organizational entity to lilich the
expatriate staff should be assigned, to whoa they should report
and to whee they should have access, and how auc:h authority
should be conveyed to them. The effectiveness of these
arrangements will ultimately depend on local •nagelllll!nt and the
relationship established between local am consultant staff.

Aanes 1
Page
Define role/vrlte TOil for both eJCpatriate
and national staff
Specl.fy TA model and deli -.ery mode

a.

7

- This emurea that both foreign and local personnel will have
aeaningful assignments and a clear uodemtancling of their
responsibilities.
·
- Tiil shouid indicate which model(•) of TA la appropriate for the
tasks: (1) perfon.er or substitute; (2) prescriptive; (3)
counterpart-adviser; (4) collaborati"Ve. Aleo, what mode or
combination at mdes of deli very is preferable: long~em or
short~ena specialists or a c011blnation of b~h, passibly in
association with a training specialist, and t e - of eJCpatriate
and national specialists; coaching by ·dsiting• experts or a
panel of experts; or a •twinning• arrangeaent.

Sources and Choice of £xpertise
Identify potenUal suppliers of TA

SpecJ.fy individual -rsus fir.

Local "Versus foreign specialists

C•

4 of

- TA suppliers include expatriate and local individuals and
consulting firms, U.R. agencies, IC;Os and wlunteer
organizations, bilateral&, private -nufacturers, siailar
operating entities, universities, trade and professional
organizatioos.
- ls iodirldual comultant or co1111ulting fira preferable?
Individuals aay be preferable for lonaer tera adrlaory poaitlons
or when -nagement TA is required. Firms are preferable men
complementary skills are required, becked up by professional and
achainistrathe support from headquarters.
- The choice of expatriate, local, or joint "Venture expertise
depends, in part, on the technology to be used in the parent
project and how much adaptation is required to local
circm1&tances. Other consicleratiooil include the uraency with
which the recipient wishes the project· to be iaplemented, the
developaent strategy, the availability of local talent, and the
relative level of local "Versus expatriate salaries.

Training Design
Design PK'IA and training in concert

- Transfer of skills and technology can be mre effective i f it is
planned and iapleaented as an integral part of the project and
other training efforts in the sector or country.
- If training can begin before the project starts, local staff are
in a better position to make the m>st effective use of TA
personnel once they ar.rhe in the field.
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- Call on a training or institutional specialist to design the
training coaponents as vell as institutional measures to retain
trained staff.
- Chances of successful skills transfer are better with an
explicit, separately budgeted, training coaponent, vith tvo
exceptions: (i) success has been achieved vi th engineering
consultants training in contract and construction 1anagement; and
(ii) skills are successfully transferred when nationala have
priaary or substantive responsibility for task achievement.
- If contract is expected to be ghen to a single firm. that haa
proved effective both as consultant and trainer, be sure to all<Jll
enough time and financial resources to enable success at both
tasks.
Choose a training strategy

Ensure vays for trainees to use oev skills

III.

A.

- Training strategies include:
(a) '"Sandwich'" training vith on-the-job vork.
(b) Train on the job first, identify stars, send thea for
further training, build a cadre.
(c) Send trainees to· a job overseas, e.g., under a tvinni~
arrangement.
(d) Use short-term. experts as coaches to train.
(e) Arrange study tours abroad.
- Training can be tailor-aade or a standard prograa, a one-time or
periodic activity, fonaal or non foraal, on the .)>b, in-house,
in-region, or overseas.
- Ensure support of trainees' 1anagers by involving the• in
beginning and ending training sessions or setting up special
workshops or sellinars for them. Follo.i up trainees after
coapletion of training; incorporate training aaterials into
ope rational 1anuals.

Adainistrative Design and Implementation
Make Logistical and Adllinistrative Arrangements
Specify administrative responsibilities

- Select implementing agency and assess whether same agency should
be responsible for designing, contracting, and iapleenting the
TA.

I
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- To meet professional and personal needs of expatriates and their
families {housing, offices, and equipment), ensure that
beneficiary agency can provide adequate support, otherwise
strengthen agency's capacity or shift responsibility to
consulting fira or other TA supplier.
- Specify recipient'• contribution (financial or in kind) to the TA
assignment.
Ensure that professional aspects of TA
process are aanaged

B.

C.

Provide for Periodic Evaluation

- Specify arrangements for briefing, supervising, and backstopping
the TA team, and its coordination with other apncies.
- Promote continuity of staff from design to illplementation, or at
least access of designers and iapleaenters to each other.
- Make arrangements for pr011pt review of TA staff reports,
especially Inception Report, tilhich may redefine TA needs and TOI.
and require early action.
- Schedule periodic joint evaluation aaong aid agency, TA
recipient, and consultants to allow changes in assignment over
time on the basis of implementation experience (flexibility to
adjust TOR aay be more significant for iDBtitutional than for
engineering TA, although in the latter case scheduling •Y have
to be adjusted or even the scope of vorlt as condit ioDB chanp).

Arrange11ents for Staff and Trainee Selection
Select local staff

- Assess availability of appropriate local staff at an early stage•
- Local consultants may be used where iaple•nting apncy staff are
not available.
- In some cases, it aay be desirable for foreign coosultant to help
establish selection criteria and to assist in local staff
selection, especially for training.
- Staff self-selection can enhance the chances of havi111 mtivated
staff. Special incentives aay aometi.es be necessary, hovewr.
- Key characteristics of effective local •nager (and staff)
include c~tment to the project, effecthe use of coosultanta,
good working relations with authorities.

Select expatriate staff

- Verify that recipient has pnerally accepted and eound selection
and contracting procedures; otherwise provide guidance.

~
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- Consider advantages of large versus small firm, U.N. organization
versus individual contracts, the impact on TA staff DDrale of j:>b
security upon completion of assignment, etc.
- Ensure that if several groups of expatriates from different
organizations are engaged, their conditions of employment are
comparable.
Decide what selection criteria are most
essential in achieving the particular PRTA
task

D.

Hake Arrangements for TA Follow-up

- Individual qualities to consider in selection of expatriates
include:
technical competence; understanding of aid agency and
recipient procedures and policies; and a range of personality
characteristics (adaptability, dedication, flexibility, patience,
tact, empathy, political sensitivity, and cross-cultural
communication skills including linguistic ability). Training
skills may also be a criterion.
- Psychological testing, interviews, or short-ter11l initial
appointments are ways to improve the matching of foreign and
local staff.
- Create local permanent positions to replace expatriates.
Arra~e
for decisions to be taken about policy recommendations and assign
responsibility for implementation. Retain consultants for
additional advice, training as needed.

I
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LESSON 6
BUILDING TRUST

Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Outline the factors affecting the establishment of trust.
2. Evaluate the characteristics of an outsider who is trusted.
3. Assess how well this class is establishing trust.
Activities
1. Discussion of factors affecting the establishment of trust
(1 hour)
a) feelings about homework assignment.
b) list factors on newsprint.
2. Break

(15 min)

3. Midterm evaluation
a) Triads
(30 min)
Tasks - Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this
course so far. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
the facilitator. What affect has the establishment of
trust had on the success and failure of this class so
far?
b) Large group discussion
(30 min)
What have we done in this class to enhance or inhibit
trust among ourselves?
4. Handout Homework #6 - Managing Rural Development.
(10 min)
No class at scheduled time next week. On following Saturday
will have all day class, 8-5 p.m.

HOMEWORK 6
MANAGING RURAL DEVELOPMENT
1. Read:
1. Heaver, Bureaucratic Policies and Incentives in the
Management of Rural Development.
2. Korten, pp.53-162.
3. Chambers, pp.140-167.
4. Hyden, pp.182-205.
5. Moris, pp.116-125.
No class at regular time next week. Week from this Saturday we
will play The Green Revolution Game from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. at the
Fine Arts Center, Room
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SUMMARY
Neglect of the__!'1_anagement Factor
Pollr public sector management is recognized as a key constraint on
poverty-orient<'cl rural development. But it is an elusive and neglected
constraint becn1111e:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

( f)

It ill hard to separate the results of poor management
from the many problems in poor countries which are beyond
manl\~<'rs' control.
Mana~~ment

research has concentrated on the upper levels of
bur<'nucracies, rather than the middle and junior officials
who Actually implement projects in the field. It thus does
not mt•t"t the practical needs of managers or advisers.

Hahltll of thought and appraisal techniques have not changed
to m<'<'t the needs of the 1970s generation of managementintttmd ve rural development projects.
Prof~s$ional

bias encourages the wrong diagnosis of acrossorganization and management problems as specializrd. technical, sectoral problems.

thr-ho~rd

FunJln~

agencies have little access to key management proin implementing organizations, and hence to the causes
rathrr than the symptoms of poor management.

cc~~r~

The ~~~ess problem is compounded by the political sensitivitv 0f management issues, especially the controversial
qu~$ti0n of who has control of scarce resources for what
en"~~·

Why Emphasire

In~entives

and Politics?

Tw 0 a.tJor approaches to management improvement have been through
the structur~l r~form of organizations, and management training. However,
structural r~f''nl is often short-circuited by the workings of the informal
management s,~tMl, and then results in no more than symbolic action. Management trainin..~ is often not adapted to the environment of third world
bureaucracies· ~n incentives approach to management complements existing
structural an-J training approaches. It is also more fundamental, in that
the pattern 0 ~ :u~entives and motives within the bureaucracy ultimately
determines ~~:~r new structures and newly trained managers will be used to
their intend.-.J ~~feet.

?0d
j
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Four models of organizational processes are examined: rational,
bureaucratic, garbage can and political. It is suggested that current
management approaches imply that implementing agencies work primarily according to a mixture of bureaucratic and garbage can processes, to which a
rationalist response would make sense. In reality, the political model is
often more appropriate. The apparently unplanned, haphazard outcomes of much
bureaucratic activity in fact suit important political interest groups, and
are hence not as random as they seem. Rationalist solutions will therefore
fail if they do not take account of political processes with their own
rationality, and the incentive systems these imply.
Bureaucracy as Politics
The official goals of poverty-oriented development are
multi-purpose and qualitative. Lack of goal clarity and difficulties in
measuring achievement allow the pursuit of informal political goals within
development bureaucracies. Informal personalist management systems also
imply a looser structure and hence greater scope for playing politics in the
implementation process. But the prevalence of politics and conflict, personalism and patronage are insufficient to explain why even winners in the
struggle for resources and power are often consistently bad performers in the
field. Seen from within, the bureaucratic picture is of interest groups in
conflict. Seen from below--the viewpoint of the poor--it is one of
coalition: a coalition of indifference to their needs. Conflict occurs
primarily over the allocation of resources: but there is little perceived
political advantage in using resources to maximum developmental effect once
secured. The poor do not have the political voice to disturb this coalition.
As a result, resources enter the bureaucratic system, but do not "trickle
down" to the intended beneficiaries.
Perpetuation of many of the ''problems" of bureaucracy--centralism,
departmentalism, duplication, and sometimes red tape in decision-making--is
often in the interest of the key political game-players adept at handling the
system. "Rationalist" administrative innovation tends to destroy the informal management systems fundamental to the existing balance of power, and will
therefore be resisted. The implications for an incentives approach to
management are extremely significant. New programs and projects must take
account of bureaucratic politics, and provide an incentive, in terms of a
perceived personal advantage, for bureaucrats at each level and in every
department involved. This implies the addition of a new dimension to project
design: the assessment of motivation and incentives within implementing
agencies, and systematic attention to the kind of incentive patterns which
will make indifference to poor beneficiaries no longer the politically
rational attitude.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ASSESSING INCENTIVES

Recognizing Political Rationality
One basic assumption, implicit in the idea of bureaucracy as
politics, underlies the assessment of incentives--that individuals at all
levels in the organization are for the most part behaving rationally from
their own standpoint. Expectations of bureaucracy often implicitly accept
that its definitive qualities are apathy and ignorance--Koestler's simplistic
but revealing definition of bureaucracy, which he sees as the polar opposite
of the meritocracy, defined as intelligence plus effort. The contrasting
approach put forward here is that implementing organizations contain large
reserves of intelligence and effort if appropriately stimulated:
but that
this stimulus is often missing, and/or these reserves are often concentrated
in pursuit of unofficial goals which may not match those of funding agencies.
It is not rational for individuals or organizations to exert themselves in a
particular direction when there is insufficient incentive to do so:
and it
can therefore very well be argued that the logical result in many bureaucracies is often a combination of Koestler's two definitions--a situation
where it is intelligent to be apathetic in pursuit of development goals.
In
the discussion of bureaucracy as politics, an informal decision-rule for
civil servants was implied:
"What political gain will implementing this
policy bring me?" Following from the above assumption about rationality a
parallel question needs to be asked by evaluators. The question the conventional evaluator has asked when examining progress in the field is "What has
gone wrong here?" The basic question proposed in contrast is "What are the
influences on the officials involved which make this result/action/non-action
rational from their own point of view?" I.e., not "What makes this wrong?"
but "What makes this right?" This is the question that is basic to the
assessment of incentives. Asking this question directs attention to management and motivational root causes, while asking "What has gone wrong?" is
more likely to direct attention to problem symptoms.
This notion of bureaucratic rationality must be distinguished from
both "imperious" and "bounded" notions of rationality. This is clearly not
the objective rationality of Pfeffer's first model (Table 1, page 11), since
the political model of bureaucracy implies behavior which is often not in the
rational interest of development goals.
But nor is this merely bounded
rationality, which still assumes that the individual is attempting to behave
in some objectively or ultimately rational manner, but is constrained from
doing so because of his imperfect knowledge and the bounds of his analytical
ability.
In contrast, bureaucratic behavior is often based on rational
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self-interest, an approach to managerial behavior which in itself is no new
one. It is implied in Herbert Simon's classic "Administrative Behavior"
(Simon, 1962: 243): "This is the basic task of administration--to provide
each 'operative' employee with an environment of decision of such a kind that
behavior which is rational from the standpoint of this environment is also
rational from the standpoint of the group values and the group situation."
It has been specifically applied to rural development by Chambers (1974),
for example:
Often, however, an examination of the work environment,
perceptions and expectations of field staff will show, not
that they are willfully negligent, but that they are reacting
rationally to a situation in which it is not clear what is
expected of them but in which it is clear that the exercise
of initiative in development matt-;rs is at least as likely to
be penalized as deviant behavior as rewarded for being good
work (p. 23), and (p. 61): What does emerge, however, is that
much of the inactivity and low work output can be understood
as a rational response to a combination of terms of service,
living conditions, working conditions and supervision.
Neither penalties nor rewards provide strong incentives for
better performance. In these circumstances, the potential
abilities of staff lie largely dormant, a latent but
unrealized resource. Staff could work eight hours a day
instead of five. They could visit more than just the
progressive elite of farmers. They could cover villages
and farmers more distant from the places where they live.
That they do not do these things is largely because they
are rational. The question is how to change their work
environment so that it becomes equally rational for them
to work harder and better.
What is now needed is formal recognition of the importance of rational
self-interest as defined by the patterns of incentives within recipient
organizations. The effects of this incentive climate on individuals must be
seen in proper perspective. Few officials are Machiavellian intriguers
seeking all the time for their own advancement. Most are more reactive than
proactive in their attitudes, and some are plain lazy and will be unresponsive even to a custom-designed incentive system. The following three
bureaucratic types give a rough sense of the spectrum in the average
implementing agency:
1.

The Political Gamesman: The idea of tile gamesman is taken
from Maccoby's well-known analysis of top corporate leaders
(Mac co by, 1976). His book is subtitled "Winning and Losing
the Career Game", and this approach--to career as a game
to be won--is the key to the bureaucratic gamesman. As
a skilled politician, he will be highly sensitive to the
informal goals and priorities of the bureaucracy, to the
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sources of power, and to the key officials and politicians
who are now or will become powerful. He will seek to advance
his career by selling politically appealing projects to
superiors and by implementing them in ways which take
account of informal priorities (the case study below gives
an example of this). He will ensure that the incentive
systems controlling those below him reflect the informal
goals that are in his career interest to pursue.
2.

The Entrepreneur: The approach of the entrepreneurial
bureaucrat can be described as follows:
"Bureaucrats invest
their energies where there is the greatest prospect of
return. Developing country bureaucrats in particular are
constantly making calculations because they have so many
alternative investment options both in terms of their daily
work (what meetings to skip, etc.) and in terms of their
medium-term career (which project is likely to mutate into
a corporation)" (John Howell, pers. comm.). The entrepreneur bureaucrat has some of the characteristics of the
political gamesman. He has a career plan, and decides
his priorities on the basis of his medium term interest.
But he is reactive within a framework of investment
options, responsive to rather than creating possibilities
for advancement (the gamesman is more likely to propose
the project which later mutates into a corporation). The
entrepreneur's choice of priorities will affect the
incentives of those below him; but he is as much a
responder to incentives as he is an incentive-setter.

3.

The Incentive-Follower: The majority of lower-level
officials are incentive-followers only. They are the
field staff described by Chambers, and in head office
they are the yes-men clients of political patrons.
Incentive-followers are almost entirely reactive
responders: they have little concept of control over
their careers and may perhaps best be described not
as recognizing and reacting to positive incentives,
but as following the "line of least resistance" within
a given incentive pattern.

These categories are arbitrary in that all officials are to some
extent incentive-followers (the gamesman's reactions to superiors and to a
constraining environment) and all to an extent incentive-setters (the extension officer's effects on the motivation of client farmers).
All are acting
in their rational self-interest given their career goals and limitations.
But it is important, among these rational actors, to distinguish those who
are acting mainly as incentive-setters, since it is they who will control
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attitudes and behavior in the organization, and ultimately the effectiveness
of implementation.
Key Interest Groups and Incentive-Setters
The assessment of incentives within implementing agencies can
validly concentrate on a small number of key groups or individuals and on
an examination of how far their motives and aims conflict with those of other
key groups, and those of project originators.
At the lower levels of organizations, interest groups are likely
to be large--for example, the entire field officer contingent at a particular
level of the extension service hierarchy. The entire group is likely to
share similar problems and incentives, just as will the entire group of their
immediate superiors. Groups will have different interests according to
department and function, as well as according to their position in the
hierarchy:
extension officers will have very different ~roblems and interests from those of water bailiffs, while water bailiffs are likely to form a
different interest group from that of, say, the irrigation engineers controlling them. The organization charts of the various departments involved may
thus be broken down very quickly into a series of groups which a priori may
be expected to have common internal interests and to be to some extent in
conflict with superior, subordinate or coordinating groups. Higher up in the
hierarchy, groups give way to individual managers with particular personal
interests. These groups may be cut across, or individuals may be united, by
other groupings, based not upon departmental, hierarchical or personal interest, but on professional loyalty (e.g., engineers versus planners), race or
age (which may determine attitudes to or possibilities for career development).
When these groups are superimposed upon those derived direct from the
organization chart, the picture becomes more complicated:
but it still does
not take account of the interest groups created by the informal management
systems of a political bureaucracy.
Superimposed again must be patron-client
interest groups, which clearly will cut across horizontal hierarchical groupings, and are equally unlikely to be synonymous with formal departmental
groups.
It begins to seem as if there are more intersecting, shifting coalitions in the organization than there are individuals.
In practice, however, the large number of groups that a sociologist
might isolate can be reduced to a few key groups and individuals whose
strategic placing gives them control over project performance.
Given that
bureaucracies are basically authoritarian, the interests of more senior
individuals and groups tend to determine the incentives of those below.
Analysis should therefore start with the individuals near the head of the
organization, whose attitudes will tend to dictate the incentive system for
subordinates.
If they share the aims of the project originators, attention
can be turned to those next in the hierarchy, with the aim of determining
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where conflicts in motivation occur which break the chain of common interest--for it will be at these points that commitment and cooperation will be
lost, and the "trickle down" effect will become apparent.
The search for key interest groups and incentive-setters cannot,
however, be confined to the formal hierarchy. Those in a position to control
incentives are those who have power. Those with power, as the political
approach to bureaucracy suggests, are those who control resources: and the
control of key resources is far from limited to those with greatest formal
authority.
Starting-points for finding the incentive-setters would include
answers to the following questions:
1.

Who controls agendas. The obvious controllers of the
organizational agenda are the planners who formally set
priorities in conjunction with top management. But those
with control over the agenda of important meetings and
committees or with the ear of top (formal) managers can
exert tremendous influence in seeing that certain
decisions/problems are confronted and others not.

2.

Who controls the budget process, central to the
distribution of resources.

3.

Who controls the procurement of physical resources.
Given that the actual budget is seldom sufficient for
all required resources, the process of equipment and
supply procurement gives scope for favoring particular
goals/activities.

4.

Who controls the procurement and distribution of human
resources. The quality of staff assigned to different
activities can determine success or failure.
So also
can the informal applications of formal policy with
regard to promotion, postings, housing, pay and
allowances, and in-service training.

S.

ilhich departments and interest groups actually~ the
most/finest resources and most favorable treatment.
These may be the informal powers behind the thrones
of the budget, procurement, personnel and planning
processes.

6.

Who is irreplaceable.
Individuals who are irreplaceable
have power. They may have technical expertise that is
essential to the organization. They may simply be the
relative of someone important outside the organization.
They may have knowledge of complex bureaucratic procedures or special contacts in other departments such as
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the Ministry of Finance:
such "fixers" are crucial for
ensuring the steady supply of resources--including
the key resource of cooperation from coordinating
departments.
7.

Who controls information. Information is perhaps the
greatest single source of informal power. The selection
and presentation of information largely determine
planning and the control of agendas, and also the
evaluation of performance (through selection among
objective judgment criteria, or simply distortion of
reports). Among key positions in the communications
network are those responsible for reporting and liaison
between head office and the field, and those responsible
for communication and coordination with other agencies.

Incentives, Priorities and Pressures
Breaking the organization down into a relatively small number of
key interest groups and incentive-setting officials is a somewhat crude
simplification of a complex reality:
but this is necessary, since appraisal
must be rapid, and specific targets must be selected for assistance and
intervention, if attempts are later to be made to influence incentives.
Similarly, some systematic effort must be made to classify and interpret the
complex and often conflicting incentives and pressures that determine the
priorities of interest groups and individuals--whether gamesman,
entrepreneurs or followers.
It is suggested that incentives as they affect
the individual or group can for practical purposes be simplified into four
sets of conflicting or complementary factors, which may be termed internal
priorities, official and unofficial pressures from superiors, and local
pressures.
Internal priorities may be defined as "intrinsic" motivation--that
is, the attitude of the individual or group to his or their career.
In the
case of individual managers, personal levels of ambition may be important, as
may personal values:
in the case of both individuals and groups, attitudes
towards work and career will be determined very largely by the personnel
management and reward system. Factors include salary and allowance levels,
opportunities for promotion and in-service training, questions of housing and
posting. This is the area which has received most attention from field
researchers, who have commented, for example, on the motivational implications of frequent personnel transfers in mid-project, and of alternative
promotion systems based on merit, nepotism or length of service.
It is an
area of crucial importance, because it determines the basic attitudes and
outlook of officials at all levels.
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Official pressures from superiors tend to reflect the "party line",
for example, the goals of the project or program as set out by the government.
It is important to determine how far these are clearly expressed to
officers down the line and in the field.
Junior officials and field officers
frequently share a different conception of the project from those of the
project originators, are unclear about their roles and goals, and hence
inevitably poorly motivated.
Second only to the clarity of the official line
in importance is the way in which official pressure is exerted on subordinates:
the question of management style. Generalization is difficult,
because different civil services and departments within them exhibit and
indeed expect different types of managerial behavior. A cooperative management style appropriate in a department characterized by informal relationships would be interpreted merely as a sign of weak leadership in a department or culture that expected and respected authority and instructions.
There will also be a trade-off with the incentives provided by the personnel
management system--staff motivated by good salaries and conditions may be
prepared to tolerate more authoritarian management. However, more cooperative management styles tend to encourage subordinates to share information
and problems more frequently with their superiors--an important advantage in
rural development, where "bottom-up" management is particularly important.
The presentation of the official line is therefore as important as its content.
Informal pressures from superiors are likely, in a political
bureaucracy, to be as important as official ones, and it is these that have
been seriously neglected.
Informal pressures reflect the actual priorities
of superiors, where these are not in agreement with official priorities.
Subordinates are extremely sensitive to these informal pressures, since it is
by their response to them that they are likely, de facto, to be judged by
their superiors.
In the case of a subordinate with a wide-ranging job
description, the official line coming to him may be equal emphasis on his
various areas of responsibility:
but if it is in his superior's or the
department's interest to pursue one area rather than another, the subordinate
is likely to realize rather quickly what his best interests have become. For
example, if a superior's aim is to demonstrate progress in a new extension
campaign, and this can be presented in terms of the number of farm visits and
farmers meetings held by junior officials, then the informal incentive for
junior officials is to hold (or at least report) the largest possible number
of meetings, irrespective of their effectiveness:
though both superior and
subordinate know that the official aim is to increase acreage of the new
crop, this need not be their informal priority.
Informal priorities will
seldom be announced, but they are nevertheless effective as pressures on
subordinates who are concerned with their political future in the organization, or simply to keep in line with the boss.
Local pressures include all those day-to-day pressures on the
individual or group sterrnning not from their superiors, but from the execution
of their job and their relationship with peers, subordinates and clients.
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For example, an irrigation manager in the field will be subject to pressure
from peers to cooperate and probably to conform, pressures from farmers
(complaints, requests for advice), pressures from subordinates, and from the
many routine administrative matters that de facto take up the majority of his
time. He may therefore be subject to four types of influence:
from his own
career ambitions; the official project implementation line; informal departmental priorities; and local pressures. Pressures from his superiors,
reflecting the priorities of superiors and the pressures acting on them in
turn, may be in conflict with local pressures, e.g., requiring attention to a
strategic problem, rather than to clearing pressing and immediate tactical
ones. Local pressures are neglected by evaluators, who, in short visits, and
with counterpart officials taken off their normal duties to accompany them,
concentrate on results in the field to the exclusion of getting a picture of
daily workloads and problems. But the pressures and frustrations of an
official's daily round inevitably bulk large in the trade-off he must make
between conflicting pressures from different directions.
In principle, therefore, the individual or group's behavior may
be governed by incentive factors quite apart from the dictates of official
project aims--internal priorities, local pressures, and informal pressures
from superiors. Project goals will only be pursued:
(a) where these are
not in conflict with more important, i.e., more rewarding factors; (b) where
project goals are in conflict with other interests, but official pressures
are so strong that they cannot be ignored; or, (c) most effectively, where
internal priorities and informal and official pressures coincide as far as
possible with each other and with project goals. An incentives approach
suggests that the main aim of project and donor management should be to
create a situation (c) where there is a minimum conflict between these four
factors.
It follows that determining which are the key interest groups, and
what are the key incentives and pressures affecting them, must become a major
goal of organizational appraisal and implementation analysis.
Case:

Incentives in a Complex Project System

This section illustrates the incentives approach in a brief
analysis of implementation problems on a major irrigation/settlement scheme
in South Asia. The project in question was managed on an integrated basis by
a River Basin Development Board with wide powers, and assistance from major
aid donors. A number of problems were apparent. Agricultural credit default
rates were extremely high; equipment offered under project aid loans had not
arrived; farmers were late in beginning cultivation operations at the start
of the wet season; essential inputs such as fertilizer arrived late or in
insufficient quantity; farmers were growing flooded paddy rice on porous soil
instead of the subsidiary food crops recommended in the project plan; some
farmers harvesting late had no time to thresh their crop before the land
preparation period of the subsequent season; perhaps worst of all, irrigation
water use was double the per acre allocation in the project plan, and hence
water supply for the tail end of the Scheme still to be irrigated and settled
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was threatened. In addition, construction work in the latter area was haphazardly planned, with priority often going to activities off the critical
path.
Most of these problems were linked in vicious circles. Farmers
took longer than planned in land preparation because tractors available under
the aid loan had not been procured and distributed. This meant that farmers
kept paddy fields flooded for tillage after the peak period of rains, and
hence used more irrigation water. Non-arrival of threshers under the aid
loan meant that crops were often stacked after harvest until buffalo or
tractor power became available for threshing. This increased grain wastage,
and delayed the receipt of cash from the marketed surplus. This often meant
default on agricultural loans, with the prospect that the use of modern
inputs in the following season would be reduced. Delay in harvesting and
threshing also meant a late start on land preparation in the next season,
missing the peak period rains and thus continuing the vicious circle. These
agricultural problems were, however, no more than symptoms of more fundamental planning and management deficiencies. Farmers were hampered by the
absence of much of the government support designed into the early period of
implementation. The Development Board was responsible for procuring tractors
and threshers under the aid loan, and had not done so. Annual inputs were
arriving late or not at all, again the Board's responsibility. Planned
marketing services for the subsidiary food crops had not been organized, so
that farmers had every incentive to grow their traditional flooded paddy crop
on the porous soils, and hence vastly increase water consumption. Project
management was in general inadequate.
In turn, planning and management problems could be traced to root
causes in the area of incentives. The assessment procedure suggests starting
the examination of incentives at the top, even if it is problems in the field
which are most apparent. The Chairman of the Board was an able political
gamesman, who had been promoted to his current position after assuring a
senior politician that a massive acceleration in the speed of implementation
of the Scheme was feasible. The politician's personal support gave the
Chairman exceptional power. But his political future now depended on meeting
targets defined by himself and interested politicians in terms of acres
irrigated and delivered ready for settlement. His personal incentive was
therefore to concentrate on construction activity, since the measure of
progress was acres delivered with irrigation infrastructure, rather than
agricultural output, etc., in the irrigated areas. This was therefore the
key divergence in incentive terms between informal and political goals.
The Chairman was an engineer by profession and this, as commonly
in irrigation projects, reinforced the bias towards construction. He surrounded himself with a loyal and effective engineering and construction staff
in head office, which was clearly the key professional interest group. Significantly, the top managerial post in the area of settlement was filled and
operated efficiently (perhaps because the arrival of settlers was part of the
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measure of progress), while the chief managerial post for agriculture was
left vacant for over a year--a clear enough indicator of priorities. The
Chairman and engineering staff controlled the flow of information to the
Cabinet and overseeing agencies. Reports of progress in the field consistently highlighted construction activity and downplayed agriculture and
community development. The priority given to different forms of construction
work reflected the Chairman's incentives. He concentrated on the building of
irrigation infrastructure rather than Coop stores essential for community
development purposes and the provision of agricultural inputs. Within the
activity of irrigation development, he concentrated on jungle clearance and
major canal construction rather than on minor canals and field channels.
In
line with the bias in measures of success, it was clear that work was concentrating on activities of high public visibility and concern. What had
seemed haphazard planning from the perspective of official project goals was
in fact perfectly rational given the incentives and pressures affecting the
key interest group in the organization.
The pattern of incentives developed consistently down the line.
The acceleration of effort meant that officials were overworked in all sectors, and therefore that they could not attend to all aspects of their formal
job descriptions.
Given the pressure to obtain bulldozers and other construction equipment, it was rational for procurement officers in head office
to concentrate on these at the expense of agricultural equipment.
The overworked Project Manager in the field naturally took the line of least resistance in concentrating on construction rather than agriculture and community
development work.
Personally enthusiastic agriculture officials had no
support from head office and hence neither incentive nor ability to carry out
their work according to the project plan.
Coop officials responsible for
procuring agricultural inputs could not plan requirements in advance, since
they could not predict next season's cultivated acreage on the basis of the
inflated targets for expansion of the irrigated area given them by the
engineers. Water bailiffs attempting to reduce water issues faced political
hostility (including telegrams to the local MP) from top-end farmers who
stood to lose, and had no incentive to enforce restrictions, given the lack
of support from top management. All were behaving rationally, but all failing by the standards of official project goals.
The above incentives-oriented sketch of problems and problem causes
in an integrated rural project illustrates a number of important principles.
First, the fundamental importance of identifying the divergence between
official project and informal political goals.
Second, the fact that the
organizational pattern of incentives was determined at a high level in head
office, far from the resulting problems in the field.
This underlines the
importance of investigating incentives as they operate vertically through the
hierarchy, and of concentrating on key incentive-setting individuals and
interest groups.
Third, the way in which the key interest group was able to
pursue its informal goals through control over the setting of organizational
agendas, and control of information going to overseeing agencies.
Fourth,
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that while political gamesmanship was evident at higher levels, no conspiracy
theory or informal politicking is necessary to explain behavior at the level
of incentive-followers in the field. Field staff could not have given weight
to all official goals given the work pressures upon them. The informal
priorities of superiors were translated into pressure for results in certain
directions which could not be ignored, either in terms of rational
self-interest or simply in terms of carrying out instructions. In
general--and most importantly--officials in the implementing organization
were not planning badly and deviating from official development goals through
ignorance or incapacity: they were doing so because of the incentives and
pressures acting upon them.
The Practicalities of Assessment:

When, By Whom, and How?

Previous sections have developed a conceptual approach to assessing
incentives, and have given a brief illustration of application. The
remainder of this chapter is concerned with the practicalities of assessment,
and the need for integration with existing appraisal procedures.
When: Although the concern of this paper is with implementation,
it is clear that the assessment of incentives must primarily take place
during project preparation. This is because the assessment of political will
to undertake the project should influence design, and may even raise questions as to whether it should go forward at all. It is also because the most
effective way to influence incentives is to design measures to do so into the
original project plan (Chapter Five). Systematic attention to assessing
incentives would therefore require:

l
l

1.

A Reconnaissance Stage Report, assessing the general climate
of incentives and pressures in the organization, and recommending the broad form of project which might be roost or
least appropriate and hence successful.

2.

A Feasibility-Stage Report: this should trace through the
network of activities involved in implementation, stop at
each critical action or assumption (e.g., about coordination), and assess whether the incentives exist for
officials to act as planned.

3.

Feedback During Implementation: this is equally important,
for two reasons. First, it may be hard to fully assess the
incentive system· in the organization at the appraisal stage
if it is not already undertaking projects closely comparable
to that proposed. Second, inherent instability in the system,
and the long implementation periods of rural projects, mean
that incentives will inevitably change during implementation
(sponsoring politicians may lose power, key officials may be
replaced, budgets may be cut, new projects may come up which
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offer greater bureaucratic rewards and hence change priorities, etc.).

By Whom: The use of a management or organization development
specialist for this type of assessment has both good justification and disadvantages. On the positive side, it indicates recognition that management
is an important subject area in its own right:
since management problems are
as (or more) likely to lead to project failure as any sectoral, technical
problem, there is as much justification for a management specialist on the
project appraisal team as there is for a soil scientist or economist.
Second, it is justified because management as a specialist field requires
assessment skills different from those of many sectoral experts. And the
management specialist offers the advantage of organizational "systems vision"
which does not see problem symptoms through the often distorting glasses of
sectoral expertise. The disadvantages include the cost of adding yet another
specialist to the appraisal team, and the fact that management specialists
with experience of third world bureaucracies and rural development are anyway
thin on the ground. Also, the management specialist is inevitably fairly
"high profile." Despite his specialty (or because of the announcement of
it), he may have more problems in gaining access to the informal management
system than sector experts who are less suspected of the desire to probe into
sensitive areas. Presentation as a planning expert may help to minimize the
third problem.
Two conclusions may be drawn:
1.

In general, the management challenges of development are
still underestimated.
In the case of large, integrated
projects, this should be recognized, and management
specialists included on appraisal teams as a matter of
course. Large integrated projects are both the ones
which can afford the extra professional costs, and the
ones which imply greatest organizational expansion and
interagency cooperation, and hence the greatest management problems.

2.

The costs of appraisal may make a specialist management
input impractical for smaller projects. The task can
then either be given to one or more individuals or split
among all members of a multidisciplinary team, each
responsible for assessing incentives in his sector.
The latter method has the advantage of encouraging
each sector expert to take management factors into
account when he plans his own aspects of the project:
the result may be modified proposals at the technical
level, with a better chance of implementation. On the
other hand, given that the assessment task needs an
integrated multisectoral view of the project, it can
be useful to assign this to team members with this
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overview--for example, an economist or the project
leader.
How: The need is to penetrate the formal bureaucracy and to assess
its inform~priorities and processes. The two major practical obstacles
to this are the questions of access and subjectivity.
Senior officials of
implementing agencies have every incentive to present and stress the excellence of the formal system in order to secure resources:
somehow, access to
the informal management system must be gained. And once off the security of
the Organization Chart, the assessor of incentives must often rely on personal, subjective judgment about what is significant. Given that appraisal
time is limited and the ideal approach of participant observation unwelcome,
there are in practice two major methods of applying the conceptual approach
outlined above. The first is interviews with field staff, which are likely
to reveal very different views of organizational resources, goals and
priorities from those gained from senior officials in head office. The
second is performance checking to test the consistency of officials' professions about priorities with action in the field. What has been done and what
has been neglected, and the amount of time that has been put into different
activities will reflect priorities and pressures if the rational bureaucrat
approach is correct. The evidence of performance will provide valuable
objective information on how informal pressures from above conflict with
official ones. Analogous in economics to the idea of "revealed preference",,
this extremely simple approach to evaluating what management has a real
commitment to has not been available to the project evaluator who has assumed
that if a non-action is not explicable by a skill or resource gap, then it is
due to "bureaucratic inertia" or apathy. An approach which works back from
the concrete evidence of achievement or non-achievement in the field to make
inferences about motivation and incentives will tend to minimize the problem
of subjectivity, whose biggest danger is the projection of the evaluator's
own beliefs and assumptions onto the officials he is interviewing.
Presenting the Results
The results of an incentives assessment must be presented so as to
maximize its usefulness.
Full assessments cannot be presented in formal
project documents, copies of which go to implementing organizations, since
the procedure will be seen as potentially manipulative and unwelcome. On the
other hand, the question of incentives cannot be ignored in appraisal documents, since one of the best methods of influencing incentives is itself to
make the implementing agency formally aware that funding agencies care about
incentives. The following compromises may be suggested for different situations:
1.

Where the pattern of incentives throws real doubt on the
question of project viability, a full assessment report
needs to be made in confidence to the funding agency.
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2.

Where there are divergences between formal and informal
priorities, but the project appears viable if incentives
can be influenced:
a.

Where the incentive problem is non-threatening, it
should be dealt with fully in the appraisal document.
An example would be where incentive problems primarily
concern junior field staff with little political power,
i.e., incentive-followers.
Inclusion in the project
document of a clear analysis of the problem and proposals to counter it is useful, because this formally
recognizes the incentive system as the root cause,
and commits the implementing organization to action
in this area. Since the incentive problems affecting
field staff that deal directly with farmers are particularly important and generally non-threatening,
assessment of these should be incorporated into agency
appraisal guidelines as a matter of routine.

b.

Where incentives assessments are politically threatening, drawing attention to the~ill be counterproductive. An example would be the situation in
the case study above.
In such cases, the value of
assessment would be in designing appropriate measures
to change incentives, and the inclusion of these
measures at appropriate points of the project plan.
In addition, a confidential assessment of the situation should be written for the funding agency, first
so that potential implementation problems can be
anticipated and watched for:
second, so that agency
officials are aware of the reasons for and importance
of measures in the plan document primarily aimed at
influencing incentives.
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CHAPTER FIVE
INFLUENCING INCENTIVES

Points of Entry
The very idea of influencing incentives has overtones of manipulation and conflict. Given that the aim is to minimize conflict that will
impede implementation, the essential preliminary to considering points of
entry at the implementation stage is serious consideration of "points of
exit" at the planning stage:
the use of an incentives assessment to avoid
investment altogether in projects where real lack of recipient political
commitment has been detected. However, funding agencies may not welcome the
frank appraisal of political commitment which this implies. Aid agencies, in
particular, accepters of gradualist change, have not cared to analyze too
closely the degree of gradualism they are prepared to accept, the degree of
compromise they are prepared to make in pursuit of their official goals.
Realistic assessment of those projects which promise to be implementable if
incentives can be favorably influenced involves facing this question of
compromise squarely. The need to maintain legitimacy as a foreign agency
rightly breeds caution about activism on sensitive issues. Such caution is
quite wrongly likely to result in a negative attitude towards conscious
attempts to influence incentives in implementing organizations, on the
grounds that this could be interference of a political nature.
It cannot be
stressed too strongly that it is a non-issue to raise the question whether
agencies should be involved in the sort of recipient bureaucratic political
activity described in Chapter Three.
It is a non-issue because agencies have
no choice:
they already are involved in the political game. The trickle
down effect is already diverting resources to the benefit of the bureaucracy
and the rural rich rather than the rural poor. If funding agencies choose to
adopt a do-nothing strategy, this is effectively a political decision to
accept the present position.
If agencies are serious about their official
goals, the question (to paraphrase Sapolsky, p. 17 above) is not whether they
play politics, but how to be better at it than others. This is the question
addressed in the remainder of this Chapter.
There are two broad approaches to influencing incentives, concerned
respectively with affecting intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic
motivation--in the language of this paper the internal priorities that shape
attitudes to work and career--is determined largely by financial rewards and
the personnel management system. The fact that these are often outside the
scope of agency influence does not diminish their importance. As Esman and
Montgomery (1980:
208) point out, field staff should be rewarded for the
extra effort needed to work with the hardest-to-reach, most marginal farmers.
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Changing financial and benefit systems and the creation of national awards
for success in poverty-reducing projects and programs could do muth to make
the work of agricultural extension or bare-foot doctoring as prestigious and
rewarding as careers in research or official medicine, and thus have tremendous effects on performance in the field.
At the project level, where direct
influence over base salaries is seldom possible, funding agencies may nevertheless be able to influence material· incentives in a number of different
ways. First, it may be possible to increase cash incentives other than
salaries--for example, field and travel allowances. Second, non-cash
material incentives such as better transport or housing may also be more open
to negotiation, and equally effective motivators. Third, promotion, training, and the payment of annual bonuses can be linked much more directly to
performance. Bottrall (1981:
118), in a detailed case study of irrigation
project management, illustrates clearly the incentive effect of bonuses
payable to field staff at the discretion of project management--an outcome
facilitated by the unusual independence of the case project from the government budget, due to revenues collected from farmers in payment for project
services.
The second broad approach to influencing incentives is concerned
with extrinsic motivation, and it is this which has been least systematically
considered elsewhere. Extrinsic motivation involves influencing the remaining groups of incentives--official, informal, and local pressures and incentives. The need is to find ways of reducing counter-productive informal
political activity without creating unnecessary conflict, and without overstepping the funding agency's bounds of legitimacy.
In the following sections, it is suggested that two broad points of entry minimize these dangers:
approaches through planning and control, and approaches through feedback,
monitoring and evaluation. The aim here is not to spell out the detail of
planning and evaluation techniques whose principles are available elsewhere,
but to show in particular how they can be used to influence incentives in a
manner that is as depoliticized and non-threatening as possible. The considerable scope of such "non-political" methods of entry for creating effective change in informal political priorities is discussed, and illustrated
with a number of examples of success and failure from the field. The final
section of the Chapter then considers the limitations of such indirect
influence, and the need to complement this with direct influence through both
encouragement and pressure.
Depoliticized Entry:

Planning

Perfectly legitimate influence in the prima facie non-political
area of planning can have direct impact on the much more obviously political
area of control. The procedures of better planning can hardly be refused as
unwelcome by implementing agencies, for they represent merely more efficient
means of achieving project or program goals agreed to by both funding agency
and recipient. Yet planning has direct impact on incentives and motivation.
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Goal Clarity: Effective goal-setting is the essence of planning.
No official can be motivated to perform well unless he knows exactly what
is expected of him. Clear job descriptions appear such basic tools that they
may be assumed to exist, while attention goes to the fancier techniques of
planning. Such job descriptions need not be the detailed exercise developd
by western personnel managers. The essence is the clear definition of role
and interactions, as found, for example, in the Training and Visit system of
extension (see page 53 below). Only if individual roles are clear does a
subordinate know what he needs to do so satisfy his superiors and win promotion:
only then does a supervisor have an adequate standard by which to
judge subordinate performance. Clear job descriptions therefore act as both
a positive incentive, and as a negative pressure discouraging movement away
from the official project line.
The task of writing job descriptions can be difficult, in that it
involves disaggregating complex program goals into relatively simple "standard operating procedures" for individuals.
It also usually involves making
trade-offs between conflicting goals, which are seldom fully resolved, if at
all, at the project formulation/funding stage. At the allocation stage, it
is often politically wise to leave goals as all-embracing as possible, so
that diverse interest groups may see themselves as benefitted, and hence
support the allocation.
(Whether or not this is desirable, it will continue
to happen.) The task at the implementation stage is to see that choices
between goals are faced at once, rather than left to be resolved by junior
officials without sufficient power to counter local pressures.
In particular, if choices about target groups are not made at this stage, the
project is more likely to benefit influential interest groups than the poor:
planning to avoid this outcome is considered further below.
Senior management must be involved in the vetting of all job descriptions, since this is
in fact an important extension of policy-making. This also forces top
managers to think realistically about the pressures on junior field
staff whom they may meet rather infrequently. At the general bureaucraticpolitical level, developing clear job descriptions is a way of clearly stating official priorities at all levels in the hierarchy, and a way of reducing
the areas of vagueness which are necessary if managers are to pursue informal
goals.
It is small wonder, therefore, from a political point of view, that
this important activity tends to be overlooked.
Realistic Goal-Setting and Participation:
It should be possible
to carry out the job as described. Though this is one of the more obvious
points to be made about planning workloads, it is almost universally true
that field staff are so overloaded that they have no hope of carrying out
their jobs effectively, even if it is clear what they are supposed to do.
There are two common results.
The first is apathy--the feeling that if a
field worker is supposed to visit an impossible number of farmers each day,
he can never work satisfactorily and might just as well give up and visit
no farmers.
The second reaction is to focus attention on those elements of
the job which are either easiest to carry out or which there is most pressure
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to attend to (through local or informal pressures from above), i.e., to
follow the line of least resistance. Clearly, unrealistic job descriptions
are likely to result in deviations from official goals. It is, however,
quite rational for senior managers to design impossible jobs for their
juniors. Quite often, over-ambitious project or program targets are set by
politicians and must be at least formally acquiesced to. In situations of
manpower and budget shortages, this necessarily means stretching field staff
impossibly thin. Aid donors are often partly to blame for this, in at least
three ways. First, they are predisposed in favor of bounded-site,
resource-intensive projects which mop up an unfair share of the best staff
and reduce availabilities elsewhere. Second, they (and recipient governments) are often tempted to expand existing successful projects by widening
the duties of field staff. Third, development agencies with foreign exchange
to sperid are often insufficiently willing to contribute local, recurrent
funding for field staff essential to project success.
Once again, setting realistic goals involves making uncomfortable
choices about priorities. Donors and consultants here have an opportunity
to be of political help to top implementing officials, who on their own can
do nothing to moderate unrealistic targets set by politicians (for example,
the disincentive effects of the totally unrealistic targets for rice production in Indonesia between 1969 and 1974, set solely by Soeharto and an
intimate circle of advisers, are considered in Hansen, 1971). Donors can
legitimately insist on working out reasonable targets in conjunction with the
implementing officials themselves. This is an activity where participative
management is essential. The choice of goals may be a policy decision at a
high level, but the realistic setting of quantitative targets can only be
done in conjunction with implementing officials who are aware of constraints
in the field. Such participative planning has the greatest possible incentive benefits, since officials are likely to be committed to targets that
they believe to be realistic and have helped set. For this reason, participative goal-setting should be extended to the lowest levels of the
hierarchy. Bottom-up rather than top-down targetry is not only realistic,
but essential to motivation. More realistic goal-setting has important
bureaucratic-political consequences too. Unrealistic targets encourage
managers to focus on activities which are the most visible or the most
measured, and general overload provides a smokescreen behind which informal
goals can be given priority. Goals that are realistic as well as clear make
deviation from the official line more obvious and less excusable.
Planning Planning: Given that the sort of basic planning efforts
described above will constrain informal political activity, they will not
develop by themselves. It is, however, perfectly legitimate for funding
agencies to assist in the institutionalization of planning by designing a
Planning Unit into the structure of larger, integrated projects and programs.
Its terms of reference need to be carefully drawn, however, if it is not to
become a center of political conflict. Planning Units must, above all, avoid
the centralization of detailed planning functions. They should have two
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major roles. First, to be available to assist other departments in the
development of their own planning capability. Second, to aggregate and
coordinate the various detailed plans from departments into a macro-plan for
the project or program. This involves checking the realism of departmental
plans, making sure that such plans are mutually consistent, and where such
plans involve reliance on other agencies or departments, ensuring that
appropriate arrangements for coordination have been made. The Planning Unit
should report only to the program chief or directing board, and should furnish a realistic macro-plan, or a statement why present departmental plans
are inadequate or inconsistent. It is then up to top management to instruct
departments to improve or alter plans, or to make arrangements for coordination. Planning Units without executive power are essential if planning is to
be as far as possible participative, aggregative and bottom-up. Lack of
executive power minimizes the risk of a Planning Unit being seen as a political threat by departments concerned with their own autonomy. Institutionalized planning may also appear threatening from the political point of view of
a chief executive: its introduction during implementation may seem an unwelcome restriction of his freedom of action in a personalist bureaucracy.
Institutionalized planning must therefore be planned into the project at the
design stage, as one of the quid pro quos of funding, presented as a means by
which top management can increase its control of implementation activity.
Planning Coordination: The cooperation of coordinating agencies
is a key resource requirement for integrated rural projects. Once again,
coordination is unlikely to be politically rational and practiced unless it
is specifically planned for. Cooperation must be seen as a plus-sum game.
All too often, where the achievements of the project go to the credit of the
"major" implementing agency, cooperation is seen as a zero-sum game, in which
the coordinating agency loses the resources (physical, staff, time, energy)
put into the project, for a return which goes to another organization. Coordinating agencies must be involved in all stages of the planning process, a
key part of which must be the design of agreed mechanisms for ensuring continued coordination. Smith, Lethem and Thoolen (1980: 26) give a useful
summary of such mechanisms ranging from "weak" to "strong". At the weak end
of the spectrum, mechanisms include ad hoc meetings to coordinate as problems
arise: midway they place measures such as participation in regular planning
meetings and the development of liaison positions: at the strong end of the
spectrum, written working agreements, full-time membership in committees,
development of liaison groups, and participation in matrix structures (i.e.,
with dual reporting relationships). Regular planning meetings and the
nomination of liaison officers are likely to be the necessary minimum in
practice. The latter is an important means of reducing buck-passing and
confusion, and should be introduced as a routine measure, since the liaison
function need not be a full-time job for the individual involved. Members of
the planning units of each agency are one logical choice for the liaison
position, given their overall view of project activities, relative political
independence, and access to top management. With regard to the stronger

-44-

measures put forward, written working agreements are a useful means of focusing on goals, priorities and the distribution of responsibility, and provide
an essential reference-point for the future. A number of other mechanisms
are less desirable, in that coordination has costs as well as benefits:
the
time costs of committee membership and the political costs of attempting to
form matrix structures, for example, may well be unacceptable. The exception
is the creation of liaison groups, providing that these consist of members of
the Evaluation (see page 47) and Planning Units of the respective agencies,
and are thus a logical extension rather than a duplication of internal planning and monitoring efforts. The function of such groups is considered
further below.
Planning to Reach the Poor: Like coordination, benefitting the
rural poor is a special problem in the context of a political bureaucracy.
As Chapter Three noted, informal incentives at present make it rational for
field staff to concentrate on larger, richer farmers who are more influential
and easier to reach and deal with. Specific incentives and pressures must
therefore be built into the project to make it rational for field staff to
make efforts to reach the poor. The first essential is simply to specify
the provision of benefits to poorer groups as a priority goal, if this is the
official aim of the project. When goals are unclear, and trade-offs have
not been resolved at the planning stage, field officers will usually be left
with unranked, multiple goals:
for example, in the case of an agricultural
extension officer, increasing the acreage of a new crop, and raising the
incomes of the least well off.
Such lack of goal clarity is an effective
incentive to concentrate on the richer rather than the poorer, given informal
and local pressures.
The second essential is again to make sure that targets
are realistic.
Project designers seldom take sufficient account of the
greater efforts needed to contact and work with poor beneficiaries: elements
of the project may need to be redesigned during implementation to take
account of conservative attitudes to risk and innovation: and, even with the
most appropriate of project designs, the discontinuance rate among poor
beneficiaries will be higher than average. These and other factors will mean
that the number of beneficiaries with which one field officer may hope to
work may need to be reduced, and that slower progress (though in the right
direction) must be expected and accepted. Only if field staff are set
realistic goals will they treat poverty reduction as a challenge to be
accepted rather than avoided.
Fundamental to this type of clear, realistic goal-setting is the
identification of the right target group of beneficiaries at the earliest
possible stage.
Political pressure to proceed with implementation and
produce results often means that this most crucial part of the planning
exercise is neglected.
The ideally planned project will be based on a
thorough socio-economic survey of existing conditions in the project area, as
an essential starting-point for designing proposals which take account of
potential beneficiaries' existing priorities and constraints.
Where such
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surveys are not available, and there is pressure to proceed with implementation (the majority of projects), quicker-anddirtier methods of target group
selection can be very effective (see, for example, Chambers, 1978: 11-14 for
guidelines). These are simple enough to be applied by the village-level
field staff who, in programs of wide coverage, may have to be responsible for
the selection of beneficiaries/ contact farmers.
Where this is the case,
the Planning Unit must undertake a sample survey to determine whether such
guidelines are actually being followed (see, for example, Cernea and Tepping,
1977: 59). There is every incentive to skimp this part of the planning exercise, on the part of politicians interested in the support of influential
rural groups, on the part of top management wanting to proceed visibly with
implementation, and on the part of field workers whose lives will be made
easier if they can miss the poorest beneficiaries. Funding agencies can help
here by allocating time and money in the project plan specifically for this
purpose, by monitoring this stage of project activity more carefully than any
other, and by offering technical assistance if necessary for the development
of suitable guidelines and survey techniques.
Planning During Implementation: A major mental reversal is beginning to be made away from thinking of planning solely as the formal planning
exercise before implementation. Equally important is effective on-going
planning, adaptive to changing goals and constraints during implementation.
Funding agency assistance in planning still tends to concentrate on the major
project document needed for the allocation of funds.
But it is just as
legitimate for donors to offer assistance in on-going planning and management. The potential political threat of such assistance may be defused by
stressing its technical nature, as in the apparently neutral control technique of critical path analysis. Critical path analysis requires first the
definition of the range of activities going to make up the project:
then
their arrangement into a network, showing sequences and interconnections:
then the identification of the resource requirements over time for the
various activities. Critical path analysis therefore implies:
(a) having a
clear idea of project goals; (b) placing importance on the need for coordination (through networks stressing the complementarity of activities); and (c)
defining responsibility for different actions (necessary in the matching of
human resource requirements and project activities).
Such continuous planning techniques usefully assist in clarifying official goals at all levels,
and reducing the areas of vagueness in which informal goals may be pursued.
Depoliticized Entry:

I
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Feedback

Management is frequently described as decision-making. This,
of course, is correct.
But the emphasis in such a view is often
misplaced, focussing almost exclusively on choice. Choice,
however, is only one step in the decision process.
Prior to
the exercise of choice, information about the environment and
possible consequences of alternative actions must be acquired
and processed. Once this is done, the choice is usually
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obvious. Instead of describing management as decision-making,
we could describe management as information gathering and be
both consistent with the original position and possibly more
descriptive of the actual emphasis of managers (Pfeffer and
Salandk, 1978: 266).
Effective monitoring and evaluation complement good planning partly
through their indirect effects on the reward element necessary to motivation.
Officials may have clear and realistic goals, but will have little incentive
to work towards them if what they do is not seen to be done and appreciated.
But the establishment of better information flows has still wider implications for better project management. As Pfeffer and Salancik point out, the
predisposing nature and function of information flows is not sufficiently
realized. The job of deciding what is reported is an extremely important and
responsible one, because it will determine the view of the project held at
the highest political levels. Better reporting systems in effect constantly
confront the official proposals of the project originators with the informal
interpretations of them by the executive. If the publicly exposed discrepancy is too great, it becomes very hard for managers not to take action
to correct it. Informal management systems can only flourish in areas where
duties are vague and evaluation and inquiry not too closely pressed. If the
political level is clear in its priorities, but has been misinterpreted by
the executive, the political level has for the first time the right information on which to base the right orders to exert corrective influence. If the
political level is not clear in its commitment to all project goals, its
position will at least become explicit for the first time.
Monitoring should therefore have two major goals. The first is to
provide information about progress without which on-going planning and control are not possible (for a thorough analysis of the use of information
systems for control purposes, see Lawler and Rhode, 1976). This task is
clearly basic to a view of management seen as an iterative process between
planning and feedback. The second goal is to motivate managers and field
staff. The ideal approaches for developing information systems to meet these
two goals are somewhat in tension. The next two sections therefore discuss
two major and potentially conflicting approaches, and ways in which these may
be successfully implemented together.
"Participative Monitoring": From an incentive standpoint, monitoring must be seen as much for the benefit of the subordinate as for the superior. If realistic goals are set with the cooperation of subordinates, the
aim should be a monitoring system by which subordinates can themselves
measure their own progress towards their own mutually agreed goals. But the
system cannot be solely under the control of field staff, or their incentive
will instead be to misreport activities, for example by falsifying entries in
their log of field visits. Systematic checks must therefore be made by
superiors both to provide negative pressures against misreporting, and to
provide the positive incentive of recognition of good performance. The need
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is to develop monitoring systems which are objective and honest without the
heavy (and demoralizing) hand of authoritarian supervision. Four suggestions
can be made for procedures which will help to make performance checks positive rather than negative incentives. First, the bulk of routine monitoring
should be carried out by field staff's own immediate superiors: the descent
of specialist M/E staff from head office is hard to present as a supportive
procedure. Second, superiors should never check performance by calling staff
in for review, but should do so in the course of routine field visits when
the superior may observe and participate in his subordinate's work. Performance checking is more objective when carried out in the field. But from an
incentives standpoint, the key thing is that the superior comes to the subordinate, takes an interest in his work and problems, and resolves any difficult.ies and gives any advice he can. Performance is thus automatically
evaluated in the course of discussion of the previous week or two weeks'
work. Thirdly, peer participation should be built into the monitoring and
management system. From the incentives standpoint, the institution of
regular discussions of problems and achievements between a superior and all
of his field staff in a local area has several positive effects. Sharing
problems develops a sense of teamwork, and builds commitment. Peer group
pressure is one of the strongest possible incentives for achieving conformity
to norms. Providing challenging but realistic performance standards have
been set in the planning process, this therefore reduces superiors' needs to
act as controllers rather than consultants. Also, from a management standpoint, regular interaction between field officers in direct contact with
beneficiaries is in itself one of the most effective forms of implementation
problem-solving, and will often be superior in realism and practicality to
the contributions of superiors and planners in head office. A fourth crucial
way to strengthen the effectiveness of participative monitoring is the involvement of the beneficiary. Part of the superior's regular field visit should
be spent in discussion with contact farmers or other beneficiaries, so that
their satisfactions, dissatisfactions and suggestions for change are clearly
registered. This emphasizes client orientation in general, and the fact that
M/E in particular is not for the ultimate benefit of authority in the
organization, but for the benefit of the farmers, etc., with whom staff are
working.
The Planning and Evaluation Unit: While "participative monitoring"
is the best positive performance incentive, it must be complemented by independent M/E on a sample basis conducted by an outside unit: without this,
both senior and junior staff may find it in their joint interest to misreport
progress up the line in their respective departments. This sort of "monitoring of monitoring" must be carried out by an independent unit not politically
beholden to the implementing department. Such a unit must have total control
over the choice of indicators used in reporting, and complete freedom from
censorship from above. Since the unit's first function is to provide objective checks on performance, this supervisory role has the potential for
conflict with the more participatory monitoring developed_ with incentives in
mind. Whether the P and E Unit is seen as authoritarian and heavy-handed or
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helpful is a question of management style. As in the case of planning, the
central monitoring unit must see its function equally as the provision of
consultancy services for the development of M/E in individual departments, so
that these may strengthen control of their activities. Again as in the case
of planning, the central unit must not seek an executive role:
its function
is simply to report to top management, and to aggregate departmental progress
into a picture of overall program-wide progress.
It is in the P & E Unit
that technical assistance is likely to be of greatest value. Though the
training function of technical assistance is rightly stressed as of key
importance, in practice one of the most valuable things that foreign experts
do is to act as a channel of communication for junior or field officials who
often have a very clear picture of problems and suggestions for solutions,
but who are unheard (or who are constrained from speaking) because superiors'
informal priorities are elsewhere. The sad fact of life is that many junior
officials are competent, but are prevented from acting competently. This is
a major reason for the often-noted fact of technical assistance not "training
itself out of a job".
Sector experts may make their counterparts more technically expert, but when they go home may well leave them at their former
political disadvantage in the organization. Hence the value of non-sectoral
technical assistance in setting up organization-wide (and hence more durable)
feedback systems which will allow existing competence to be heard.
Finally, with both politics and incentives in mind, M/E systems
must be designed with the cooperation of the managers who will use them, or
they will fail.
As Deboeck and Kinsey point out (1980: 16):
Managers will undoubtedly argue that unless a monitoring program
has been approved from within, it is primarily motivated by the
fact that it can be used as a lever in the form of criticism •••
Working against the monitoring unit doing a good job is the
project manager's ignorance of what it can do for him. This may
amount to a fear of the evaluation component of the unit.
If
such a fear exists in the project manager's mind, it will infect
all the divisions of the project.
In these circumstances, the
monitoring unit can make a very limited contribution to the
project's progress.
What Should be Monitored? The information gathered by M/E units on
rural projects to date has seldom been used effectively. This is generally
because it has not been both relevant and timely.
The need for timeliness
together with the dictates of "information economics" (often also ignored)
mean that M/E information must be quickly collected and simply digested (see
particularly Chambers, 1978, 1 'Rural Poverty-Oriented Monitoring and Evaluation.
Simple is Optimal?"). The purpose here is not to deal in detail with
the choice of indicators (treated elsewhere) but to note that simplicity--the
optimal M/E requirement from a managerial standpoint--is also the ideal from
an incentives standpoint.
Present reporting requirements are often not only
of very little benefit to management, but so lengthy that meeting them is a
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significant "local pressure" on field staff, diverting them from actual
implementation activity. A small number of indicators which are carefully
chosen to directly reflect essential goals both reinforces the clarity of
those goals, and gives staff confidence that good performance in pursuit of
them will be clearly reflected to top management. At present, what is
reported may not reflect ultimate goals, and success measures therefore
reward behavior which may not contribute to ultimate goals. The lack of
effective performance measures makes existing non-performance-related
criteria for promotion (often based on education, training and seniority)
almost inevitable. Technical assistance is likely to be important in the
choice of M/E indicators, since the difficulty of choosing suitable measures
varies in proportion to their simplicity. Western consultancy firms are
gradually becoming more proficient in this area, and their presence can be
politically effective in that they carry the weight of donor support behind
them. But just because this political weight guarantees formal acceptance by
the implementing agency, special care must be taken to develop M/E systems
with the cooperation and support of implementing managers, if the result is
to be effective rather than symbolic action.
Some Examples of Failure and Success
Agrarian Reform in Peru: McClintock (1980) discusses the agrarian
reform in Peru carried out by the Velasco regime (1968-75), in a case which
clearly illustrates the incentives consequences of lack of goal clarity. The
military government was divided on most major policy issues, including that
of land reform. Political pressure (in the form of peasant invasions) forced
agreement on the principle of a massive redistribution program, which had by
1976 affected 35 percent of agricultural land and 24 percent of farm
families.
Implementation problems arose in the setting up and running of the
cooperatives that were to take over the redistributed land. These had their
roots in the often intense conflicts over goal priorities:
The conflicts within the military leadership about the desirable
degree of redistribution and the desirable degree of state and/or
technocratic influence upon the peasantry were evident in the many
alterations and gaps in the agrarian reform law. Indeed, it is
difficult to speak of "formulation" of agrarian reform "policy"
at one time because so many key points of the 1969 Law were
changed, and so many other critical issues were not discussed
in the law. (McClintock, 1980: 72).
As often, policy had to be framed vaguely in order to gain the formal support
of different political interest groups for implementation. Implementing
officials were left with unclear, conflicting and constantly changing goals.
As a result, conflict within the military was reflected by a political split
in the goals of the two (theoretically cooperating) implementing agencies.
SINAMOS, the official reform organization, was primarily interested in
redistribution and political participation for the poorest peasants excluded

-so-

from the cooperatives. The Ministry of Agriculture, on the other hand,
consistent with its technocratic outlook, was more interested in the productivity of the cooperatives.
Ministry of Agriculture officials were concerned that peasants were
insufficiently educated to cultivate their new holdings effectively, and
feared a sharp fall in production which would discredit the entire agrarian
reform program. Their reaction was to insist on official guidance, in the
form of Ministry managers for each of the cooperatives. Peasants, on the
other hand, having just escaped from the hands of hacienda-owner patrons,
were determined not to fall into the hands of new bureaucratic patrons, and
were not hesitant to exercise their right under the new law to fire managers
they did not like, often within 24 hours of appointment. Peasants were also
worried about the future political situation: the fact that a rightward
swing might reinstate the hacienda-owners, and the fact that a leftward swing
might mean the management of "their" cooperative as a state-run enterprise
was a further disincentive to contribute. Significantly, "although this
limited commitment to hard work and jnvestment in the enterprise was rational
from the perspective of cooperative members, it was rarely seen in this light
by ministry officials, who often regarded the peasants as lazy and ignorant."
Given the extremely weak position of cooperative managers, and the rational
attitudes of peasants, it was inevitable that cooperative development would
fail. As would be expected, given the lack of effective pressures or incentives from superiors, many managers took the line of least resistance in
submitting to local pressures. In some cases, this meant resignation to
impotence in preference to being fired:
in others, this meant cooptation or
corruption by richer peasants--an outcome encouraged by managers' small
official incomes.
Cooperatives in Zambia: In the Peruvian Cdse, political disunity
and goal conflict were so great that implementation failure was inevitable.
Quick (1980) discusses tl1e case of cooperative development in Zambia under
a relatively united political leadership: a case in which the introduction
of an effective M/E system could perhaps have led to a clearer definition
of goals and more effective performance.
No clear statement was ever provjded by Kaunda as to
precisely what the immediate goals of cooperative policy were
to be, and yet it was made abundantly clear in a variety of
public speeches made by the president that the cooperatives
were supposed to do a great deal and do it very quickly.
During the early months of 1965, the president spoke frequently
about the cooperative movement, and in these speecht:0s he
articulated no fewer than ten specific goals that he expected
the movement to achieve in the next few years. The cooperatives
were expected to provide employment and stem the flow of
population to the towns, increase the income of members,
promote equality in the distribution of income, create
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collective goods for the rural population, preserve the
traditional values of the village community, increase
political participation, strengthen procedures for the
democratic control of elites, promote a sense of national
identity, increase and diversify agricultural output, and
develop a spirit of self-reliance in the local population.
(Quick, 1980: 46).
In this situation, cooperative department officials knew they had
only one unambiguous goal: to create as many cooperatives as possible, fast.
Since the number of new coop registrations was the visible symbol of progress
reported to the president, officials had every incentive to enroll prospective cooperatives without checking members' experience and suitability, and
consciously did so. Since the cooperative movement was a political priority,
a large budget was available to the department, and the next unambiguous
measure of activity became the granting of coop loans, statistics for which
were politically impressive and easily produced. Officials therefore quite
rationally granted seasonal and long term loans in large quantities, with no
supervision of the use to which these loans were put.
The interesting feature of this case is that although field staff
had no official M/E requirements (and were not even required to visit "their"
societies regularly), they became so concerned about waste that they sent
regular reports of inefficiencies and problems back to head office, and
actually requested closer supervision and a temporary moratorium on new
registrations. There was no response from the department director until the
spring of 1967, when the threat of a staff revolt forced him to halt
registrations. Quick puts forward a number of (politically rational) causes
of head office unresponsiveness. Kaunda had placed a politician in charge
of the agency because of his distrust of the bureaucracy, and this
politician, given the president's constant criticisms of caution in
bureaucratic implementation, had no incentive to annoy his patron by concentrating on inefficiencies at the cost of expansion. In effect:
The feedback of field staff was directed at goals that the
department had not yet defined to be of central importance.
The field staff was concerned about the inefficiency of the
economic performance of local societies, and although this
was a part of the formal goal structure of the agency, it was
not a part of its operational goal structure. (Quick, 1980: 54)
The lack of any outside criticism of departmental activities further
facilitated the pursuit of informal priorities:
In the case of the Department of Agriculture, a direct rival of
the Department of Cooperatives for funds and prestige, bureaucratic
jealousy resulted in a conscious withholding of critical information on cooperatives. The agriculture field staff was discouraged
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from reporting problems with cooperatives to the Department of
Cooperatives so that the Department of Agriculture could slowly
build up a case for the abolition of the whole cooperative movement.
There was no effective external criticism of the department until
after 1967, when a critical report by Rene Dumont coincided with a budget
crisis, and provided the incentive for a radical review of expenditure. The
resulting national productivity drive was an effective goal clarification for
the department, and resulted in an immediate effort to improve M/E.
Implementation subsequently became more efficient and effective, but the
cooperative movement was never rescued:
it was too late to attract back
demoralized farmers (often the most skilled) who had earlier left the movement, and at the same time political support dwindled, as politicians concluded that the program was a failure best abandoned. The case clearly
demonstrates the importance of assessing before implementation whether
political goals are effectively developmental or symbolic, and the need to
design planning and feedback mechanisms into the initial program plan if
there is to be any hope of creating a climate of incentives favorable to
project success.
Rural Development in Malaysia:
Esman (1972) discusses the internationally celebrated "Redhook and Operations Room" system of project monitoring developed through the 1950s and 1960s in Malaysia.
The system was the
child of the dynamic Prime Minister, whose influence and commitment to
development ensured its continued political feasibility.
The system had two
major incentive elements. First, the establishment of monitoring units at
all levels of government, federal, state and district.
Planning and monitoring techniques centered on charting the progress of projects in red books and
in visual displays, so that progress and lags in implementation could be seen
at a glance by monitoring staff and senior visiting officials. Feedback was
thus readily available, and provided the strongest possible performance
incentive down the line.
Second, the minister himself backed this formal
system up with encouragement and rigorous checks which made it consistently
clear to implementing officials that formal goals were the de facto political
priority.
His surprise visits to outlying operations rooms and to project
sites to check progress against claimed results often resulted in
well-publicized personal interventions, such as punishments for officials
misrepresenting progress and promotion for the successful.
The system's results in the field made it an internationally known
success.
Esman further documents, however, the way in which the system
subsequently froze and lost its adaptability as officials became convinced
of its perfection. The system was aimed almost entirely at certain types of
minor rural construction projects and a~enities, such as mosques, wells and
community halls which, however, did not always meet the production and welfare needs of potential beneficiaries. The process of development came to be
seen as the monitoring of progress on this limited variety of projects, and
spending the "development" budget on schedule. The system had many of the
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virtues of the "planning unit" approach, without the necessary complement
of participative monitoring. As a result, it lacked the responsiveness to
local needs implied in the balanced control-and-feedback approach to management. Ultimately, M/E became an end in itself, with its own vested interest
in survival unchanged. As a senior officer claimed: "The operations room is
perfect, it is some of the people--the officers, politicians, farmers, who
are at fault."
The Training and Visit System of Extension: The successful Training and Visit (T and V) System of Agricultural Extension (Benor and Harrison,
1977) illustrates the incentives effects of planning, monitoring and evaluation at the more detailed procedural level. Some of the features of the
system which provide mutually reinforcing positive incentives are considered
below:
Clear and realistic goals:
1.

Administrative control of the VEW (Village Extension Worker)
and other field staff is handled solely by the agriculture
department. VEWs are concerned only with extension, and no
other developmental activity.

2.

There is concentration of effort on the few most important
crops in the local area. For these few crops, there is
concentration on the few practices which bring the best
economic results.

3.

Each VEW attends a weekly or fortnightly training session
which is devoted almost entirely to the agricultural
operations and problems faced by farmers in the next week
or fortnight. VEWs can therefore be confident that their
advice will be relevant and timely, and they are not
overburdened with more information than they can absorb
and communicate effectively.

4.

The entire extension organization is built up on the
basis of the number of farmers that one VEW can handle
under local conditions, and the number of VEWs an
Extension Officer (AEO) can handle (usually not more
than eight). This ensures realism in extension workers'
goals, and is expressive of the system's bottom-up
planning orientation.
Coordination:

i

0.

5.

Representatives from coordinating input supply, etc.,
agencies attend VEW training sessions on a regular basis.
This both builds their understanding of the system (and
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hence the effectiveness of their planning), and provides
a regular opportunity for extension staff to report and
resolve problems in their areas.
Monitoring and evaluation:
6.

Monitoring of progress is carried out by AEOs in the course
of visits to field sessions in which they will participate.
VEWs' field logs are inspected and signed, and progress and
problems discussed. The VEW's diary shows the names of
attending farmers, practices taught, and problems encountered.

7.

The self-evaluation built into the system is complemented by
regular monitoring by superiors. Given the realistic nature
of goals, monitoring "is relatively simple:
farmers can
be asked if they know the name of their VEW, the day of
his visit, and three or four of the recommendations made
that fortnight or even during the whole season.
If the
farmers know these and results can also be seen in the
fields, then the extension personnel are doing their
main job."
Adaptability/Responsiveness:

8.

The fact that training is carried out each week or fortnight
means that VEWs can report and get advice on farmers' problems
immediately.
It also means that the latest research findings
can be disseminated straight away.

9.

Regular training sessions in groups give VEWs the opportunity
to discuss and resolve among each other common problems
encountered with farmers.

The interaction of detailed procedures for planning, control and
feedback has produced effective incentives for farmers and field staff and
impressive results in implementation. The system combines clear and realistic goal-setting, close supervision, and a broad framework of "standard
operating procedures" with built-in "organic" planning and feedback
mechanisms that emphasize adaptability to client requirements.
Speed in
communication, upwards, downwards and sideways, is a key feature of the
system, made possible by the regular training sessions, and limited VEW
goals. Concentrating on realistic priority goals and a small number of
contact farmers has meant visible changes in cultivation techniques after
only a few months of operation, leading to the spontaneous spread of new
practices.
Settlement in South Asia:
The case project described in Chapter
Four illustrates the rise and fall of a Planning and Evaluation Unit. The

-55-

original project design included such a unit in the head office of the
Development Board, with funding under the aid loan for a foreign Implementation Adviser to work directly with the Chairman. The Chairman carefully
defined the Unit's role as that of a non-executive mirror of progress,
reporting solely to him. The Unit began its work by developing a monitoring
system for construction progress in the field, which it displayed in visual
form on map-folders of the project area, redrawn monthly and circulated to
senior staff. For the first time, managers had a coherent picture of what
was happening in the field, and the Chairman welcomed this additional tool
for control, and asked the Unit to extend its activities to a full critical
path analysis of the 100,000 acres of the Scheme currently in development.
As the monitoring system for construction progress became an operational
routine, the Unit turned its attention to progress in the agricultural and
connnunity development sectors, and began to include rough proxy indicators
for these in the monthly reports. These quickly began to show the imbalances
in development. The absence of any significant acreage under the subsidiary
food crops was a pointer to the vicious circle of marketing, water management
and other problems. The very slow progress in the construction of
multi-purpose cooperative stores--used as a rough proxy for attention to
agricultural and community development matters--was also evident.
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After three or four months of routine operation, the existence of
the progress reports became more widely known, and politicians and
Cabinet-level officials asked for copies. For the first time, uncensored
information began to feed back to levels above the Development Board. The
map form of presentation made it easy to compare progress month by month,
and a rough extrapolation of current progress strengthened growing doubts
about the Chairman's ability to meet his promised targets. From this point,
the Chairman's attitude to the Unit became ambivalent.
Previously, its
feedback had come to him alone, and strengthened his control over the construction operation. Now the mirror was beginning to reflect the Board's
implementation weaknesses as well as its strengths to higher authority.
Ambivalence turned to hostility as a result of two specific developments.
First, a senior politician asked the P and E Unit directly for a forecast of
progress over the next six months. The Unit's planning work was now sufficiently far advanced for it to give rough optimistic and pessimistic
forecasts which clearly indicated that targets were unattainable.
Second, a
routine donor agency review mission was taken on a tour of the project area
by Unit staff, at the Chairman's request. The tour comprised a fair sample
of project activity, and alerted donors to some of the imbalances in development, and the poor quality of some irrigation construction work.
The Chairman now saw the P and E Unit as a direct threat to his control, and reacted
swiftly. On the grounds that the Unit's "disclosures" to the donor had been
a personal embarassment to him, he had the P and E Unit manager transferred.
In an outward show of response to the donor's requests to develop more
balanced implementation based on "better" planning, the Chairman. suggested
that the Implementation Adviser move to a small office directly off the
Chairman's so as to have his personal ear. The adviser rightly saw this as a
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move instead to keep him under the Chairman's eye, and to remove him from the
mainstream of information in the P and E Unit. He declined to move.
Finally, the Chairman replaced the P and E manager with a loyal engineer from
his own staff. Somewhat symbolically, the direct connecting-door between the
Chairman's office and the P and E Unit was for the first time unlocked.
The Essential Complement:

Reinforcing Political Commitment

Planning and feedback techniques have tremendous under-exploited
scope for reducing counter-productive informal political activity, and making
official goals the rational ones to pursue. One value of such techniques is
that they are presentable as technical help rather than political intervention, and therefore allow influence with a minimum of conflict. Their
depoliticized nature is, however, their potential weakness as well as their
strength (as the last case example shows), in that their institution and
success rest ultimately on the political sanction of top management. The
examples in the previous section illustrate clearly the importance of political commitment as the necessary precondition of incentives-oriented planning
and feedback. In the Peruvian case, political support only really coalesced
around the somewhat negative goal of defusing the political threat of peasant
invasions. There was never agreement about positive policies for improving
peasant welfare beyond redistribution, and hence the prospects of implementation of any coherent plan were small. In the Zambian case, support for
cooperative development seems to have been commitment more to a political
idea or symbol than to a serious development effort. The Malaysian case
illustrates the positive effects of clear goals and clearly expressed political support. Part of the success of the "red book" system was due undoubtedly to the monitoring techniques employed. But the incentive to apply
these techniques rigorously was supplied by the constant encouragement and
pressure of the Deputy Prime Minister. As a former civil servant, he clearly
understood that formal support at the time of institution of a new plan was
not enough: and that it was necessary to follow this up with constant proof
throughout the implementation process that officially declared goals were
consistently the actual political priority. The South Asian settlement
project case illustrates the potential weakness of the planning/feedback
approach. To be successful as management and incentives tools, Planning and
Evaluation Units must be non-executive and hence, on their own, politically
weak. Their viability is therefore totally dependent on the political support of top management. If planning and feedback techniques come to be seen
as a threat, they can no longer successfully be presented as non-political,
and will only be acceptable in a watered-down and unobtrusive form which will
marginally affect project performance. The fundamental criticism of the
"procedural" approach to the management of rural programs, such as that
developed most fully and effectively by Chambers and Belshaw in Kenya, is
the assumption that top management will see it as profitable to use the new
procedures in a positive fashion. If they do not, reasons can always be
found why they are too cumbersome and impractical to use at all, or they will
be used partially and hence (by official criteria) ineffectively.

-57-

Some significant conclusions for funding agencies can be drawn.
Since the scope for agency intervention in the field of management and
motivation is anyway limited--for example, the chances of significantly
altering the personnel management and reward system are often nil--the agency
must operate forcefully and effectively in those areas where it has
legitimate access and influence. Yet "technical" help in the field of planning, monitoring and evaluation can often be circumvented if it is politically unwelcome. The agency can only counter this by facing the political
question directly, and attempting to influence the attitudes and priorities
of managers at the top. There are both positive and negative approaches.
Encouragement:
Funding agencies could "sell" official goals to
project managements much more forcefully than is the case at present. If
agencies really believe in their priorities, they could be much clearer in
the definition of the type of policy they support, and could institute more
frequent reviews at the highest level of progress in their programs.
In the
case of very large integrated programs or projects, it should be possible for
high-level representatives of the funding agency to meet with the recipient
project director and his minister on a regular basis to review progress and
problems. To the extent that budget/donor agency and politican begin to
demonstrate a cooperative commitment to improvement, senior project management would begin to get the message that the official line is the real
priority--and hence have every incentive, if they value their own advancement, to bring their informal priorities into line with official goals.
Though the official line could be much more energetically sold by funding
agencies at all levels (and especially in the field), it is at the highest
(and most sensitive) levels that the effort must be concentrated if it is to
be effective.
This principle could be followed in practice by using the results
of incentives assessments and political analysis of bureaucracy to anticipate
problems in particular areas. An incentives assessment at the project
appraisal stage should indicate those points where official and informal
goals are most likely to diverge and commitment to be lost. These are points
on which project review should concentrate. Such problem areas may reflect
incentives and pressures affecting groups and individuals that are peculiar
to the project--such as the informal pressures on the Chairman in the settlement project case. But there are also problem areas, given the common incentives towards departmental autonomy and growth and the bureaucratic "coalition of indifference", which are likely to arise in all development projects:
the special problems of coordination and reaching the poorest, for example.
If funding agencies stress from the start that these are priorities, and
constantly reiterate their priority, implementing organizations will have
more incentive to follow suit. The presentation of a strong official line at
the outset of a program is the best means of avoiding conflict later, when
ceding to external agency pressure to revert to formal project goals may
involve loss of face on the part of project management--again as in the
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settlement project case.
Funding agencies must show at the outset and constantly throughout implementation that they are more than symbolically committed to their goals.
Pressure:
In those frequent cases where the priorities of both
politicians and incentive-setting civil servants are influenced in some
degree by an informal coalition of indifference to the rural poor, the
limitations of a positive approach used on its own are clear. Agencies must
apply carrot and stick--encouragement and pressure.
It is commonly argued
that the power of funding agencies is extremely limited because it rests
primarily on the all-or-nothing sanction of withdrawing financial support--an
extreme measure which agencies are naturally reluctant to employ. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of unexploited scope in the possibilities of
conditionality. At the project level, this should mean more sequential
development, with funding first of a pilot project and then of successive
stages or phases of the full scheme, conditional on performance.
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LESSON 7
THE GREEN REVOLUTION GAME
(Have not yet received game so am unable to create notes for
participants)
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HOMEWORK 7
MANAGING FOR SOLUTIONS
1. Write:
In 3-5 pages discuss the factors you must consider in
managing the solution or processes involved in your rural
develpment case. Draw on your experience today and the
readings from homework #6.

40/

LESSON 8
MANAGING AMBIGUITY
Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Understand the multitude of relationships that rural
development workers must strengthen and manipulate.
2. Develop guidelines for managing relationships.
3. Discuss incentives for effective rural development from the
perspective of different "players."
Activities
1. Discussion of homework and simulation exercise
(40 min)
a) What were the most difficult aspects of the simulation
from a programmatic point of view?
b) Whose role did you perceive as the most difficult?
c) How would you have approached this role?
2. Triads to develop guidelines for approaching management
problems
(40 min)
(10 min)

3. Break

4. Lecture by Robert Chambers (or someone else with extensive
management experience in rural development
(40 min)
Management strategies for Outsiders

S. Discussion with Robert Chambers

(40 min)

6. Handout Homework 8 - Organizing Management

(10 min)

(There will probably be a reception if Dr. Chambers does
participate in this session.)
Materials
1. Cups and water.
2. Flip chart and newsprint.

L/Dl-

HOMEWORK 8

ORGANIZING MANAGEMENT

1. Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Korten, People-Centered Development, 171-188.
BRAC, "Unraveling Networks of Corruption."
Johnston, "Redesigning Rural Development."
Chambers, pp.168-190.
Moris, 67-98.
Shah, "Fatima the Spinner and the Tent."

2. Write:
In 3 to 5 pages describe the appropriate management strategy
for your case, elaborating on what factors you had to take
into consideration to make your choice. What considerations
would you make given Fatima's experience?
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Community Management
Asian Experience and Perspectives

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Unraveling Networks of Corruption1
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
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In July 1'179 BRAC became concerned about the effects of a major
drought in certain parts of Bangladesh and anticipated that, by September,
serious food shortages might develop. To address this need, an emergency relief program was organized in three different areas of the country.
The strategy called for organizing groups of landless people in each village,
encouraging them to start collective agricultural activities, using their own
resources initially and then expanding to more ambitious efforts using
food-for-work grains supplied through BRAC to compensate participants.
In addition the landless groups were assisted in obtaining use rights to
land on a collective basis through private lease and share cropping arrangements and through obtaining rights to cultivate public lands.
Through this involvement with the landless poor, BRAC staff became
familiar with their situation and problems. Gradually they became aware
that large scale government relief operations were going on that, if successful, would have made BRAC's work largely unnecessary. But rather
than reaching the people for whom they were intended, these resources
were being controlled and enjoyed by a small number of powerful men
who had good connections with local government officials. It also became
evident that a similar pattern prevailed in the fields other than relief operation, for example in the use of public forest lands. Although the poor were
not allowed to gather small bundles of fire wood, several rich and powerful men were making large profits from the illegal cutting and sale of the
timber. Combinations of economic power and threats or actual force were
being used to gain control over a variety of both public and private
resources. But more was involved than the economic power, followings
of violent and nonviolent supporters, and official positions of a few individuals. Most significant in giving these men a disproportionate share
nc;
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of local power was the complex net of co-operative connections linking
them into a seemingly irresistable network of corruption.
Tune after time we found the landless people with whom we were
working caught up helplessly in the mesh of this invisible network, only
partially understanding it, and feeling powerless in dealing with it. As
a result of the participatory research effort described here, they came to
better understand the sources of the disparities in power between
themselves and this power elite. 2 They became increasingly aware of the
extent of the benefits intended for them: food-for-work, rations, education, etc., that were not getting th.rough-being instead "caught in the net:'
This growth in understanding spurred their efforts to organize themselves
as a means of breaking its power and restoring their own means of
livelihood. This was the genesis of this participatory research effort.
Our methodology was simple and can be repeated by any field worker
who can read, write, and do simple arithmetic. Our main information
sources were the landless people of each village, though the power elites
also supplied us with considerable information about themselves and each
other. Later, we obtained help from government officials, who gave up
substantial time to clarify various points for us.
We started by carefully recording all the examples of oppressive, exploitative and illegal activities we could find. The search required little
effort. The landless and the poor who were the principal victims came
to us. As our study continued, their interest and analytical capacity increased to the point where they brought us pens and paper, insisting that
we record everything. No individual incident we recorded was news to
them. But generally they were not fully aware of the systemic patterns,
illuminated by the recording process, that linked individual actors and
incidents across villages.
Through interviews with government officials at union and thana levels,
we were able find out the amounts and intended uses of program resources
put into the area by the government and the intended outcomes of important public policies. These were then systematically checked against
what we knew was actually happening. fur example, we obtained exact
details of food-for-work allocations, and worked with the landless to check
them against the work done and the grain actually distributed. By the
act of recording and discussing the oppressive activities we demonstrated
that when one person adds his knowledge to that of others and then
engages in analyzing and calculating everything, it is possible to see the
situation dearly for the first time-and then to see the possibilities for
change. This contributed to a new consciousness and militancy among
those who were working with us. As a consequence they have started
taking collective action on certain issues and have achieved limited success.
After checking all details with at least four separate sources (sometimes
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up to fifty), we plotted all the connections involved in each incident to
build up a picture of the network involved. Our charts were constantly
altered and improved as our knowledge increased. Ultimately we were
able to identify each of the key power brokers and their main followers.
A profile was prepared on each covering their background, political and
business activities, landholding and so on. By this point we limited our
study to a cluster of ten villages in two unions. For each of these villages
we prepared a simple village profile showing its main characteristics.
One important insight of the study is the importance of going beyond
single village studies to understand how the critical linkages of the power
structure extend across villages and into the different levels of government.
However, in the interests of brevity and simplicity we limit ourselves here
to reporting the data from just two villages, addressing the linkages between them and into union and thana levels of government. 3
The two villages on which we report here we have chosen to call Adanpara and Kathidanga, located on either side of the border between two
unions. Both are within four miles of the Indian border and three to four
miles from the local thana headquarters. The area is generally hilly and
40 to 50 percent of the land belongs to the furest Department. About 30
to 35 percent of the land in the region is still forested. Interspersed among
the forest lands are many areas suitable for cultivation of paddy and certain winter crops.
It is normally a rice surplus area and also exports large amounts of
timber and firewood to local towns and to Dhaka. Most of the people are
involved in agriculture as farmers and laborers, or woodcutters-either
individually or as part of larger operations. A significant number are engaged in trade, smuggling, and theft.
Until the 1940's the area was mainly inhabited by tribal people known
as Adivasis. Changes began coming rapidly during the 1965 war as
refugees from India poured into the area and many of the Adivasis
emigrated to India. This process was given further impetus by the liberation war of 1971 and by the abortive rebellion of the "Kader Bahini" in
1976. Thus, unlike some other parts of Bangladesh, kinship relations
among the Muslim households are not yet well developed and many of
the power holders have only recently gained this status. This accounts
in part for the high degree of lawlessness found in the area.
THE POWER HOLDERS OF KATHIDANGA AND ADANPARA
These two villages are adjacent to one another and their power holders
are linked in several ways, as we will elaborate later. 4
Kathidanga Village
Kathidanga, with a population of 750, is much smaller than any of
its immediate neighboring villages. Of its 119 households, 6.7 percent pro-
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duce a surplus on their own lands beyond subsistence needs, 16.0 percent are self-sufficient, 24.4 percent are marginal (meaning their land is
insufficient to provide for their subsistence), and 52. 9 percent are landless.
Its main power holders are as follows.
Nazmul, age 55 who comes from an adjacent thana and fought in the
British Indian Army in Burma. He arrived in 1950, the first outside settler
in this Adivasi village, and worked as a day laborer until he was able to
occupy five acres of Adivasi land in 1%4. When the communal riot occurred in 1964, he occupied an additional 1.5 acres of government (khas) land
and sold off the cows and G.I. sheets belonging to the Adivasis who had
fled to India. With this money he bought five acres more.
Since that time he has been heavily involved in money lending as his
main occupation. During 1971 he was again involved, with many other
people, in looting the possessions such as copper and brass utensils,
wooden door frames and other household goods of Adivasis who fled
to India. Now he has ten acres. The main clients of his money-lending
business are Adivasis and he maintains good relations with several Adivasi
leaders by offering them hospitality and gifts even as he takes advantage
of the weaker members of their community.
Farid, age 50 came in 1967 from an adjacent thana and married into
the same family as Nazmul. At that time he occupied one acre of khas
land and started engaging in money lending activities. Like Nazmul he
does not engage in politics or other activities but concentrates on making
profits through money lending. His daughter is married to the son of
Kamal Member who resides in Adanpara. Now he has eighteen acres.
Matin Master, age 3S5 came from an adjacent thana, where he still had
land, with his family in 1976. After arriving in Kathidanga he bought four
acres from refugees. He is a high school graduate and a teacher at the
Kathidanga government primary school. He is also the Secretary of the
union branch of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which was the party
in power at the time of the study, and maintained good connections with
the local Member of Parliament, the Chairman of the Sundorganj Union
Council, a former Minister of the Cabinet, the President of the local
organization of the (BNP), the Secretary of the Thana Teachers' Association, and the President of the Central Teachers' Associations in Dhaka.
Idris Master, age 35 arrived after 1%4 from an adjacent thana and married a local girl. He received one acre as a gift from his father-in-law and
bought another acre from Selim Commander. He is a gambler and has
since lost all but one half acres in gambling. Previously he was a teacher
in Adanpara primary school, but the school has been closed since it was
damaged in 1977 by a cyclone. He contested the last Union Council election and lost. Even so he remains active politically and is powerful because
of a close connection with Matin Master.
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Mostafa arrived with his father from an adjacent thana after the communal riots of 1964. At that time his father bought six acres. Mostafa obtained two of these and latter bought an additional acre. Formerly he
belonged to a violent gang led by his uncle and another leader, now both
dead. The gang also included his brother-in-law, now also dead, and a
cousin. Mohiuddin, a faction leader in nearby Taluqkandi Village, was
another leader of the gang until he was elected in 1977 to the Shantigarh
Union Council. After his election, Mohiuddin formed his own gang and
in the winter of 1978 killed Mostafa's brother-in-law in a land dispute. The
next day Mostafa's cousin and another relative killed Mohiuddin's father.
In late 1979 the relative joined Mohiuddin's group and, at Mohiuddin's
instigation, killed Mostafa's cousin. With the death of his relatives, Mostafa
became the leader of the original gang. There is a case pending against
him for robbery on which his family has already spent Tk. 25,000 in bnbes
and other expenses.
Humayun comes from a notorious family of thieves that has lived in
the region for two generations. Following the family profession, he has
been in jail once and has two cases pending agianst him. He maintains
close links with Mohiuddin, Salehuddin, and Kamal. He has married twice
and divorced his first wife. His present wife was previously Salehuddin's
third wife. He has a daughter, a son, and no land.
Factions. There are two main factions in Kathidanga Village. The first
consists of persons from nearby villages, fifty households led by Mostafa,
Martin Master, and Idris, but controlled from outside by Mizan, former
Chairman of the Sundorganj Union Council. The second, less dominant
group consists of forty-five households of refugees from India.
Adanapara Village
Adanpara is a larger village to the north of I<atidanga that dominates
the surrounding villages. It has a market and a population of 2,700 persons in 448 households. Of these households, 3Z7 are setlers and 121
Adivasis. Broken down by landholdings, 2.2 percent are surplus, 5.8 percent self-sufficient, 30.8 percent marginal and 61.2 percent landless. Before
1950 there were no settlers. The major influx began after 1964. The main
leaders and power holders are as follows.
Huda Master, age 60 came to the village from another part of the same
District in the early 1950's and acquired five acres of khas land, of which
he still has two. For about ten years he forcibly occupied khas and Adivasi
land, which he in tum allocated to people coming from his former village.
There were about 100 such families who came and received his "help and
patronage" in return for money and services. Many of these people,
however, did not actually get the land for which they paid him and became
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destitue. Of the 100 such families, only about twenty remain, the others
having moved elsewhere. Income from these activities allowed Huda to
employ several people and to buy a number of houses, including one that
is quite large, plus a shop and various luxuries such as expensive furniture.
He also involved in the timber and leaf businesses, 6 and in various
types of forgery and other deceptions. In 19'71 the local people tried to
get him involved in incidents that would get him put behind bars or killed. Even so, his good education has given him prestige and helped him
in his activities. He is the retired headmaster of Motihar primary school
and the father-in-law of Kamal Member.
Kamal Member, age 45 arrived in 1960 from an adjacent thana and married Huda Master's daughter as his second wife. His eldest son married
the daughter of Farid from Kathidanga. When he first arrived in the village,
he took employment as a laborer for Manzur Sarkar, later becoming a
supervisor for Manzur and running off with about Tk. 10,000-a part of
which Manzur has since recovered. Soon after he arrived he forcibly occupied two acres of land and has since increased his holdings to seven acres.
More recently he has become heavily involved in leaf and timber
businesses, which are the basis of his present wealth. He was closely connected with the former Union Council Chairman and, 1977, ran against
Taher Company for a position on the Union Council, but lost. After Taher
was killed by the Kader Bahini, Kamal obtained the seat in a by-election,
mainly through the support of Manzur Sarkar. He is now close to Mohiuddin and other Union Council Members and has good connections with
the local Member of Parliament, Matin Master, the local forester, the
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR, the border patrol), and the police. He is the
Secretary of the Adanpara Primary School Committee and is a member
of various other committees including the Madrassa Committee. His
brother, Salehuddin's status as a freedom fighter had been helpful to him
at various points in his career, until Salehuddin caused a clash with the
local landless people (described at the end of this report), which Kamal
has since been trying to settle without success.
Salehuddin, age 36, the younger brother of Kamal Member, arrived in
1960 and obtained two acres of land. He has had five wives and many
mistresses. Through his elder brother he is well connected with Mohiuddin and many others, and works closely with Latif. During the day he
spends most of his time drinking and gambling. At night he steals cows
and other things with the help of several colleagues within the region and
from across the border. There are eleven cases and three warrants against
him now. He has been severely beaten by the Police and members of the
Bangladesh Rifles in the market and has been sent to jail several times,
but usually manages to escape through payment of liberal bribes. In 1971
he was a "freedom fighter'' 7 and extracted several thousand taka from the

Unraveling Networks

of Corruption

141

poor, as well as from Razakars, 8 like Selim Commander of Taluqkandi
Village (who was himself actively engaged in land grabbing), continuing
these activities until 1973.
Hafiz, age 55 came from Assam in 1964 and obtained an allocation of
9 acres, 3 acres each for himself and his two sons. Ex-Union Council
Member Lutfur from nearby Motihar Village helped him get the additional
land for his sons, as well as money for three ploughs and three bundles
of G.I. sheets. He assumed leadership of the refugees in the area. He has
continued to be active in land grabbing schemes, as will be detailed later.
He left the area for a year in 19'76, but returned to continue his profession
of land grabbing and resale with the help of Lutfur.
He works closely with Latif, his nephew, and has close connections
with Salehuddin and Kamal Member as well as with Humayun of
Kathidanga Village. He was involved with the leaf business for two years
as a sub-agent. He has been married six times since divorcing two of his
wives. Two current wives are engaged in collecting firewood from the forest
and the other two live with their respective sons, Latif and Mofiz. Latif
is the son of Hafiz's elder brother, but after his brother's death Hafiz married the brother's wife, so Latif is both his nephew and step-son.
Latif, age 35 came to the area with his uncle Hafiz and lived with him
for five years until he married the first of his two wives. When Latif set
up a separate household, Hafiz gave him three acres and he bought four
acres of illegally occupied land from Hafiz. He has since sold off all except 3.5 acres. Latif is a heavy drinker and is closely connected with
Salehuddin, Humayun, Kamal Member, Lutfur ex-Member from Motihar
Village, and Mohiuddin Member of Taluqkandi Village. Also, he is a
member of the Village Defense Force (VDF). He currently has six cases
against him: two for robbery, others for highway robbery, attempted
murder, illegal occupation of temple land, and the attempted abduction
of two young women.
Mahfuz, age 36 arrived in 1960 from another part of the District and
occupied five acres of khas land. In 1962 his father came and bought three
acres. He has since bought seven acres more. In 19'71 he was a freedom
fighter and terrorized many people including Selim Commander from
whom he extracted Tk. 900. He extracted Tl<. 1,000 from another influential person and other amounts from less important people. Now he is the
Secretry of Adanpara (west) primary school and has unsuccessfully campaigned for a seat on the Union Council. He is now trying to get the support of the local landless people to run for the Union Council in the next
election. He was involved in the leaf business and has spent six months
in jail. He used to drink, but currently does not.
Taher Company (now dead) was orginally from Comilla where in his
youth he was involved in a murder case. He fled to Assam to escape
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conviction and started a business there, hence his title. In 1964 he came
to Adanpara as a refugee and occupied a huge area of land temporarily
abandoned by the Adivasis. By obtaining false refugee cards he got extra
land allocated to him and bought a house at the thana headquarters. Later
much of this land was reoccupied by the Adivasis and allocated to other
refugees by the Border Magistrate.
He was deeply involved in the leaf business and bought nine acres
out of the profits. As a rich and intelligent person he was often asked to
9
give judgement at salish and was very influential. Kamal called him his
godfather-in-law, a fictitious relationship, to get his patronage. In 1977 he
ran for a Union Council seat and won by spending Tk. 10,000 to bribe
election officials. But when Kamal Member and Salehuddin found out
on election night they got angry and said that Taher Company's days were
numbered.
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In the same year he was shot. He survived for a few hours, during
which he told his relatives that he knew who was responsible, but for
the safety of his family would not reveal their names. His relatives eventually learned the identity of the killers and were preparing to file a case
when Kamal reached a settlement with them. 10 The following year Kamal
was elected to the Union Council in the by-election.
Manzur Sarkar, age 72 is the biggest landowner in the area, with a total
of 150 acres divided between several individual plots. During the British
rule his family were talukas. He is influential throughout the thana and
plays a ''kingmaker" role during elections. He was previously involved
in the timber business in a big way and was once a member of the Union
Council in the adjacent union, when his uncle was Chairman. He was
recently the major force enabling Kamal to become a member of the local
Union Council. Now he is more or less retired from business and politics
and has become "respectable."
Factions. There are three major groupings in Adanpara. The first is
led by Kamal Member and consists of his own group of forty households
and a group of twenty-five mainly Garo households, as well as Hafiz's
small kinship group of five households, and ten households from the east
para (neighborhood). Second is a looser grouping under several small
leaders including three groups of twenty, fifteen, and thirty-seven
households each, plus a group of sixty-nine Adivasi households. Forcertain purposes the Adivasi groups all unite under the leadership of a Garo
Catholic with good connections in the Catholic Mission. Although the
first faction is much smaller than the second, its tighter organization, the
ruthlessness of its members, and its good connections make it the more
powerful and successful.
LAND

The history of the area during past twenty years has been a continuing
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process of land occupation, primarily of Adivasi lands by Muslim
refugees-actual or self-proclaimed. The land grabbing reached its peak
in 1964-65 and 1971, when communal riots and wars forced many Adivasis
to flee temporarily to India. At these times men like Selim Commander,
Mohiuddin Member, Huda Master, Lutfur ex-Member and Mizan exChairman were able to grab lands on a large scale and build up their present wealth and power, while Nazmul laid the basis for his money-lending
business. This process is still going on and every year at transplanting
and harvest times new disputes arise.
Oearly what has been involved has not been a simple matter of larger
numbers of settlers arriving over the years and each occupying some land
for himself. The large number of landless in the area itself refutes this
theory. And the Adivasis have rarely sold productive land voluntarily in
this area. In fact, the land occupation has been the work of a small number
of men who, seizing a tragic opportunity, have used violence, trickery,
deceit, bribery, and the forgery of official documents to expand their power
and wealth and finance their vices.
As of 1976-77, with the Kader Bahini rebellion still going on, a new
wave of land grabbing was underway. For the most part, the men who
had assumed the lead in earlier episodes were now playing a more "respectable" role, providing protection, encouragement, and finance to a younger
and more active generation-with notable exceptions such as Mohiuddin
Member and Selim Commander who were still active.
Much land has already changed hands. The action, however, is shifting away from villages like Kathidanga, where 100 percent of the land
has changed hands during this period, to villages like Adanpara and
Motihar where land remains that has not yet been captured by the net.
The methods of operation are illustrated in numerous examples including
the following cases from Adanapara, for which we have detailed data supported by land documents and case numbers, as well as direct personal
observation.
Recently Hafiz and his nephew Latif have been the most active in land
grabbing in this village. In 1967 they forcibly occupied eight acres belonging to a KDch, member of the scheduled or untouchable caste who over
two years filed nine cases against them and others in the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate's Court. They were all arrested but released after seven days
on bail while the case continued. When their conviction became imminent, they approached the Union Chairman who threatened the Koch,
pressuring him to come to a compromise. As a result he kept 4.25 acres
and Hafiz got 3.75. At this point the Chairman brought his influence to
bear in the Court, reporting that Hafiz had never occupied any land. fur
his services in the case he received Tk. 1,000 from a grateful Hafiz. At
the same time Hafiz was engaged in the occupation of 4.40 acres from
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two more Koch for which he has been able to obtain ownership documents
from the Revenue Department.
In lgJl a coalition of Selim Commander and Hafiz, with the support
of Kamal Member, Lutfur ex-Member and others from outside occupied
100 to 200 acres of land belonging to Adivasis who had temporarily fled
to India. Much of this land was registered in the names of relatives who
had since died. Since there are no proper birth and death registers in the
area, the occupiers were able to maintain that the actual owners were not
dead, but still in India and therefore the land was "enemy property." Any
complaints from the owners to the Court were referred to the Officer-inCharge of Police, who had been bribed by the group and simply ignored
the instructions of the court to investigate. Much of this land was sold
to new arrivals. Some was recovered by its owners. Hafiz kept three acres
of temple land and one acre of private land obtained in this way. Latif
retained three acres.
The enemy property ordinance; which figures centrally in much land
grabbing, was passed after the 1%5 war and was intended to be used to
confiscate the property of those who had defected to India and make it
available for settling refugees from India on a lease basis from the government, though often in practice it was opened for occupation. In 1967-69
a census was carried out to find out who had permanently left the country for India and to confiscate their property. We were told by senior district
level officials, however, that the census officials never went to the field,
but rather sat in their offices and, whenever they saw land registered in
the name of a person with a non-Muslim name, they classified it as enemy
property. It was a system that easily lent itself to manipulation as it was
a simple matter to get land so classified. One senior official of the land
settlement operation told us that in checking through classifications in
part of an adjacent thana, he had found that 75 percent of "enemy property" classifications were false and that even some Muslim families had
been included.
A related problem was the difficulty facing the average person in finding out how a given piece of land was classified. A senior district officer
told us the story of a man who came to the Magistrate's court appealing
against an enemy property classification on thirteen small plots of land.
It turned out that eleven of the plots were not in fact so classified. He
had been deceived by the local registrar who used his control over the
local records to pretend that large amounts of land had been so classified
to extract bribes on the pretense of changing the records. The remaining
two classifications were false and were overthrown.
In contrast to the ease with which property can be incorrectly
classified, getting a false classification corrected can be a difficult and expensive process. The owner usually has to go first to the Sub-divisional
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Officer and the Additional Deputy Commissioner, and finally to the
Ministry in Dhaka. Not the least of his problems is how to get inside the
Ministry, which is inside a guarded secretariate building with restricted
access.
One measure intended to prevent much of this type of land grabbing
is a ruling by the Border Magistrate that even the land allocated to refugees
in the border area is given to them only on a one year share-cropping
basis and does not become legally theirs even by continued occupation.
This ruling is completely ignored and ineffective.
In the face of the sophisticated system of corruption that has emerged to exploit the weaknesses in these systems, the ignorant and unorganized people on the one side of it and the senior government officers on the
other side seem almost helpless.
CAPITAL

The local power elites are also able to make effective use of their near
monopoly control over liquid capital, lending it out at extremely high rates
of interest. Although several of the prinicipal money lenders got their start
by illegally occupying land and continue to use their power over debtors
to increase their holdings at low cost, the two types of operation demand
different styles, connections, and methods of operation. The case of Nazmul of Kathidanga Village, illustrates the methods of the money lender.
Nazmul built up his initial capital by land grabbing and looting. In
1966 he started lending money at the rate of 100 percent per crop season.
There are two main crop seasons per year: spring and summer. In that
year he lent one maund of paddy worth Tk. 20 to a Garo. The Garo was
unable to repay at the end of the season, and Nazmul continued to extend the loan until W73. By that time the debt had grown to 16,384 maunds.
Nazmul offered to accept Tk. 5000 in repayment and forget the rest. In
1973 he received 0.50 acres of land worth Tk. 4, 980 as a final settlement.
In 1972 he lent two rnaunds and Tk. 200 to another Garo, who returned
Tk. 200 and five maunds after one season (the price at that time being
Tk. 40-50/md.). Nazmul claimed Tk. 1800 more and his debtor had to give
him the use of 0.50 acres for one year. That year the yield was fourteen
maunds and the following year he received another four maunds. He still
claimed Tk. 1200 more. Finally his debtor paid him another Tk. 100 after
selling his cow and begged to be forgiven the rest. The matter was settled, and Nazmul's profit was approximately Tk. 2,300. His business has
grown over the years. This year he expects to receive 145 maunds and
has already recovered forty-five.
A client of one large money lender was watching an eclipse of the
moon with us one night. ''Do you know what's happened to the moon?"
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he said as it began to disappear. "He took a one paisa loan from the
sun ... :' 11
THE FORESf
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Govenment forest covers an area of about 8,000 acres, or half the total
BRAC project area. Two thirds of this is still forested, though large timber
merchants are cutting it off at a rapid rate with the unofficial co-operation
of the forestry officers. Every year for three months from February to May,
large numbers of trucks come to the area and carry away large sa/ trees
[a valuable timber species) to the towns for sale, and small trees and branches to the local markets for firewood. Possibly no other activity
demonstrates so dearly the imbalance of power as the way in which officials treat the commercial loggers on the one hand and the poor who
cut headloads of wood to sell for survival on the other.
The following is a description of one typical scheme for illegally
harvesting trees from government land.
Many Adivasis have plots of private registered land inside the government forests which they do not use for agriculture because the soils are
poor. Timber operators buy up these plots at Tk. 300 to 500 per acre and
obtain permits from the District Forest Officer (DFO) to cut trees on this
land. Though officially such permits are given free for cutting on private
land, in fact they cost several thousand taka in bribes. Having obtained
the permit, the operator then starts cutting down trees in the public forests
adjacent to the plot. These are then carried to the plot and placed next
to old stumps. The Forester is brought in to stamp the trees with a special
hammer so they can be removed. A single stump may be "cut" in this
manner as many as six or seven times.
The price of timber in the sub-divisional town is at least Tk. 80 per
cubic foot (dt.) and the transport cost is Tk. 1,000/truck. One truck can
carry about 200 cft. and the cost of cutting 200 cft. on government land
is Tk. 1,400. Therefore, the sale price per truck is Tk. 16,000 and the costs
Tk. 2,400 excluding bribes. Firewood is sold locally with no transport cost
at Tk. 2,000 to 2,500 per truck with a cutting cost of Tl<. 150. The profits
are therefore Tk. 13,500 per truckload of timber and Tk. 2,IXXJ per truckload
of firewood. Bribes may take as much as one third or even half this amount.
The amounts of timber and firewood cut are about equal. In three forested
unions, including the BRAC project area, in the winter season of 19'78-79
about forty large contractors were operating for five months, each employing an average of 100 laborers a day. Actual shipment out of the area occurs during a brief period at the end of the season. All trucks coming out
of the area have to pass by the same point. A check revealed that at least
twenty trucks passed that point each day for at least forty-five days, about
half carrying timber and the other half firewood.
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These large and profitable operations are in stark contrast with the
activities of landless and destitute families who spend all day cutting a
headload of firewood, then carry it on their heads to the local market where
it fetches Tk. 5. According to the Forest Department, this work is only
legal if the wood is broken and collected with bare hands (not cut with
an axe) and if a pemit application signed by the Union Council Chairman
is submitted and a fee of Tk. 1.50 paid for each headload. Because of the
difficulty of conforming to these regulations, no one does, and so poor
people who have no other livelihood are often harassed by the local power
elites as well as by police and forest officers. An example:
On the 18th of September 1979 at 4:00 a.m. twenty-three landless
laborers went from Adanpara toward the sub-divisional town carrying
firewood they had cut the previous day. There was no work available and
the condition of their families was serious. Some policemen returning from
patrol caught them; three ran away and twenty were arrested. They had
no money to pay a bribe and so were taken to the police station. Mizan,
ex-Chairman of the Sundorganj Union Council and one of the area's major timber operators, spends most of his time around thana headquarters
and happened to be present at this time. He became involved and
negotiated a rate of Tk. 5 per head for their release. Soon their friends
and relatives and other members of the landless organization arrived. With
them came Amin, a faction leader of Osmanpur Village and two-time unsuccessful candidate for the Union Council. Amin was allowed entry into
the police station to negotiate together wiht Mizan though the rest were
refused.
On his return he told the group that by now the rorest Department
had become involved and so the price had gone up to Tk. 10 per head.
They refused to pay and said they were prepared to take the case to higher
levels if the prisoners were not released. By this stage the prisoners were
hungry and the sentry who had given permission for food to be sent in
now refused. Mizan and Amin interceded with the police and got permission. After showing their sympathy in this way they gave the news
that the Bangladesh Rifles had been informed by telephone and the rate
had now gone up to Tk. 15 per head. The friends still refused to pay,
however, and the police sent a man over to the rorestry office for
co-ordination.
Then Mizan, Amin, and the police began discussions with the
prisoners inside and friends outside simultaneously. They hinted that the
prisoners might be beaten, kept without food, and later sent to jail. Amin
reminded the prisoners that their friends would find it very difficult to
go to higher levels and offered to sign a bond for their release. Eventually
they agreed and each had to sign two bonds, one admitting guilt and
another promising to pay Tk. 20 each. By noon they were released. Later,
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they paid. Out of the Tk. 400 collected, the police, BDR and furest Department personnel each got 25 percent and the remainder was divided equally
between Mizan and Amin. Although this was paid on the understanding
that the case would be dropped, it has not been.
Thus the power elites are not only able to defy laws protecting the
forest with impunity for their personal profit, they are also able to use
the same laws to exploit and harass the poor.
FOOD

Though our area is surplus in rice and exports substantial amounts,
such a high proportion of the population is comprised of landless laborers
that anything that reduces their employment opportunities results in much
suffering. This happened in May/June 1979 when drought seriously affected the spring rice crop and made weeding unnecessary, thus leaving
most of the laborers unemployed and on the edge of starvation. This situation was repeated in September-October. In such circumstances the almost
total control enjoyed by the power elite over government food supplies
disbursed by the government under food-for-work and rations programs
puts them in an extremely powerful position.
.!;::
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Food-for-Work
Normally during the winter season large amounts of wheat are made
available all over Bangladesh to compensate laborers for the creation of
rural infrastructure such as roads, canals, and embankments, and for the
raising and leveling of land. The program is administered by the Union
Councils under the supervision of the government. In 1979, because of
the crisis caused by the drought, much of the wheat intended for use in
the dry winter season was brought forward during the monsoon.
In the four months August to November 1979, twenty-six schemes were
sanctioned, and a total of 2, 100 maunds (mds) of wheat were disbursed
by the Government for this program. 12 The twenty schemes we were able
to check were allocated 1,825 mds. Of this, only 425 mds. 32 seers (srs.),
23.9 percent of the total sanctioned, were really distributed. The remaining 1,392 mds. 8 srs., with a market value of Tk. 139,200, "disappeared."
According to Union Council members interviewed, 30 percent of the
wheat for each scheme always goes for "expenses," transport costs and
the shares of the various government officers. The transport cost is actually covered separately by the government and, from BRAC's own experience, should not in any event exceed 3 percent of the total. Several
levels of government are involved, from the project implementation officer, who checks all movements and certifies completion, through the
thana officer in charge of development, up to the sub-division.
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In December 1979, a special scheme was sanctioned for raising and
leveling the Adanpara primary school field. The school is not registered
or even running though its teachers continue to draw rations. This was
a special scheme transferred from some other allocation, and fifty mds.
were sanctioned. It was implemented by Kamal Member, Matin Master,
and Idris Master. Less than five mds. were really distributed.
But the incident of the Adanpara primary school field had begun even
earlier. In early October 1979 Matin Master told three marginal farmers
that he had received a delivery order for 100 mds. wheat to repair the
Adanpara school field, but needed money to transport it. After bargaining, the farmers bought mds. in advance for Tk. 300. He shared the money
with Idris Master and Kamal Member. When the wheat finally arrived
three months later, he told them that since only fifty mds. had been sanctioned and had gone on "expenses" he could not supply any.
Control over food supplies is also an effective method of patronage.
Food-for-work, for example, is usually given to the relatives and faction
members of the council member. This also has the advantage of keeping
the amount distributed as secret as possible. It can also be denied to any
rivals or dissatisfied groups. fur example, once the landless people became
organized and started demanding higher wages and other benefits, the
Union Council denied them any further food-for-work allocations.
RESISTANCE

In recent years the landless poor and marginal farmers have been increasingly successful in organizing themselves and in challenging some
of the activities of the "net:'
In Adanpara there are 4. 2 acres of temple land belonging to a Koch
which had been claimed by Hafiz and his relatives and previously occupied
by them. In 1979 the Koch made an arrangement to share this land with
a landless group of seventy settlers and Adivasis. They all filed a case
against the land grabbers, and because of their large number were able
to transplant and harvest their crops successfully.
On a much larger scale, the big land occupation operations started
in 1976 in a nearby village by Kamal and others have been successfully
countered. fur three years the occupiers were able to use about 100 acres
belonging to all the Adivasis of the village. In 1979 when BRAC's foodfor-work program was beginning, the victims began to discuss how to
recover their land. By transplanting time they had organized a strong group
including almost all the landless settlers and Adivasis in the village and
had established good contacts with similar groups in the surrounding
villages and with the local Member of Parliament. At that time the central
government was giving special attention to the Adivasis. After careful
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preparation, they transplanted and harvested in a large group of sixty people and have reoccupied almost all the land, though there is a case filed
against their leader.
One of many reasons why organizing has worked to increase the
power of these groups is that they have been able to agree not to hire out
to work confiscated land for members of the net nor serve as their guards.
When such agreements extend to neighboring villages, illegal land occupation becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
As the landless began to get organized and take action, members of
the net began to strike back. During BRAC's food-for-work program, several
women's groups were organized and started joint cultivation. Salehuddin started bullying and threatening them when he was drunk. Their
leader complained to the Union Council Member, who is Salehuddin's
brother, but got no satisfaction and so contacted all the landless groups
in the surrounding villages. They decided to organize a salish among
themselves and summoned Salehuddin to attend. At the salish it became
clear that he had been threatening many people with beating and murder
if they spoke against him. Because of this, before taking the matter any
further, the landless leaders reported these threats to the police, who were
uncooperative. It was learned that they had just received a Tk. 500 bribe
from Salehuddin in another case.
One leader had been particularly active in the salish and had also
played a central role in resisting the land-grabbing activities of Salehuddin and friends. Two weeks after the salish they attacked him in the bazar
at dusk. Though he was only slightly injured, another landless leader,
Kazim, and a local rich man who had come out of the mosque to stop
the fighting were wounded in the head and hand respectively.
The landless people became angry, cutting up bamboo to make lath is
(sticks) and discussed whether to go to Salehuddin's house to kill him.
They decided against it. The victims went to the Sub-Division for treatment and to the thana police station to file a case. Salehuddin also filed
a counter-case against the landless leader, which was well received by the
Officer-in-Charge (O.C.) of police because of their dose relationship.
The following day, 600 men marched to the police station to request
the O.C. to take action against Salehuddin, shouting the slogan: ''Build
landless organization, stop robbery!" The O.C. met them on the road. He
spoke nicely and sympathetically-not his common practice with the
landless-and promised to investigate. They heeded his request that they
return home.
When the O.C. reached the police station he found 200 women, who
had come by a different route, gathered there. He gave them promises
as well and the following day came to investigate the case.
Salehuddin disappeared for some time and his assistant Latif was
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arrested. Salehuddin reappeared after his brother sold 0.5 acres, mortgaged
0.5 acres and paid the O.C. Tk. 3000 to avoid arrest. He then tried to
negotiate a settlement with the landless organization.
Given an understanding of the local power structure, it no longer
seems surprising that resources intended for "development" rarely reach
the poor. The words and plans of central government mean little. The
realities of power relationships at local levels determine what actually
happened.
AN UPDATE

In early 1985, a little more than five years after the original study, a
follow-up was carried out in the areas to assess the impact of efforts by
the landless to shift the power balance in the two villages examined above.
This follow-up revealed the substantial difficulties of the undertaking. The
reader should bear in mind that, of the ten villages included in the original
study, Kathidanga and Adan para were chosen for attention in this article
specifically because it was here that the net was particularly well entrenched and powerful. It should also be kept in mind that the border area
in which the original ten study villages was located is one of the more
inaccessible in Bangladesh, and had more than the typical level of lawless
activity.
After reviewing developments in Kathidanda and Adanpara, we will
look at a key indicator of the progress being made by the landless of the
surrounding area and at some of the lessons which this experience
generated for BRAC.
Kathidanga Village

In Kathidanga village the landless organization no longer exists and
any impact it may have had on the village is difficult to detect. It was one
of the earlier villages organized by BRAC and contributed important
lessons which BRAC has since been careful to observe. When Kathidanga
was being organized, BRAC had not yet instituted the practice of beginning with a comprehensive village survey which, among other things,
makes it possible for BRAC workers to specificially target the landless.
Nor was it considered important at that time to restrict membership to
the landless class. Consequently the organization had attracted members
who were not identified with the interests of the landless and who assumed a dominant role in the association. It also turned out that most of the
landless in the village were refugees without established ties to the community. Unable to find employment there and having no real ties to the
village, most had left the area by 1985.
Of the net members from Kathidanga, Nazmul has increased his

152

Mobilizing Resources

holdings to twenty-two acres of land and 100 head of cattle through a continuation of his money lending and land grabbing activities. His three sons
are active in smuggling and black market operations. Farid has had similar
success with his money lending, increasing his holdings to twenty acres.
His daughter has married one of Kamal Member's sons. Matin Master is
still serving as a teacher in the local primary school and has engaged in
some successful land transactions, but drinks heavily and has had to sell
off almost all of his property to cover drinking expenses, retaining only
a one-acre homestead plot. Idris Master, having lost his land in gambling, works as a share cropper in his father's village but still remains sufficiently active politically to have been nominated to serve as a union council
member. A string of additional cases were brought against him for theft
following the case mentioned earlier, which had already cost him Tk. 25,CXXJ
in bnbes and other expenses. To meet the expenses of these cases, he eventually was forced to sell off all his land and now lives in a deplorable financial condition. Humayun is still a prominent member of Mohiuddin's gang,
maintaining good relations with Salehuddin and Kamal Member.
Adanpara Village
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In Adanpara Village the landless organization survives as an important force in the village, though it faces continuing and difficult obstacles
including corruption among its own leadership. Kazim, secretary of the
central committee of the landless organization, who had suffered head
injuries in the 1CJ79 incident with Salehuddin, received Tk. 2,200 from the
members of the organization to press their case with the district court.
Some days later he demanded more money to spend on the case. As he
refused to give the members an accounting for the previous money, his
request was denied. It was later learned that he took another Tk. 2,000
from the central committee's account, which he was only willing to say
he had spent on the case. In the meantime, he convinced the organization to compromise with Salehuddin on the case. He lost the support of
the landless organization, but later won an election for Union Council
membership with the support of elite factions which opposed the landless
organization.
Later another leader, Kalam Munsi, obtained a loan of Tk. 1,000 from
the group to buy land for himself but later refused to repay the money
or tum over the land. When the group was unsuccessful in reclaiming the
money, it disbanded and most of its members joined another of the Adanpara people's organizations. Still another leader gave over one acre of his
land to the group for collective cultivation on the condition that they dean
and level it. But after the work was done, he retained the land for himself
and joined with Kazim in supporting political factions that opposed the
people's organization.
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As for the key figures mentioned in the earlier study, Huda Master
involved himself as a member of the landless organization, consistently
working against its interests until the members took a strong stand against
him. His economic position and standing in the village subsequently
deteriorated until he finally sold off his remaining property and returned
to his home village where he passed away in 1982.
After Kamal Member became a Union Council member his income
increased rapidly during the first half of his term through a variety of questionable activities. In early 1983 the landless organization caught him redhanded in collecting the grain from a Food for Work Project on which no
work had been accomplished. They filed a case against him at both thana
and sub-division levels, but no action was taken. So they took their case
to the local Member of Parliament and with his help seized the wheat
sanctioned for the scheme, completed the project, and distributed the
wheat to the participants. Kamal's timber and leaf business started to
decline. Blocked by the landless group from further illegal profiteering
from his Union Council position he has turned to cattle stealing, with two
cases being brought against him in the local thana during the past year.
He still maintains good relations with the Bangladesh Rifles, Forestry, and
Thana (Upazilla) officials. But in the last union council election he lost
badly, receiving only eighty votes.
Salehuddin, with the help of Kamal Member and the local UP Chairman who maintains frequent contact with the landless leaders, was finally successful in negotiating an agreement with Kazim, the Secretary of
the central commitee of the landless organization, and the case brought
against him by the landless was finally withdrawn. He later begged pardon for the incident from the landless people in a public gathering. He
continues to serve as a member of Mohiuddin's gang, engages in cattle
and timber theft, and does what he can to hinder the activities of the
landless organization. He now has fifty acres of land.
Hafiz lost all of his land in gambling and in paying expenses of
disputes over land taken from the Adivasis. He is now a poor old man
of no importance suffering from various untreated diseases. His nephew,
Latif, continues to practice cattle theft and robbery as a member of Mohiuddin's gang. With the help of Mohiuddin's connections with local officials
and some small bribes, he has been successful in getting the six cases that
were pending against him dropped, though he spent a total of two years
in jail from 1<J7'9-83. He serves as a member of the Village Defense Force
and owns two acres of land.
Mahfuz has increased his holdings to twelve acres. He has continued,
without success, to win the support of the landless organization in bids
for the union council. He remains an important social and political figure
in the area.
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Manzur Sarkar became a supporter of the landless organization, giving one acre of land to the Adanpara Landless Women's Organization for
collective cultivation of cassava and giving support to the candidate sponsored by the landless organization for UP Chairman Candidate in the most
recent election. He died in 1984, and his family continues to hold his 150
acres of land.
Union Council Elections
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As the members of landless organizations have become more politically
aware, they have given increasing attention to winning representation on
the local Union Councils. The Union Council elections held December
1983 to January 1984 were contested by forty-two candidates from the
landless groups. Ten of these were from the ten villages included in the
original study, and the remaining thirty-two were from neighboring
villages. Though none of the candidates from the ten villages won, twelve
of the candidates from the neighboring villages did. Though this was only a minority of the landless candidates, the results were taken as an important victory by the landless who felt it marked a turning point in their
endeavor to gain power.
This focus on union-level elections has been accompanied by moves
toward the formation by the landless of their own union-level federation
of village level associations. So far two union-level committees have been
formed by the landless, comprised of one representative from each of their
village organizations. These committees meet once each month to discuss
issues that affect their organizations and to seek common solutions.
Among the accomplishments of these committees has been a successful
effort to reorganize and reactivate the landless organization in one of the
ten study villages which had run into difficulties.

LESSONS
BRAC has learned numerous lessons from this experience. First is the
importance of beginning involvement in a village with a comprehensive
survey that clearly identifies the target population and reveals the social
structure of the village. Membership in landless organizations is then
limited to those who are actually members of the landless class. Mass confrontation with elites is avoided whenever possible, attempting to resolve
disputes by more tactful means. Efforts are made to develop broadly based leadership to make it difficult for one person to assume a dominant
role, which 'may be used to his personal benefit. From the very beginning, attention is given to self-managed income and employmentgenerating programs based on traditional skills and occupations. This contrasts with earlier BRAC programs that were oriented more to providing
emergency relief to the poor and tended to create dependency.
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And so the poor continue their struggle and BRAC continues to learn.
There are no easy victories and each success is built on the learning from
past failures. fur all the set-backs the landless of the area are making progress, no longer feeling they are simply at the mercy of corrupt elites, politicians, and administrators. And as difficult as the organization-building
process is, there is no evident alternative. If these people are to gain a
decent livelihood and a respected place in the community, it must come
through their own efforts and organization. Try as it has, it seems to be
beyond the capacity of government or foreign aid agencies to achieve this
for them.
NOTES
1. With the exception of countries and capital cities all names of individuals and places mentioned in this study have been fictionalized. Any similarities to names of actual persons and
places are coincidential.

2. \.A.le refer to "power" elites rather than simply elites because all members of the economic
elite of the village are not members of this corrupt network. Many are indeed honest and
civic minded individuals who themselves are subject to exploitation by the "net:'
3. The union is the lowest political level of government and is comprised of several villages.
The thana (recently named Upazilla), comprised of 5e\leral unions, is the lowest administrative
level of government.
4. The following report is written in the present tense to retain its sense of immediacy. The
study [except for the update provided at the end] was, however, completed by the end of
1979 and the statements made apply to that point in time.
5. Titles are sometimes appended to the name in Bangladesh according to one's occupation.
"Master" indicates a teacher. "Company" designates a businessman. "Member" is a member
of the Union Council. "Chairman" is the Chairman of the Union Council-locally a powerful position. Member and Chairman may be prefaced by "ex~· indicating they no longer hold
the position.
6. This involves collection of a particular type of leaf from the forest which is used in making the local cigarettes. Marketing of these leaves is controlled by a large, government licensed
monopoly through local agents such as Huda Master.
7. Some so called "freedom fighters" were little more than thugs who took advantage of
the war to rob and pillage their neighbors in the name of a patriotic cause.
8. Members of the local militia who fought with the Bangladesh army in the Liberation War
with Pakistan.
9. This is the village court which is formed by respected local residents to resolve a dispute.
All the villagers gather to observe the proceedings.
10. They concluded that the assassination was arranged by Salehuddin, the brother of Kamal,
and carried out by members of the Kader Bahini, some of whom were friends of Salehuddin.
11. A paisa is one-hundredth of a taka.
12. One maund

=

40 seers. One seer

=

approximately one kilogram.
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The most striking thing about evolutionary history is that the operation
ofphylogenesis in its generalizing mode created improvements in organism
adaptability until it generated learning organisms. Thus, the behavioral
reprogramming of organism behavior that is phylogenesis gradually evolved
a program (genotype) that provided the organism with the power to reprogram itself-to act as a true learning system at the organism level. In the
human species the learning organism reached the point where learning
becomes largely socialized because the dominant aspect of the individual
organism's learning environment is the presence of and the sharing with
other learning organisms.
In this way there emerged a process of social evolution distinct from
biological evolution and a process of social learning distinct from a purely
stochastic learning process. This process takes place at two levels-the level
of the individual and the level of the group.
The major elements in an individual's learning and personality formation are associated with his social environment. He learns by sharing in
a range of acquired information through communication and social system
participation. Individual behaviors form group clusters to exploit the
behavioral amplification that specialization and exchange can afford. Thus,
individual learning and behavior are shaped by the nature of the group
activities in which the individual participates and through which he is
molded, and which in turn, are frequently molded by him.
Social learning also takes place at the level of the group, where the
result is not the transformation of individual behavior but the transformation
of group behavior. Either the collective membership of the group or some
leadership elite undertakes to monitor the group behavior with reference
to group goals. Serious deviations constitute problems which must be
resolved through technological innovation and social reorganization.
Social learning subsumes both social system learning and the socialized
Excerpted from Edgar S_ Dunn, Jr., Economic and Social Dn·elopmenr: A Process of Social
Learning (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Cni,·ersity Press, 1971), pp. 239-45. Published
for Resources for the Future, Inc. Copyright •r· 1971 by The Johns Hopkins l:ntversity Press.
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learning of the individual. Its operation at the two levels is obviously interrelated. Since the orientation of this book is a social science one, we have
been predominantly concerned with the way in which the process works
to transform social systems. The essence of what we have learned about
the operation of the process is as follows.
Social behavior is not identical wirh social learning. Two of the unique
aspects of the human social process continue to operate in the absence of
social learning. Behaviors directed to evaluating and organizing behavior
are continuously employed in maintaining social processes that are homeostatic in character. There they operate to modify the mix and flow of established modes of behavior in response to established behavioral criteria
associated with the monitoring of moderate environmental changes.
Since social systems frequently encounter situations, in which such
predetermined forms of adaptation are inadequate, rarely can they long
escape the necessity for social learning. Then they must display the third
unique component of the social process - behavior directed to changing
behavior. In this learning process both behavior-evaluating behavior and
behavior-organizing behavior continue to operate, but they become transformed into aspects of behavior-changing behavior. They operate together
to form a process of social learning.
This we identify as a process of evolutionary experimentarion -a
process that is different in important respects from the experimental process
known to classical science. Social sysrem evolution is rhe resulr of a problem
solving process that is an implicit if nor explicit form of hypothesis resting but is problem solving and testing of a different order.
Classical experimental physical science takes place at two levels: analysis
and sysrem design. At the level of analysis it is concerned with understanding
the operation of deterministic physical systems from the posture of an
external observer. It commonly rests hypotheses abour the narure of the
system by observing the effect upon components of rhe sys rem of changes
in exogenous parameters, usually under highly controlled condirions. In
this way it seeks to identify laws or universal relationships. Ar the level
of system design, these relationships or laws are applied to the design of
deterministic systems like machine systems, creating artifacts that amplify
human behavior. The design of these systems is engineered from the posture
of an external manipulator. To the extent that the valuation process is
involved, it is concerned only with instrumental values or efficiency criteria
at the design stage.
In social sysrems problem solving and hyporhesis testing rake on a different character. The basic point of depanure is rhe fact rhat the social system
experimenter is not exogenous to the system. He exists as an endogenous
component of the system he is attempting to understand and transform. He
is not dealing with the understanding and design of fully determinisric
systems. He is immersed in rhe act of social system self-analysis and self-
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transformation. He is the agent of social learning-a purposive, self-actuating,
but not fully deterministic process. He is not interested to the same degree
in establishing universals because the social system which engages his activity
is phenomenologically unique and both its structure and function are
temporary in character. He is engaged, rather, in formulating and testing
developmenral hypotheses. The developmental hypothesis is a presupposition rhar, if the organizarion and behavior of the social system were to be
modified in a certain way, the goals ofrhe system would be more adequately
realized. This developmental hyporhesis is not tested repeatedly under nearly
identical or controlled conditions. Rather, it is tesred by the degree to which
goal convergence is realized as a result of the experimental design. Problem
solving- hyporhesis formulation and testing-is an iterative, sequential series
of adaptarions of an adaprable, goal-seeking, self-activating system. It can
be characterized as evolurionary experimentarion.
This process calls into play the other two unique processes in its support.
Because by irs nature social learning involves social reorganization, behaviororganizing behavior is involved. We have seen that an organization is defined
by a set of boundary condirions. These boundary conditions are a set of social
sysrem goals and the controls imposed upon component systems to assure
that their behavior supports the total system goals. Developmental
hypotheses arise out of the anomalies of social organization when the social
system controls do not adequately serve the social system goals. They are
tested through social system reorganization designed to bring the system
goals and controls into consonance.
Evolutionary experimentation can be seen to exhibit both a normal and
extraordinary mode. In normal problem solving the emphasis is upon the
reorganization of the system controls. It involves the reorganization of
subsystem boundaries under rhe control of the total system goals. It does
not threaten the context of the system. As we have seen, this mode of problem
solving is frequently inadequate. The developmental hypotheses and the
associated subsystem reorganizations are not sufficient to bring about
consonance of total system goals and controls. Thus, evolutionary experimentation occasionally manifests itself as a paradigm shift or a displacement
in the operating context of the total system. It comes to deal, not with the
reorganization of controls, but with the reformulation of total system goals
as well.
This makes plain that behavior-evaluating behavior is also an essential
servant of evolutionary experimentation. In the case of normal problem
solving, attention is restricted to a consideration of the adequacy of instrumental goals and criteria. Subsystem goals may come under consideration
because they are in conflict with the target goals of the total system. They
are either placed under additional constraints by the reorganization of control
subsystems or they are directly subjected to the reorganization of their own
goals and controls. In this mode, however, even the revision of subsystem
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goals is undertaken under the control of total system goals. In the case of
evolutionary experimentation that is manifest as a paradigm shift, it is the
target goals of the total system that are subject to revision. This makes plain
that the social scientist concerned with developmental problems cannot
abstract from normative or value-laden issues. The process of evolutionary
experimentation is essentially a normative process; one of its consequences
is the evolution of social values.
Throughout social history the operation of this process of social learning
has been hazardous and haphazard because its conduct has not been efficient
and because it has been predominantly concerned with instrumental goals.
In effect, the process of social learning has not understood itself sufficiently
well to rationalize itself as an efficient process with a coherent purpose.
Because the process has not been understood and consciously applied,
social change has frequently been dominated by an attempt to implement
change by processes incompatible with the reality of social evolution. Acting
on the basis of inadequate paradigms and metaphors, we have been inclined
to practice a form of social engineering. It is presupposed that the change
agents can act as though they are external to the process and have the knowledge and power to design a terminal state that will bring about consistent
goals and controls in a deterministic fashion. Also acting on the basis of an
inadequate paradigm of the social process, an attempt to freeze the social
:::l status quo - to create and maintain static social system boundaries - is
frequently evident. Both of these impractical modes are clearly impossible,
but the attempt to impose them upon social change has a tendency to
exacerbate the traumatic and unpredictable consequences of the process.
The other part of the difficulty stems from the fact that social learning
is being applied more efficiently in one of its modes than the other because
it is only partly understood. The resulting disproportion has had serious
social consequences. The conscious and efficient practice of physical science
and the design of physical systems has been perfected to the point where
normal social system problem solving is dominated by the reorganizations
associated with new physical technology-the redesign of machine subsystems and their control. This has had the effect of accelerating the rate
at which organizational crises occur - in particular, the rate of those that
can only be resolved by paradigm shifts. This accelerated need for social
reorganization is not matched by an appropriate understanding of social
system learning. We do not yet see the implications of normal problem
solving for the control of human subsystems (involving the consistency of
individual and total system goals), nor do we see clearly how to engage
purposively in the process of controlling paradigm shifts. This has led to
an accelerating rate of painful, reactive, major social reorganizations. The
revision of the target goals of social systems is as yet largely uncoordinated,
fragmentary, and opportunistic.
One concludes that amelioration of many of the world's worst social
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ills, if not the long-run survival of the social process itself, must hinge upon
our ability to make the practice of social learning more orderly and rational.
First, we need to devote concentrated attention in social science to
understanding the process. Second, at every stage and level of our understanding we need to apply what we know to conscious, orderly practice
and control of the process. This implies that developmental hypotheses
should be more objectively and consciously formulated by the group. The
evolutionary experiment should be frankly conceived as an experiment and
deliberately provided with information feedback that monitors goal convergence and sets the stage for the next round of experimentation. The
seductive appeal of utopian social engineering must be put aside. Third,
we need to innovate organizational forms and procedures that efficiently
integrate the goals and controls of social learning itself. Fourth, we need
to acknowledge that this may require an over-arching social goal or value
that serves as a final test for evolutionary experiments- that guides the
formulation of developmental hypotheses and passes judgment upon
paradigm shifts.
We have suggested that this over-arching goal is the development of
the growth motives of the human individual. If this suggests that, as a
consequence, social evolution becomes teleological in a way not matched
by cosmological or biological evolution, it should be pointed out that this
is not a terminal state or a transcendent teleology of the kind associated
with the orthogenetic fallacy; nor is it the conventional teleology of social
action formed by the pursuit of instrumental goals and social maintenance.
It is a process teleology. It suggests that human beings can establish the
process of human development as the goal of the process of social evolution.
Both the process and the goal are understood to be open to further transformation as we advance in the practice and understanding of them.
By asserting the normative priority of human development as our social
goal, we add· to the internal consistency of the social learning paradigm
as well as to the order of the process. It provides the interface between
the social learning of the individual and social system learning. It is only
through establishing such a priority that group behavior and individual
behavior come to be mutually reinforcing in a nonstatic world.
If this makes the social process and social science anthropocentric in
character, no apology is necessary. To deny that this is appropriate would
be to deny a fundamental aspect of human nature and the evolutionary
process that formed it. The psychic orientation of man and his motivation
to action is by nature anthropocentric just as that of the rat is rat-ocentric.
Man happens to have the potential through social learning to create a
controlled process that can support him in the realization and exercise of
his highest human potential- perhaps even to enlarge that potential and
the meaning and joy that accompanies its exercise.
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One of the clear lessons of the 1970s has been that effective participation
of the rural poor in the development process is more easily mandated in
programming documents than achieved in the real world of program implementation. It is not, however, a new lesson. In earlier decades, experience
with cooperatives and rural development produced similarly disappointing
results in the context of high expectations and good intentions. Generally
the cooperatives proved to be creations of government operated under
government management-which provided little market power, produced
few returns to members, and consequently enjoyed little or no popular
support. Similarly community development, when implemented on a large
scale, ended up as little more than one more set of centrally formulated
programs and targets implemented through conventional bureaucratic
structures and largely unresponsive to local preferences and/or needs.
In hindsight the results seem quite predictable. Yet in spite of the
monotony with which the basic lessons thus learned have been repeated
and the fairly substantial progress made in understanding the nature of
the problem, it remains the rule rather than the exception to see in development programming: a) reliance, even for the planning and implementation
of "participative" development, on centralized bureaucratic organizations
which have little capacity to respond to diverse community-defined needs
or to build on community skills and values; b) inadequate investment in
the difficult process of building community problem-solving capacity;
c) inadequate attention to dealing with social diversity, especially highly
stratified village social structures; and d) insufficient integration of the
technical and social components of development action.
From Rural Developmen1 Par11opa11on Re-i:iew 2 (11haca, N.Y.: Rural Development
Comminee, Cornell l'niversity, Winier 1981), pp. 1-8. The research on which this paper
is hased is documented 1n detail in a much longer version: "Community Organization and
Rural Development: :\ Learning Process Aprroach," Pub/le Admln1S1ra11on RM·lcU",
Sepiem~r-October, 1980 pp. 480-510.
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Prominent among the barriers to effective participatory programs are
pressures on development financing agencies to move too much money too
quickly in time bounded, pre-planned projects in pursuit of short-term
results; while the need is for a flexible, sustained, experimental, actionbased, capacity-building style of development effort for which both donors
and recipient bureaucracies are ill-equipped. Pressures for immediate results
measured by goods and services delivered drive out attention to building
the capacity of the responsible institutions to provide these goods and
services in ways which are responsive to local needs and build the local
problem-solving capacity on which sustained development depends. Programming procedures which demand detailed upfront planning coupled
with rigorous adherence to fast-paced implementation schedules and preplanned specifications all but assure that the projects will be unresponsive
to subsequent popular input-or even to a growing understanding of what
the real problems are on the part of the project's professional staff.

Three Asian Successes
Are there options? Apparently so, as there are a number of successful
experiences that provide exceptions to the more typical outcomes. These
bear examination in a search for useful lessons. Three cases selected for
examination for Asia share several common characteristics: a) involvement
of rural people in their own advancement; b) greater than average success,
with results that are not dependent on uniquely favorable settings; and c)
a scale of operation that places them substantially beyond the pilot project
stage.
INDIAN NATIONAL DAIRY DEVELOPMENT BOARD

India's National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), built up from the
model of the Anand Milk Producers' Union, is frequently cited as an
example of the potentials of cooperative organization in the Third World.
By the end of 1976 it was comprised of 4,530 village cooperatives with
a combined membership of2 million farmers. The cooperative collects milk
from members at village collection points twice each day, transports and
processes it, and markets the processed products in major urban centers.
It is known for being efficient, free of corruption, and effective in providing
major benefits to even the poorest members of the village communities it
serves.
But it did not begin with the NDDB operating a national-scale program.
Its roots go back to the mid-forties when a group of dairy farmers grew
tired of cooperating with the government-sponsored milk market program
which offered them low and fluctuating prices. Boycotting the government
program, they formed their own cooperative under the leadership of a
farmer-member. By 1947 eight village cooperatives with 432 members had
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formed a cooperative union. These were difficult times for the cooperative
and in 1949 they called on the assistance of Verghese Kurien whom, it
seems, destiny had brought to their village. Along with the farmers, Kurien
learned how the problems of milk production and marketing within a village
cooperative framework could be overcome. As they learned, other cooperatives were formed and brought within the organizational umbrella. Gradually methods were refined, and the organization that was eventually to
become the NDDB grew-from the bottom up-adding new layers and
branches as it grew, always under the sustained leadership of Kurien.
Appropriate management systems to meet the demands of the program were
worked out through experience. The values of integrity, service, and commitment to the poorest member-producers were deeply imbedded in its
emerging structures. Management staff were hired fresh from school, trained
through experience on the job, indoctrinated in the values of the program,
and advanced rapidly as the program grew.
BANGLADESH RURAL ADVANCEMENT COM!.\IITEE

~

~

BRAC was formed in early 1972 under the leadership of Mr. F. H. Abed,
a practicing accountant, as a modest relief effort to resettle refugees in the
Sulla area of Northeast Bangladesh following the war of partition with
Pakistan. Those involved soon learned that relief alone was not going to
overcome the miserable conditions in which even the successfully resettled
refugees were forced to live, and it was decided to reorient their efforts
toward village-level development.
A multi-sectoral program was evolved which included construction of
community centers, functional education, agriculture, fisheries, cooperatives, health and family planning, and vocational training for women. In
each sector early failures led to program modifications. For example the
teaching methods and lesson plans of the functional education program
were substantially revised to make them more relevant to village life. In
the health program they turned to use of paramedics, with physicians reorienting their roles to be first trainers, second planners, and only lastly
curers'. But close monitoring of the villages in which they were working
revealed to BRAC staff that they still were not producing the results they
wanted. Too few of its programs were addressing the needs of the landless.
Conflicting interests of landed and landless made it nearly impossible to
address the interests of each within a single village association. Each sectoral
activity tended to operate independently of the others. Village activities
remained overly dependent on the presence of BRAC staff The paramedics
tended to concentrate on cures rather than prevention. The literacy program
was not producing useable skills.
BRAC programs had fallen into the patterns of most sectoralized gov-
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ernment sponsored rural development efforts-with similar results. Again
a major review was undertaken to assimilate the lessons learned and evolve
a change in strategy. The new strategy would concentrate entirely on the
poorest 50% of the village population-defined operationally as those families whose livelihoods depended in part on selling labor to third partiesand program initiatives would come largely from the beneficiaries. When
entering a new village, an initial survey identified members of the target
group. Informal discussions at traditional gathering places served to identify
the major concerns of this group and to single out those with leadership
potential. Discussion groups grew until a village assembly of the poor
became formalized. Leaders received training at a special BRAC center in
organizing and consciousness-raising methods.
To insure against dependence on BRAC and to discourage participation
by those only interested in handouts, initial activities developed by the group
had to be carried out exclusively with local resources. Only when the group
had proven capable in mobilizing such resources were supplemental BRAC
resources offered. Education provided literacy and numeracy skills, but was
designed concurrently to raise consciousness of class exploitation and to
build commitment to group action. The activities dealt with truly basic
needs such as demands for a rightful share in government programs; bargaining for improved wages, share cropping and landlease terms; and
schemes to gain control over productive assets. Women's activities
emphasized productive employment, often involving difficult physical work
under a food-for-work program. All schemes were planned and implemented
under the supervision of leaders from the target group.
As the strongest possible indication that BRAC's new approach was
indeed responding in an effective way to strongly felt needs, the program
was being self-replicated by the villages themselves. As one village set out
to organize another to protect its newly negotiated gains in wages and
contract terms, the landless of other villages came from miles away asking
organized villages to help them achieve the same.
At about the time that BRAC moved from a sectoral to a more peoplecentered approach, it also established a research unit to advance the understanding of its staff of rural poverty. Questions were addressed such as:
Who controls what assets in the rural village and how? How are some
families able to advance themselves while others become increasingly
impoverished? What is the peasant's perception of famine and credit?
Participatory research techniques such as the use of peasant panels to
generate data on peasant perceptions of famine and credit proved highly
effective. Researchers and field workers often exchanged roles or worked
jointly to insure that research was fully integrated with operations. By
January 1980, 378 BRAC staff were working with some 800 villages.
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As an official of Thailand's development planning agency responsible for
observing government programs in action from 1965 to 1971, Mechai
Veravaidya reached two conclusions: I) the government's development
programs were largely failing because they were designed from the top
down, involved no participation of the people, and seldom provided effective
follow-up on completed projects; and 2) the few gains made were rapidly
overtaken by Thailand's rapid population growth. Mechai left the planning
agency in 1971 and began experimenting with the idea of bringing family
planning closer to the people. He tried having a doctor offer family planning
services in a local school. The people responded, but he could not get a
second doctor interested. He tried using student recruiters to send potential
acceptors to a clinic. The doctors liked this approach, but the people didn't.
After a variety of failures he tried in 1974 a totally new approach which
would not be dependent on physicians. Shopkeepers were recruited in each
of five villages, given a supply of birth control pills, instructed in their
use, and encouraged to sell them for a small commission. Good sales led
to recruitment of seventy new distributors. Expansion continued thereafter
and Mechai eventually set up a new organization specifically to service his
distributors and expand the program.
As the program expanded, Mechai became preoccupied with the design
and operation of strong management systems consistent with the needs of
the village-level operations. Continuous testing and revision resulted in
important changes in supervisory, resupply, and reporting systems. New
layers of management were added as required. As top management became
further and further removed from field operations he instituted a requirement that each make periodic visits to the villages with local supervisors
to keep them grounded in village reality. Finding donor-mandated statistical
reporting systems cumbersome and oflittle utility, he drastically simplified
reporting requirements to gather only the most basic of performance
information, directly related to program operations. Color coded graphs
and monthly staff meetings were mechanisms for encouraging staff to make
regular use of this data. Unimpressed with the utility of conventional impact
surveys which did not relate to administrative units and produced results
only after the time for action had passed, he devised his own "mini-survey"
method by which his supervisors gathered data from a sample of households
each month, processed the data, and put it to immediate use.

unless there is a close correspondence between: beneficiary needs and
program output; program task requirements and the distinctive competence
of the assisting organization; and the mechanisms for beneficiary demand
expression and the decision processes of the assisting organization (see
figure 1).
The various programs examined in the cases above each found a particular solution to the requirement for fit appropriate to its time and circumstance. If we look to these experiences for a program or an organizational
blueprint for replication elsewhere we are only likely to be disappointed.
It is to the process of their development that we must look for the most
useful lessons. The nature and significance of this process is best understood
by contrasting it with a more conventional approach to development
programming, understood as the "blueprint" approach.
THE BLUEPRINT APPROACH

This approach, with its emphasis on careful pre-planning, reflects the
textbook version of how development programming is supposed to work_
Researchers are supposed to provide data from pilot projects and other

SCHEMATIC REPRESENT ATI ON OF FIT REQUIREMENTS
PROGRAM

The Common Feature: A Learning Process
The performance of a development program can be characterized as a
function of the fit achieved between beneficiaries, program, and assisting
organization. In more specific terms a given development program is likely
to perform poorly in terms of advancing the well-being of a specific group
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studies from which project designers will choose the most cost-effective
designs for achieving given outcomes. Administrators of the implementing
organizations are supposed to execute the project plan faithfully, much as
a building contractor would follow construction blueprints, specifications,
and schedules. Once implementation is complete an evaluation researcher
is supposed to measure actual changes in the target population and report
actual versus planned changes to the planners at the end of the project cycle
so that blueprints can be revised.
Its clear-cut order, allocation of funds for precisely-stated outcomes,
reliance on "hard" data and expert ~udgment, and the clearly-stated implementation schedules make project justification easy in budget presentations.
It is a programming approach quite appropriate to certain types of development projects-most notably physical infrastructure projects-where the
task and outcomes are defined, environment stable, and cost predictable.
Unfortunately, however, in rural development the objectives are more often
multiple, ill-defined, and subject to negotiated change; task requirements
are unclear; environments are constantly changing; and costs are unpredictable. Although knowledge is severely limited, the blueprint approach
calls for behaving as if it were nearly perfect. Where there is need to build
institutional capacity for sustained action on unfamiliar development problems, it assumes that development actions are terminal and that hastily
assembled temporary organizations will suffice. Where the need is for a
close integration of knowledge-building, decision-making, and action-taking
roles, it sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional
locations of the researcher, the planner and the administrator.
Awareness is becoming widespread that the blueprint approach is an
inadequate response to the rural development problem, but its assumptions
and procedures continue to dominate most rural development programming and to provide the core content of most training courses in development management. This is unlikely to change until viable options are understood and supported.
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Examination of the three Asian success cases suggests that the blueprint
approach never played more than an incidental role in their development.
None was designed and implemented. Each emerged out of a long-term
learning process in which villages and program personnel shared their
knowledge and resources to create a fit between needs, actions, and the
capacities of the assisting organization. Each had a leader who spent time
in the villages with an idea, tried it, accepted and corrected his errors, and
built a larger organization around the requirement of what he learned.
In each instance the overall process can be broken down into three
stages, each with its own unique learning requirement (see figure 2). The
elements of each stage can be described roughly as follows:
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Stage 1: Learning to be effective. One or more teams of highly qualified
personnel are sent to one or more villages which constitute their learning
laboratory or pilot site. Here they develop a familiarity with the problem
in question from the beneficiary's perspective and try out some promising
approaches to addressing joinrly identified needs. They may be supported
by a variety of external resource persons with expertise in the social, managerial, and related technical sciences. Errors will be common and the
resource inputs required will be high relative to results. It is assumed that
rapid adaptive action will be taken as errors in initial assumptions are
identified.
Stage 2: Learning to be efficient. As insights are gained into what to
do, attention is redirected to learning how to do it more efficiently, eliminating activities which are relatively nonproductive and working out simplified problem-solving routines for handling critical activities within the grasp
of less skilled persons. New learning laboratory sites may be selectively
established to test and further refine such methods-simultaneously giving
additional personnel experience in their application.
Stage 3: Learning to expand. Then attention is again redirected, this
time to the phased development of a supporting organization geared to the
requirements of carrying out the prescribed activities on a larger scale. It
requires building into the organization the supporting skills, management
systems, structures, and values.

response, the organization's members become skilled in hiding such errors.
Those in authority, thus removed from operating reality, are reassured that
as a result of their "brilliant" leadership everything is going just as intended.
They may impress the unwary visitors with their briefings on program
accomplishments. But to more sophisticated observers the claim that a
program addressed to the rural poor is working effectively exactly as originally planned is a sure indicator that mistakes are being hidden, that leadership is ineffective, and that actual program operations are probably in a
state of disarray which bears little resemblance to what has been described.
In the defeated organization the source of error is assumed to stem from
forces beyond the control of the organization's members. Thus while adverse
factors may be discussed in rich detail, no action is taken. When individual
members feel impotent and therefore refer all problems to their superiors
for action, they render their superiors equally impotent, ultimately
immobilizing the entire organization.
In the learning organization error is treated as an essential source of
information. Since some margin of error is treated as inevitable, particularly
in the early stages of the learning process, it is viewed neither as a sign
of failure, nor of environment perversity. Error is discussed candidly in
such organizations, but in the context of lessons learned and corrective
actions being attempted. There may be no surer indicator that an organization has effective leadership.
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The three stages as represented here are a simplified abstraction of what
in reality may be a very disorderly and largely intuitive process. Yet the
abstraction helps to explicate an alternative to the blueprint approach to
programming.
A key point worth special note is that in the cases examined, there was
no thought given to simply testing a program model in a pilot context and
then leaving it to others to implement. To the contrary, each was distinguished by a substantial continuity of personnel. The people who had the
experience of figuring out an original program design capable of doing the
job were the same people who then built an organization around that model
adapted to its requirements.
THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION

Any pre-planned intervention into a varied and constantly changing sociotechnical system inevitably will be in error by some margin; the outcome
will nearly always deviate from the outcome intended. It is the response
to this error that tells the true character of the organization and its
leadership.
In the self-deceiving organization those in authority treat error as synonymous with failure and seek to place blame on some guilty party. In

NEW ROLE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES

While the demand for greater sensitivity to the dynamics of social behavior
in rural development programming is now notably high, the influence of
the social sciences in programming decisions is notably low. Given the roles
normally accepted by social scientists in relation to action programs, their
limited influence is hardly surprising. In their role of summary evaluator
they have mainly engaged in documenting failure long after the time for
corrective action has passed. In doing social soundness assessments, they
have most often been called in after the basic choices affecting project design
have been made to certify that there will not be serious adverse social
consequences. In testing the program concepts in pilot projects, they have
been asked to certify program blueprints when in reality the results achieved
will often reflect more the operational competence of the organization which
has done the implementation than the specific validity of the program
design. In carrying out baseline surveys there is seldom any real presumption
that the data will be used as a substantive input to planning. More likely
the survey was contracted only to meet a requirement set in some programming document for baseline evaluation data.
What is all too rare is for the social scientists to help an organization
build its capacity to actually use social science knowledge and data as a
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normal part of its operating routine. What the case studies suggest as needed
is a willingness to experiment with new research methods by researchers
committed to providing action agency personnel with simple tools to facilitate their rapid collection and interpretation of social data directly relevant
to action for which they are responsible. The task is to make a demystified
social science available as every person's tool, turning agency personnel,
and in some instances the villagers themselves, into more effective action
researchers.
This most often seems to involve disciplined observation, guided interviews and informant panels rather than formal surveys; emphasizing timeliness over rigor; employing oral more than written communication; offering
informed interpretation rather than extensive statistical analysis; making
narrative rather than numerical presentations; and giving attention to the
processes unfolding and to intermediate outcome data required for rapid
adaptation, rather than dwelling on detailed assessment of"final" outcomes.
Rather than provide the static profiles found in the typical socio-economic
survey, it involves a quest to understand the dynamics of the socio-technical
systems that govern village life, to provide a basis for operational-level
predictions of the consequences of given development interventions. It
means identifying target group members and behaviors in terms relevant
to progrnm action rather than simply producing aggregated statistics.
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Application to an Established Bureaucracy
The framework of the learning process approach can be applied in either
of two ways. One is by building an entirely new program and organizationfrom the bottom up-as illustrated in the three cases discussed earlier. The
other is by introducing an analogue of this same process within an established organization which seeks to build a new capacity for effective villagelevel action. The methodologies for the latter application are presently being
worked out by the Philippines' National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
in an effort directed toward strengthening its capacity to work in effective
support of small farmer owned and operated (communal) gravity-fed irrigation
systems.
Concerned that the communal irrigation system it was assisting often
fell into disrepair and disuse soon after rehabilitation construction was
completed, NIA officials concluded that attention was needed to strengthen
the water user associations concurrently with work on physical construction.
They first selected for special attention two systems scheduled for assistance.
Since the NIA had no community organizers of its own, a number of experienced organizers were hired on a temporary basis to work with NIA
engineers on these systems. The idea was to integrate the social and technical
aspects of the work-developing the social and technical capacity of the
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water user association through active involvement of its members in such
activities as planning system layout, obtaining water rights and rights of
way, organizing volunteer labor inputs to system construction, and exerting
control over project expenditures. Known as the Laur Project, the experience established that such integration was at once important and difficult
to achieve.
In one community, local power struggles emerged which led to a twoyear postponement of construction plans. In the second community, a high
level of cohesion greatly facilitated farmer involvement, but seldom in ways
which made life easier for project staff. Delays resulted from farmer demands
for scheduling and design changes. The use of volunteer labor posed unfamiliar problems of supervision worked out only through lengthy meetings.
The engineers did not always welcome farmer interest in monitoring purchases and limiting the staffs personal use of vehicles operated on gasoline
charged to the farmers' loan account. Particularly tense was a conflict in
judgment between farmers and engineers as to whether the materials chosen
for dam construction would withstand the force of local floods. Farmers
said no. Engineers said yes. (The farmers won a Pyrrhic victory when the
dam, finally constructed to the engineers' specifications, washed out a few
months after completion.)
At this stage the pilot projects were a failure from the standpoint of
any normal evaluation criteria. But it was quite evident to those involved
that the weakness was not in the basic concept- it was in the as-yet-limited
capacity of the NIA to make it work. And the experience provided extensive
insights as to what was required to develop that capacity on both the technical and institutional sides. A major commitment to further learning was
implied, involving major changes in the NIA's structure and operating
procedures.
A series of new pilot projects was initiated, the designs of which were
carefully worked out to incorporate the lessons of the earlier Laur experience. New personnel were brought in and thoroughly trained in these
lessons. A top-level national communal irrigation committee was established
to coordinate the learning process under the leadership of NIA Assistant
Administrator Benjamin Bagadion, a man with total dedication to the idea
of independent farmer owned and operated irrigation systems. The committee included central level NIA officials, representatives of related action
agencies, and senior members of collaborating academic and research
institutions-each of whom had a major day-to-day commitment to the
effort. A new social science research program supported by the Ford Foundation was introduced to build within the NIA the new skills, methods, and
systems it would require for its new participative approach. Social scientists
from the Institute of Philippine Culture developed guidelines for rapid
collection and assessment by NIA field staff of"institutional profiles" which
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contained social-institutional data critical to project selection and planning.
They also observed field activities and produced monthly "process documentation" reports which provided non-evaluative narrative feedback on
key process events.
Concurrently, management experts from the Asian Institute of Management assessed the fit between requirements of the new methods for assisting
communals and the existing NIA management systems, advised on new
management roles and procedures, assisted in planning the organizational
change process, and coordinated workshops for NIA managers and engineers
on the new methods. On the technical side, an agricultural engineering
team from the International Rice Research Institute and the University
of the Philippines at Los Banos was developing simplified methods for
diagnosis and correction of common water management problems by farmers
and NIA engineers, and designing water management systems suited to
needs of small water user associations.
Once the new methods for assisting the communal projects seemed to
be proving more successful in the second round of pilot projects or learning
laboratories, a second set of 12 sites was chosen, one in each region of the
country, to test their broader application and to begin building the basis
for the expansion stage. As of mid-1980 the NIA was perhaps half way
through the learning process on which it had embarked three and a half
years earlier. It was likely to be a total of seven or eight years before the
new capacity would be in place throughout the agency. Such a lengthy
undertaking does not fir well with normal donor programming cycles and
requires uncommon commitment, patience, and continuity of leadership.
Bur it may be exactly the type of undertaking in which any major agency
concerned with being effective in assisting the rural poor must become
engaged.
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The programming methods which gained currency in the days of largescale capital infrastructure project construction continue to dominate development action, even though they are manifestly inappropriate to the require·
ments of new style programming. However, a basis can be found in current
experience for the formulation of alternative and more appropriate programming frameworks and methods based on a learning process approach
which recognizes that in working with rural people, our knowledge of what
is needed and our institutional capacity to do this are both limited. There
should be no call for endless research. Bur neither should there be contin·
uation of blind action based on inappropriate statements of the problem
and ineffectual implementing organizations. The challenge is to integrate
action-raking, knowledge-creation, and institution-building into a coherent
learning process, as a number of relatively more successful development
programs are already doing.
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Orpnizine the Rural Poor
We have noted the tendency of development to be done to the poor, and we
have emphasized the poor's failure to benefit from much of the doing. Of the
remedies which have been proposed, none have been so hotly debated as those
11 Frequent shifting of field staff, and the destructive effects this had on program cootinuity, contributed irnporuntly to the incfl'eaivencss of development programs in Dharampur,
where the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, carried out a major study (Gupta 1981).
14 Thus, notwithstanding the IDllny substantive ditflCUlties of the community-«wJopment ~ iu "failure• may have been u much a result of its not beins liven the time to
ac:complish iu objectives u of any fundamental inability to do so (Uphotf, Cohen, and Goldsmith
1979, p. 19).
is See Lele (197S, p. 177) for a similar approach.
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dealing with organization of the poor themselves." The basic notion is simple
enough: link the poor into Brewster's •continually widening network of larger,
specialized units of collection action," thus helping them better to solve local
problems, to make demands on the broader system, and generally to become
involved in the choice and execution of development programs. A great variety of organizational techniques have been adopted in pursuit of these goals.
Interest-group organiz.ations have linlced the poor •horizontally" with other
people to form units of collective action; cooperatives, self-help groups, political unions, farmers' associations, and the li1ce are obvious examples. Numerous '"vertically" linked organizations have tied poor people directly into the
larger socioeconomic structure, with little emphasis on the fonnation of local
groups: some agricultural extension efforts, health clinic and paramedic programs, and attempts to reach the poor with credit and market opportunities
suggest the range of those vertically oriented activities.
In this section, we adopt a broad view encompassing both styles of organization and, indeed, including any linkage system in which poor people themselves constitute at least one end of the link." Our goal is to analyze the perfonnancc of past efforts to organize the rural poor, and from that analysis to
shape practical guidelines for the design of more effective organiz.ation
policies.

The Social Context
We have argued that the perspectives of academics, analysts, and planners
arc often distorted by the presumption that they have a clean slate on which to
write their policy recommendations. This is particularly evident in studies on
organiz.ation of the rural poor: '"Thus, many scholars . . . tend to treat the
existing peasantries as some exotic social type characterised by a basic benevolence and by being relatively undifferentiated. But these assumptions do not
obtain in actuality. Socio-economic differentiation and kinship loyalties
emerge into prominence among factors affecting differential participation by
individuals in . . . organization" (Migot-Adholla, as quoted in Hunter 1971,
pp. 2-3). In addition, even the least developed community is li1cely to possess
1• Tilia and the following section dn.w heavily on rea:nt worlc by Duid Konen. We are
deeply indebted to him for his critical comments on our ideas and for let tin& us see a n urn ber of his
unpublished papen. Amoncthe published worb we ha"W:dnawn upon are Konen (1979a, 1979c,
1980a,and 1981). In retrospect, we wish that we had also drawn on Mancur Olson's ( 1971) lofic
of Co/Jtttiw Action. It has much to say that is relevant to organization of the rural poor; our work
is the poorer for not having utilized it.
11 This is the criterion by which - "Cf'llln.le the !1Uhjcct matter oft hi.~ 50"1ion frnni that ".If
the ICCtion on "Orp.ni.zing the Facilitaton~ (becinning on p. 199). The latter ICCl.ion deals with
linlcasea relevant to the organization o( staff activities within the broader context of development
administration. Ahhouch (it is hoped) thex staft' activities are uhimately concerned with reaching
the poor, the orpnizationaJ problems of stalfm& and controlling a large marlcetinc board or
extension tcrvice are radically different from those of mobilizing a score of peasants into "'reciprocally helpful behaviors.~ "The distinction blurs, of courx, at the interfac% where staff mceu the
poor, and WI: will dUcuss this critical area explicitly.
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some external linkages through the activities of priests, traders, tax collect on,
or agents of civil administrations (Uphoff and Esman 1974).
Efforts to organize the rural poor arc in reality efforts to reorganize, to
create new patterns of linkage different from the old ones which already bind
them. Effective policies for reorganization begin with a recognition of what the
existing linkages are, and how they affect the well-being of the rural poor. We
shall not attempt to review the extensive sociological and anthropological literature on the structure of rural communities." Restating some central themes
of that literature will be appropriate, however, if for no other reason than that
they are so commonly overlooked in efforts to formulate policy for rural
organization.
The phrase "traditional community structure" covers such a range of specific realities that we hesitate to use it even in the strategic context of the present
essay. Nonetheless, for some common organizational features of rural communities in the late~eveloping countries the term "traditional" remains a practical shorthand. The most important such feature for our present discussion is
the dominance of immediate personal ties as a form of organizational linkage.
Aid, protection, cooperation, and reciprocal obligations arc looked for primarily within groups defined by extended family and kinship ties: Such groups
arc eniercd by birth, and given up, if at all, only through drastic wrenching of
the social fabric. They thus stand in radical contrast to "'modem" groups
linked together through specific (but transient and limited) common interests.
In the early da)'s of the cooperative and community-<ievclopment movements, many argued that the traditional forms of cooperation could be
smoothly taken over by cooperation within modem interest groups. Experience bas been unkind to this hope. A wide consensus has emerged that
interest-group organization ..involves different kinds of action, for different
purposes, by people in different relationships with each other, from the kinds
of action, purpose and relationship enshrined in traditional co-operative activity. " 19 The relevant questions for policy have become, When is a transition
from traditional modes of organization desirable and feasible? and, How, and
to what extent. is that transition to be affected1
Such questions cannot be ans"WCrcd, however, without reference to a second
important feature of rural organization: its socioeconomic differentiation.
'"The rural poor" are not a homogeneous group. In this respect rural communities in the lat.c-<ieveloping world arc much lilc.e communities everywhere: a few
individuals, by birth or Juel( or labor, are much better situated than anyone
else. They have accumulated sufficient wealth, power, and skill that these re11 Brewster ( 1967) and Hunter (1969) provide useful reviews of that litenture. Sec abo
Friedland (1969). Epstein (1973), Migdal (1974), Scott (1976),and Victor lkhendu's discussion of
"Social Determinants ol Agricultural Cllan&c• in Anthony et al. (1979, chap. 6).
19 Sec Hunter ( 1972, p. 193) summarizin1 papen by Hyden, Migot-Adbolla, and others
in the Uppsala seminar on '"Cooperatives and Run! Development in East Africa•; Wldstnnd
(1970); Oocombe (1971, pp. 161-98).
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toUfCet feed on one another, creating more of each. Such privileged positions
..,-ty always come to entail disproportionate ownership of land and other
ICIJ"CC productive assets. Differentiation of a small group distinguished by
accumulated assets virtually guarantees differentiation of a much larger group
distinguished by the relative lade of such assets-in our case the small farmer
and the landless laborers. Between these two extremes lie a variety of other
tocioeconomic strata with a range of asseu, objectives, and organizational
connections. The most significant for rural development are those with ties to
viaorous outside structures, be they religious, economic, or political in character (Hyden 1970, pp. 61-80).
·
The problem ofelites. Traditional group structures and strong patterns
of social differentiation often combine to create a system of orgattlzation dominated by a few powerful local elites. The elites are linked to the poor through a
variety of patronage/ dependency relationships. As we noted earlier, because
of the traditional group attitudes ingrained in most members of the community, people look for help to kinfolk, or at most to individuals whom they know
personally. But the locally acknowledged stratification ensures that only individuals with wealth or contacts arc seen as able to offer such help, especially in
situations dealing with the "outside... The poor then tender support of various
kinds in exchange for, and expectation of, such patronage. In general, the
exchange reinforces the stratification on which it is based. Patronage further
secures the privileged position of the elite, while the reciprocal dependency
further undermines the position of the poor (Hunter 1969, pp. 38, 70).
Viewed through the glasses of egalitarian ideology, the power oflocal elites
appears to be just one more unmitigated evil visited on the long-5uffering rural
poor. Such a perspective, however, is both narrow and distorted. The emergence of a local elite can mean many things, among them the beginning of the
rural community's ability to impose itself on the outside world. As we shall see
later in this chapter, local elites arc also an important if imperfect source of
hom~own., grass-roots leadership-a resource both scarce and invaluable
for promoting the transition from traditional kin-group to modern intercstgroup forms of local organization.
Political and entrepreneurial elites have performed similar linkage functions
throughout Western history, as well as in many of the developing countries.
That they have also, and simultaneously, exploited the people they were leading constitutes one of those moral ambiguities of action which malcc serious
debate about organizational issues so difficult and so rare.
About the exploitation itself there can be no question. The evidence from
the developing countries is monotonous and depressing. Most attempts to
organize the rural poor, if they surtive at all, are "captured.. by the local elites,
who use them to enhance position, power, and wealth more effectively than
before. This was the case in early efforts to build political organization at the
local level (Leys 1971; Chambers 1974, p. 86). It is the fate of most functioning
cooperatives (lnayatullah 1972; Hunter 1971, p. 2) and community--Oevcl-
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opment programs (Holdcroft 1978, p. 15). It almost certainly is the future o(
most of today's New Directions programs, cast as they are in the old
community-development mold (Kortcn 1980a, pp. 482-85).
Experience with such exploitation has led prudent development workers to
conclude that chances for effective local reorganization along interest-group
lines will be greatly enhanced wherever social conditions provide a relatively
unstratified population, a relatively equitable distribution of assets, or a means
of holding elites at least partially accountable in their leadership. Th.is is undoubtedly true as far as it goes; impressive quantitative support is provided by
the Asian survey data of Uphoff and Esman ( 1974). There has been a tendency, however, for some analysts to take the argument a step further. They then
suggest that "deparochializ.ation" of the masses, radical land refonn, and popular control or removal of the local elite are necessary preconditions for effective rural reorganization.
This is a very serious claim. A precondition. in common usage, is something
you can't do anything about. Accepting the notion of preconditions therefore
means abandoning as untouchable some of the most important goals of rural
development, for instance, social modernization, increased equity, and greater
popular control More precisely, it means declaring that these goals are things
that incremental policies of local reorganization can't do anything about; it
means admitting that people wishing to obtain them should consult revolutionaries, not policymakers. As we argued in chapter l, revolution may indeed
be necessary to improve conditions of the rural poor when social conditions
render incremental improvements infeasible. The historical fact that revolutions usually devastate the lives of many people (especially the poor), and that
they seldom fulfill their promises, merely emphasizes the sadness and the seriousness of the choice.
In this light, it seems to us that the responsibility of the analyst-indeed his
greatest challenge-is to discover and promote programs of incremental improvements which are feasible, within the constraints of the social context that
the poor actually face. In much of the developing world, this context does
include tradition, stratification, and patronage-all of which indeed make it
likely that most efforts to reorganize the poor will fail. But for analysts to
demand a clean slate, uncluttered by such historical constraints, as a precondition for analysis is a failure of another sort, one which we arc tempted to call a
failurc of nerve.
Adopting a perspective that views considerations of social context as con.. ~traints on, rather than preconditions for, reorganization makes a great practi.,.. dll difference. Constraints, wc argued in chapter I, need not be taken as fixed
but instead may be slowly relaxed through carefully implemented policies of
reform and redesign. The relevant question for policymakers is how to do this
gradual relaxing. In general, wc concur with those development workers who
see this as a two-part problem. Fint, it is necessary to design local organizations that link rural poor people with one another and with the larger social
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sr-tem- Second, it is necessary to design higher-order support organizations
that protect the local groups, help them perform their problem-solving functions, and integrate their needs with those of society at large. We discuss these
two facets of the organiz.atio~esign problem in the remainder of this chapter.

Participation As ln-wstmmt
Why have efforts to reorganize the poor into nontraditional linkage patterns so often failed to improve rural well-being? The vested interests of local
elites doubtless constitute one reason. Another is the hostility or apathy to
meaningful reorganization so often displayed by central government administrations. We argued in chapter I, however, that analysts commonly overrate
the contribution of venality to policy failures and underrate the contribution
of self-delusion. This is almost certainly true in the contemporary debate on
rural reorganization.
There have been numerous sincere efforts to discover more effective ways of
organiring the rural poor. These, however, have produced an array of apparently contradictory findings which may confuse policymakers as much as help
them. Thus, some analysts conclude that a major obstacle to greater participation by the poor is the existence of strong, antiegalitarian local elites; others
conclude that effective participation requires strong, grass-roots leadership,
which when present at all usually emerges from the ranks of the elite. Some
argue that the appropriate size of the "primary group" oflocal organization is
the village or an even larger unit; others arc adamant that only small, relatively
homogeneous and ..like-minded" groups work well in practice. Cogent analyses arc advanced that the most successful local organizations serve multiple
functions; yet single-industry institutions like the Indian National Dairy Development Board, the Kenya Tea Development Authority, and the Colombia
Coffee Association arc widely acknowledged to be among the brightest
achievements of developmenL Many stress that local groups need a multiplicity of linkages with the larger socioeconomic system if they are to be effective;
other respected students oflocal organization argue that the most important
goals of local organization often arc achieved as soon as a small, primary
grouping has been forged. Moreover, they argue, these primary achievements
arc jeopardized by efforts to build larger, more efficient, more tightly integrated structures. The list of apparent contradictions could be extended
indefinitely.
Planning parriciparion. The sad fact is that analysts, planners, and politicians simply do not know what kind of local organization is actually in the
poor's interests. The delusion that sufficient cogitation can overcome this
ignorance-that the "newest direction" will finally be the right direction-may
be a greater obstacle than ignorance itself to designing better reorganization
programs.
The self-delusion of analysts and advisors manifests itself in many ways.
Most obvious is the continued commitment to programs on the basis of their
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piofcssed form rather than their revealed function. Thus development
planners continued to advocate cooperatives modeled on a strict EnglishScandinavian Rochdale pattern long after actual performance had demonstrated that this was inappropriate for most developing countries. Why? Because everyone knew that the Rochdale plan was designed with the express
intent of ensuring that maximum benefits would flow to coop members (Hunter 1971).
The policy-analysis perspective discussed in chapter 1 suggests that where
intellectual cogitation has proved delusory as a problem-resolving technique,
greater provision should be made for social interaction-for acting out those
parts o! the problem most resistant to thinking-through solutions. In parti.allar, to avoid the pitfall of self-delusion the planner needs to supplement intellectual cogitation with interactive signals or feedback through which he can
learn when a program is actually benefiting the poor. Many interactive mechanisms suggest themselves once reorganization is perceived as a problem of
choosing and learning rather than one of discovering and knowing.JI> We shall
focus on one such mechanism. somewhat akin to the concept of induced institutional innovation developed by Davis, North, Haya.mi. and Ruttan.2 1 In·
essence, we shall propose that the poor themselves signal what is in their interests, by means of their decision to invest their scarce resource of active participation in a particular local reorganization. Let us consider the implications of
this shift in perspective.
The term "participation" appears with great frequency, emotion, and looseness in the development debate. This imprecision may have rhetorical value in
certain political contexts, but for purposes of analysis it serves merely to cover
up fuzzy or nonexistent thinking. We shall follow Uphoff and Esman ( 1974, p.
81), using "participation" in its ex ante sense of"before-the-fact involvement in
the choices and efforts producing benefits. '"2l When we intend the economists'
ex post sense of after-the-fact distribution of benefits, we shall say so explicitly.
the abilEx ante participation in effective organizations can greatly
ity of the rural poor to solve local problems and to make demands on the larger
social system. In many circumstances, participation in '"units of collective action" may be poor people's only organizational alternative to continued dependency on traditional or state patrons. In fact. a consensus approaching
dogma has emerged throughout the development community that effective
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ll 'This is a thrnie that we will return to throughout the prc:sent chapter. bow to design
orpnizations not as aruwcrs to problems of calculation and control but as means of learning.
through interaction, how colkcti'l'C social action can be more effecti¥Cly promoted.
21 A "theory of institutional innovation" is set for1h by Davis and North ( 1971). This is
exp&ndcd and applied to the dC"l'Clopment context in Hayami and Rutt.an (1971), Ruttan (1978),
and Hayami (1978). Most of this latter wort has emphasized the r.cdulological component of the
innovation opportunity, wc stress the personal pcrspecti'l'C of the rural "investor.• The two views,
wc believe, an: complementary.
n Additional useful pcnpectivcs on the treatment of "participation• an: liven in
Ownben (1974, pp. 84--88); Lodae (1970); and Huntington and Nelson (1976).
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participation by the poor is a siN qua non for development strategics seeking
major improvements in rural 'NCO.being.
7M co.rts ofparticipation. Both political rhetoric and academic arguments on development strategy have tended to treat participation in local organization as a free good, desirable in unlimited quantities. This is particuJarly
evident in the credo of New Directions planning. one of the more recent
schools to hold forth on the development stage. The World Bank's sector
paper on rural development policy typifies the trend, unreservedly endorsing
more "participation by the rural poor in the planning and implementation
processes through loc::al government, project advisory committees, cooperatives and other forms of group organization" (World Bank 197S). Nor is the
enthusiasm confined to official agencies with political clientele. A thoughtful
academic review concludes that "participation should not be viewed as a separate program or sector for rural development, but rather as an a pp roach to be
integrated as feasibk in all development activities" (Uphoff, Cohen, and
Goldsmith 1979, p. 28; emphasis added).
There is much to support in such sentiments. Nonetheless, the policyanalysis perspective warm us that feasible panicipation is not ncccssarily useful or desirable participation. Chambcn decries the pernicious influence of
"'those who, for ideological reasons, or because they arc simple-minded, or
more commonly from a combination of these causes, rcify 'the people' and
'participation' and push them beyond the reach of empirical analysis" (1974, p.
109).
Whatever its cause, the '"more is better" view of participation flies in the face
of both experience and common sense. Anyone who has been active in a local
government council, a committee of concerned citizens, or a community
cooperative knows a truth virtually ignored in the current development debate: effective local organization is expensive to those who choose to participate in it.
Concerting reciprocally helpful behaviors requires that individuals join together in social problem-solving efforts. Through some combination of intellectual cogitation and social interaction, these individuals must perform all
those tasks of c:akulation and control we discussed earlier. Linkages of understanding, mutual expectation, and trust must be built and nurtured. Goals
must be agreed upon, conflicts settled, and tasks allocated, all within a shifting
context of incomplete information, personal rivalries, and individual motivations. What~ ebe is involved, organization therefore requires substantial
and continuing investments of time, energy, and personal freedom of action
on the part of participants." This is surely one reason why, even in modernized
n "TheR is nothing noYel about our emphasis on time: and energy u 11Cara: reaouroes (sec
especially March and Oben [ 1976, p. 14 and passim] and also Becker ( 196SD. There lw, ho~.
been remarkably littJe atiention a:iYen to this constraint in the bul)conin1 literature on community
participatiOCl.
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Western societies with multiple opportunities for local organization, studies
show that most people choose not to participate at all.l4 It should not be
surprising to find even lower rates of participation within the traditional societies of the developing world .
Tune, energy, and freedom from unproductive obligations are among the
very few resources that the rural poor possess. The notion that investment of
these scarce resources in local organization is always or often a rational choice
reflects the same peculiar view of reality which can't understand why rural
women don't spend more time at ho~nomics lectures. The behavior of
the poor themselves suggests that they suffer from no such delusion. On the
contrary, the actual choices that poor people make concerning which local
organizations to participate in, and how much participation to offer them,
have much the look of rational investment decisions. In short, poor people
invest their participation when they believe it will secure them valuable benefits not otherwise available at comparable cost, time, and risk.
We shall sec that many of the historical failures and successes oflocal organization efforts begin to make sense, and many of the apparent contradictions
mentioned earlier can be resolved. when viewed from this investment perspective. Moreover, the notion that the poor arc investing participation in organization suggests the relevance of questions familiar from capital-investment
situations: What arc the opportunity costs of committing this scarce resource
to a particular use? What risks do they run and what returns do they expect
from the contemplated commitment? What other means do they have for
achieving comparable returns? Above all, the investment perspective emphasizes that it is poor people themselves who make the investment choice, who
decide whether a proposed program of local organization offers sufficient incentives to attract their personal resources of time, energy, and freedom of
action away from other urgent and competing tasks.
The poor as investors. Our perspective of participation as investment
docs not ..rcify the people," nor is its admitted simplicity altogether simpleminded. We do not assume that the poor make smart investments. We do not
argue that participation is always in everyone's--0r even anyone's-best interests. We argue only that it is poor people's choices of which organizations they
will participate in, not the analysts' discoveries of '"correct" organizational
designs, which result in action on the social front. Moreover, though the
choices made by the poor may not tum out well, they can be and arc made on
the basis of available perceptions. The analysts' discoveries, in contrast, require data and understanding that do not exist now and arc unlikely to become
"'·· ")o"lbc present infatuation with participation is ruch that many will doubt this statement
Consider, however, that comparative studies show the United States to be among the most partic·
ipatory of modernized societies (Abnond and Verb& 1965, chaps. 5, 10). Even in America, however, less than half the people bother to vocc in local elections, less than a third an: active in a !inglc
organintion dealing with community problems, less than one in five has even contacted a local
ao'YmUTICnt official about an issue, less than one in seven has ever formed a group to resolve a
local problem (Verba and N"ic 1972, p. 31).
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available in the foreseeable future. Moreover, what policymakers want-what
they beli~ to be in the poor's interests, what they perceive as '"mcaningfuf'
organiz.ation-is largely irrclevanL Participation is "owned" by the poor. Experience shows that the investment of effective participation caMot be commanded by policymakers but must in.stead be induced. The requirement of
effective policymaking for local organizations is therefore not omniscience but
entrepreneurship: the ability to recognize and design programs capable of mobilizing participation; the ability to abandon as unviable and ill-advised programs unable to attract that invcstmcnL
.. Entrepreneurial" policymalcing will be imperfect, like all its alternatives.
But in a world of inevitable trial and error, it provides a relatively efficient way
of learning when you have guessed wrong. As in the capital-investment analog. the self-proclaimed (or self-deluded) "goodness" of the entrepreneur's
proposal is immaterial. What counts is how attractive the proposal appears to
the investors, and how able and willing they arc to mobilize sufficient resources
for its effective support.
We next propose some entrepreneurial guidelines for the design of local
organiz.ations which should be better able to a~ct investment of participation from the rural poor.

Attractiveness of &nefil.S
One of the most obvious lessons of past experience is that the rural poor will
invest active participation only in an organization that is responsive to their
most intensclyfcltnccds(Hunter 1971). More specifically, they will invest only
in organizations that offer highly desirable and tangible benefits not otherwise
obtainable at similar cost. time, and risk. In part this is due to the opportunity
costs of participation discussed earlier. In part it is because only such needs
and benefits provide sufficient force to overcome the bonds and habits of
traditional organization (Lodge 1970, pp. 146-47).
Available evidence suggests that the ..needs" that most readily induce the
active participation of the rural poor are related to production, in particular
capital formation and income enhancemenL For example, the justifiably famous Anand Milk Producers' Union (later the Indian National Dairy Development Board) grew from acute dissatisfaction of local producers with low
and fluctuating prices offercd by existing commercial markets (Korten I980a ).
Nonetheless, sufficiently urgent consumption-related needs can also serve
the mobilization function. An excellent example is Thailand's Community
Based Family Planning Cooperative, another of the successful organizations
cited by K.orten ( l 980a). In this case, a ~ntrally organized operation identified
a strongly felt need-the desire of rural women for a reliable means of birth
control-and set out to help provide access to the required technology. Little
"selling" of the benefits was necessary, though innovative means of enhancing
the acceptability of those benefits obviously enhanced the program's success.
That success has been substantial: by 1979 women from more than sixteen
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thousand villages were participating through the regular purchase and use of
birth control pills.
The requirement for intensely felt local needs to mobilize active participation is all the more evident when we consider the many experiments in organization where local perceptions of need (or changes in those perceptions) have
been ignored. The latter situation occurred in many previously colonial countries during their time of independence. Active local groups had been organized around intensely felt needs to be rid of colonial administration. Once
independence was obtained, participation in these groups waned or fractured
into smaller conflicting factions built around new, less unifying priorities.
Another example is the cooperatives that have failed to attract the active participation of landless laborers or subsistence farmers because the services they
offered were confined to production loans and marketing aid (Korten 1980a,
p. 481). Many"cooperativcs" have not even pretended a concern with responding to local needs, scclcing instead to exercise control over distnoution and sale
of goods and to promote government directives. The pitfalls of such organiutional designs appear obvious but are nonetheless still widely ignored. K.orten
summarizes a number of critical studies when he decries New Directions programs for their continued '"reliance for the planning and implementation of
'participative' development on centralized bureaucratic organizations which
have little capacity to respond to diverse community~efmed needs" ( l 980a, p.
483).
Ironically, a consequence of the emphasis in U.S. aid programs on New
Directions and "basic human needs" has been a tendency to restrict allocations
for irrigation, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure projects that often rank
high among the felt needs of people in rural areas. Moreover, a very significant
role oflocal organizations or other participatory mechanisms is to enable local
groups to influence decisions about the design and location of roads, irrigation
works, and other infrastructure projects in the light of local knowledge and
priorities.25
Planning benefits. Many analysts have come to identify the problem of
designing participative organizations in terms of "bottom-up" versus "topdown" initiatives. Needless to say, •bottom-up" is good. reflecting the needs of
the people, while "top-down" is bad, reflecting the needs of the bureaucrats.
There is just enough truth in this view to ma.kc it rhetorically attractive. Once
again, however, the willingness to let ideology masquerade as analysis has
hindered rather than helped the policy debate.
Organizing from below, as we shall sec later on, often results in both incffi.,,- Two "'<XDt papers by Tmdler are pertinent to ti- issues. One of the papen DO(eS
that "New-Direct.ions critics ay that infrutnictute projects do not baYC a dirtct imJ*:t on the
rural poor. in comparison to projects in the aius o{ rural health, nutrition and aJricu!turc•
(Tendler 197%, p. v). The other paper emphasiza that an additional advantage of dcoentramrd
manaaement of rural roads projects ia that it facilitates the adoption of labor-using comtructioCI
method• (Tendkr rcma, pp. 42-59).
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dmcicl and grave inequities; the organizers, after all, arc more likely to be the
b;aJ elite than the poor. Conversely, initiatives from above have produced
tome of the most successful and participative local organizations in develop-

history.
To return to a theme we broached at the beginning of this chapter, effective
dcsip of organizations is more complex than the dichotomous isms of popular debate allow. The critical issue is not from where the initiative comes but
whether it in fact promotes the "'fit" oflocally felt needs, available technology,
and organizational means. Sometimes, as in our dairy ex.ample, that initiative
will come from "below" as a spontaneous outpouring of realized need and
recognized potential. Other times, as Chambers ( 1974) has emphasized, a
c:ommunity-devclopment or other "'top-down" initiative will be required to
help local groups identify and articulate their needs.
Our earlier discussion of means-ends relationships in action programs puts
this particular experience of development into a larger perspective. The "intensely felt needs" we refer to in this chapter, like the general "'preferences" we
rdcrrcd to in chapter I, arc not tangible and immutable entities waiting to
serve as passive guides to action. Rather, they arc the product of a continuing
interaction between what people believe they want and what they believe they
can get. Belief and perception arc key elements here. The high-yield varieties of
wheat and rice made available in the Green Revolution po'lll'Crfully altered
farmers' perceptions of what they might get from research and from their
fields. In this context, it has become fashionable among certain analyns to
bemoan the conservatism of the rural poor and the aversity to risk of the
peasant farmer. In other words, poor people have been known to act as though
when things get worse you starve or lose your land or get shaken down by the
big men. while when things get better it is only a matter of time until they get
worse aga.in.26 It is in this context that the notion of ..an intensely felt need"
must be perceived. lf the poor do not look on an organization proposal or a
new technological gadget with great enthusiasm, their "conservatism" may
well have some justification. At a minimum, it is a reality with which a successful cffort to induce the poor's participation must cope. The challenge of designing local organization-from top or bottom-is to understand how risks and
uncertainties color perceptions of needs and bow opportunities can be made
more tangible. Thus we shall emphasize shortly the important role that convincing and realistic demonstration projecu have to play in mobilizing participation in all manner oflocal organizations. More generally, the changing and
relative nature of "intensely fcit needs" suggests that perceptions of feasibility
as well as desirability arc relevant to the individual investing in participation.
and therefore to the design of organizations seeking to call forth that participalnCDl

» This view of life is not unique to poor people in today'1 deYelopin1 countries. Leys
reminds m of Stendhal'1 view that an avmase Frenchman's hicrvchy of Deeds in the days before
the Rnolutioo was "(a) not to be killed; and (b) for 11ood warm coat• (Leys 1971, p. 110).
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tion from the rural poor. One of the most important of these feasibility con:rid·
erations turns out to involve the creation of harmony concerning the objectives the proposed organization will pursue.

Harmony of Objectives
Organizations of the rural poor promote collective social action by, among
other things, surfacing and settling conflicts among potential participants.
When this capability is lacking or underdeveloped, as is too often the case,
"local organizations can become overpoliticizcd, immobilized by factionalism,
with rural development objectives displaced by struggles for local power and
control" (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 82). Our investment perspective empha·
sizes the costs that the surfacing and settling of conflicts imposes on an organization's prospective participants: if too much conflict requires too much time,
energy, or commitment to resolve, then active participation is unlikely to be
mobilized. In this section. we argue that the rural poor arc more inclined to
make sustained investments of participation in organizations that embody a
relative harmony of objectives, that is, organizations in which most participants agree on what the organization should be doing. We focus on the specific
choices of organization design which promote this harmony through effective
and efficient resolution of potential conflicts.
A first step towards understanding the nature of conflict and harmony in
rural organizations is to recognize that different people have different needs
and priorities. We noted earlier how often this truism is rejected by a rhetoric
of development planning which portrays the rural poor as a homogeneous
group with undifferentiated objectives. 21 Even within the broad socioeconomic groups we described in our discussion of social conduct, however, the reality
is that individual people will share some interests but not others. Two landless
laborers, to take a common developing-world example, may agree on goals of
land reform but support different political factions. Two small farmers may
agree on matters of access to cn:dit but disagree over access to water because
one has it and the other needs iL Two women may stand united on the need for
markets in which to sell their household produce but, especially if they belong
to different age groups, may have radically different views on the need for
family-planning support. The list obviously could be continued. In general,
any effort to link people into units of collective action will carry with it the
· potential for conflict as individual members seek to bend the organization to
their own interests and to resist the corresponding activities of other members.
Choice of membership and function. Two design choices arc particu.,, 1' One o( the most important and obvious differenoca, ol ooune, is that between elites
and none lites. We will defer considcratiQQ o( the role playcd by cli1cs in the creation and resolution
of conflict until later (p. 193). This is not because we underestimate the significance of that role;
rather, we wWi to cmphasin: that the problems and costs of conflict resolution must be borne by
an orpniz.ation even when there are no elites com plicatina the local picture. 'The ubiquitous need
to build harmony of objccti't'CI amona participants who dit!'cr in their interests, if not their socioeconomic status, is often overlooked when elites are viewed u the essence of the conflict problem.
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larly important determinants of the kind and degree of conflict which actually
arises over a particular organization's activities. The first is the choice of membership: Who will be included in, and who excluded from, the organization?
The second is the choice of function: What benefits will be pursued by the
organization, and what benefits will be left to other organizations or to individual pursuit? These choices arc interrelated. Effective conflict resolution
does not require that all members of a particular organization share a common
view of what should be done in the world at large. Rather, members need only
to reach reasonably harmonious agreement on who should do what within the
limited range of activities which the organii.ation that links them chooses to
pursue. If the who and the what of organization design arc carefully matched,
the amount of conflict with which participants must contend can be kept within tolerable bounds. This relationship is sketched as a hypothetical example in
figure S.2, which can be used to follow the historical evidence that follows.
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Figure 5.2. Harmony of Objectives.
Notr. This portrays the range of people (or of relatively homogeneous groups) present in a given
community, and in range of activities, functions, or benctiu about which at least one of them feels
sufficiently strongly to in¥CSt participation in an orpnization commincd to iu attainment. In a
particular instance the "people,w who we have labeled wA, B, C, D, ... wmight include (Jroups
of) small farmcn, la.ndlcss laborers, local mcn:hants, unmarried women, and so on. 1bc "functiom: which we haYC labeled "i., ii, iii, iv, v, ... w might include building a tubcwcll, providing
family plannina servia:a, providina acc.ess to markets, and so fonh. In this simple illustration, the
entries in the matrix indicate men:ly whether a particular pcnon (or group) does(+), or docs not
(-),desire the benefits sought throuah a potential function sufficiently intensely to consider investing participation in an organization that adopted that function. A particular organization can be
described (or designed) in terms of which rows and which columns-which members and which
functiom-it includes. This in turn defines the organization in tcnns of which cells of the matrix it
encompasses. Where functions and members are chosen so that all cells encompassed by the
organization cor.uin M•w DW"lc.i, C'ICf)'Onc in the organization wanu it to do exactly the same
things and total hannony over the organization's objectives will prevail. On the other hand, where
functions and members arc chosen so that some cells encompassed by the organization contain M_M
mark$. at least some members may be a.skcd to support the punuit of bcnctiu they do not particularly desire. Other things being equal. we would expect the latter kind of organization to embody
mon: conflict and less harmony oYCr iu objectives, to require more onerous investments in calculation and control ofiu collective actions, and to be a less effective mobi!Uer of sustained panicipa·
tion by the rural poor.
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Conflict problems can arise, as we have said, when more diffcrcnt kinds of
people and more different kinds of functions arc encompassed within the same
organization. Not surprisingly, organizations that arc succ:cssful in attracting
the participation of the rural poor have often limited conflicts over objectives
by limiting membership to relatively homogeneous groups sharing both common identity and common needs. 21 The limited internal conflict of such homogeneous groups was a key characteristic of the fcw successful organizations
identified by a United Nations survey of cooperative cfforts in Asia (UN RISO
1975; sec also Hunter 1978b, chap. 4). The Cornell Committee on Rural Development reached a similar conclusion from its broader survey of a variety of
Asian organizations (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 68); evidence from East
Africa points in the same direction (Hunter 1971, p. 10).
A particularly illuminating example is that of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC).29 Initial attempts to include both the landed
and the landless poor within one organiz.ation were counterproductive; efforts
to create a single community center foundered on underlying factionalisms
unperceived by program designers. Having learned from these mistakes,
BRAC changed its approach and is now enjoying heightened suro:ss with
organization policies which restrict membership to specific target groups defined in terms of common nceds.lO
Conflict can also be limited by restriction of the organization's functions to
pursuit of a single, narrowly defined benefit This in fact has been the design
strategy in some of the most spectacularly successful local organizations in the
history of development: the single-industry, vertically integrated cooperatives.
The Malaysian Rubber Association. the Kenya Tea Development Authority,
the Colombia Coffee Association. and the Indian National Dairy Development Board arc illustrative of the range of locations and activities to which the
single-function design has been successfully applied. Significantly, Kortcn
(1980a) points out in his analysis of the Indian dairy cooperatives that the
membership of such organizations often includes individuals from different
social (caste) and economic backgrounds who represent a variety of different,
even conflicting interests. Their cooperative organization operates effectivcly
precisely because members have agreed that it shall function only in pursuit of
that one benefit they all desire (good, steady prices for their milk) and shall not
attempt the difficult calculations and controls which would be required to
resolve conflicts on other matters.11 The large single-industry organizations
arc only the most obvious example of this phenomenon; as Hunter (1971)
reminds us, there arc undoubtedly thousands of less well-known or unreport~ instances of a few community members banding together through infonnal
In t.ablc S.2, this means confining membership to a single row, such a.s A.
This account o( BRAC is from K.orten ( 1980a).
For example, thoee who seU their labor to third panies.
JI Int.able S.2, an example o( such an organization would be one including groups A. B,
and C in its membenh.i p, and function iii as its only activity.
ll
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bargaining to install a tubewell or to build a cattle dip, despite their inability to
agree on a wider range of community issu~.
Two caveats. Adopting a single function or a homogeneous membership admittedly represents an extreme (and extremely successful) solution to
the problem of harmonious organization design. Indeed, Uphoff and Esman
conclude from their survey of Asian experiena: that the adoption of multiple
functions often can help organizations '"to insure their viability and capacity to
integrate diverse services" ( 1974, p. xix).ll Moreover, Uphoff and Esman suggest that if circumstances temporarily stop the organization from performing
one of these functions, it might persist by continuing to attract participation
through its continuing performance of its other functions. These arguments do
not necessarily conflict with our view of the irnportana: ofhannony in organizational objectives. Again, it is not limitation of membership or function per sc
which is needed to reduce conflict. What is needed is a '"fit" between the two
that produces no more conflict than the organization is currently able to resolve in an efficient manner.
Two caveats should be borne in mind when considering the evidence cited to
demonstrate the feasibility of multiple-function organizations. First, on closer
inspection many such organizations turn out to be composed of relatively
small '"suborganizations" of restricted membership and function. It is within
these latter classically harmonious designs that most of the actual collective
activity takes place. To cite just one example, in the Sarvodaya Shramadana
Movement of Sri Lanka, '"the preferred village level organization includes
individual groups for youth, mothers, farmers, children, pre-school, elders,
and for persons with special education and skills" (Korten I980a, p. 486). Only
at higher levels-with access to professional administrative support for the
required calculation and control-arc these groups integrated into a multiplcfunction, relatively open-membership organization.
The second caveat is an essentially methodological one. Scholars who, like
Uphoff and Esman, conduct large-scale, "cross-sectional" surveys necessarily
sacrifice a temporal perspective on the dynamics of specific organizations for a
comparative perspective on the many different kinds of organization that exist
at the time of the survey. The two perspectives can be complementary. But it is
important to realize that most of the organizations observed in a crossscctional analysis will be relatively mature and established ones rather than
those that have lost (or are still fighting) their battles to attract and hold participants. We will argue later on that many mature organizations have sensibly
and naturally diversified their functional base after getting started and gaining
experience from a narrow-and often single-function-beginning. In contrast, scholars who follow the birth, evolution, and survival or demise of parn In tcnns of table S.2, I.hey are suggesting that the individuals or groups rcpl"C$Cntcd by
A ind C could build an organization around functions iii and iv without, in principle, producin&
any conflict at alL
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ticular local organizations arc often able to identify the design features responsible for early failures, which the cross-sectional-survey people hardly ever sec.
There seems little doubt that one of the most common causes of such early
demise is too much unresolved conflict caused by too many differcnt groups
trying to accomplish too many different things under a single organizational
roof. On the other hand, detailed studies which arc able to observe particular
local organizations in their infancy are not likely to know what kind of functional diversification is eventually undertaken by the fcw that grow to maturity. Those who study the evolutionary dynamics of particular organizations arc
therefore least likely to observe the "facts" that the cross-sectional scholars arc
most likely to observe, and vice versa. No wonder they seem to disagree.
Common to both sorts of scholarship, however, is the basic finding that
pursuit of multiple functions carries potential benefits and potential liabilities
for an organization. Although historical experience with local organizations
does not let us resolve the implied trade-off unambiguously, it strongly suggests that the success of multiple-function organizations depends on their relative sophistication or experience in resolving conflict and on their ability to
restrict membership sufficiently that the total conflict encompassed by the
organization does not overly tax whatever conflict-resolving capability it has
been able to build.
The design of harmonious organizations. The view we have just advanced suggests that attempts to start local organizations that simultaneously
encompass a broad base of membership and a wide variety of functions arc
likely to fail. This expectation is confirmed by, and sheds light on, the previously mentioned failures of the community-development movement. Many
factors were surely at work in this failure, but community development was
precisely an attempt to build an organization that included all members of the
community, and functioned in pursuit of all of their needs. It is hardly surprising that the organizations were unable to perform the monumental tasks of
calculation and control which their choice of membership and function forced
on them, or that so many of them disintegrated in the face of conflicts they
were unable to resolve. That so much was expected of communitydevelopment organizations and that so little time was allowed for them to
build up the necessary organizational skills and attitudes no doubt also contributed to the movement's dcmise.ll
The need for time to learn conflict-resolving (and other) skills and attitudes
is a theme which we will consider at the end of this chapter. The difficulty-the
virtual impossibility-of moving the rural poor away from their traditional
kin-group organizations by means of open membership, multiple-fun(.iion designs is clearest, however, when we consider the history oflocal political organ" In fact, many of the activities ha....: continued with new labels. In the Philippines a
Department of 1..ocal Go....:mment and Community Development continues to operate. In addition, many of the rural trainers and conununity orpnilcn who an: performing dTcaiYCly in other
propms in the Philippines acquired their skills u <X>IM!unity-developmcnt field workers.

I

181

I
I

Orpnization Procnms

izations in the developing world. Herc, the ideological commitment to open
membership and comprehensive functions runs directly counter to the practical need for effectivc and efficient conflict resolution. Local political organizations did indeed enjoy a certain amount of success in the previously colonial
devcloping countries during their transitions to independence. In these cases,
howevcr, it was precisely because a single, univcnally desired function (rcplacing foreign rule) temporarily dominated all others that the organizations could
temporarily function. 34 Typically, once this function was no longer necessary,
its unifying influence dissipated, and the latent conflicts of an opcnmembership, multiple-function organization began to surface. Factions broke
away, ineffectiveness was rampant, and the local political organization declined in importance as a technique of collective social action throughout
much of the previously colonial developing world (Chambers 1974, pp.
1

86-88)."

·-

Simplicity of Technique
However harmonious the objectives of an organization. there remains the
problem of designing means by which those objectives can be realized. Mane:
saw this as a problem of taking '"from each according to his abilities" and
giving "to each according to his needs." Others, from the author of Psalm 62 to
Adam Smith to Mao Tse-tung, saw it in much the same way but substituted
work for needs.
Regardless of ideology, resolving questions of who gives and who gets what
in a social group requires effective organizational tC(;hniques for calculation
and control. The specific tC(;hniques employed may involve exchange, hierarchy, polyarchy, or bargaining. combined to provide all manner of mixes of
social interaction and intellectual cogitation. Once again. however, our perspective of participation as investment suggests that calculation and controlwhatever their form-will be more or less expensive activities for an organization's membcn. We therefore expect-and find-that people arc more
inclined to invest their participation in organizations with relatively simple
demands for calculation and control.
Two related features of organization militate against simplicity of calculation and control. The first and more obvious is large size: the more people
For example, function i in table S.2.
» We shall have more to say on the reasons for this decline in subsequent sections. The
Tanzanian ujamaa mo~nt is frequently cited as an exception or C'o'Cn a countcr-<:x.amplc to the
kind o( ariumcnt we have advanced here. We hope this is true, though if so, it will be the c~tion
which proYCS the rule. The planncn of ujamaa explicitly staked iu hopes for success on (I) an
ability to redistribute ao:::css to basic resources and bcncfiu in such a way that all membcn of the
village "family" do have identical interests and minimal occasion for conflict over the ujamaa'J
objectives, and (2) a gradual process through which individual villa gen learn the admittedly difiicuh task:J of calculating and controlling communal activities in a manner satisfactory to all participanu (Tanzania 1969). No one will disagree that achicving thc1c goals, if possible at all, has been
an exceedingly difficult, time<onsuming. risky, and expensive endeavor. Whether ujamoa'J highly politicized and ambitious ancmpt at reorganization has actually suco:<:dcd in bringing in~ benefits to a large fraction of the run! poor is a question we leave to others.
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engaged in a social enterprise, the more complex is the problem of assigning,
coordinating, monitoring. and legitimating their individual responsibilities
and rewards. The second is what might be called ..communality": when participants contribute their labor and other resources to a common productive
activity, calculation and control are more complex than when each individuars contribution is immediately and directly reflected in his own individual
reward. Oifferent techniques of organization impose different costs on, and
yield different benefits to, participants as size and communality increase. The
challenge for designers of reorganization programs is to design combinations
of techniques which fit effectively with the size, communality, and other requirements of a particular local situation.
Small and selfish organizations. Calculation and control obviously
pose their simplest demands within the simplest form of organization: the
individual acting alone and in his own self-interest. Whole philosophies have
been based on this theme, and some improvements in rural well-being can
indeed be accomplished with such minimal formal organization. This, of
course, is the great practical advantage of the family farm. We noted in chapter
3 that because of the distinctive characteristics of the agricultural production
process, hard work. initiative, and the .. on-the-spot supervisory decisions" so
pervasive in farming are generally performed better when the farm unit's work
force has a direct interest in the outcome. It has also been emphasized that in
agriculture '"the small proprietary or family firm" tends to promote more efficient and more rapid capital formation and technological change (Raup 1967,
pp. '17J-n, 293-97).
Frequently, however, the gadgets and activities that can improve the wellbeing of the rural poor exhibit some degree of increasing returns to scale;
agricultural research, crop processing. irrigation systems. and political power
arc only a few of the benefits not accessible to the individual acting alone. 36 The
challenge of organization design is to balance the benefits that can be obtained
through larger, more complicated organizations against the costs of calculation and control which such complexity tends to impose.
Organizations comprising only a few members have in fact been reasonably
successful when they have designed their function to require little communal
activity. Joint use of a small tubewcll or a low-lift pump is a good ex.ample .
Even in such cases, however, problems arise, especially with respect to ensuring satisfactory maintenance.
When participants' contributions and benefits talce on a significant communal character, even small groups face serious problems in seeking to form
aad sustain an effective organization. There are instances in which a few people have organized for the communal purchase and use of a tractor, a boat, or
» We do aot imply that potential benefits continue to increase with incrcasin& scale o(
social entcrprilc; in most cues, theR ii in fact a size aboYC which further arowth yields little but
trouble. This does aot chanae the fact that t.echnical and other facton militate in favor of aroup1
Larrc enough to incur significant COits of calculation and control
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a thresher and thereby radically improved their own well-being. Our impression, however, is that for every such success there have been many failurcsmany instances in which the available techniques for calculating and controlling proved inadequate to the ta.sic at hand. This docs not suggest that small
communal organizations should be discouraged in the future, but only that
such organizations are in general marginally viable and more likely than not to
fail. Less organizationally expensive means of improving rural well-being
should also be considered. The emergence of commercial tractor contractors
in many developing countries is a notable example of a simple commercial
solution to sharing the use of a "lumpy" piece of equipmenL
l.Arge and selfish organizations. Tractor contractors typically remain
small, but frequently the commercial operations carried out by private firms
are characterized by Significant economics of scale. We note shortly that largcscale public enterprises created to perform essentially commercial functions
such as marketing of agricultural products or the distribution of credit or
inputs commonly resort to a "multi-tier" form of organization. In many countries, however, this type of commercial operation is often performed by large
private firms engaged in the marketing and processing of agricuhural products
or the manufacture and distribution of fann inputs. In these instances, calculation and control arc accomplished by exchange techniques, specifically market
and price mechanisms. The internal control and management of these private
fmns is hierarchical, thus simplifying problems of coordination. Private
profit-maximizing firms of this nature have significant advantages in being
relatively flexible and capable of making decisions promptly in response to
changing conditions affecting costs of inputs or product prices.
In discussing the role of markets and prices in chapter 6, we note that the
results obtained by relying on a market system as a means of calculation and
control arc often criticized, especially in relation to the equity goal of social
policy. A major justification offered for promoting some of the "multi-tier"
cooperative and public organizations discussed in later sections is that they
protect small farmers from exploitation by large private organizations. There
are, however, some important practical arguments for utilizing the organizational capacity and technical and entrepreneurial skills that are often available
in private firms. Even in late-<tcveloping countries, competition among private
flnDS frequently limits their monopoly power. Lele reports, for example, that
"most price exploitation that has been obsctved in Ethiopian markets is covert. through false weights and measures, rather than overt"; and this implies
that farmers "have the potential to enjoy real bargaining power" (1975, p.
114).37 Therefore, the most appropriate government action may be to facilitate
more effective performance of a market system and to reduce the scope for
11 Lele ( 197-4, p. 0)) cites 15 marketing studies carried out in Africa, Asia, and utin
America "which indic:a1.c th.at, contrary to general belief, the priva1.c marketing systems in L D. CJ
are, by and large, highly competitive and operal.c cflkiently giwn the conditions in which they
function..
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exploitation by measures such as the introduction of standard weights and
measures, dissemination of adequate and reliable price infonnation at all levels of the marketing system, and improving means of communication and
transportation. There are two cogent arguments for governments to emphasize facilitative and regulatory actions rather than to attempt to replace private
firms in carrying out essentially commercial operations. First, government
organizations such as a grain marketing board tend to be relatively inefficient,
in part because of the need for bureaucratic regulations to limit graft and
corruption. Such regulations increase administrative costs and reduce flexibility. The second and more general argument is that in a situation in which
administrative manpower is in short supply, government programs should be
concentrated on those types of activities '"which are not likely to be undertaken
without public intervention" (Lele 1975, p. 191).
Most controversial of all is the role of large transnational (multinational)
corporations (fNCs). Such corporations are, of course, very large. They possess significant economics of scale because of the resourCes that they can devote to R&D, their market connections and experience in advertising and
other techniques of market promotion, and their easy access to international
capital markets. In the case of technologies that are inherently large-scale and
complex, such as the manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers, TNCs can play a very
useful role in the design and construction of efficient, low<OSt plants. 3' Particularly in the case of a perishable commodity such as bananas, TNCs have been
highly successful in organizing the assembly, packaging. transportation, marketing, and quality<ontrol functions involved in exporting to overseas
markets. (We defer consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of agricultural exports for developing countries until chapter 6.)
Several significant arguments against the role of TNCs need to be emphasized. Such fmns often transfer technologies that are inappropriate to the factor
proportions prevailing in less developed countries. However, this is often in
response to economic policies and price distortions which also encourage domestic firms to choose inappropriately capital-intensive technologies. Perhaps
equally important is the tendency on the part of a number of TN Cs to promote
inappropriate products." Fmally, the sheer size and '"roultinationality" of
many TNCs poses problems because of their economic and political power. 40
• It is noteworthy that in reoent years the People's Republic of Otloa has contracted
with ~ral TNC, to build very large nitrogen-(ertiliz.cr factories to Ille advantage of the drunatic cost-mJucing developments that have occurred since 1963, when the centrifugal compressor
w.u introduced. There arc, of coune, instances in which companies h.avc persuaded governments
to contract for the construction of relatively small, inefficient factories. For example, a SO-percent
"Tubsidy on fertilizer in Tanzania simply offseu the high cost of producing fertilizer in the un=>nomic plant buih to supply the country's limited market for nitrogen fcrtili.z.er (lLO 1978, p. 70) .
" A favorite example is the virtually worldwide spread of Coca Cola. The most unfortunate ex.ample, however, is the vigorous promotion o( infant fonnulas for bottle-feeding, which has
contributed to the decline of breast-feeding in many areas, with the adverse consequcnocs that we
noted in chapter '4•
.., For more extended discussion of transnational corporations, see Vernon ( 1977) and
Wand Strccten (1977).
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l.Argt and communal organizations. What happens to local organizations which are not only large but also communal? We would expect such
organizations to impose even higher cosu of calculation and control on potential participants and to run even higher risks of failure. From the few hard data
available, this indeed seems to be the case. Uphoff and Esman, for example,
point out that successful communal organizations in Asia comprise few
enough people that an informal "bargaining" through shared knowledge of
perfonnance and special circumstances suffices as a technique for calculation
and control. Their survey data suggest that within groups of thirty to fifty
families there is often an effcctive trade-off between the increasing returns to
scale of organized communal action and the rising costs of organization which
larger groups entail (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 68).
A similar result emerges from China's experiments with different scales of
farm organization. Early efforts to build communal groups at the commune
and brigade level experienced crippling problems of perfonnancc and incentive. This experience Jed to the present, apparently more satisfactory design, in
which production teams of thirty to forty families carry most of the burden of
calculating and controlling who gets and gives whaL••Above this scale, organizational functions are carried out by more formal arrangements which do not
impose direct costs on local participanu.
Additional relevant evidence comes from a survey of successful irrigation
communes in the Philippines conducted by de los Reyes and her colleagues
(1979, as cited in Bagadion and Kortcn 1980). Communal organizations of
water users have existed for centuries in the Philippines, uniting people in
complex social functions which serve from less than ten to as many as four
thousand hectares. Most organizations, however, cover an area of less than
one hundred hectares and involve fewer than fifty families. The studies show
that irrigation organizations in this small size range often prosper without
much in the way of formal administrative structure; again. informal personal
knowledge of individual performance and circumstance appears sufficient to
perform the relatively simple tasks of calculation and control required. This
was not the case for groups with an area of more than one hundred hectares or
involving more than fifty families. These groups generally had to subdivide
into smaller local groups and to develop formal hierarchical structures in order
to perform their more complex tasks of calculation and control without imposing an unacceptable burden of organization on participanu. 41
The examples just cited suggest that one practical means of making and
" For a masterful IQCOWll oC the !hooey and practkc o{ rwa.I orpniution by Chin.. ·s
C-omm unist pany, sec SchunnaM ( 1968, chap. 7 and esp. pp. 471-92). For more rcc:ent summary
Tunmcr (1976). OUM (1978). ind Schno (1980).
Of succcuful irrigation organizations covering more thao one hundred beet.arcs, 90
pcromt haYC formal organization ltr\lcturcs and 60 pcroenl haYC abo subdivided into smaller
lfOllps; oC organizations coYCring fewer than fifty beet.arcs, less than 25 pcroent have formal
llNt'turea and less than S pcrocnt have subdivided (Bagadion and K0r1en 1980, table 2, citing de
lea Reyes et al 1979).
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keeping organizations attractive to potential investors is to keep them small
This is not as academic a notion as it may at first appear. Hunter ( 1972), for
example, argues that the greatest return to the poor on their participation
investment often comes as a result of forming interest groups of a few cooperating individuals, linked through informal bargaining procedures. Further increases in size beyond the initial primary group often benefit leaders and administrators performing support functions more than they benefit the poor
themselves.
It remains true, however, that technological or political factors often force
an organization to grow beyond the size at which calculation and control can
be handled by techniques relying on shared knowledge and bilateral bargaining between individual participants. What design alternatives then remain?
Design alternatives: polyarchy and hierarchy. One common response
to this situation has been to adopt polyarchical techniques of organization. in
which formal leadership by a few accountable individuals is used to simplify
participants' problems of calculation and control. Though this approach has
worked on a limited scale, we noted earlier that in much of the developing
world, local political organizations have not provided a particularly cffcctive
mearu of organizing the interests of the poor. Almost everywhere that local
political organizations have survived, their original polyarchical relationships
have drifted towards exchange, hierarchy, and thinly disguised recapitulation
of the patronage/dependency design of traditional organization (Chambers
1974, pp. 86-88). Such techniques work to the extent that relatively inexpensive participation-for instance in the form of voting~ be exchanged for
benefits desired by the individual participants, and available to the local elite.
But the superficiality of the resulting "organization" is dearly revealed when
the political leadership can no longer provide the accustomed benefitsperhaps because a centrally administered aid program no longer provides the
resources that had been used for this purpose. Tune after time, in country after
country, as the dole dries up, the "participation" in the local organization
disappears, leaving little but dependency in its walce.
A more commonly effective design for large-scale enterprises invokes
"multi-tier" organization (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 69; Korten 1979a). The
lowest tier comprises the same like-minded groups of poor people to which we
have been referring. These '"primary" groups are characterized by members'
predominant commitment to activities other than organizing and by their consequent preference for those techniques of calculation and control which entail
a minimum investment of their time and effort: informal shared knowledge
and bilateral bargaining. Above this primary level, one or more hierarchical
tiers may be added to handle inter-group tasb of calculation and control. The
design and management of these upper-tier organizations is discussed at
length in the last section of this chapter (p. I 99ff.). The upper tiers are distinguished from the primary, or lowest, tier by their participants' commitment to
careers as professional organizers and their (consequent?) preference for effi-
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cient and effectivc techniques of organizing large numbers of people. Hierarchical and, more rarely, political techniques arc their preferred means of calculation and control
The problems of multi-tier support structures arc many, and we will discuss
them in a moment. Nocetheless, multi-tier support structures can perform
important functions, not the least of which is relieving participanu in the
primary groups of the burden of directly negotiating responsibilities, righu,
and obligations with all other members of the organization. When the multiticr, hierarchical structure can also actually deliver attractive benefits to the
primary-group members, and when it can achieve a suitable harmony of objectives, it therefore has real attractions as a means of inducing participation of
the poor in inherently large and potentially complex organizations.
Design alternatives: limited communal obligations. The costs of participation in local organization can be mitigated not only by limiting the size of
the primary group but also by adopting functions and designs which reduce
the amount of explicit calculation and control required for alloeating communal tasks and benefits. Once again, this is an area in which ideological.ly
grounded sclf-<lelusion of advisors and planners has often clashed with the
practical self-interest of the poor them.selves. Reporting on another aspect of
the Philippine irrigation studies referred to earlier, Alfonso (1981) describes a
typical example of such a futile misunderstanding. Engineers working with the
local farmer group knew that one irrigation turnout from the main system per
every forty to fifty hectares was the most efficient design in a resource-scarce
world. They were therefore bewildered and unsympathetic to the "wasteful"
farmers' demands for a much more expensive design providing one turnout
per farmer. The engineers did not recognize that for the farmers the most
significant costs were not those of construction. Rather they were the costs of
calculation and control which would be incurred if each individual had to
negotiate with one or two dozen neighbors over access to, and control of, a
single communal turnout. Neither we nor Alfonso suggests whether the engineers or the farmers arc right in this particular instance. Our general point is
that the poor often attach great significance to limiting the communal content
of local organizations. So long as advisors remain unaware of and insensitive
to such concerns, they will continue to design technically efficient, elegant, and
otherwise admirable organizations which fail to produce the anticipated benefits because the poor inexplicably refuse to participate in them.
It is worth pointing out that some of the most successful local organizations
haw recognized the importan~ of limiting communal obligations. The cooperatives of the Indian National Dairy Development Board, to which we referred earlier, arc a case in point. In his summary of the conditions that led to
the outstanding performan~ of this organization, Korten emphasizes that
"the basic functions of the village milk cooperatives . . . plac(e] few demands . . . for communal labor, or for complex decisions that might favor
one group over another" (I 980a, p. 48S). The same story could be repeated for
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a number of the single-industry cooperatives we have mentioned elsewhere in

this essay.
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The design feature that makes possible organization with limited communal
obligation was spelled out long ago by Chayanov (1966) in his concept of
'"vertical" cooperation: local outputs and needs arc handled by major commercial (exchange) or administrative (hierarchical) organizations at a regional
or higher level, without requiring any ..horizontal"' grouping of the poor with
each othcr.'l Individual poor people thus can obtain many of the benefits of
organization without incurring substantially more costs than they would by
remaining in their tradition-bound, individualist state.
Vertical organization of this extreme form is anathema to many advisors
and policymalccrs. These people arc correct in recognizing that vertical organization docs little, at least in any direct way, to develop the indigenous problcmsolving capabilities of the rural poor. They arc mistaken, however, in letting
this lack of comprehensive intent blind them to the limited but important
practical accomplishments of vertical organization. especially when it is employed in the context of a pluralistic approach to organizational design.
Health-related activities such as malaria control arc buih on an essentially
vertical pattern of organization, as arc the single-industry cooperatives noted
above. Perhaps most impressive, however, is the performance of certain agricultural extension efforts which we discussed in chapter 3. These efforts typically do not involve much in the way of horizontal organization and comrnunal problem-solving." The essential need is for organizational techniques that
tap the local knowledge, experience, and judgment of individual farmers in
order to ensure that the technologies recommended by extension workers arc
feasible and rewarding for those farmers, given the constraints and opportunities that they face. Equally important is that agricultural research workers
should be linked with these information flows so that their decisions concerning research priorities take account of conditions and perceptions at the farm
level How such techniques can be structured and administered will be discussed below.
In summarizing this argument, we must again emphasize that we have not
recommended forsaking horizontally structured groups employing bargaining
or polyarchical techniques in favor of organizations emphasizing vertically
structured, hierarchical or exchange techniques. We have only suggested
that-measured by poor people's willingness to invest participation rather
than policymakers' preconceived biases-more local problem-solving obligations arc not always what the poor want; furthermore they arc sometimes not
., In the terminology of figure j_ I, hierarchical and exchange techniques have been substituted for those ofbarpinin&- In the procesa, the individual poor people have lost their status u
co-leaden.
.. K.oncn (1981)argues that this is an interestiqupect olthe methodoloaY evolYCd in
Guatemala for rnalcina ~hand extension more Uld'ul for small farmen, a methodoloaY
wtuc:h we dilcusled in chap(Cr 3 (ICC Hildebrand 1976).
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· , _ what the poor need. Problem-solving is expensive to problem-solvers,
9'o arc often acting with good appreciation of their own limited abilities for
cakuJation and control when they opt for a smaller problem and simpler tech8qucs than their advisors might ha vc them adopt. The proper goal of analysis
II to understand the trade-offs involved in this behavior, to articulate the alterMtiw organizational techniques available, and so to help design pluralistic
panmu of link.age which can better serve the needs of the rural poor. We next
advance some thoughts on how such designs can be promoted.
Guitk/ines for Design

Our argument and evidence to this point arc summarized in figure S.3,
which portrays the three design features that we have identified as major determinants of local participation: attractiveness of benefits, harmony of objectives, and simplicity of technique. Each feature is shown as one axis of a
three-dimensional volume. Note that each axis is oriented such that low values
occur at the periphery of the figure, and high values towards the center. Within
this volume, we have suggested relative ..locations" of some specific organiza-

I

ATTRACTIVENESS OF BENEFITS
(f9f1,_jJ

..

HARMONY OF
OBJECTIVES (me<nt..nll ip, function I

;~--,-------.,,~...--

/

SIMP\.ICITY OF MEANS
(size, --..nelily)

/
Flilf,. 5.3. Design Features of Participatory Organizations.
Not~: Some specific organizational programs that ha-..e been historically successful in attracting
the participation of the rural poor are ,i-..en: F represents family planning orpniz:ations; A, agricultural extension;/, inigation projects at the community level; V, vaoc:ination programs; D, dairy
cooperatiYeS; and H, household task aUocation.
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tional programs which historically have been successful in attracting the participation of the rural poor. The assigned locations arc highly impressionistic-it is not by accident that no scales are given on the axes.
It would be silly to take any such figure too literally: we intend only to
suggest certain qualitative relationships between design and historical performance in organizations of the rural poor. The figure reflects our finding that
such organizations have tended to attract and retain active participation to the
extent that they score .. high" on the three design features portrayed. Such
organizations lie towards the figure's center. Conversely, the rural poor have
generally been less willing to invest participation in organizations scoring low
on these design features and therefore lying towards the periphery of the
figure.
Figure S.3 also reflects the limited trade-offs of organization design implicit
in our argument. Organizations with sufficiently high ratings on any two of the
three design features have often competed successfully for the poor's participation, even when their rating on the third was relatively low. We have not,
however, found a single instance of sucoessfuJ participation in an organization
that rated low on more than one of the design features.•' The implied constraint leads to the .. organizational opportunity'" surface we have sketched in
the figure. Historically speaking, locations lying inside this surface have represented the most feasible designs for participatory local organization, in the
narrow but operational sense that the rural poor have been more willing to
invest participation in them.
It remains to be seen whether the historical relationships suggested in figure
S.3 can help to prescribe specific interventions for future programs of local
reorganization. If they can, it will be by functioning not as a finished blueprint
but rather as an incomplete guide to what must ultimately be an interactive
process of trial-and~rror learning. Put somewhat differently, though our
analysis docs not say how to build a particular organization in a specific context, it may suggest some good ways to start the sequence of construction.
Equally important, our analysis highlights some major pitfalls of past experience in a way that should help contemporary development workers to a void
them.
Local field studies. Our analysis suggests that the most important interventions arc local field studies to support reorganization efforts. Effective
designs for reorganization require intimate knowledge of certain local conditions: what the poor want, where potential conflicts lie, and how much capacity for calculation and control exists. This knowledge cannot be deduced by
planners, analysts, or ideologues sitting in central offices. Instead, it requires
the creation of trained assessment teams and their placement in the local
community. There they can tap ..common" knowledge and observe for them.s Such ocp.nilltio111 surely exist; we sugacst only that they are relatively rare and that
their desicn is relatively rislcy .
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selves the particular circumstances which set the constraints and opportunities
for specific organizational interventions. We will have more to say on the
conduct and management of such field assessments below. Suffice it for the
moment to note that neither the one-day, hit-and-run visits so popular with
some development agencies nor the exquisitely detailed surveys of some academic analysts arc what is nceded.46 Later, we shall cite studies which lead us to
suspect that a couple of weeks' work by an experienced team, focused on a few
specific questions, will often be sufficient to get the interactive design process
off to a good start.
The first and most important job of the local field study is to identify one or
more intensely felt local needs which can serve as the core of a reorganization
program. Unless such a need is identified, the program will almost certainly
fail to attract any meaningful participation from the local people. It cannot be
overemphasized that local perceptions, not national priorities or overall efficiencies, arc of ultimate importance here. Local desirability lies at the heart of
organizational feasibility and thus is an essential component of any effective
development program. Some development workers have recognized this explicity." More frequently, however, the debate on development priorities proceeds with blithe disregard for whether the programs that plannen seled arc
programs in which the poor will participate. This sort of mismatch helps no
one; and it is one of the reasons why we insist upon the interdependence of
production. consumption. and organization programs throughout our discussion of development strategies in chapter 6.
The next important issue for study by the local field team concerns the
interaction of benefits, membership, and organization function. The goal, we
have argued, is to achieve sufficient harmony of objedivcs that the organization can cope with its tasks of surfacing and settling conflicts. Although good
sociological analysis probably can be of some help here, the chances of arriving at a ..correct" answer through cogitation alone arc bleak. We suspect that
the best bet is for a reorganization program to start with a relatively narrow
function and membership in order to maximize the chances that it will survive
at all. If it does survive, additional functions and member groups can be added
au necessary or appropriate.
We are equally skeptical that even the best of field studies can identify in .
advance the optimal means of calculation and control for a particular organi.. R=t dixussions o( "rapid rural appraisal" arc relevant (sec, for example, Chambc:n

(1980]).
., Korten, fore:umple, advaDCCS the "radical proposition-that "having the local rcor~
idtntify a need around which popular interest can be aroused may be more important than sclect1111 a program that will dcliwr the most uniu of 1ervice at the lowat cost• (1979o, p. 27). And a
foreign advisor working with the UNICEF Village Technology Unit in Kenya provides a rcfreahlna view: "Our approach to the seneration o( interest in technologies which may be appropriate for
Ille at villasc kvel amongst very poor people, is bucd on the fact that wr do not know what is, or is
DOt.. appropriate, and neither do our 1ovemmcnt counterperu. The only people who can really
docide what is, or is not, appropriate arc the people, thcmscM:s• (McDowell 1978, p. 7S).
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zational situation. Our analysis has identified some of the factors that such a
study might profitably consider, but a good deal of subsequent trial-and-error
learning will almost certainly be necessary. Again, we will explore how this
learning might be carried out and supported in a later section (beginning on p.
199). Our general recommendation, however, is that a first attempt to redesign
a traditional organization should begin with one of the simpler techniques we
discussed in the last section. Communal efforts should generally be avoided,
and the opportunities for shedding some of the required calculation and control onto existing commercial or support organizations should be seriously
considered.
Inadequacies of local participation. In the preceding pa~ we have
discussed the design of basic starting points from which a trial..and-error process of local reorganization might profitably begin. We have been reasonably
explicit about what we think such designs will offer the rural poor. It remains
to be equally explicit about what they will nol
Nothing we have said in our discussion of local reorganization should be
taken as an endorsement of the naive, ideologically distorted view that the
poor are uniformly wise and goodly people, thwarted in their development
efforts only by evil elites and callous bureaucrats. Rather, we believe that although effective local participation is a necessary component of development
organization, it is rarely sufficient to handle all the organizational tasks on
which effective programs of social action depend. These tasks, to recapitulate
our argument in the first section of th.is chapter, include choice, allocation,
mobilization, distribution, and productive utilization of resoun:.cs. The dimensions oflocal organization's insufficiencies are well known, if for no other
reason than that they have been displayed so frequently in past efforts at local
reorganization. It should be sufficient to recall some of the most serio~ .
An obvious problem is the inability of autonomous local groups to obtain
high productivity from their local resources. The common sight of two cattle
dips built next to each other by rival clans is representative of a great number
of similarly inefficient practices (Oyugi 1973).
An ability to mobilize local resources of knowledge, material, and labor has
justifiably been hailed as one of the strong points of participative local organization. Even here, however, the frequent failure to link local resource mobilization to a broader social perspective leads to wasted effort and disillusionment. For example, local initiatives started under the ill-informed belief that
the central government would supply operating budgets and staffing have left
a trail of unused schools and clinic buildings throughout the developing world

(Ownbers 1974, p. 102).
A further shortcoming of local organization is its inability to cope with the
tasks of resource distribution among competing objectives. A bias for shortterm programs over long-term progranu is understandable in rural communities, but it clearly blocks access to many important benefits. We mentioned
earlier the predilection of local governments for consumption-oriented rather
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than production-oriented programs (see also Chamben 1974, p. 86; Lele 197S,
p. IS9).
At a more fundamental Jevcl. the widespread advocacy of local autonomy
has been counterproductive in terms oflocal groups' abilities to perform the
organizational tasks of surfacing and acttling conflicts, signaling group
choices. and aecuring allocation of resources appropriate to those c:hoices. 1be
community~cvelopmcnt movement failed in part because it treated the traditional village as a self-contained development unit which would carry out most
organizational tasks without the aid of external intervention (Heginbotham
197S; Sussman 1980). We showed above why this rarely works, and outlined
conditions under which smaller, more specialized local groups linked through
broader support structures were more likely to perform the required tasks.
In general. an informal group offering attractive benefits to a few likeminded individuals is a good point from which to start a program for redesigning local organizations. It is only a start, however, and a very imperfect one at
that. To realize its potential-perhaps even to survive-the initial local group
will almost always have to begin reaching out to form linkages with the broader social system. There are dangers in such linkages, cspccia1ly if attempts are
made to forge them too ambitiously or too soon. Nonethclcss, the dangers of
punuing a mythical local autonomy are even greater, the goal is not isolation
but rather an ability to build reciprocally helpful linkages with the national,
regional. and local communities which form each local group's social environment. The need for resolutely pursuing this goal is particularly clear when
we consider the special design problems posed by rural elites.
Coping with tM Elite
Skilled assessment teams often will be able to identify more than one design
around which a local reorganization program might be built. We have argued
that one of the central failings of past efforts to build local organizations is that
so frequently the design chosen is one which could be bent to the benefit of the
relatively wcll-<>ft' local elite. There is no sure way to avoid such failures. Nonethelcss, a growing body of practical experience suggests that a few fundamental design choices each reflecting detailed knowledge of local circumstances
can substantially improve the chances for success. We shall outline four such
choices, proceeding from simpler to more complex organizational designs and
following the general design framcwork we developed in figure S.2•
P03Sive exclusion. The most direct way 'to keep the local elite from
taking over or unduly influencing an organization is to define the function of
the organization in such a way that the elite do not want to participate at all. In
our general discussion of harmony and conflict. we showed how choice of
• Ditcuaions ,,.;th David Leonard baYi: contn'buted substantially to this section.
lliroll&hout the remainder o( this llCCtion. we will frequently 111e the IUCll;inct term •elites• u an
ldmittedly approximate shorthand for the more awkward but more incluaiYC phrue "rdatiYCly
~tr and influential.•
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organizational function can influence membership. A typical constructive use
of this influence was gradually evolved by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAq, described earlier. By defining their organization's function in a manner that simultaneously required inputs of manual labor from
participants and eliminated handouts to them. the BRAC organizers discovered that they could lose the interest of the relatively wcll-<>ff villagers and
restrict the willingness to invest active participation to their target group of the
very poor (Kortcn I980a, pp. 488-90).
The benefits of this approach to organizational design are obvious. The
potential disadvantages, however, arc not insignificant. First of all. restricting
an organization to functions that arc not attractive to the local elite means
forgoing a large number of functions that are attractive to the poor. In addition, as we have already pointed out (and will discuss in more detail below),
local skills of leadership and management tend to reside disproportionately
with the elite members of the community. A local organization explicitly cutting itself off from those skills must either seek comparable skills from outside
(for example, from a professionalized supporting organization, as was the case
in BRAQ or adopt techniques oflin1cage which do not require them. As noted'
earlier, one solution is to build around existing commercial institutions, if
suitable ones exist. More likely, the solution will be to remain sufficiently small
or noncommunal that informal bargaining techniques are sufficient for the
required tasks of calculation and control This small-group solution should
not be lightly dismissed. As Hunter has so frequently pointed out (1969, 1970,
l 978a), such groups can accomplish many of the primary goals of local reorganization. Moreover, they have frequently provided the initial experience in
interest-group cooperation from which more ambitious programs later grow.
Active exclusion. When the benefits of local organization desired by
the poor arc also desired by the elite, several design alternatives remain. The
most extreme is explicitly to exclude the elite from membership in the organization. But this is at best a rislcy choice. Competent, committed external organization will be required to support and protect the poor people's organization if it is to have any chance of success. A good example of the potential and
limitations of such a design is India's Small Fanner Development Administration as described by Hunter (1976). We discuss some of the substantial pro~
lems of organizing the required external support in a later section. Nothing we
say there, however, gives us reason to believe that efforts to exclude the elite
from organizational benefits which they strongly desire can be successful in
any but the most exceptional circumstances. More often. if the interests of the
poor arc to be protected, organization redesigners will have to look: beyond the
choice of membership to the character of the benefits pursued and the choice
of particular techniques for calculation and control.
Willingly shared benefits. One class of organizational designs which
has been particularly effcctive in advancing the interests of the poor is that
which pursues benefits that the elite desire for themselves but cannot-or do
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not want to-keep the poor from sharing with them. Somewhat surprisingly,
at least for those who see the world as a constant struggle between the haves
and have-nots. a number of such benefits arc of great importance to poor
people in the developing world.
For one thing, elites have been known to be more altruistic than rapacious.
Cynicism and habit should not blind social rcorganiz.en to the opportunities
inherent in altruistic circumstances such as those exemplified by the previously
mentioned Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement of Sri Lanka. In another
group of programs accrual of benefits to the elite is in part contingent on the
program's effectiveness in reaching the poor members of the community. Sanitation and immunization programs arc typical examples. Only slightly different arc programs such as family planning, in which little is to be gained by the
elite in denying or controlling access to an organization's benefits.
Consumption-related benefits arc generally more likely than arc productionoriented ones to be willingly shared by elites. Nonetheless, when productive
benefits arc characterized by substantial externalities, the elite may not be able
to limit use by the poor whether they want to or not. The road-building programs wc remarked on earlier provide one example of how production-related
benefits with high externalities can be successfully pursued by organizations
including both elite and poor segments of a rural community.
Obviously, only a small proportion of the benefits desired by both poor and
elite will be shared due to altruism, common interest, or externalities. But the
few benefits which arc conducive to such willing sharing constitute an invaluable resource for social reorganizers trying to design programs which will reach
the poor in an elite-ridden world.
Zero-sum contests. If some program benefits arc willingly shared by
the elite and the poor, others arc essentially the prizes of a contest in which
winners take from losers. Land, water, and local political power arc only the
most obvious benefits which may be at stake in such "zero-sum" situations.
Conditions precipitating hcad~n battles between the poor and the elite over
these benefits arc not nearly so ubiquitous as some writers suggest. They arc
nonetheless latent and significant in many rural-development situations. And
the chances of the poor emerging as victors in such battles arc virtually nil. We
therefore cannot overemphasize the desirability of discovering policies and
organizational designs which mitigate the need for fighting them at all. One
reason why wc have emphasized our preference for unimodal production programs is the organizational difficulty of securing benefits for the poor within
the structure of directly conflicting interests so often encountered in bimodally
Structured societies.
Frequently, however, bimodal or other conflict-laden social structures will
be the reality with which the social organizer must work. In some such cases it
may be feasible to design an organization that provides alternative benefits
more attractive for the elite, thus moving them out of competition with the
poor. We discussed one such case in chapter 3 while reviewing the prospects of
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providing nonagricultural sources of income and status for the most well-todo and progressive members of rural communities, thus mitigating the contest
for scarce land and related assets. Realistically speaking, however, in most
cases of direct conflict between the poor and the elite, there arc few direct and
effective cures to be had through mere tactical modifications of existing organizational structures. The tricks we have suggested may be worth a try, but it
would be naive to pretend that revolutionary change or strong and sustained
intervention from outside will not usually be required before the poor have
much hope of bettering their condition.
Getting a fairer share. Between the extremes of willingly shared benefits and zero-sum conflict, there exists a large, fertile, and relatively unexplored
ground for innovative organizational designs which help the poor to obtain
some share, if not always a fair share, of development's benefits. Herc we arc
concerned with the variety of programs that arc capable of providing more
benefits for everyone. The question is not whether the poor will receive any
share of these benefits but rather how close they can come to receiving a fair
share. How can specific techniques of organization be used to increase the
magnitude of the benefits which the poor actually receive? Of the basic organizational techniques which we discussed in the first section of this chapter,·
bargaining is unlikely to play a dominant role in such designs: neither the size
constraint nor the implicit requirement of negotiation among equals is likely to
be met. Polyarchical techniques, in contrast, have often been applied to such
situations. They have not met with outstanding success. In fact, experience
suggests that it will usually be most useful to the poor if reorganization programs designed to effect immediate improvements in their well-being are kept
entirely separate from local organizational structures dealing in political power. This is neither defeatism nor a contradiction in terms. First of all, political
forms of organization are particularly ill-suited to attaining benefits for the
rural poor. A principal goal of elective and even single-party political organizations is to achieve as large a membership as possible. Typically, this is done
by providing (or at least promising) something for everyone. Indeed, the very
legitimacy of the political organization often rests on its commitment to open
membership and its pledge to pursue the interests of all its members. As we
argued earlier, however, this sort of open-membership, multiple-function design almost guarantees a dangerous amount of conflict over organizational
goals. Moreover, where local political organizations have survived at all in the
developing world, they have done so largely in terms of traditional patronage/
dependency linkages functioning to enhance the status of the local elite. New
social functions, when ·added to such organizations, are likely either to threaten the status of the elite or to be taken over by them. In either case, the poor
will fail to benefit. Lele ( 1974, p. 74) describes such a situation in the context of
East African agricultural development. Pyle (1979, p. 17) provide3 a similar
story from his work on Indian health programs. In the latter case, the popular
village health workers were explicitly instructed to avoid
political involvement because this might alienate an otherwise cooperative or indifferent elite.
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Exchange techniques, especially when embodied in a well-developed commercial structure which is relatively immune to the pressures oflocal elites, are
often more effective than political organizations in promoting fairer shares for
the poor. We noted in chapter 3, for example, that small farmers arc more
likely to have access to credit and inputs if these benefits are provided at competitive, market-clearing prices. When artificially low prices c:rcate an excess
demand and ncc:essitate relianc:c on bureaucratic or political rationing. the
local elites generally can be expected to capture a greater share of the benefits.
How great that share will be may be influenced by auditing and other regulatory controls imposed through specific (and usually hierarchic:al) techniques
of organization. In cases like that of the Indian dairy cooperatives, this control
derives in part from a heavy relianc:c on publicly visible techniques of exchange: justic:c is seen to be done. Elsewhere, periodic: elect.ions may conc:civably keep elites accountable for their excesses. In general, however, the need is
for what Dore ( 1971) has called '"institutionalized suspicion": a formal, probably hierarchical auditing system visibly insulated from the traditional kin and
patronage obligations of the local community. Suc:h auditing systems cannot,
of course, guarantee equitable distribution of bencfjts among poor and elite
participants. To be even reasonably effective they require a truly extraordinary
commitment of senior officials in supporting organizations. Nonetheless. it
remains one of the truisms of development that in organizations of the sort we
describe here, a failure to provide and to diligently pursue such institutionalized suspicion virtually guarantees that the poor will suffer.
Pros~cts for progrtss. What can the poor realistically expect to gain
from the various tc<:hnical reorganizations we have discussed here? Not everything they need, not a fair share of benefits, and quite possibly nothing but
increased exploitation. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the poor
can and have extracted substantial improvements in their well-being from
organizations that include members of the elite.
By joining with the elite in local organizations such as those we have described here, p<>Or people gain leadership talents and initiative which they
would be less likely to find within their own ranks. They also gain the tangible
benefits of effective organizations. Furthermore, the opportunity for some
small amount of mutually beneficial interaction between diffcrent strata of
society is also an opportunity for initiating more ambitious organizationbuilding programs.
The potential for coincident interests of poor and elite, and for beneficial
interaction between them, seems to require that elite and poor members of the
community both have aettSs to the resources or assets on which the functions
of the organization arc based. This condition of common access has been
identified as one of the key factors underlying the success of single-industry,
vertically integrated organizations such as the Indian National Dairy Development Board, described earlier. A similar case can be made for some of the
more prosperous East African cooperatives described by Hyden ( 1970). More
broadly, it is a condition intimately associated with a unimodal rather than a

~~----~--------------------------·--------

.J
.J

:J

:I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
1

1

.,

198

Oreanization Proerams

bimodal approach to rural development. In contrast, failures of programs like
the much-touted CADU Project. in Ethiopia, can be ascribed in large part to
the mistake of trying to join landed elites and landless tenants together under
an organizational design which can actually benefit only those with access to
land .... The operative word is ac~u. As we noted in chapter 3, the patterns o(
agricultural development in Japan and Taiwan were unimodal long before the
post-World War II land reforms. But because landlords rented out their land
in small operational uniu, tenants had access to land; owners and tenants had
a shared interest in yield-increasing innovations even though a large fraction of
the incremental output accrued to the landlord. It is therefore not surprising
that the prewar agricultural associations in both countries functioned reasonably well even though typically they were dominated by elite landlords.
Even when the poor have access to the basic resources required for participation in the benefiu of an organization, even when a credible auditing system
exists, it remains true that the elite will more than li1cely sequester the greater
share of an organization's benefits for themselves. 11tis is regrettable, unjwt,
and inevitable. We believe, however, that it will be in poor people's best interest to accept even substantial disparities in benefits. In order to get on with the
urgent job of securing absolute improvements, even substantial disparities in
benefits should not, in general. disqualify development programs which can
secure absolute improvements in the well-being of the rural poor. One important exception to this general recommendation has been pointed out to us by
David Leonard. This exception applies under conditions where allowing a
disproportionate share of benefits to accrue to the elite will increase their ability to exploit the poor in the future. It may be particularly relevant to programs
dealing with agricultural and other productive enterprises. In such cases an
incrcasc in the relative productivity of the elite could, unless otherwise controlled., bring them into a position where they were increasingly able to purchase the productive assets of the poor. If at all possible, social reorganizers
should avoid designs with this sort of potential.
In summary. We have argued that programs to reorganize the rural
poor must be based upon intimate knowledge oflocal conditions obtained by
firsthand, village-level assessments. Such assessments should seek to discover
what benefits of organization arc desired by the poor, what sorts of potential
conflict exist in the community, and what techniques and experience relevant
to organiz.ation arc available. Knowledge of these facton as they pertain at a
particular place and time should help substantially in identifying those initial
interventions most li1cely to lead to a sequence of reorganization programs
which actually benefit the poor. Other things being equal. it would sccm best to
start with an intensely desired benefit which can be shared with (or is not
desired by) the elite, a combination of membership criteria and organizational
functions which assures a reasonable harmony of objectives among partici" Tbe CAD U (Oillalo Airicultural Development Unit) Project, its octensible 1oak. and
itl aaual im i:-c:t an: di9cussed in Cobtn and Uphoff ( 1977).
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pants, and a commitment to extremely simple techniques of calculation and
control The evidence we have reviewed suggests that more difficuh or complex organiL:ltions should be undertaken very cautiously-if at all-in the
early stages of the reorganization effort. In particular, it seems unwise to pressure small informal groups to include more rncmben or more functions, at
least until they have evolved a substantial amount of confidence and experience. Even then, designers should always ask what interest ofIM poor will be
served by expanding a small organization and thereby incurring the risks of
overextension and overexposure.
Our analysis also suggests that soci.al-scrvice and productive programs
should be separately pursued in the early stages of an organization's growth.
The risks and liabilities of organizing productive functions are so different
from, and generally so much greater than, those of organizing service activities, that combinations will succeed only rarely. It is much more likely that
organimtionally feasible social-service programs will become the pawns and
victims of a much rougher contest over control of productive activities.
Finally, every effort should be made to separate all other organizational
activities from those which unavoidably involve a conflict of interest between
poor and elite. Such halting progress as can be made in social rcorganiL:ltion
may even require a willingness to set aside irresolvable equity issues in order to
get on with the many beneficial activities which can be pursued within the
existing social context. Trite but true: the poor do not benefit when social
reformers let an ideological or personal predilection for the best stand in the
way of the good.

In chapters 3 and 4 we considered some of the development initia ·
which
a national or regional government might wish to pursue. So f · chapter S we
have considered prospects for reorganizing the rural
o better recognize
and exploit their own opportunities for develop me . ere remains the problem of linking the two levels, of fusing nation
ans and unique local opportunities into effective programs o/elopment.

The Neetb for Facilit4#'6n
The missing links~·
· framcwork of development organization arc the
"facilitator" people:
administrators and field staff, managers and entrepreneurs who arc n · er villagers nor policymakers but nonetheless serve an
essential orga · · tional function by facilitating reciprocally helpful interactions bctw n those two groups.
An ttempt to redesign t_tJduA~ions aed~organi
za · ns m
on an appreciation of their inherently schizoid nature.
~.......... tor organizations arc constantly and simultaneously called upon to
eervc the needs of three radically different clients: the rural poor and their local
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FATIMA THE SPINNER AND THE TENT

Fatima the Spinner and the Tent
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ONCE in a city in the Farthest West there lived a girl called Fatima.
She was the daughter ofa prosperous spinner. One day her father
said to her: 'Come, daughter; we are going on a journey, for I
have business in the islands of the Middle Sea. Perhaps you may
find some handsome youth in a good situation whom you could
take as husband.'
They set off and travelled from island to island, the father doing
his trading while Fatima dreamt of the husband who might soon
be hers. One day, however, they were on the way to Crete when a
storm blew up, and the ship was wrecked. Fatima, only halfconscious. was cast up on the seashore near Alexandria. Her father
was dead, and she was utterly destitute.
She could only remember dimly her life until then, for her experience of the shipwreck. and her exposure in the sea, had utterly
exhausted her.
While she was wandering on the sands, a family of cloth-makers
found her. Although they were poor, they took her into their
humble home and taught her their craft. Thus it was that she made
a second life for herself, and within a year or two she was happy and
reconciled to her lot. But one day, when she was on the seashore
for some reason, a band of slave-traders landed and carried her,
along with other captives. away with them.
Although she bitterly lamented her lot. Fatima found no sympathy from the slavers, who took her to Istanbul and sold her as

a slave.
Her world had collapsed for the second time. Now It chanced
that there were few buyers at the market. One of them was a man
who was looking for slaves to work In his woodyard, where hrmade masts for ships. When he saw the dejection of the unfortunate Fatima. he decided to buy her, thinking that In this way, at
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least, he might be able to give her a slightly better life than if' she
were bought by someone else.
He took Fatima to his home, intending to make her a servingmaid for his wife. When he arrived at the house, however, he
found that he had lost all his money in a cargo which had been
captured by pirates. He could not afford workers, so he, Fatima and
his wife were left alone to work at the heavy labour of making masts.
Fatima, grateful to her employer for rescuing her, worked so
hard and so well that he gave her her freedom, and she became
his trusted helper. Thus it was that she became comparatively
happy in her third career.
One day he said to her: 'Fatima, I want you to go with a cargo
of ships' masts to Java, as my agent, and be sure that you sell them
at a profit.'
She set off. but when the ship was off the coast of Chinaa typhoon
wrecked it, and Fatima found herself again cast up on the seashore
of a strange land. Once again she wept bitterly, for she felt that
nothing in her life was working in accordance with expectation.
Whenever things seemed to be going well, something came and
destroyed all her hopes.
'Why is it', she cried out, for the third time, 'that whenever I try
to do something it comes to grief? Why should so many unfortunate things happen to me?' But there was no answer. So she picked
herself up from the sand, and started to walk inland.
Now it so happened that nobody in China had heard of Fatima,
or knew anything about her troubles. But there was a legend that a
certain stranger, a woman, would one day arrive there, and that
she would be able to make a tent for the Emperor. And, since there
was as yet nobody in China who could make tents, everyone
looked upon the fulfilment of this prediction with the liveliest
anticipation.
In order to make sure that this stranger, when she arrived, would
not be missed, successive Emperors of Chiita had followed the
custom of sending heralds, once a year, to all the towns and villages of the land, asking for any foreign woman to be produced
at Court.
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When Fatima stumbled into a town by the Chinese seashore, it
was one such occasion. The people spoke to her through an interpreter, and explained that she would have to go to see the
Emperor.
'lady,' said the Emperor, when Fatima was brought before him,
'an you make a tent?'
1 think so,' said Fatima.
She asked for rope, but there was none to be had. So, remembering her time as a spinner, she collected Bax and made ropes.
Then she asked for stout cloth, but the Chinese had none of the
kind which she needed. So, drawing on her experience with the
"Wea\'Cl'S of Alexandria, she made some stout tentcloth. Then she
found that she needed tent-poles, but there were none in China.
So Fatima. remembering how she had been trained by the woodfashioner of Istanbul, cunningly made stout tent-poles. When these
were ready, she racked her brains for the memory of all the tents
she had seen in her travels: and lo, a tent was made.
When this wonder was revealed to the Emperor of China, he
offered Fatima the fulfilment of any wish she cared to name. She
chose to settle in China, where she married a handsome prince,
and where she remained in happiness, surrounded by her children,
until the end of her days.
h was through these adventures that Fatima realized that what
had appeared to be an unpleasant experience at the time, turned
out to be an essential part of the making of her ultimate happiness.

=
Thi! story is well known in Greek folklore, many of whose
contemporary motifs feature dervishes and their legends. The
version cited here is at1. ibuted to the Sheikh Mohamed Jamaludin of .Adrianople. He founded the Jamalia Order ('The
Beautiful'), and died in 17.50.
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The Gates

of Paradise

m~~~~~~~~~~m~=~~~~~~~~~

THUE was once a good man. He had spent his whole life In cultivating the qualities enjoined upon those who would reach Paradise. He gave freely to the poor. he loved his fellow creatures and he
served them. Remembering the need to have patience, he endured
great and unexpected hardships, often for the sake of others. He
made journeys in search of knowledge. His humility and exemplary
behaviour were such that his repute as a wise man and good citizen
resounded from the East to the West, and from the North to the
South.
.All these qualities he did indeed exercise-when~ he remembered to do so. But he had one shortcoming, and that was heedlessness. This tendency was not strong In him, and he considered
that, balanced against the other thin~ which he did practise, It
could only be regarded as a small fault. There were some poor
people whom he did not help, because from time to time he was
insensitive to their needs. Love and service, too, were sometimes
forgotten when what he thought to be personal needs. or at least
desires, welled up in him.
He was fond of sleep; and sometimes when he was asleep, opportunities to seek knowledge, or to understand It, or to practise real
humility, or to add to the sum total of good behaviour-such
opportunities passed by. and they did not return.
Just as the good qualities left their impress upon his essential self.
so did the characteristic of heedlessness.
And then he died. Finding himself beyond this life, and making
his way towards the doors of the Walled Garden, the man paused.
to examine his conscience. And he felt that his opportunity of
entering the High Portals was enough.
The gates, he saw, were shut; and then a voice addressed him,
saying: 'Be watchful; for the gates will open only once In every
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LESSON 9
EMPOWERING YOURSELF

Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Solidify their understanding of managing ambiguity.
2. Discover the factors surrounding the issue of empowerment.
3. Begin to grasp how they can empower and disempower themselves.
Activities
1. Read case, "The Road to Hell" and discuss in two groups.
(90 min)
a) What are the barriers present in this situation?
b) How can they be overcome or can they be overcome?
c) Who is to blame?
d) What other issues are at risk?
e) Relate issues in case to readings.
2. Break

(15 min)

3. Triads - What are the characteristics of an "empowered
person?"
(30 min)
4. Large Group Discussion of characteristics of empowerment and
how they can be acquired for oneself.
(35 min)
5. Handout Homework 9 - Empowering Others.
Materials
1. Cup and water.
2. Copies of case.
3. Flip Chart and newsprint.

(10 min)
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The Road to Hell

John Baker. chief engineer of the Caribbean Bauxite C:olllpany of Barracania
in the West Indies, w;1s making his final
preparations to leave the island. His promotion to product ion manager of Ke so
Mining Corporation near Winnipeg-one
of Continental Ore's fast-expanding Canadian enterprises-had been announced
a month before, and now everything had
been tidied up except the last vital interview with his successor, the able young
Barr:.icanian, Matthew Rennalls. It was
vital that this interview be a success and
that Rennalls should leave his office uplifted and encouraged to face the challenge of his new job. A touch on the bell
would have brought Rennalls into the
room, but Baker delayed the moment
and gazed thoughtfully through the window. considering just exactlv wh:.it he was
going to say and, more particularly, how
he was going to say it.
!'his case wcis prep;irnl by Mr. Gareth Evans for
Shell-BP of Nigeria, l.i111i1cd, as a basis for class
discussion in an executive 1raining program, and is
used with permission

John Baker, an English expatriate, was
45 vears old and had served his 23 vcars
\\ith Continental Ore in many different
places: in the Far East, several countries
of Africa, Europe, and for the last two
years, in the West Indies. He hadn't
cared much for his previous assignment
in Hamburg and was delighted when the
\Vest Indian appointment came through.
Climate was not the only attraction.
Baker had always preferred working
overseas in what were termed the developing countries, because he felt he
had an innate knack-better than most
other expatriates working for Continental
Ore--of knowing just how to get on with
regional staff. Twenty-four hours in Bar-·
racania, however, had made him realize
that he \\'ould need all this "innate
knack" if he was to deal effectiveh with
the problems in this field that a~vaited
him.
At his first interview with Hutchins,
the production manager, the whole problem of Rennalls and his future was discussed. There and then, it was made
quite clear to Baker rhat one of his most
124
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important usks would be the grooming

of Rennalls ::is his successor. Hutchins
poi11ted our that not only \vas Rennalls
one ()f the brightest Barrac::rnian prospects on the staff of C;.u-ibbe~m Bauxiteat London L'niversirv. he had taken firstclass ho11ours in th.e B.Sc. Engineering
Degree-but, being the son of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning,
he ~ilso had no small political pull.
The comp;rny had been particularly
ple;1sed when Rennalls decided to work
tor them rather than for the government
in which his father had such a prominent
post. They ascribed his action to the
effect of their vigorous and liberal regionaliLation program, which ~ince the
Second World War. had placed 18 Barracanians at midmanagement levei and
given Caribbean Bauxite a good lead in
this respect over all other international
concerns operating in lhrr;icania. The
success of this timely regionalization policy had led to excellent relation3 with the
government. And this relationship had
been given an added importance when
Barracania, three vcars later. became inckpendent-an occasion that encouraged
a critical and challenging attitude toward
the role foreign i11terests would have to
play in tl1e new Barracania. Hutchins had
therdore little difficulty in convincing
Baker that the successful career develop111e11 t
Rennalls was of the first importance.
The interview with Hutchins was now
two years past, and Baker, leaning back
in his office chair, reviewed just how successful he had been in the "grooming" of
Re1rnalls. What aspects of the latter's
character had helped ;rnd wh:1t had hindered? What about his own ;,,_TsciL:tlitv:
How h~td that helped or hin;lered? Ttic
Iii 'it item to go on the credit side would,
without question, be 1he ~•bilitv of Rennalls to master the technical aspects of his
joh. From the start, he had shown keen11ess and enthusiasm and had often impn:ssed Baker with his abilit\· in tackling
ne\v ~1ssignrnents and the constructive

or

comments he invariably made in departmental di~cussions. He was popular with
all ranks of Barr~1crnia11 staff and had an
ease of manner that stood him in good
'.itead when dealing with his expatriate
seniors. These were all assets, but what
about the debit side?
First and foremost, there was his racial
consciousness. His four vears at London
University had accentu;;ted this feeling
and made him sensitive to anv sign of
condescension on the part of expatriates.
It may have been to give expression to
this sentiment that, as soon as he returned home from London, he threw
himself into politics on behalf of the
United Action Partv, which was later to
win the preindepe;1de11ce elections and
provide the cou11try with its first prime
minister.
The ambitions of Rennalls-and he
certainly was ambitious-did not, however. lie in politics, for. staunch nationalist that he was, he saw that he could
serve himself and his country best-for
was not bauxite re,;ponsible , for nearly
half the value ,)r 8;11racania's export
trade)-by putting his engineering talent
to the best use possible. On this account,
Hutchins found that he hatl an unexpectedly easy task in persu;1di11g Rennalls to
give up his political work before entering
the production depart111e11t as an assistant engineer.
It was, Baker knew, Rennalls's wellrepressed sense of r;1ce consoousness
that had prevented their relationship
from being as dose ;is it should have
been. On the surface, nothing could have
seemed more agreeable. Formality between the two men w;1s at a minimum;
Haker was dclil!;hted to find th;tt his assistant shared his own pcrnliar "shagg;,
dog" sense uf humor, ,o that jokes were
continually b:..:ing excln11gcd; thev entertained each other ar their houses and
often played tennis togl't her-and yet the
b~1rrier remained ill\'i,ihlc, indefinable,
but ever present. The existence of this
"screen" between the111 w;1s ~1 con'itant
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source of frmtr;11i()11 to Baker ..-,inn: it
indic:ited a wcak11css he was 1,,,1th to accept. If he h;id hccn successful with all
other nationalities, whv not l'>ith Rennalls?
'
But :it least he li;id m;maged to break
through to Rc111i:ills more successfully
than any other cxp;11riate had. In fact, it
was the young B;11TaGmian's allittJdesometimes ovcrhe;1ring sometimes cvnical-toward otl1c r con'1 pan y ex patri'.1tes
that had been one uf the subjects Baker
had raised last yc;tr when he discussed
Rennalls's st;iff report with him. He
knew, too, that he would have to raise
the same subject again in the forthcoming interview, bcc1use Jackson, the senior
draftsman, had complained only vesterday about Rennalls's 'rudeness. With this
thought in mind, Baker leaned forward
and spoke into the intercom. "Would you
come in, Matt, please? I'd like a word
with you," and later, "Do sit down." He
offered the box. "Have a cigarelle ,"
paused while he held out his lighter, and
then went on.
"As you know, Matt, I'll be off to Canada in a few dJys' time, and before I go,
I thought it would he useful if we could
have a final chat together. It is indeed
with some deference that I suggest I can
he of help. You will shortly be sitting in
this chair doing the job I am now doing,
but I, on the other hand, am ten years
older, so perhaps you can accept the idea
that I may be able to give you the benefit
of my longer experience."
Baker saw Rennalls stiffen slightly in
his chair as he made this point, so he
added in explanation, "You and I have
attended enough company courses to remember those repeated requests by the
personnel manager to tell people how
they are getting oil as often as the convenient moment ari,es, and not just the automatic once a year when, by regulation,
staff reports havc to be discussed."
Rennalls nodded his agreement, so

B:iker \\Tilt ori. "I sh~tll always remember
the !~1st joh performance dis~ussio11 I had
\\·ith my previous boss back in Cermany.
He used what he called the 'plus and
minus' technique. His firm belief was tlur
when a senior, bv discussion, seeks to improve the work ()erformance of his staff.
his prime objective should be to make
sure that the latter leaves the interview
encouraged and inspired to improve.
Any criticism must, therefore. he constructive and helpful. He said that one
very good way to encourage a man-and
I fully agree with him-is to tell him
about his good points-the plus factorsas well as his weak ones-the minus factors; so I thought, Matt, it would be a
good idea to run our discussion ;1long
these lines."
·
Rennalls offered no comment, so
Baker continued. "Let me say, therefore.
right away, that as far as your own work
performance is concerned, the plus far
outweighs the minus. I have, for instance, been :nost impressed with the way
vou have adapted yuur considerable theoretical knowledge to master the practical
techniques of your jol:r--that ingenious
method you used to get air down to the
fifth-shaft level is a sufficient case in
point-and at departmental meetings, I
have invariably found your comments
well taken and helpful. In fact, you will
be interested to know that only last week
I reported to Mr. Hutchins 'that, from
the technical point of view, he could not
wish for a more able man to succeed to
the position of chief engineer."
"That's very good indeed of you,
John," cut in Rennalls with a smile of
thanks. ":Vty only worry now is how to
live up to such a high recommendation."
"Of that I am quite sure," returned
Baker, '\:specially if nrn can overcome
the minus factor, which I would like no1,·
to discuss with you. It is one that I have
talked about before. so I'll come straight
to the point. I have noticed that you ;ire
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111()IC friendlv and get on better with
'"ur fellow B:1rr;1c111i:.111-; tlun \·ou do
,, i1h Europeans. [n point of fact. I h.1d a
11J111pLti11t onlv yesterdav frum \Ir. Jack·..,11. who said \OU lud bce11 rude t()
l11111-d11d not for the firq time eithn.
"There is, :vlatt. l dlll sure. no need
i.ilr 111c to tell vou huw necessary it will be
to1· ~OU to get Oll \\ell with expatriates,
h(·cwse until the com;nnv has trained up
,11 !licicn r men of vou r ulibcr, Eu rope ans
.11 e bound to o~cupy senior positions
llt're in Barracania. All this is vital lO
\•Jur future interests. so can I help you
lli ~1ny \vay?"
While Baker was speaking on this
1hemc, Rennalls had sat tensed in his
l h;iir, and it was some seconds before he
replied ... It is quite extraordinary, isn't it,
how one can convey an im pressi<.HJ to
uthers so at variance with what one in1c11ds; I can only assure you once again
1!iat my disputes with Jackson-and you
ni;1v remember also Codson-have had
11othing at all to do with the color of
their skins. I promise you that if a Barr:1cmi;m had hehaved in an equally pen·mptory manner. I would have reacted
in precisely the same way. And again, if I
n1;iy· say it within these four walls, l am
-,urc I am not the only one who has
lo1111d J;1ckson and Codson difficult. I
rnuld mention the names of several exp;11 ri:1tes who have felt the same.
l lowcver, I am re:dlv sorrv to have cre:1tcd this impression ;Jf nor' being able tu
get on with Europeans; it is an entirely
false one, and I quite realize that I must
do all I can to correct it as quickly as
possible. On your last point, regarding
Europeans holding senior positions in the
romp;my for some time to come, I quite
;wccpt the situation. I !c.1ww that Car:lii>ean l~auxite-as thn i1:1ve been doing
for 111;inv years nu\\'-\\'ill pr0111ote Barr: 1c;i11 i:1 ns as soon ,\:; their experience
11.1rr;111L'i i1. .\11d. finallv, I would like to
assure you, .J1Jh11-an<t' my Lither think>

thz'. ,;rn1c. too-·-th:1t. I am very happy in
work here and h!1pe t!J sL1y with the
cump:rnv for many yl':trs to come."
Rcnrulb li:1d spokc11 earnestly, and, althow.;h not con vincl'd !iv wh:!l he h:1d
hor;l, B:1kn did 1101 1hi11.k he could pursue the m~1lter further except to say, "All
right, \fatt, mv impression muv be wrong,
but I would like to remind you about the
truth of that old s;1yi11g, "\.Vhat is importanr is not what is true but what is belie\'ed.' Let it rest at that."
But suddenlv B:iker knew that he
didn't want to "let it rest at that." He was
disappointed once again at not being able
to break through to Re1rnalls and having
yet again to listen to his bland denial that
there was any raci:d prejudice in his
makeup. Baker, who had intended ending the i11terview al this point, decided to
try another tack.
"To return for a 111ument to the 'plus
and minus technique' I was telling you
about just now, there is another plus factor I forgot to tnention. I would like to
congratulate \<JU not only on the caliber
of vour work hut also 011 the ability you
have shown i1: OVL'l'to111ing a challenge
that I, as a Eurnpe;111. have never had to
meet.
"Continental Ore is, as you know, a
typicd commcrci;d enterprise-admittedly a big one-which is a product of
the economic and sm:i:tl environment of
the Unitcu States ;ind Western Europe.
My ;mcestors have ;di been brought up in
this en\'ironrnent t'or the past two or
three hundred ye:1rs, a11d I have, therefore. been able to live in a world in which
commerce as we k1101' it today has been
part and p;1rcel of 111y being. It has not
been solllcthing rev!llutionary and new
th<tt has suddenh entered my life. In
vour case, the si:.u;1tirn1 is cliff~renl, be~ausc \'!lll and your forebears ha\'c had
only s:'ime fifty ;H ~i:-:ty vears' experience
of this commerci;d l'J1\·ironrnent. You
ha\'e had to Lice till' ch;dle11gc of hridg-
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ing the g:ip lic111('('ll tiftv ;ind t110 or
thrct: hundred yc;1r> ,\gain. '\Litt, let ine
congr;1tuL1tt: you- .ind people like youonce again ()ll !u1·ing .,() sue< essf1:lh·
m·ercomc this p;111in1L1r hurdle. lt is fur
this verv rcaso11 !11;11 I think the outlook
for Bar'.raca11i;1--;111d particularly Lmbbean Bauxitc-i-; -.o bright."
Rennails li:1d li-;tcncd i11te11tlv ;111d
when B:1ke1 fini'>fwd. rq:!ied, "Wci'I. once
ag;1in. John. l li;1·:l· lo th:mk you for what
you have s;1id, :u1d for mv nart, I can
only say that it i-; gr;1tifying' t(; know that
my own personal effort has been so
much appreciated. I hope that more people will soon co111<· to thi11k as you do."
There was a pause, and for a moment,
Baker thought hopefully th;,it he was
about to achicvt: his lonL; awaited "bre;1kthrough," but R<·11na!i~· merelv smiled
back. The barrier remained unhrcachcd.
There remained \umc f]\·e minutes
cheerful co11ver\;11 ion about the contras!
between the C11ililwan and C;rn:idian climate and whc1hcr the West Indies had
any hope of be 1ti11g England in the fifth
Test, before Baker drew the interview to
a close. Although he was as far as ever
from knowing the real Rennalls. he was
nevertheless glad that the interview had
run along in this friendly nnnner and,
particularly. that it had erided on such a
cheerful note.
This feeling, ho1,·ever, lasted only until
the following morning. Baker had some
farewells to m;1kc, so he arrived at the
office considerdlily later than usual. He
h;id no sooner 'ial down at his desk than
his secretarv walked into the room with a
worried fr~wn 011 her Lice. Her words
came fast. "When I arri1·ed this morninr.;
I found Mr. Rcnr1~dls :d,·nch 1;;iiti11g z;t
my door. He seemed \en ;m,~ry and ~old
me in quite a peremptory rr1anner that
he had a vital kt1cr 'O diudte \1·hich must
he sent off with<i1l! ;mv debv. He was so
worked up that he rnu,ldn't keep still ;tnd
kept pacing ,dJ(1lJI the rcurn. which is
most unlike him. l 1e \l'<rnldn't e\·en >•:;;it

rc;1d \<.hat he h:id dict:1tcd . .Jtht o,igncd
the p.ige 11here he ili(lught the k11e1
\\uuld l'llCL It has been distributed. :111r!
\l!llr copy is in your "in-tray.··
Ptu.zlcd and feeling 1 aguely u ncasy,
lbkcr opened the "Confidential" envelope :md read the follcming letter:
10

Fruil/:

\ssi.;rant F.n.~inccr

To: I he Chid Engtneer. C1ribhean lbt1xi1c l.irni1cd
l·lth August
.l.)SFSS.\fF,\'T OF f.\'TFHVIEW

!IFFWl:F.X JIFSSHS. 8.·11\J:'H :1.\'D
HF\',VllL5
It has ;ilwavs been rnv practice to respccl
the advice gin:n me !iv seniors, so ;1fter our
i111crvieh·, I decided 10 give careful thought
ortcc ag;1i11 to its main points and so make
sure 1hat I had undcrslood all that had
!wen said. :\s I promised roti at the time, I
had every intention of putting your ;idvicc
to the best effect.
It was ''''' · therefore, until I had sat
down quic::, in 111y holllt' yoterd<iy evening to co;;,ider the irnenicw objccti1TI~·
th:ll its rn",.' purport became clear. 011lr
1hcn did tlw lull enormity of what vou had
said cL1wn , 111 me. The' more I 'thought
:1hou1 it, rhe more convinced I was that I
kid hit upon the real truth-and the more
furious I bec1me. With a facilit)' in the
English la11guage which I-a poor !3arrJG111ia11-cannot hope to match, you had the
audacit\' to insult me (and through me,
even· Barracrnian lff>rth his salt) hv claiming t'hat our kno\,·kdge of modern living 'is
only a paltry fifty 1cars old whilst :ours
goes back 200-300 yc;1rs ..\s if 1our rnale;-i;tlistic curnrncrcial e111·ironment' could possibl1· be cornp;ncd with the spiritual v:ilues
of 11ur culture. I'll h:1ve '"u know that if
!llllt h of wh.1t I saw in Lu11do11 is rcprcsen1_;1\iYe of \'O\lr il11lst ho;is1ed culture. I hupc
fen·enth.' that it \\ill nel'er ClllllC to B:1rt·;1c111i:1.. 81 what ri'!:hi do 1·ou h;l\·c the
cffro11lery 't" cundcs« end to us: ..\t he;irt.
all you Europeans think us barbarians. or.
;is :.-ou say· amo11gst : uurseh·cs. "·c are "jw;t
down Crom the trees."
Far into the night I discu.s.'1cd 1his rn:lllcr
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Ill)' f:1t!H:r, and he :, .1, di,gtblcd ,is I.
Ile :1grces wirh me rh:lf :rny C<llnp:iny
"lime senio1 staff think as IOU do is no
pl.ice for am· Barracrni:rn prrn1d of !1is cul111rc .111d r:icc-so much fur :ill the comp:1111 .. (l:q>trap·· :wd 'pecious propaganda
:1h<i111. region:1lization :ind Barracania for
1lic Barracanians.

11i11i

I feel aslurncd :111<1 l>clr:11cd. Please :iccept this letter as Ill) rc.,igr;a1io11, which I
;vish In liccome dln 111<· i111rnedi:1tely.

cc P!"(Jd uctioll \Lui:1gc1
\Ltn:1ging Dircrlor

I !.l'l ()·-,
~\ \\

HOMEWORK 9
EMPOWERING OTHERS

1. Read:
1. Alfonso, "Empowering Rural Communities."
2. Hall, Beyond Culture.
3. De Franco, "Strategies of Household Subsistence and
Interdependency in Nicaragua."
4. Hyden, chapter 9.
5. Chambers, chapter 8.
6. Moris, chapter 10.
2. Write:
In 3 to 5 pages describe what you would do to empower
the people in your case. What differences exist in the
ways we empower ourselves compared with how we empower
others?
This is the last writing piece. You may want to think
about how you will revise your final case due on the
last day of classes.
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The first part provides a summary of three case studies dealing with
the mobilization of three rural communities undertaken by nongovernrnent organizations (NGO) in the Philippines. The second part identifies some general patterns emerging from the case studies.
THREE CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER THREE

Empowering Rural Communities
Felipe B. Alfonso

Failures far outnumber the successes in attempts at mobilizing rural
communities. The following case studies document relatively sucessful
attempts at community mobilization. They also offer some interesting contrasts in the methods used to organize the target communities.

-+:.

Kagawasan 3

~

Sometime in lo/.74, three villages in the town of Kagawasan were
threatened with eviction from the land they had farmed for five decades.
The town mayor had informed them that the land would be used for a
Boy Scout Jamboree site and the development of a watershed for the town's
water system. Feeling that this was just a ploy by parties who wanted to
acquire the land they were cultivating, the residents sought the help of
the Roman Catholic priests in the town. The priests invited community
organizers to come and help the residents of these three villages.
After a series of meetings with the organizers, a group of residents
decided to go to the provincial capital to obtain information on the status
of their land. For many, it was the first time they had set foot in a government office. They discovered that their land was classified as forest land
and that only a presidential decree could change its classification. Shortly thereafter, 300 residents confronted the mayor and demanded that he
stop harassing them with eviction threats. Susequently, the residents
engaged in a number of activities to get their land reclassified and titled.
Committees were formed which engaged the regional director of the
Bureau of Forestry and other government officials in a series of confrontations. Although the people failed to obtain title to their land, they effectively repelled efforts by the mayor and other entities to take the land from
them.
Many minor and major disputes arose among the people of Kagawasan
over the four years that they worked on the land issues. One of the major
disputes surfaced in the course of the survey of landholdings, undertaken
as a first step in acquiring land under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry. Many of the traditional boundries, often consisting of bushes
and trees, had disappeared. Rather than settling boundary problems in
court, the people constituted a "Justice and Peace" committee, whose
· ··sior:
re n
ted ·
~ry 1

~

Development programs were criticized in the sixties and seventies for
concentrating on increasing production but ignoring issues of equity. While
they yielded dramatic short-term benefits, these appeared of dubious sustainability. They transferred technologies and assistance resources to the
poor, but made the poor more and more dependent on central bureaucracies for the satisfaction of their needs. These development programs
have been labeled as production-centered.
The growing disenchantment with production-centered strategies has
gradually led to greater emphasis on "growth with equity" and on more
people-centered processes. The underlying assumption behind this new
thrust can be summerized by the ancient saying: "Give people fish, and
they can eat that day. Teach people to fish, and they can eat for the rest
of their lives." Advocates of this new strategy argue that development has
to be self-sustaining and must necessarily be seen as a capacity-building
process. 1
Experience with the people-centered processes in development over
the past decade has made it clear that bureaucracies must use new
methods of intervention which allow client communities to build up their
capacity to take care of themselves and to manage their resources. 2 The
new strategy also requires that rural communities be mobilized to enable
them to participate more meaningfully in their own development.
This paper summarizes some of the major insights that the Rural
Development Management Program (ROMP) group at the Asian Institute
of Management (AIM) has learned about community mobilization. The
concepts laid out in this paper, particularly on the objectives and the
methods of mobilization, are based on a number of case studies and on
actual involvement with development programs where mobilization of the
communitv w;is a rn~ir~r cof'"'r"~nent.
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While the men focused on the land issues, the women were organized for community activities. They obtained food from the Catholic Relief
Services and distributed this among the schoolchildren. They formed
health committees, underwent paramedic training, and arranged for the
visits of the rural health doctors. They discovered that the rural health
midwife was selling medicine that should have been dispensed free. They
successfully demanded that she stop collecting payment and that she
apologize to the community. The women refused the offer of higher
authorities to transfer the midwife to another area. They feared that
another community might not be able to prevent her from engaging in
the same practice.
They negotiated the tenure of a teacher critical to the area. They obtained assistance from UNICEF and from the Catholic Bishop. The entire
community put pressure on a bus company to give just compensation to
the family of a teacher who had been killed in an accident involving one
of the company's buses.

_::
\..,'-l

Organizing Process. The organizers in Kagawasan all had experience
in organizing squatters in the urban areas in Manila to secure title to the
lands they were occupying. The work in Kagawasan was their first attempt
to organize rural groups. The original organizers were all college graduates,
mostly from the Institute of Social Work and Community Development
at the University of the Philippines. In the course of the organizing work
in Kagawasan, thay trained other organizers. The majority of these trainees
were also college graduates: 20-30% were college drop-outs. Most of them
came from the neighboring municipalities and provinces.
The organizing methods used in Kagawasan were based on the belief
that the people could learn organization not by listening to lectures but
by organizing. The basic aim was to give the people a voice and a sense
of power so that they could interact with the rest of society on an equal
basis. The organizers were reluctant to use economic issues as a starting
point. Such issues, they felt, tended to be divisive and thus did not serve
the objective of developing a sense of community and unity.
The organizing process used in Kagawasan had a number of characteristics. First, the people were mobilized around "gut" issues, such as
land rights. The organizers sought to move the people so they could begin
acting on these issues. They assisted them in analyzing constraints against
effective action and in developing strategies for reducing and elimnating
those constraints. The first stage of the strategy was to obtain information
as a group regarding, for instance, the status of their land. After each group
mobilization, the organizers held reflection sessions during which the people were asked to abstract lessons or principles from the action. The fundamental process used was a cycle of diagnosis and planning, mass educa-
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tion, and evaluation-reflection. Each of the mobilizations served as a learning process for the people. Through a series of mass actions, the community was expected to realize its own power.
Second, the cycle of planning-action-reflection moved from simple to
more complex tasks. In Kagawasan, the people started off with the simple task of gathering information before the more complex and risky task
of confronting the mayor, the regional director of the Bureau of Lands,
and other powerful elites, such as the owner of the bus company and,
even, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the area. The women in the area moved from simple requests for medicine to developing an entire health system
for the community.
Third, the mobilization provoked a high degree of conflict and confrontation. The mobilizations were aimed at particular targets against
whom the people were agitated to make demands. The demands were
usually presented in an aggressive but legal manner. This resulted in tense
encounters between the community representatives and the bureaucrat
against whom the demands were being made. The director of the Bureau
of Lands in the province, who had been avoiding a meeting with the community's delegation, one day found a group of over 100 persons headed
for his office. When he tried to slip through the back door, he found
another group there waiting. Though angry at this affront to his dignity,
he eventually agreed to begin the proceedings for land reclassification.
Finally, the organizers in Kagawasan did not limit themselves to the
land issue. They assisted the community in pursuing other issues, such
as health and education, which the people felt strongly about. The more
issues there were, the greater the opportunity for mass actions and for
the development of leaders within the community.
The Kagawasan organizer served as a teacher-facilitator. Rather than
classroom lectures on simulated problems, the organizers used live cases,
where the stakes were high, and built the learning process around these
problems. They mobilized people to plan, implement, evaluate, and reflect.
They did not impose their views on the people, but neither were they
passive spectators. Although they let people find their own direction, they
initiated and led the entire process.
Results. The people, due to legal constraints, did not acquire title to
the land. on the other hand, they were not forced to leave their landholdings. When the organizers left the area at the end of four years, they
estimated that 100 leaders had been developed within the community.
No formal structures of organization were developed, but the people
organized themselves into groups as issues that needed attention arose.
The organizers did not initiate any economic activities, although subsequently, the people themselves started to organize consumer cooperatives
to purchase supplies in bulk. They also got the National Grains Authority
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to set up a buying station in the townsite so they could obtain better prices
for their rice crops.
Gatong 4
With a community of 183 families and a total population of 1,000,
Gatong was the first target area in the Philippines of a United States-based
Private \bluntary Organization, Indigenous Affairs Council (IAC). IAC
sought to achieve the following objectives in Gatong:
1) an increase in income and the improvement of the quality of life
of the residents;
2) the improvement of the health and education of the residents; and
3) a widely-felt sense of identity and integrity among the community residents.
After the IAC was invited into Gatong, it conducted a five-day "consult" to develop a comprehensive strategy for the community. A total of
100 nonresident consultants were involved. Representing a wide spectrum
of skills, experience, and expertise, they came from various locations of
..t the Philippines and from ten other countries. From the community, 550
-~were involved. During this period, the participants were grouped into
~ teams according to expertise and interest. Field data were gathered through
interviews, and the data collected were later processed in workshops and
plenary sessions. The consult had five tasks leading to five outputs. One
day was spent on each of the following tasks:
1) to ascertain the operating vision of the community, or its hopes and
dreams for the future;
2) to discern the community's underlying contradictions, which
prevented the people from achieving their aspirations;
3) to identify practical proposals, or the general areas to be taken up
in order to eliminate the obstacles created by the underlying
contradictions;
4) to determine the tactical systems, or the concrete steps by which
the practical proposals would be realized;
5) to identify actuating programs, or the specific projects to allow the
practical application of the tactical systems.
Immediately after the consult, three general assemblies and several
purok meetings (puroks are geographic divisions of the village) were held
to discuss the consult's findings and recommendations and to develop
strategies for implementing them. These area meetings were initiated and
led by the ten full-time IAC staff.
Following the ratification of the results of the consult, the community proceeded to implement the projects under the leadership and guidance
of the IAC staff. People interested in particular projects were organized
into workino ~ur" ,..~lied ~.. ;1 'is. T~ ·--·widE ,. ctior --~ ~ coc " a-
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tion for the efforts of the various guilds, two commissions were established, the Social Commission and the Economic Commission. The resources
needed to implement the projects came from donations of funds and goods
secured by the IAC from business establishments and foundations.
During the third year of the project, the Gatong community, with the
aid of the IAC, set up a corporate body called the Gatong Human Development Association. While official membership was limited to village
residents who were 16 years old and above, the organization included practically everybody in the community. The commissions were based on functions or projects, while the puroks were residence-based.
The IAC was in Gatong for a period of four years. After this period,
the management of the development of the community was turned over
to the community's corporate body. During the first two years, the IAC
had ten full-time international staff in the project, mostly Americans. By
1979, the number had risen to twenty-two, with the presence of other
visiting foreign staff. The IAC used Gatong as a pilot and a training ground
for other projects. By the time of the turnover, the staff had been reduced
to an all-Filipino group of ten .
Dwtnizing Process. The organizing process in Gatong was characterized
by a very definite sequence of activities. It started off with the "consult;'
which identified the different projects needed for the community's
development. Once these were ratified by the general assembly, groups
were assembled to implement the projects. All planning followed a pattern determined by the IAC. It started with the identification of the "implementaries," or the concrete steps to be taken in implementing the proposals or bans. Once determined, these steps were placed on a daily, week1y, monthly, or quarterly time-line or timetable. This was followed by the
process called '1ay-outing," or the identification and assignment of people who would execute the time-lined operational details. Finally, the timelined plans were posted in a conspicuous place in the community under
the heading ''Victories:' This served not only as a guide to what was to
be done, but, more importantly, challenged and pressured the community or groups to actualize what it had proclaimed in public as a victory,
even if it was merely a plan. This sequence of activities is often referred
to in other management literature as programming.
Second, formal training and seminars also held an important place
in the IAC strategy. Projects that were activated required specific skills for
which those who showed an interest were trained. Craft production and
design skills were improved by the introduction of technical expertise. In
order to insure the viability of projects, some guild members were taught
bookkeeping and financial management. Even the social projects had
educational components. Potential leaders were developed through intensive seminars, and those which showed promise were further trained
·' e IA~
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66

BUILDING SELF-RELIANT COMMUNffiES

A third characteristic of the IAC process was the direct attempt to
change people's perceived inability to do anything about their own
development. The IAC addressed this problem in a number of ways. At
the start, projects that were visible, such as road-building and beautification campaigns, were undertaken so people would feel that things were
moving. This, in fact, motivated people to proceed with other projects.
The IAC also integrated the use of rituals, symbols, and community singing into a lot of the community activites. For example, the week when
they were moving a huge boulder was called the Week of the Great Rock.
People were encouraged to write songs embodying their ideals, their
hopes, and their vision. One original composition was their song entitled, "Gatong: Hope:' Another spoke of their roots and history. Mother's
Day, trade fairs, a sports contest, cleanliness and beautificatiion campaigns,
were elaborately celebrated. Gatong had a monthly raffle where the winner's house received a facelift, which included minor repairs, painting,
and a cleaning of the surroundings by the community. Different teams
took turns doing volunteer work one day a week. During these days, they
performed tasks, such as road repairs, that the community as a whole
'" needed.
~
Throughout the organizing process in Gatong, the IAC played a domiV\ nant role. Prior to its phasing out, the ultimate decision-making rested
on the IAC staff or on the leaders the IAC appointed. The IAC secured
resources for the community but also excercised sole responsibility in
allocating and accounting for these resources. The conflicts that arose
regarding the allocation of resources were worked out by the IAC. Ultimate
decision-making was transferred to local leaders only upon the turnover
of the project and the total phase-out of the IAC from Gatong.

Results. In the four years that the IAC was in Gatong, annual family
income, based on three industries only, went up by 350%. Infant malnutrition decreased from 85% to 24% and infant mortality also dropped
significantly. The birth rate also decreased from 49 to 30, while elementary school enrollment increased from 10 to 116. A total of 19 infrastructure projects were completed.
On the skills side, the IAC developed community skills functional for
the implementation and management of economic projects. The formal
and on-the-job training used heightened the people's skills to deal with
the technical aspects of the projects chosen. The sequential steps followed
in carrying out various activities also developed the skills required for programming and implementing economic projects. These were further reinforced through the establishment of structures (commissions and guilds)
supportive of continuing functions. All these, plus the rituals and symbols integrated into their activities, resulted in a heightened sense
of community identification and pride.
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After the tum-over to local leaders, mismanagement and fraudulent
practices became evident. For example, when the craft and guild manager
failed to give the 20% contribution to the community funds out of the
profits of the business, the others made no protest because they were afraid
of the manager.
San Miguel5
Barrio San Miguel had a population of 3,000. Two hundred twentyfour of San Miguel's 337 families derived thier income from rice farming.
The average farm size was 2.5 hectares. Fishing, poultry, duck-raising,
basket-weaving, swine-raising, and tricycle-driving provided other sources
of income. Most of the farmers in the area were former Huks, members
of a socialist/communist radical movement in the fifties. In 1967, they formed themselves into the San Miguel Farmers' Association to confront a farm
overseer. An irrigation pump, given by the government, had fallen into
the hands of this overseer, who exacted exorbitant fees for its use and loaned money at usurious interest. Nothing came out of the confrontation.
In 1W2, after suffering from typhoons and rampaging floods, the
leaders of the association sought the assistance of the Mother Rosa
Memorial Foundation (MRMF). The MRMF was a foundation established by friends and alumnae of a girls' college in Manila, run by a religious
group. At the time, the MRMF was running a technical school in the town
where San Miguel was located.
The MRMF immediately took several steps to assist the community.
It made arrangements so the farmers could get access to credit through
a neighboring rural bank. A prominent businessman, who was a board
member of MRMF, negotiated the purchase of the irrigation pump from
the over5eer. He advanced the money for the purchase. The rural bank
advanced the expenses for the rehabilitation and operation of the pump.
The association operated the pump and charged fees among its members
to defray expenses and to amortize the pump. The fees were, however,
lower than those charged by the overseer. In 1975, the pump was replaced by a larger one, secured from the National Irrigation Administration
with the assistance of the MRMF.
After the initial assistance given to San Miguel, the MRMF felt that
it would be necessary to put together a more comprehensive development
program, not only for San Miguel, but for all the fourteen villages in the
town. Hence, it launched an integrated development program with six
major concerns: community education, rice production and irrigation
management, agribusiness development, health and nutrition, research
and monitoring, and Christian formation.
In 1<J76, another flash flood hit Luzon, leaving behind submerged rice
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fields and damaged crops. Since the farmers of San Miguel anticipated
that they would be unable to pay their Joans, they were certain that they
would not be able to obtain additional loans from the rural bank for the
subsequent cropping season. Accordingly, they again sought the assistance
of the MRMF, which then approached some friends in the Philippine
Business for Social Progress (PBSP). E.5tablished by the Philippine business
community, the PBSP lent out funds for rural development. For four successive years, the San Miguel Farmers' Association obtained production
loans from PBSP.
One of the conditions imposed by PBSP was the development by the
MRMF of a community education program for San Miguel. The MRMF
hired and fielded community organizers to organize the educational activities before, during, and after the rice production cycle. Team-building
sessions were conducted, as well as sessions on various topics like leadership, financial management, water management, and rice production. A
number of non-formal education activities were also undertaken.
In 1979, the MRMF pulled out its community organizers and left
behind a core of trained leaders and community organization volunteers
who took on the task of further development in the area.

~ Organizing Process. The organizing methods used in San Miguel contained features noted in both I<agawasan and Gatong. MRMF focused on
both long-term and short-term concerns. The short-term concerns were
undertaken in the context of a framework for the comprehensive development of the community. Its methods included non-formal, action-oriented
processes, as well as formal training programs. The organizing strategy
of MRMF had two major objectives. The first was the organization of viable,
indigenous groups with attitudes and skills for planning, implementing,
and evaluating socio-e:onomic activities. The second was the development
of trained leaders with the capabilities for management and leadership
responsibility on a self-reliant and sustained basis. Although MRMF had
been helping San Miguel since 1972, it was not until 1976 that this focused strategy was evolved and implemeted.
MRMF belived that there were six requirements for the development
of viable and self-sustained communities:
1) developing group building and basic communication skills to
develop cohesive group identity;
2) developing organizational objectives and structures;
3) developing leadership;
4) developing project development and management skills while projects were being implemented;
5) developing group linkages, and the building of a council composed of different groups and organizations: and
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6) developing volunteerism so that organizations produced their own
indigenous para-professional workers, and the role of the community organizer became that of a consultant.
At the start, a survey was used to determine the tasks the community
had to address. The community organizers then proceeded to help the
community develop the other skills it needed. The methods used included
formal seminars covering a variety of subjects, focused mainly on technical
and economic management skills. The attendance in most cases was
limited to a few people. Apart from the formal training sessions, the community undertook a number of group activities on its own. Although it
acted as broker for the community to gain access to resources, MRMF left
it to the association to manage and administer these. For example, the
production loans secured from PBSP were released to the association. The
Finance Committee released the needed funds in staggered amounts to
group leaders, who, in tum, distributed the money to their members. The
farmers were also left very much to themselves to work out their conflicts.
They disciplined erring members, ran sessions to reflect on their experiences, and assessed the performance of their leaders. They even
developed performance criteria for their leaders. When a member failed
to pay his loan to the association, the association's board authorized
the group to which he belonged to take over the management of his
farm.
Although the erring farmer continued to work on his farm, decisions
on when to undertake farming activities, such as planting and harvesting,
were made by the group. The association also decided how to dispose
of the farmer's harvest.
To insure continuity, MRMF assisted San Miguel in developing a structure for their association in 1976. The general assembly elected the officers
who constituted the executive board. The chairman headed the executive
board, while the rest of the officers headed the different committees. Committee members, ranging from three to five in number, were appointed
by the committee chairman and approved by the board. The damayans,
the smallest unit of the organization, consisted of five to six farmers tilling contiguous farms. These were established to ensure maximum participation from members and to inculcate in the farmers the importance
of collective undertaking and mutual assistance. A damayan leader was
elected by the members.
Aside from establishing a structure within San Miguel, the MRMF
also federated it with other neighboring communities that were receiving
help from the MRMF. \blunteer workers from within the community were
also trained to take over many of the functions performed by the MRMF.
When the MRMF pulled out its community workers in 1979, it left behind
a rrm> gTOU n nf lead<>rc: :.nd cnmni.unit" n.-r;ani7inn '!Olur~ 0 ~""5.
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TABLE 1

Results. Average rice yield per hectare increased form 80-90 cavans to
6

120-130 cavans. Repayment of production loans from 1976 to 1981 was
100%, except for the year 1979-80, when it was 75%. In the same period,
the association generated savings of PlD,971.80. These came out of forced savings, patronage rebates from fertilizer and chemical purchases, and
from commission fees charged to owners of threshing machines operating
within the area. From these savings, the association bought a truck for
hauling and a piece of land, where they planned to put up a warehouse
and a rice mill.
These gains invited the attention of "outsiders:' At times, the community succumbed to external threats. For example, the association acceded, because of fear, to a Barangay (Village) captain's demand for onethird of the commission fee paid to the community funds by the thresher
owners operating within San Miguel.
\'

CAPACITIES OF A SELF-RELIANT COMMUNITY

Objectives

Processes/ Methods Structures

Role of
Organizers

Ouicome

-

Increased rice
yields
Repayment of
loans
Savings

San Migud
Team-building
sessions
rormal training
Action reflection
Organization of
agri-business
groups with planrice production
ning and imirrigation
plementing skills
health & nutrilil'·' for ~onomic
research &
projects
monitoring
Training of leaders
Christian formation Articulated stages
Education & train· for development
of community
ing of the
community

Integrated
development of
community
covering:

rormal association
with officers
& committees
Damayans, 5-6
farmers with contiguous farms
(self-managed &
mutual liability
groups)

Enablers
Facilitators
Trainers
Negotiators

S~:

Ability to manage
economic

activities
Ability to make
decisions
Ability to generate
and manage
resources
Ability to manage
conflict
Ability to
discipline
members &
leaders

-....)

--" In none of the three communities did the NGO involved intend to
stay permanently. Although they differed in their specific objectives and
methods, each of them was mobilizing its target community to become
self-reliant and self-sustaining. Self-reliance implies the freedom and the
ability of a community to carry out activities needed for its growth and
development. Mobilization can be viewed as a process for develping these
skills and capacities. It will, therefore, be instructive to review the cases
and see if the required skills for self-reliance were developed.
As shown in Table l, the organizing effort in each of the cases cited
had different specific objectives. In Kagawasan, the focus was to develop
the community so it could demand its rights and defend them from encroachment by outsiders. By using mass mobilizations and an iterative
cycle of planning-action-reflection, the organizers helped the community
to develop a capacity for group decision-making and action. To implement
its plans, the community had to mobilize the resources it needed. The
interaction with external bodies, such as the government, provided ample opportunities to develop negotiating skills. A felt sense of unity, reinforced by the ability of the members to manage their internal relations
and conflicts, enhanced the ability of the community to act as a body.
The organizing objectives in Gatong were quite different. Priority was
placed on improving the economic well-being of the community and on
improving the health and education of its members. In order to attain these
objectives, the IAC relied heavily on project management. The organizers
initiated numerous economic projects, both to generate income and to give
the members of the community the opportunity to use these programming concepts in actual situations. To insure some continuity in the management of these projects, they developed a formal organiztional structure for the community.

Kagawasan
Obtain what is
due them and
protect their rights
Give people a
voice and a sense
of power
To withstand extemal pressures
To give people a
"voice" to demand their rights
To give people
power to protect
their rights from
encroachment by
others

Planning·
Action-Refl echon
Mass
mobilizations
rormation of
committees

Ad-hoc depending
on needs e.g.
committees.
Once function is
fulfilled, commit·
tee is disbanded

- Enablers
- Facilitators

Protect right to
stay in land

Obtained
assistance from
agencies e.g.,
UNICEF &: CRS
Skills:
Capacity for

group action
Ability to make
group decisions
Ability to manage
conflicts
Ability to
negotiate with ex·
temal bodies
Ability to mobilize
resources

Ga tong
To increase income and quality
of life
Improve health
and education
To develop a
sense of identity
and integrity as a
community

rormal training
and seminars
On the job
application
Use of symbols
rormation of
commissions
Training of leaders

rormal community structure based
on functions and
residence

Decisionmakers
Initiators
Teachers

Increased income
Improved health
&: education
Decreased infant
mortality
Heightened sense
of community
Skills for im·
plementing and
managing
economic projects
e.g., programming

71.

BUILDING SELF-RELIANT COMMUNffiES

The San Miguel case showed features of the other two cases. While
the organizers helped the community to improve its economic well-being,
they also paid attention to enabling its members to manage their internal
relations. furmal training sessions and "on the job" applications were used
to impart technical and economic management skills for income-generating
activities. In addition, team building and reflection sessions were employed
to enable the members to make group decisions, manage conflict, and
discipline themselves and their leaders.
A review of the three cases shows that the organizers assisted each
community to develop at least some of the skills needed for the primary
objectives of the mobilization efforts. However, the results tend to show
that each set of skills, though necessary, was not sufficient to enable a
community to become self-reliant over a long period of time. A community
which could combine all of the skills developed in each of the three communities would have a good start towards self-reliance. It would be able
to manage its internal affairs, its economic activities, and its relations with
their external environment. Each of these sets of skills deserves fuller
discussion.
~

~

Organizational Management Skills

This group of skills refers to the capacities required to manage the
internal organizational relationships among the individual members of
the community. The cases show that a community needs to do two things.
The first is to develop unity and cohesion among the members. This
follows from the very nature of rural groups. Controlling very little in the
way of economic resources, their major advantage is their numbers. To
capitalize on this advantage, they need to be able to act together as a group.
To develop and enhance this unity, they need:
-the ability to identify and establish the collective needs, objectives,
and priorities;
-the ability to arrive at group decisions;
-the ability to plan and develop structures to achieve goals with
reasonable means;
-the ability to resolve internal conflicts.
The development of these skills was apparent in the cases of
Kagawasan and San Miguel, but we see very little evidence of them in
the case of Gatong.
The need for these skills is borne out by other experiences. UNICEF
has for a long time promoted and supported popular participation in the
areas of education, health, nutrition, and water supply and sanitation in
underprivileged rural and urban settings. From these experiences, UNICEF
has derived guidelines for its field workers. Two of these guidelines emphasize the development of the skills we haw' discussed:
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-To help poor people go through the process of identifying their
own priority concerns, organize for action around those concerns,
and develop solutions to pre-identified problems.
-To train members of existing groups-formal and non-formal-in
the skills of simple problem identification, data collection, and
analysis leading to their own project development, based on local
resources or a combination of their own and outside assistance. 7
Similarily, Goldsmith identifies participation in decision-making as
one of the differentiating factors of the more prosperous and successful
villages in Korea's Saemaul Undong Movement. 8
The other major task for managing the internal relationships among
the community members is to sustain and maintain the unity and cohesion that has been established. Self-reliance implies a stability of relationships over a long period. External change agents who organize and
mobilize communities will need to leave at some point. The Gatong case
demonstrates that unless those who are left behind are able to sustain
the relationships that have been developed with the assistance of the
organizers, the community will not be able to grow any further. In fact,
it will quickly retrogress, and the initial benefits obtained will rapidly
dissipate. Insuring the ability to carry on requires:
-the ability to provide incentives for individual involvement and to
monitor, control, and evaluate individual and group performance;
-the ability to develop leaders who are responsive to community
needs;
-the ability to hold leaders accountable and to enforce discipline
among members;
-the ability to develop and modify structures to institutionalize relationships among the members;
-the capacity for problem-solving.
The rationale for these skills is quite self-evident. No organization can
continue to exist without the support of its members. Hence, it will have
to sustain the continuing involvement of its members by ensuring through
its leaders that the organization is relevant to the satisfaction of members'
needs. Furthermore, when deviations occur, mechanisms for dealing with
erring members and leaders should be in place. Korten's review of membercontrolled cooperatives showed that the successful ones had "internal
structures (that) allowed members to hold leaders accountable and enforced member discipline." 9 Leader control is a key concern because rural
communities, no matter how poor, are generally not homogeneous. They
are characterized by some kind of socio-economic differentiation. This has
usually resulted in structures where a few elites tend to dominate others
w'
re d,
:ient
·hem
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The development of structures is also essential. In order to provide
for the stability of the community, it is necessary to provide a framework
and a tool for managing on-going relations and functions. Such a structure was missing in Kagawasan, since the organizers did not mobilize for
a continuing function. It was a critical element in Gatong and San Miguel
because economic activities need to be sustained over a long period. While
structures provide some degree of stability, care must be exercised that
they do not become permanent. As the community goes into new ventures and activities, required changes in structures and processes need
to be adopted.
Problem-solving skills are also important. Sustained growth will depend on the community's ability to cope with new situations. One of the
insights emerging out of the development experiences of the past few
decades is the inadequacy of the blueprint approach as a response to the
needs of rural development. Such an approach is inflexible and is not able
to respond to unanticipated developments and problems. Because development is a dynamic process, one must be able to deal with unexpected outcomes and difficulties. Social systems need to adapt to changing conditions and requirements. As Dunn points out, "social system evolution is
~ the result of a problem-solving process .. :'1°
-lJ

Economic Resources Management Skills
The acquisition and management of economic resources are important requirements for self-reliance. Communities need goods and services
to feed their members and to sustain a rising standard of living. But the
emphasis on the economic aspects of development should not lead to ignoring other sets of skills. We saw this in the case of Gatong where the
thrust toward the attainment of economic benefits was so dominant that
not enough attention was paid to the capacity for self-management and
for dealing with external pressures. The same was true with the San
Miguel case, though to a lesser extent. On the other hand, in Kagawasan
there was a total absence of any organized effort to develop economic
resources management skills. Although the organizers realized that these
were needed, they preferred not t'J get involved with economic issues,
partly because they felt that economic issues had a divisive effect, and
partly because they did not possess the necessary skills to deal with them.
The experiences of many development institutions and research and
consulting organizations have amply demonstrated the necessity of
developing economic resource management skills. Notable among these
groups is Development Alternatives, Inc., which has been involved in
various rural development programs funded by USAID. Summarizing their
experiences, Honadle says: 11
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In fact, it can be hypothesized that when dealing with non-dominant
groups, an essential element of successful capacity-building is likely to be
the acquisition of control over a central set of natural resources. Thus,
capacity-building efforts, based only on providing social services or improving management practices and procedures, are unlikely to be sustainable.
Success commonly requires a link to income-producing activity and sufficient control over the disposition of that income.

Economic resources management skills, then, should enable the community to deal with two important issues: the acquisition and management of resources, and the distribution of the benefits among the members
of the community.
Even the poorest among communities tend to have some form of indigenous resources. A sustained pattern of development will require a
capacity to renew and multiply these resources. A community will have
to balance the use of its resources to meet both its current needs and its
needs for growth. To fulfill this function, the relevant skills are:
-the ability to tap outside resources or support when local resources
are insufficient to achieve targets and objectives;
-the ability to generate economic benefits for the community;
-the ability to sustain activities over the long term;
-the ability to allocate resources according to set priorities;
-the ability to maintain records and to keep track of resources.
As seen from the San Miguel and Gatong cases, it is not enough to
acquire resources, manage them, and generate benefits. The long-term
viability of the community requires that it also deal with the issue of the
distribution of these benefits. One of the constant disappointments with
development programs is their inability to channel benefits to the poorer
sectors of society. The differentiation that exists even in rural societies often
results in structures that allow elites to capture the benefits from development programs. What is needed is not equal but, rather, equitable distnbution of these benefits. This can further reinforce the cohesion built within
the community and the continuing commitment of the members. The relevant skills to fulfill this function are:
-the ability to distribute economic benefits in a manner that is fair
and equitable to all;
-the ability to ensure a decent standard of living for the members
of the community.
Political Skills
These skills refer to the capacity of an organization to deal with external institutions and persons. A rural community cannot remain viable for
long unless it is able to deal effectively with its environment. Economically,
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the rural community usually does not have all the resources it needs to
satisfy the needs of its members. Similarly, it needs external markets for
the excess goods and services that it produces. Politically, many policies
and actions of other institutions often threaten the freedom and the rights
of communities to make decisions regarding their own development, as
shown especially in the case of Kagawasan. The structure of society is such
that the imbalance in resource bases of different groups has resulted in
the emergence of local elites who have exploited the poor. Strong patterns
of social differentiation have also resulted in structures that reinforce the
dominance of a few powerful elites. Consequently, the poor are frequently
inhibited from making decisions regarding their own development.
In order to manage these relations with their respective environment,
communities need to develop a sense of power to demand and protect
their right to have a say in things that affect them. Due to lack of resources,
they are often unable to influence events as individuals. What they need
to do is to capitalize on their numbers by acting together as an organized
unit. The establishment of an organization, however, does not in itself
lead to the power to influence the course of events. Communities need
to acquire skills to build coalitions with other groups with similar interests
and to effectively negotiate with others. The set of skills needed to manage
~ the environment includes:

Empowering Rural Communities

There is another area of technical knowledge implied in the capacitybuilding process. This area focuses more on the nature of the capacitybuilding process itself. For example, knowledge of the nature, dynamics,
and structure of groups is critical to enable the community to adjust its
internal structure and relations to its evolving needs. Some knowledge
about the dynamics of change is also going to be very useful. This
knowledge may not initially reside in the community, but in order to
develop self-reliance, a community needs to acquire the skill to search for
such knowledge. Having acquired the knowledge, it must learn to use
it. Knowledge in itself does not lead to action, and action is what leads
to growth and development.
Although we have dealt with each set of skills separately, in practice
there is a lot of overlap among them. Not only are they very closely interrelated, but they also mutually reinforce one another. Organizational
management skills affect the community's ability to manage its economic
resources, and the way economic activities are managed, in tum, can either
reinforce or destroy the sense of cohesion and unity among the members.
Similarly, political skills can enhance the ability to gain access to resources,
while the extent of a community's resources has tremendous impact on
its ability to influence outsiders and outside entities.
PROCESS FOR MOBil..IZATION

'1

-the ability to negotiate with external groups;
-the ability to establish external sources of power and support and
to use these for the benefit of the community;
-the ability to develop and build productive linkages with groups
that share similar interests and objectives;
-the ability to resolve conflicts with other groups, individuals or
institutions;
-the ability to protect community resources and gains from external threats.

Technical Skills
Technical skills refer to those capacities needed in order to carry out
certain activities, such as farming, stone-cutting, and the like. One class
of technical skills relates to economic and other livelihood programs. These
skills are not developed in a vacuum, but within the context of certain
activities. In Kagawasan, the community needed reliable information on
the applicable forestry laws and procedures in order to develop their
strategy to address the land issue. Specific weaving and stone-cutting
skills were essential ingredients for the success of the economic livelihood
projects in Gatong. The repayment rates in San Miguel would have been
very different if the farmers had not used the appropriate farming
technoln\!it><; to c11ltivate th.,;,. rice f;,,1r1,.
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Starting Point
Our discussion has shown that in order to be self-reliant, a community
has to develop four sets of skills. Where does one start? Is there a natural
starting point among the different capacities we have descnbed from which
one can logically progress to develop the other elements of self-reliance?
Theoretically, one can argue that a logical starting point is to develop
the capacity to manage internal relations among the different members
of the community. Unless they are able to act as a group, there is very
little that they can do. In practice, however, the cases we examined indicate different beginning points. The initial focus in Kagawasan was
political. The first mobilizations were aimed at getting the government
to recognize the rights of the people to secure title over the lands they
were cultivating. The two other programs started off with addressing
economic issues. In Gatong, efforts were concentrated on developing
livelihood projects to generate resources for the sustenance of the community. The initial concern in San Miguel was the need for credit. What
was common in the starting points of the three cases, however, was that
they were all based on the "felt needs" of the people. This appears to be
a most logical starting point because any attempt at organizing the rural
poor must respond to their articulated concerns and problems. Their participation involves investment of time and other resources and they must
se- --- ~h jn----'-nent -- '-enef-'-'
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Most mobilizations of rural communities involve the intervention of
external change agents. From the start, it is therefore crucial to identify
the real felt needs of the community and to insure that there is a fit between them and the capacities and mandate of the change agent.
The cases show that felt needs can be established either through informal or formal means. In Kagawasan, the primary method used was
informal. As the organizers began to live in the community, they gathered
information regarding prevailing power and leadership structures and the
people's perception of their own problems. In Gatong, the organizers
started off with a formal and elaborate five-day "consult." In San Miguel,
a formal, but less structured, approach for assessing needs was used. The
organizers conducted survey-feedback research by carrying out interviews
among a sizeable sample of the community members.
In addition to determining the felt needs of the community, it is important to ascertain that there is a fit between these felt needs and the
mandate and the capacities of the change agent. Some change agents, like
the private voluntary organizations in our cases, have very broad man12: dates so that they can deal with almost any community need. Others, like
"""'-- government agencies, tend to have much narrower mandates. Should there
- be a lack of fit between the mandate of the change agent and the felt needs
of the community, there exists a real danger for the intervening agency
"to force" its way through to the community. As a result, there will be
a reduction, or even a total absence, of community participation. Another
possible result of such a lack of congruence is that the change agent could
unconsciously lead the community to address issues with which the
change agent is more comfortable, but which may not be of great concern
to the members of the community.
In summary, there are three screens that finally determine the starting point of mobilization: the community's felt needs, the mandate of the
change agent, and the latter's capacity and skills. For a successful beginning, it is necessary to achieve a fit among these three.
Progression from the Starting Point
After a mobilization has gotten off to a successful start, what further directions should it take? An examination of the field data is again instructive.
In both San Miguel and Gatong, the initial mobilization was around
economic issues. As the communities managed their income-generating
projects, certain powerful individuals became interested in taking advantage of the benefits generated at the expense of the community members.
When this became apparent, it was time to address the enhancement of
the community's political skills and capacity to address the potential threat.
In contrast, Kagawasan initially concentrated on developing political skills.
The community's eventual felt need and interest in developing some

Empowering Rural Communities

79

income-generating projects was the trigger for a greater emphasis on
economic resources management skills. The evidence from the three
cases seems to show that it will be difficult to pre-plan and predetermine the exact time and direction of the required shift in focus from one
set of capacities to another. What the change agent needs to be aware
of is that there is more than one set of skills needed for self-reliance and
that a shift of emphasis from one set of skills to another most likely
needs to be accompanied by a change in the methods used for capacitybuilding.
Mobilization Methods
The methods used to develop community capacities are described in
the cases and are summarized in Table 1. The two principal methods used were the planning-action-reflection mode, or, simply, action-reflection
and formal training. The former was the principal method used in
Kagawasan, and the latter in Gatong. In San Miguel the organizers used
a combination of both.
Action-Reflection. The action-reflection method used in Kagawasan was
very conflict-oriented. The people were mobilized against a common
enemy, the regional director of the Bureau of Forestry. The underlying
assumption is that people are more easily mobilized to unite themselves
and to develop a sense of power in dealing with their environment when
they have a common enemy. Hence, this method could be a powerful
tool for developing political skills. However, there can be very serious
consequences in the use of this method. The conflict-confrontation mode
possess the characteristics of what management scientists call a "zerosum game." Game theory tells us that when a zero-sum game is played,
the total value of the benefits is reduced. Furthermore, succeeding games
tend to be zero-sum. Finally, zero-sum games lead to inflexibility in defining the problems that are the subject of the game. Development is not
just transferring resources from one pocket to another. Development
means insuring that the growth in the total amount of benefits is equitably
distributed among the different segments of society. It requires continuous
collaborative effort among different segments so that problems are
creatively solved.
There is another form of the action-reflection method-the negotiation mode. This was used in the cornrnunals program of the National Irrigation Administration of the Philippine government, discussed in
Chapter 11 of this volume. Instead of focusing on a common enemy or
oppressor, this process seeks to create a climate of cooperation so that the
parties are able to combine their expertise and resources and channel them
to the solution of community problems. The result is an enhanced capacity
on the part not only of the community but also of the other agencies or
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institutions that the community is negotiating with. The collaborative
climate allows both to learn from each other. In the communals program
of NIA, major decisions on the design of the system, for example, were
the outcome of negotiations between the irrigators group and NIA
technical staff. Each party learned from the other. The synergy resulted
in more functional designs which each party working on its own could
not have accomplished. This climate, however, presupposes a certain level
of maturity of the parties involved. It assumes a focus on a common set
of objectives.
In choosing between the conflict-confrontation method and the
negotiation mode, one needs to be reminded by the principal objective
of mobilization. We can organize people to tackle specific issues and problems, such as land tenure or access to credit. We do this not only to achieve
specific results on these issues, but also as part of a series of building
blocks that will enhance community capacity to carry out functions that
are essential to the community's survival and growth. The need for a continuing relationship and interaction between the community and its environment poses serious questions about the use of the conflictconfrontation mode. This approach can do potentially long-term damage
-4:::- to the relationship between the community and other elements in the en~ vironrnent. However, experience has shown that situations do exist where
certain institutions and agencies cannot be "awakened" except though
confrontation. Where the use of the confrontation method is deemed
essential, the organizers and the community must keep in mind its potential risks so that these can be managed.
Formal Training. A considerable amount of formal training was used
in Gatong and San Miguel. This mode is functional for imparting
knowledge and can build up a community's capacity for technical selfreliance. To enhance its value, it is important to ensure that the subjects
of the lectures are within the experience of the community. The additional formal training merely serves to sharpen the instinctive wisdom
acquired by people through experience. One of the principal shortcomings of formal training, however, is that knowledge does not necessarily
lead to action.
For sure, there are methods other than those that were used in the
cases we discussed. One does not need to be married to a particular
method to the exclusion of the others. What is critical is to ensure that
the methods used are functional for the development of community
capacities. The data from the three cases does seem to indicate that community capacities are enhanced more through action and active involvement than through formal training, whose primary object is to pass on
knowledge. Therefore, the emphasis on mobilization should be directed
towards having t}w nP()ple thPrnSelvP<: 11ndert"I<<> the rP<11Jifed <'!rtivities.
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This implies that the organizers or the change agents should be
enablers rather than implementors. The function of the organizer is to
develop community capacity. He manages the learning process rather
than the outcome of the project. He leaves the latter task to the
community.

SUMMARY
We have examined three cases where external change agents have
tried to mobilize rural communities. Our discussion has focused on the
major objective of mobilization-the building of community capacity to
address its own needs. We have identified four sets of critical skills that
a community must possess before it can become self-reliant. We also
discussed some of the processes and methods used to develop these skills.
However, we have tried to relate our discussion of the processes and
methods to the development of the needed community capacities. There
is at times a great temptation for one to be dogmatic about his methods.
Ultimately, these methods will have to be judged on the basis of the major objective of mobilization: Do they result in developing skills that empower rural communities to address their own needs?
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There are two related crises in today's world. The first and
most visible is the ~/etmronrnenf dills. The second, more subtle but equally lethal, is hritnanlincf• ldlf.i.·
tforuliips ·to ffS-:emmi~..·mstitutions, ideas; as well as
the relationships among the many individuals and groups
that inhabit the globe.
If both crises are not resolved, neither will be. Despite
our faith in technology and our reliance on technological
solutions, tfiere ae ncntt1 Jm~ -.O'futioils 10·DldfV'ftAt
probletili ct>nfrontmg bllDWI beings. Furthermore, even
those technical solutions that can be applied to environmental problems can't be applied rationally until mankind
transcends the intellectual limitations imposed by onr insti..
tutions, our philosophies, and our cultures. Compounding
all of this is the reality of politics.
Politics is a major part of life-beginning in the home
and becoming more and more viSI"ble as power is manifest
in the larger institutions on the local, national, and international levels. We should not be fooled by the fa~de of
either politics or political institutions. What we are talking
about b f>o\llet.and.ib uM!. 'Certainly there is more to life
than either disguised or raw power; at least one hopes that
in time the power motive will combine with more rational,
more humane ways of proceeding. Apart from power, culture still plays a prominent viSl"ble role in the relations between Russians and the West, for example. Culture has
always been an issue, not only between Europe and Russia.
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but among the European states as well. The Germans, the
French, the Italians, the Spanish, Portuguese, and English,
as well as the Scandinavian and Balkan cultures, all have
their own identity, language, systems of nonverbal communication, material culture, history, and Way8 of doing
things. The frequently heard argument that cultures are
not unique is one of the irrationalities discussed in the
chaptexs to follow. At this moment, Europe is prosperous,
temporarily calm, and causing few problems. But what
about the clash of cultures in the Middle East that
threatens to involve all countries that are high consumers
of oil? And what about the emergence of China and
Japan? Any Westerner who was raised outside the Far East
and claims he really understands and can communicate
with either the Chinese or the Japanese is deluding himself.1 On the horizon are the multiple cultures of Africa
and the emerging nations of Latin America demanding to
be recognir.ed in their own right. In all these crises, the
,.futurC 'dejkiads on man's being able to transcend the limits
of individual cultures. To do so, however, he must first
~ and accept the multiple hidden dimensions of
,~ri>as culture. because every culture has its own hid. den, unique form of unconscious culture.
Exacerbating the world's political and cultural problems
are environmental and economic crises. As Hardin 2 showed
with wisdom and insight in his article entitled, "The Tragedy of the Commons,, manlind cannot continue to increase the consumption of the world's finite resources. The
classical English pattern of using the vt1lage commons
(that communally owned and used land which was available for pasturing fnTvclte livestock) did not involve a conflict between public and private welfare "' Ion& as there
was. fJriough Lmd. However, as herds increased, the overgrazed land became less productive so that herdsmen had
to increase their stocks in order to stay even, and thus the
commons were destroyed. The tragedy was that profits aecrued to the opportunistic herdsmen who exploited the

commons the most. while losses were shared by all the
users. Those who exercised restraint were doubly penalized.
Not only did they suffer losses from the overgrazing of
neighbors, but they were unable to exploit the market by
means of their own production.
Today;· the sea. the afr,:··ttre wataways;;,;tiMJ'earth, the
land and what it produces ha1'e·afl ~'bif'.~
and all are being overused. It is clear that appeals to altm.
ism are futile and in a sense foolhardy. Technology will not
resolve this dilemma either because these are human problems. Hardin argues that the single-track, Newtonian
approach will satisfy only the politicians and the big a.
ploiten of the commons who stand to gain from over.
simplification of issues. What is needed, he feels, is a more
comprehensive, Darwinian (Dionysian) approach that can
be used as a basis for cstabttlbhtt' i:-ioll•~~fff'Cf;
and options. In a word. unless human beings can learn
to pull together and regulate consumption and production
patterns, they are headed for disaster. It is imposstble to
cooperate or to do any of these things unless we know each
other's ways of thinking.
The answer lies not in restricting human endeavors, bat
in evolving new alternatives, new possibilities, new dimensions, new options, and new avenues for creative uses of
human beings based on the recognition of the multiple
and unusual talents so manifest in the diversity of the human race.
This brings us to an important question that has grown
in my mind throughout my lifetime. It has to do with
our undedying attifudes't6w11rth:>tillt:h1t:s. I am not speak.
ing of something superficial, which can be easily observed
or experienced, but something deeper and more subtle than
what appears on the surface. The question is: ~·
most f»oPl8 .o ~ hiltthin ~Why do
they not make better use of their talents? It is as though
we nurtured the child that is in all of us and, in being
childish, were afraid of each other. This is not a simple
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problem. and it may be worldwide. Certainly the human
species has not begun to tap its potential and half suspect.
ing this deficiency, we blame everyone and everything ac:ept the real culprit.
We see evidence of mankind's disparaging itself in folk.
lore. 1eligion, philmophies, institutions, as well as in daily
life. It seems that these processes are not within the reach
of conscious control but deep within us. Freud was so
struck by the capacity of the human race to put itself down
that he pooited a death instinct and built bis theories
around the notion that the human species inevitably ad..
vane.cs at its own expense. Freud believed that the basic
eneigies (the hbidinal forces) had to be repressed for peo..
pie to even live in groups, and that the hbidinal energy
was "sublimated" into the creative, cooperative drives that
produced modem institutions. For him, creativity was a
by-product of the necessity for man to repress his human
natnrc. Like all of us, Freud was a product of his times,
which were chamcteriud by such thinking, and in the context of the times much of Freud's thinking made sense.
Nevertheless, the study of our past as well as our present
fails to confirm Freud's view that humans advance and
build institutions through a process of sublimation of sex..
nal energy. This book suggests another alternative, namely
that once people began evolving their extensions, particularly language. tools and institutions, they got caught in
the web of what I term •ertenston tnmsfcmlce'" (Chap.
ter 2). and as a consequence, they err in judgment and
become alienated from and incapable of controlling the
monsters they have created. In this sense, humans have
advanced at the expense of that part of themselves that
has been extended, and as a consequence ended up repressing human nature in its many forms. Man's goal from
this point should be to rediscover that lost, alienated natural self.
Certainly, there are tremendous areas of conflict between Western man and his material, and nonmaterial ex.
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tensions. The instruments we have created are like ill.
fitting shoes. By creating extensions that don't fit or don't
work, humans have failed to develop some of the most im.
portant aspects of their own psychic and physical potential.
According to some of the most distinguished and thoughtful studenb of the mind, pmhaprtlle'moih1e.U&tmg and
damaging thing that can happen- to: mmeono·»"to·fail tofulfill his potential. A kind of gnawing emptiness, long.
ing, frustration, and displaced. anger overwhelms people
when this occurs. Whether the anger is turned inward on
the self, or outward toward others, dreadful destruction re.
suits. We know that mankind has great talent; we see evidence of it on all sides. Yet, how humans evolved with
such an incredible reservoir of diverse talents is not completely understood. We haven't looked, poSSibly because
we are not neatly enough in awe of omsehes, possibly be.
cause we knciw so little and have nothing to measure ourselves against.
Part of the problem lies in the tension between creativeness and diversity and the rather specific limiting needs
of institutions. Most cultures and the institutions they en..
gender are the result of having to evolve highly specialized
solutions to rather specific problems. For example, in Eng.
land during the early days of the Industrial Revolution,4
when villagers and field hands were brought into the factories to work, the first generations of mill hands had
not been conditioned to the factory whistle and linear.
scheduled time. Like all preindustrial peoples, when they
earned enough to pay off their debts and keep body and
soul together for a while, they would quit and go home,
much to the consternation of the factory owners. This situ.
ation could have continued indefinitely if there bad not
been a hidden trap-<:hildren. Not only were there no child
labor laws then, but no one to care for the children at
home; so the malleable children worked with their parents
in the factory, and being young, they became imprinted
by the whistle. When they grew up they brought up their
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own children accordingly, thereby setting in motion a seri~
of events and ways of handling time which fit neither the
psychic nor the physical needs of the workers. However,
because the adaptation to the linear schedule had become
intcmaltted and automatic, it was viewed as an asset and
not a liability. It bas taken almost a century and a quarter
to begin to work itself out. Today children are brought
np on a different time system-one that is less obviously
tied down in time and space, and to single institutions;
there is also growing pressure to overcome monotony and
the tempo oonJlicts between man and the machine. Beca~·#'Jiinle'.pbt omaeha- in our 'own· zoo, we find it
difficult to break out. Since pe0ple can't fight institutions
on which their lives depend, the result is that first they
unconsciously tum their anger inward then later outward.
To continue our basic theme,
~a Jeme of
1'Cith ir·dircctly·related to the n~ber of sitUations in
ewbQ the1 are in control, which means that many people
have problems with their self-image because they are clearly
in control of so little.11 The ultimate in human degradation
and the subservience of human needs to institutional forms
is shown in Ken Kesey's8 novel, One Flew Over the
Cuckoo'• Nest. Big Nurse in Kesey's book epitomizes all
the anti-humanism and destructiveness, all the distortions
of the communication process, all the violations of cultural
norms that one finds in the bureaucracies that we have
created. The book is an exquisitely apt metaphorical statement of the powerlessness and lack of self-affirmation so
common in our times.
Powerlessness and laclc. of self-affirmation lead to aggres.
lion, as repeatedly asserted by psychologists and psychiatrists. Psychological powerlessness is the result of past
events, but situational and cultural powerlessness are here
and now. Blacb and other minorities rioted in :recent years
because they saw themselves as powerless to make the system work. There is no other way to explain the incredible
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outburst of rage triggered by the assassination of Martin
Luther King or the "incursion" into Cambodia. The
groundwork ha~ been laid long before, but it was suddenly
and oveiwhelmingly apparent to minority groups.
Things are quieter in the ghettos now because the
rhythm of black life is in a quiet phase-they are taking a
breather. It is quieter on the campus since the winding
down of the Vietnam War. But a major and continuing
source of frustration exists because the many gifts and talents of women, blacks, Native Americans, Spanish-Americans and others are not only unrecognized, but frequently
denigrated by members of the dominant gronp. It is the
corrosive daily frustration, the inability to communicate
or to establish meaningful relationships that is so soulshrinking.
The cultural and psychological insight that is important
for us to accept is_ ~at,dcny:i,ug~ and'·tJ!ICi'lllJ g·thct
effecb that it
have· on hurmfu 'tllttib. &a~tllihll d6.:
structive and potentially dmlger0us
~ Cliril. We
must come to terms with both. It is our powerlessness in
the face of cnlture and the cnltural limitations placed on
the development of self that result in aggression. Pamdox:ically, the only way that we can escape the hidden co~
straints of covert culture is to involve ourselves actively and
consciously in the very parts of life that we take most for
granted.
A ~ coltmal literacy mi>W:mebt that is not imposed, but which springs from within is called for. We
can all benefit from a deeper knowledge of what an incredible organism we really are. We can grow, swell with
pride, and breathe better for having so many remarkable
talents. To do so, however, we mnst stop ranking both people and talents and accept the fact that there are many
roads to truth and no culture has a corner on the path
or is better equipped than others to search for it. Furthermore, no man can tell another how to conduct that search.
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Writing a book is a cooperative effort; while the author
is ultimately responsible for the content, form, style, and
organization of ideas, he depends upon the assistance of
others, without which his task would be immeasurably
lengthened.
My first atlnowledgment, therefore, with thanks and appreciation, is to Mildred Reed Hall. my friend, partner,
and wife, whose faith in my work frequently kept me going
in times of doubt or stress. Despite fulltime professional
responstbilities, she made it possible for me to have time
for writing by assuming burdens and shielding me from
the demands of others. She has also read and criticized
several versions of this book. For editorial assistance I am
indebted to Roma McNickle, whose skiII and experience
were extremely helpful. My first editor at Doubleday, William Whitehead, provided an extensive and thoughtful
critique of the first draft. The second draft of the book
was reviewed and strengthened by Elizabeth Knappman.
To both these Doubleday editors I express my thanks. My
agent, Robert Lescher, also contributed invaluable assistance at many stages in the production of the manuscript.
Special thanks go to tL ... following individuals who performed innumerable tasb essential to publication: Cornelia Lowndes, who deciphered my handwriting, typed several versions of the manuscript, and contnbuted many
helpful suggestions; Lane Ittelson and Cynthia Peters, who
helped with library research, checking footnotes and bibli0graphic references; and Ellen McCoy Hall, who contnboted many cogent comments on the manuscript at various
stages.

1.

The Paradox of Culture

Two widely divergent but interrelated experiences, psycho.
analysis and work as an anthropologist, have led me to the
belief that in his strivings for order, Western man has
created chaos by denying that part of his self that integrates while enshrining the parts that fragment experience.
These examinations of man's psyche have also convinced
me that: the natural act of thinking is greatly modified by
culture; Western man uses only a smal1 fraction of his
mental capabilities; there are many different and legitimate ways of thinking; we in the West value one of these
ways above all others-the one we call "logic," a linear system that has been with us since Socrates.
Western man sees his system ·of kigiC ai lfn<inym<>os
with the truth. For him it is the only road to reality. Yet
Freud educated us to the complexities of the psyche, helping his readers to look at dreams as a legitimate mental
process that exists quite apart from the linearity of manifest thought. But his ideas were from the outset strenuously resisted, particularly by scientists and engineen,
who were still wedded to a Newtonian model. When
taken seriously, Freudian thinking shook the very foundations of conventional thought. Freud's followers, particularly Fromm and Jung, undeterred by popular stereotypes
and the tremendous prestige of the physical sciences,
added to his theories and bridged the gap between the linear world of logic and the integrative world of dreams.1
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Knowing that the interpretation of dreams, myths, and
acts is alvvays to some degree an individual matter,2 I cannot help asking myself what a psychoanalytically sophiSticated reader would add to my own interpretation of a sequence of events reported in the New York Times
concerning a police dog sighted on Ruffle Bar, an uninhabited island near New York. 3 Visible only from a distance,
the dog, nicknamed the King of Ruffle Bar, had sustained
itself for an estimated twci years, was apparently in good
health, and presumably would have survived in his semiwild state, barring accidents, for the rest of his natural life.
However, some well-meaning soul heard about the dog
and reported him to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, thereby setting the bureaucratic wheels in motion. Since the King could not be
approached by people, a baited trap was set. According to
the Times report: ". . . every day, a police launch from
Sheepshead Bay takes off for Ruffle Bar, the uninhabited
swampy island of the dog. Every day, a police helicopter
hovers for a half hour or more over Ruffie Bar." A radio report of the broadcast at the time described how the helicopter harassed the dog in futile efforts to "catch" (sic)
him (he refused to enter the trap) or at least to get a better view of him. Police were quoted as saying the dog
'1ooked in good shape." When questioned, representatives
of the ASPCA said: "When we catch the dog, we will
have it examined by a vet, and if it is in good health, we
wlll find a happy home for it." 4 (italics added)
If this story had been a dream or a myth instead of a
news report, there is little doubt as to its interpretation.
Both the latent and the manifest content are quite clear,
possibly explaining why this local news item was given national coverage. I find, as I go over the story, that free aSsociations come to mind on different levels. The story epitomizes the little man against the big bureaucracy. There
is also a delusional side which cannot be overlooked. TI1e
ASPCA became obsessed with capturing the dog. Once
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triggered, the ASPCA involved the police with a remorseless, mindless persistence that is too terrifyingly characteristic of bureaucracies once they are activated. Interestingly enough, the police, having known about the dog for
two years, had been content to leave him on the island.
Emotionally, they sided with the King, even while carrying out their orders. "Why don't they leave the dog
alone?" said one policeman. Another observed, "The dog is
as happy as a pig in a puddle." 3
The delusional aspects have to do with the institutionalized necessity to control "everything," and the
widely accepted notion that the bureaucrat knows what is
best; never for a' moment does he doubt the ~of the
bureancra:tic solution. It is also slightly insane, or at least
indicative of our incapacity to order priorities with any
common sense, to spend thousands of dollars for helicopters, gasoline, and salaries for the sole purpose of bureaucratic neatness.
Even more recently, a New York Times news iteme reported a U. S. Park Police campaign to stamp out kite
flying on the grounds of the Washington Monument.
Their charter to harass the kite Biers lay in an old law
written by Congress supposedly to keep the Wright
brothers' planes from becoming fouled in kite strings.
The psychoanalyst Laing is convinced that the Western
world is mad.7 These stories of the dog and the kite Biers
bolster Laing's view and symbolize man's plight as well as
any recent events I know.s However, it is not man who is
crazy so much as his institutions 9 and those culture patterns that determine his behavior. We in the West are
alienated from ourselves and from nature. we,~1mder
a nmnber of delusions~ one of which' ii tmt. life,..kes
sense; i.e.. that We ate l'aDe. We persist in this View despite massive evidence to the contrary. We live fragmented, compartmentalized lives in which contradictions
are carefully sealed off from each other. We have been
taught to think linearly rather than comprehensively, 10
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and we do this not through conscious design or because
we are not intelligent or capable, but because of the way
in vvhich ;deep cultmal undetetments structure life in subtle .·but highly contistent wayS that are, not consciously
~b:d; Like the invisible jet streams in the skies that
detennine the course of a storm, these hidden currents
shape our lives; yet their influence is only beginning to be
identified. Given our linear, step..by...step, compartmentalized way of thinking, 11 fostered by the schools and
public media, it is impossible for our leaders to consider
events comprehensively or to weigh priorities according to
a system of common good, all of which can be placed like
an unwanted waif on culture's doorstep. Yet, paradoxically, few anthropologists are in agreement as to what to
include under the general rubric of culture. While it will
be denied by some, much depends on the anthropologist's
own culture, which exerts a deep and abiding influence
not ouly over how anthropologists think but over where
they draw the boundaries in such matters. Frequently, the
greater portion of contemporary culture will be excluded
or referred to as "mere convention." In a practical sense,
the conventions of the field and what one's peers are studying have more to do with what anthropologists define as
culture than an appraisal of one's data might indicate.
Like everyone else, anthropologists use models, and some
models are more fashionable than others. Most of them
are handed down and modified periodically.
The reader may well ask, "What is a model?" or
"What kind of models are you talking about?" While
models and how man uses them are just beginning to be
understood, oue thing is certain: many different models
exist. Mechanical models, such as scale models of airplanes
Bown in wind tunnels, show how machines and processes
work. Models for making molds can reproduce everything
from machines to copies of works of art. Life models help
the artist fill in gaps in a faulty visual memory. Parents
and teachers may be models for the young.
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Scientists use theoretical models, often mathematical in
nature. These are used to symbolically express certain qualities, quantities, and relationships encountered in life.
Econometricians, for example, use these models to investigate how the more measurable aspects of the economic
system operate.
Anthropologists use predominantly non-mathematical
theoretical models that are rooted in culture. Since culture
is itself a series of situational models for behavior and
thought, the models anthropologists use are frequently
highly abstract versions of parts of models that make up
the entire culture (kinship systems, for example).
Man is the model-making organism par excellence. His
earliest intellectual endeavors resulted in monuments that
mystified and puzzled twentieth.century man ·until they
were figured out. Stonehenge, for example, is a model of
the solar system that enabled the early inhabitants of the
Salisbury Plain to make accurate observations of celestial
events and to keep track of the seasons, order their ceremonial life, and even predict eclipses at a time when no
one would have thought such refined calculations and observations were possible (fifteen hundred to two thousand
years n.c.I).
Grammars and writing systems are models of language.
Any school child who has struggled to make sense of what
he is taught knows that some fit reasonably well, others
don't. Myths, philosophical systems, and science represent
different types of models of what the social scientists call
cognitr.:e systems. The purpose of the model '9:10'aaal>le
the'.\m:r to do a better job in handl.mi the., TI ¢11(-cOm.
plexity of life. By using models, we see and test how
things work and can even predict how things will go in the
future. The effectiveness of a model can be judged by how
well it works, as well as how consistent it is as a mechanical or philosophical system. People are very closely
identified with their models, since they also form the basis
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for behavior. Men have fought and died in the name of
different models of nature.
'''/ill• t:beoretieltl:'modelS are incomplete. By definition,
they are abstractions and therefore leave things· out. What
they leave out is as important as, if not more important
than, what they do not, because it is what is left out that
gives structure and form to the system. Models have a half
life--'5ome are ephemeral, others last for centuries. There
are highly explicit models, while others are so much a part
of life as to be unavailable for analysis except under very
special circumstances.
In constructing their models of culture, most anthro.
pologisb talce into account that there are different levels of
behavior: overt and covert, implicit and explicit, things
you talk about and things you do not. Also, that there is
such a thing as the unconscious, although few are in
agreement as to the degree to which the unconscious is
influenced by culture. The psychologist Jung, for example,
hypothecated a "collective" unconscious that was shared
by all mankind (a concept many anthropologists might
have trouble accepting). Paradoxically, studying the
models that men create to explain nature tells you more
about the men than about the part of nature being studied. In the West, people are more concerned with the content or meaning of the model than they are with how it is
put together, is organized, or performs, and the purpose it
is supposed to fulfill.
Anthropologists have studied only those things people
could or would talk to them about, with the result that
many of the important things-Culture patterns that make
life meaningful and really differentiate one group from
another-have gone unnoticed or been unreported and
brushed aside as trivial. If one were to use a linguistic
analogy, it would be as though there were data on the vocabulary of culture but very little on either the syntactic
(grammar) or phonemic systems (alphabets are based on a
phonemic analysis). It is not enough to say that the
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French believe this and the Spanish believe that. Beliefs
can change. Beneath the clearly perceived, highly explicit
surface culture, there lies a whole other world, which
when understood will ultimately radically change our view
of human nature. Writing forty years ago, the linguist
Sapir started the ball rolling by demonstrating that in language (an important part of culture) man created an instrument thal: is quite different from what is commonly
supposed. He states:
The relation between language and experience is
often misunderstood . . . [it] ~;<lefines experience for us by reason of its formal completeness and
because of our unconscious projection of its implicit
expectations into the field of experience. .•• [L]anguage is much like a mathematical system, which
. . . becomes elaborated into a self-eontained conceptual system which previsages all possible experience in
accordance with certain accepted formal limitations. . . . [C]ategories such as number, gender,
case, tense, mode, voice, "aspect" and a host of others
. . . are not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon it . . . . (italics added) a
Sapir's work, which predates McLuhan by thirty-five years,
not only makes a stronger, more detailed case than McLuhan that "the media is the message," but can be extended
to include other cultural systems as well. In the process of
evolving culture, the human species did much more than
was at first supposed.
The usefulness of Sapir's model was demonstrated in a
practical way by Kluckhohn ancU.Alichton in their pioneering book The Navujo.a which illustrates the difficulties
the verb.oriented Navajo children experienced when they
attended white schools and were confronted by English-a
loosely structured, adjective language. Kluckhohn and
Leighton's basic point, however, was not only that
differences in emphasis on adjectival and verbal forms
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caused difficulty in school, but that the total orientation of
the two languages was different, forcing the two groups to
attend and fail to attend entirely different things in natnre. Having lived and dealt with Navajos for a number of
years, I have no doubt not only that they think very
differently from the white man, but that much of this
difference is at least initially traceable to their language.
Working with other cultural systems, I have found evidence that it is not just in language that one finds such
constraints, but elsewhere as well, provided of course that
one is fortunate enough to have studied cultures
sufficiently different from one's own to bring its latent
structures into focus.
In considering the data presented in this book, it is important for the reader to come to grips with his own
model of culture in its manifest as well as its latent forms,
because my purpose is to raise some of the latent to conscious awareness and to give it form so that it can be dealt
with. Technically, the model of culture on which my work
is based is more inclusive than those of some of my colleagues. My emphasis is on the nonverbal, unstated realm
of culture. While I do not exclude philosophical systems,
religion, social organization, language, moral values, art,
and material culture, l feel it is more important to look at
the way things are actually put together than at theories.
Nevertheless, and in spite of many differences in detail,
anthropologists do agree on three characteristics of culture:-:;ft iS jbt &lmitc, but learned; tbe''Vflrious facets of cultme.aie,.intt:nclated-vou touch a culture in one place and
mrYthing else is aff~ted; it i; shated md in effect defines
the boundaries of different groups.
Culture is man's medium; there is not one aspect of
human life that is not touched and altered by culture.
This means personality, how people express themselves
(including shows of emotion), the way they think, how
they move, how problems are solved, how their cities are
planned and laid out, how tr:rnsportation systems function
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and are organized, as well as how economic and government systems are put together and function. However, like
the purloined letter, it is frequently the most obvious and
taken-for-granted and therefore the least studied aspects of
culture that influence behavior in the deepest and most
subtle ways.
As a case in point, let us examine how white Americans
are captives of their own time and space systems-beginning with time. American time is what I have termed
"monochronic"; that is, Americans, when they are serious,
orually prefer to do one thing at a time, and this requires
some kind of scheduling. either implicit or explicit. Not all
of us conform to monochronic norms. Nevertheless, there
are social and other pressures that keep most Americans
within the monochronic frame. However, when Americans
interact with people of foreign cultures, the different time
systems cause great difficulty.
Monochronic time (M-time) and polychronic time
(P-time) represent two variant solutions to the use of both
time and space as organizing frames for activities. Space is
included because the two systems (time and space) are
functionally interrelated. M-time emphasiu:s schedules,
segmentation, and promptness. P-time systems are characterized by several things happening at once. They stress•ift:i
volvement of people and completion of .hamactiODI rather
than adherence to preset schedules. P-time is treated as
much less tangible than M-time. P-time is apt to be considered a point rather than a ribbon or a road. and that
point is sacred.a
Americans overseas are psychologically stressed in many
ways when confronted by P-time systtms<9*ti•ld ~in
Latin America and the Middle East. In the markets and
stores of Mediterranean countries, one is surrounded by
other customers vying for the attention of a clerk. There is
no order as to who is served next, 1 6 and to the northern
European or American, confusion and clamor abound. In
a different context, the same patterns apply within the
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governmental bureaucracies of Mediterranean countries: A
cabinet officer, for instance, may have a large reception
area outside his private office. There are almost always
small groups waiting in this area, and these groups are
visited by government officials, who move around the
room conferring with each. Much of their business is tranSacted in public instead of having a series of private meetings in an inner office. Particularly distressing to Americans is the way in which appointments are handled by
polychronic people. Appointments just don't carry the
same weight as they do in the United States. Things are
constantly shifted around. Nothing seems solid or firm,
particularly plans for the future, and there are always
changes in the most important plans right up to the very
last minute.
In contrast, within the Western world, man finds little
in life that is exempt from the iron hand of M-time. In
fact, his social and business life, even his sex life. are apt
to be completely time.dominated. Time is so thoroughly
woven into the fabric of existence that we are hardly
aware of the degree to which it determines and co-ordinates everything we do, including the molding of relations with others in many subtle ways. By scheduling, we
compartmentalize; this makes it possible to concentrate on
one thing at a time, but it also denies us context. Since
scheduling by its very nature selects what will and will not
be perceived and attended and permits only a limited
number of events within a given period. what gets scheduled in or out constitutes a system for settim: priorities for
both people and functions.16 Important things are taken
op first and allotted the most time; unimportant things
are left to last or omitted if time nms out.1 7
Space and its handling also si~nal importance and
priorities. The amount of space allocated and where a
person is placed within an organization tell a lot about him
and his relation to the organization. Equally significant is
how he handles his time. In fact, discretion over schedul-
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ing-the option of determining when one W111 be in the
office-indicates that one has arrived. The exceptions are
salesmen, whose jobs demand that they be away from
their desks, or those who hold unusual positions, for example the city editor of a newspaper, whose job is inherently
polychronic. The importance of place-where tlte activities
are permitted to occur-has become so much a part of
modem bureaucracy that some employees whose performance would be enormously enhanced if they could get
away from their desks are seldom permitted to do so. For
example, .American Foreign' ·SmW:e -~~>m;griert, to
Latin r.America showd bC ·oat interac:ting :~~~ l<>aal
people, ' but •because.·' of immutable .bUreaumtic0.tustom
they can;t leave their desks: Cut off from the people with
whom tltey should be establishing ties, how can they ever
be effective? In another American-based bureaucracy, an
important and famous research program was threatened
because the space required for the experiments was greater
than that appropriate to the rank of the investigator.
Madi' Yes, completely mad; but bureaucratically vecy real.
For M-time people reared in the northern European tradition, time is linear and segmented like a road or a nbbon extending forward into the future and backward to
the past. It is also tangible; they speak of it as being saved,
spent, wasted, lost, made up, accelerated, slowed down,
crawling, and running out. These metaphors should be
taken very seriously, because they express the basic manner
in which time is conceived as an unconscious determinant
or frame on which everything else is bnilt. M-time scheduling is used as a classification system that orders life.
With the exception of birth and death, all important ac:tivities are scheduled. It should be mentioned that without schedules and something very much like the M-time
system, it is doubtful if our industrial civilization could
have developed as it has. There are other consequences,
however. Monochronic time seals off one or two people
from tlte group and intensifies relationships witlt one other
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person or, at most, two or three people. M-time in this
sense is like a room with a closed door that ensures privacy. The only problem is that you must vacate the
..room" at the end of fifteen minutes or an hour, a day, or
a week, depending on the schedule, and make way for the
next one in line. Failure to make way by intruding on the
time of the person waiting is egocentric, narcissistic, and
bad manners.
Monochronic time is arbitrary and imposed; that is,
learned. Because it is so thoroughly learned and so thoroughly integrated into our culture, it is treated as though
it were th,e only natural and '1ogical" way of organizing
life. Yet it is not inherent in man's own rhythms and creative drives, nor is it existential in nature. Furthermore, organizatiom, particularly business and government bureaucracies, subordinate man to the organization, and they
accomplish this mainly by the way they handle time-space
systems.
Everything in our lives must be fitted to the Procrustean demands of the schedule. As any American can tell
you, there are times when things are just beginning to
develop in the desired way; yet they must be stopped to
conform to a preset schedule. Example: research funds run
out just as the results are beginning to be achieved. How
often has the reader had the experience of realizing that
he is pleasurably immersed in some creative activity, totally unaware of time, solely conscious of the job at hand,
only to be brought back to "reality" with the rude shock
of realizing that other, preset, frequently inconsequential
commibnents are bearing down on him?
From this, we see that many Americans make the common mistake of associating the schedule with reality and
one's self or the activity as somethin~ that is removed
from life. M-time can alienate us from ourselves and deny
us the experience of context in the wider sense. That is,
M-time narrows one's view of events in much the same
way as looking through a cardboard tube narrows vision,
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and it influences subtly and in depth how we think-in
segmented compartments.
Possibly, this restriction of context explains in part the
difficulty that American enterprises have in adapting to
other time systems. An economist once told me that Eskimos working for a fish cannery in Alaska thought factory
whistles were ridiculous. The idea that men would work or
not work because of a whistle seemed to them sheer lunacy. For the Eskimo, the tides determined what men did,
how long they did it, and when they did it. Tide out
meant one set of activities; tide in, another. This same
man later worked in a large international agency and observed in himself signs of stress resulting from futile attempts to gear his own productivity, particularly its creative aspects, to a time schedule. Finally, convinced that it
was impossible to schedule creativity, he gave up trying
and compromised by adopting a schedule in which there
were periods when he was tied to a desk and handled
trivia, followed by other periods in which he worked
around the clock. One wonders how many individuals who
have been forced to adjust to eight-hour, nine.to.five
schedules have sacrificed their creativity, and what the social and human cost of this sacrifice has been.
Time and space are functions of each other. How can
you meet a deadline if you are constantly interrupted, for
example? How much you are interrupted depends on how
available you are. And how available you are is a matter of
how well you are screened from others. Also, how can a
doctor listen deeply and carefully to a patient's account of
his life without proper screening? It's impossible. I am referring here to ideal patterns. Many people have to put up
with spaces that cripple them in the performance of their
jobs. Some of this comes about because of the tight way in
which space, as well as time, is locked into the bureaucratic ranking system. It is quite clear, for example, that
case workers in welfare departments require the privacy of
an office, yet the rank of their activity and the low status

22

~

BEYOND

CULTUR~

accorded the needy are such as to make an office bureaucratically unfeasible (offices are for "important" people).
Incongruities of this type at all levels, where the requirement! of the activity call for one thing and the organizational needs for something else, endow much of life
with an Alice in Wonderland quality.
It is in this respect that cultures also contrast with each
other; polychronic people, such as the Arabs and the
Turlcs, who are almost never alone, even in the home,
make different uses of screening. 1 8 They interact with several people at once and are continually involved with each
other. Scheduling is difficult if not impossible with P-tirne
people unless they have mastered M-time technically as a
very different system, one they do not confuse with their
own but use when it is situationally appropriate, much as
they use a foreign language.
Theoretically, when considering social organir.ation,
P-time systems should demand a much greater centralization of control and be characterized by a rather shallow
or simple structure. This is because the top man deals continually with many people, most of whom stay informed
as to what is happening: they are around in the same
spaces, are brought up to be deeply involved with each
other, and continually ask questions to stay informed. In
these circumstances, delegation of authority and a buildup in bureaucratic levels should not be required to handle
high volumes of business. The principal shortcomings of
P-type bureaucracies are that as functions increase, one
would expect to find a proliferation of small bureaucracies
as well as difficulty in handling the problems of outsiders.
In fact, outsiders traveling or residing in Mediterranean
countries find the bureaucracies unusually unresponsive. In
polychronic countries, one has to be an insider or else have
a "friend" who can make things happen. All bureaucracies
are oriented inward, but P-type are especially so.
There are also interesting points to be made concerning
the act of administration as it is conceived in these two
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settings. Administration and control of polychronic peo..
pies (in the Middle East and Latin America) is a matter
of job analysis. Administration consists of taking each sub.
ordinate's job and identifying the activities that go to
make up the job. These are then named and frequently indicated on the elaborate charts with checks that make it
possible for the administrator to be sure that each funetion has been performed. In this way, it is felt, absolute
control is maintained over the individual. Yet,: how .and
when each activity is actually attended to is up to the cur
ployec. To schedule his activities for him would be considered a tyrannical violation of his individuality.
In contrast, M-time people schedule the activity and
leave the analysis of the parts of the job to the individual.
A P-type analysis, even though technical by its very nature,
keeps reminding the subordinate that his job is a system
and is also part of a larger system. M-type people, by virtue of compartmentalization, are less likely to see their ae~~~~~~~~~~~~~This~

not mean that they are unaware of the "organir.ation"-far
from it; only that the job itself or even the goals of the organization are seldom seen in larger contexts. Again, plaeing the organir.ation above what it is supposedly doing is
common in our culture and is epitomized in our allowing
the TV commercial, the "special message," to break the
continuity of even the most important communication. By
way of contrast, in Spain I once counted twenty-0ne commercials lumped together at the end of an hour's program.
The polychronic Spanish quite sensibly put the commercials between the major programs, not within them.
Both systems have strengths as well as weaknesses.
There is a limit to the speed with which jobs can be
analyred, although once analyzed, proper reporting can enable a P-time administrator to handle a surprising number
of subordinates. Nevertheless, organir.ations run on the
polychronic model are limited in size, depend on having
gifted men at the top, and are slow and cumbersome when
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dealing with the business of outsiders. Without gifted
men, a P-type bureaucracy can be a disaster, as many people know. P-type models proliferate bureaucracies as a way
of handling greater demands on the system.
M-type organizations go in the opposite direction. They
can and do grow much larger than the P-type. However,
they combine instead of proliferating bureaucracies-e.g.,
consolidated schools, the business conglomerate, and the
new superdepartments we are developing in government
today.
The particular blindness of the monochronic organi,, zation is to the humanness of its members. The weakness
of the polychronic type lies in their extreme dependence
on the head man to handle contingencies and stay on top
of things. M-type bureaucracies, as they grow larger, tum
inward, becoming blind to their own structure; they grow
rigid and are even apt to lose sight of their original purpose. Prime examples are the Army Corps of Engineers
and the Bureau of Reclamation, which wreak havoc on
our environment in their dedicated efforts to stay in business by building dams or hurrying the flow of rivers to the
sea.
Monochronic and polychronic have to do with the way
time and space are organized and how this organization
affects the very core of existence. We can look at things in
such a way as to transcend culture and, in so doing, generalize about how culture is organized. One of these generalizations concerns the subtle but complex relationship between meaning and context described in Chapters 6, 7,
and 8. Another deals with man as a producer of extensions
which in tum mold his life (Chapter 2). What the ethologist calls action chains (Chapter io) and the situational frame and situational dialect (Chapter 9) are all
structural features of unconscious culture. Possibly because
they are so ubiquitous, man's extensions will be taken up
next.

2.

Man as Extension

Nineteenth.century naturalists suggested that mammals
were divided into two groups-man and all other mammals; they also thought that birds should be divided into
two groups-bowerbirds and all other birds. These cat.
egorizations resulted from the observation that both man
and the bowerbird have elaborated their extensions and in
so doing have greatly accelerated their evolution. The bowerbird occupies the jungles and thickets of New Guinea
and northern Australia and, as its name implies, builds a
bower with which to attract and woo its mate. The elaborate bower, constructed of twigs and grass, is decorated
with shells, iridescent skeletons of insects, seeds, clay balls,
charcoal, pebbles, and brightly colored objects including
freshly picked flowers. Actually, the bower .md its decoration is not only an extension of once brilliant pinmage but
also of courtship displays as well. As Cilliardl states, " •••
these object.S have in effect become extemal.iud bundles of
secondary sexual characteristics that are psychologically
but not physically connected with the males" (italics
added). Behind the bower lie some radical chan.ges in social organization and behavior. The bowerbirds belong to a
group of birds who no longer pair off (pair bonding) with
the opposite sex to mate, nest, and raise the voung. Instead, males gather in clans (separate from the females) in
which they rank themselves hierarchically. In the spring,
the clans are formed around "arenas" in which dispby and
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to report the findings of a study
of subsistence characteristics of producers and peasants (campesinos) in
the coffee-growing regions of Nicaragua and to analyze the implications
of these characteristics for the design of agrarian and rural development
policies. The central premise is that the lack of consideration in the design
of food production and commercialization policies given to the interdependency among producers and campesinos, between production
and commercialization systems, and between food-crop cultivation and
labor in the production of coffee and other export crops, will result in unnecessary social and political costs. This is illustrated by the example of
Nicaragua since the Revolution in July 19'79.
The first three sections of the chapter describe in some detail the
characteristics and operational logic of coffee producers in Nicaragua, the
determinants of labor absorption, and the survival strategies pursued by
rural workers and peasants linked with the coffee industry. The fourth
section attempts to evaluate the effects of policies implemented by the
Revolutionary Government on both producers and workers by focusing
on the impact of these policies on their strategies of survival and subsistence. In the fifth section, some general conclusions and their implications for the management of social development are presented.
CHARACfERISTICS OF COFFEE PRODUCTION
Traditionally, coffee has represented one of the main sources of foreign
exchange in the Nicaraguan economy (about 30 percent of total exports
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exchange earner, but also on its capacity for employment generation (22
percent of annual agricultural employment, 33 percent of employment
during the picking season), and on the significance of the portion of
agricultural land under cultivation which it represents (about 21 percent).
Nicaraguan coffee production is concentrated in the mountainous
zones of Jinotega and Matagalpa in the north central part of the country
and in the Cordillera that separates Lake Managua from the Pacific Ocean.
The coffee zones are characterized by cool climates, sparse populations,
and scarce infrastructure.
Unlike other agro-export crops, such as cotton, the cultivation of coffee is not a year-to-year decision. The creation or renovation of a coffee
plantation requires from four to six years, which implies that the coffee
grower is betting on making a profit in the long run. Once he has planted
the coffee and the trees begin to produce, the only factor that the producer can attempt to control is the va.riable cost. In other words, once
he has made the investment, the producer becomes a price taker in the
Jong run, in contrast to the cotton grower, who may base his cultivation
decision on short-run price expectations.
Coffee growing is also characterized by the variability of inputs required at different times during the year, which greatly depends on the
cultivation practices followed. The demand for labor is concentrated dur.t_ ing the harvest period, from November to February.
In spite of its importance to the Nicaraguan economy, the productivity of the crop has never been high. Yields in Nicaragua average 10
cwt. per manzana, 1 while it is possible, as proven by the experience in
other countries, to attain average yields of 25 cwt. and more per manzana. Highly technological plantations in El Salvador can yield 80 and
more cwt. per manzana.
Behind the average yield figure of 10 cwt./mz. is a dispersion from
under 5 cwt. to 30 cwt., according to widely varying technologies. Eightyfive percent of the twenty-seven thousand coffee producers are considered
to be in the "small" category, utilizing rudimentary technologies based
on the intensive use of family labor and few modern inputs. These small
producers account for around 30 percent of total coffee production. Their
characteristics, as opposed to the characteristics of medium and large producers, are shown in Table 1.
As Table 1 illustrates, small coffee producers in Nicaragua are
characterized by low productivity, high isolation, and low technology,
education, and income levels. This implies that an important task in the
improvement of agricultural conditions and in obtaining a greater amount
of foreign exchange lies in the improvement of production methods and
the social conditions of this small producer group. Improved production
methods, in tum, imply the delivery of complementary inputs (fertilizers
and pesticides) and, with it, access to credit.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF COFFEE PRODUCERS

Personal
Characteristics

Small Producen;
(100 cwt of Coffee
per Year, or Less)

Medium Producen;
(between 100 and
500 cwt of Coffee
per Year)

Large Producetll

Low level of education (10% with less
than 2 years of
schooling)

Higher level of education (71 % with more
than 7 years of
schooling)

48% with more than

Live at the farm all
year (90%)

Most nonresidents of
farms

Most do not live at
the farms

High degree of isolalion and access difficulties (66% between
1 and 20 kilometers
from small villages)

G realer access: 88%
have transitable roads
all )"!at. but 41% have
only small villages as
nearest settlement
and are isolated from
provincial capital

90% have access all
year. 44% have provincial capital nearby

37% have access to

Generally have yearround access

Generally rum, yearround access

Less cultivation of

Most ol the land not
planted with roHee is
for pastures for cattJ~

(More Than 500
cwt of Coffee per
Year)

U years of schooling

Some of them former
salaried workers
Degree of
Isolation

villages only during
dry season
Diversification

Technology

Plant 2 or more crops
essentially basic
grains (90% at least
one more)

basic grains

Own animals (dairy
cattle, fowls, hogs)

G realer use for
pastures and cattle

Most of production
for consumption of
farm

Not for family use

Not for family use

Absence of inputs
other than labor

Use of fertilizers and
more advanced
cultural practices

In~ive

Average yield 5

Average yield 15
cwt/manzana

Yield 25-30
cwt/manzana

cwt/manz.ana

use of fertilizers, pesticides,
and advanced cultural
practices

Predominance of
caturra coffee variety

Little relative use of
high-yield coffee
varieties

Production based on
the family

Not based on family
labor

Some (33%) facilitate
land to permanent
work en;

Permanent worken;
have access to Iand

Most (70%) provide
land for worken; for
the cultivation of
basic grains

Source: Survey of 75 producers conducted by INCAE in August-~ember 1980 as part of a study sponsored by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada.
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The survival strategy of the small growers is broadly based upon a
family work force for the coffee production (except during the harvest
period), and complemented by the growing of basic grains and the raising of animals for domestic consumption and the generation of additional
income.
At the other hand of the scale, the strategy of large producers is to
diversify into crops other than coffee for the strict purpose of generating
more cash and reducing the risk of dependence on a single product.
This diversity in size, technology, and crop diversification of the producers implies that a rural improvement policy through the use of instruments such as credit, inputs, and technical assistance will clearly be
insufficient if it does not have the flexibility to adjust to the different situations and peculiarities of the producers on an almost one-to-one basis.
This policy should be based not on a single crop, but rather on the set
of activities which, together, form the survival strategies of the different
types of producers and the workers linked to them.
In all cases, field research among seventy-five producers revealed that
the social arrangement within the plantation is more complicated than
a simple salaried worker-capitalist relationship. Although at first glance
it would seem that the permanent workers 2 are simply salaried employees,
many times these workers are instead paid piece-rate during the year, complementing their income with what they cultivate in parcels of land
~
usufructed from the plantation. It can be argued that the fact that owners
~ grant the usufruct of land to the workers for household cultivation-often
without cost-is part of the producer's strategy to retain and flexibly use
labor without having to fully pay for the cost of its maintenance. However,
this argument has important implications for a policy of improved income
distribution, one of which is that the betterment of these workers cannot
simply be achieved through higher salaries without causing serious disruptions in the existing set of social arrangements as well as in production,
as we shall see further on.

·-

DETERMINANTS OF THE ABSORPTION AND
PROCUREMENT OF LABOR
One of the most notable characteristics of the cultivation of coffee is
the marked seasonality of labor demand. The harvest period, which lasts
for seventy-five days from mid-November to late January, accounts for 37.5
percent of the total absorption of man-days in the cultivation of coffee.
Careful and timely picking of the ripe bean from the tree is critical to the
quality and yield of the product and thus to its price and income.
Alternatives to hand-picking are non-existent, due to the fact that the
mountainous terrain precludes the use of machinery and, in any case,
there is no current technology capable of ripe bean selection.
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The absorption of labor throughout the year and during the harvest
is largely a function of the yield per manzana of the plantation, which
is reflected in the use of modem technologies. The range of labor demand
per manzana of coffee is between 61 and 200 man-days, with the peak
coming in the picking stage. Nevertheless, the use of advanced cultural
practices, such as pruning and weeding, and the more intensive use of
inputs, such as fertilizers, is linked to a higher demand for labor, since
the substitution of labor by equipment and machinery is highly limited.
The absence of modem practices and inputs not only reduces the demand
for labor for these activities, but also, with the lower yields, reduces the
demand during the harvest.
Coffee producers pursue two strategies for obtaining labor. The first,
pursued by medium and large growers, involves the use of laborers
residing in the plantation who often have access to plots within the property, which allows them to work throughout the year. It is common for
the growers to pay piece-rate for coffee production tasks, which allows
a close adjustment of salary expenses to the actual work requirements.
The access to land permits, on the other hand, the survival of the worker's
family, thus complementing his income in periods of low demand. This
does not necessarily imply that this arrangement is the most adequate.
In fact, the income and quality of life of these workers have traditionally
been deplorable.
fur small producers, the mechanisms for the procurement of labor
is the use of the family labor force. During the picking season, however,
the strategy of all producers is to incorporate the entire labor force resident on the plantation, including minors not utilized during the rest of
the year and, in addition, to hire labor in a strictly regional market through
mechanisms which vary according to the type of producers. (See Figure
1.) The small producers rely upon neighbors and local farms as complementary sources of labor, while the large ones have to seek them in
a much broader geographic area. 3
The use of family labor largely explains the differences in the measurement of sub-employment between the small, and the large and mediumsized producers. 4 The large producers show a practically insignificant subemployment (which does not necessarily imply adequate incomes or optimal location of the labor force), while among the small ones, almost onethird (29.3%) of labor is under-utilized. In the case of the medium and
large producers, the fact that this measure carries no great weight is due
not only to the previously described practice of paying piece-rate, but also
to the diversification of crops, which allows the utilization of labor in other
types of activities which generate profits in periods of slack coffee activity.
In the case of the small producers, the diversification runs to basic
grains, which, in part, are for self-consumption. This combines with the
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Figure 4-1
Participation in the coffee labor market, by type of worker
(Nicaragua, 1981-82)
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TABLE 2
PROBLEMS WITH LABOR PROCUREMENT
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absence of advanced cultural practices in an inexorable logic: the demand
for work fluctuates, and in spite of the fact that there is no high demand
for labor, the small producer does not "fire" his relatives, since the family
subsistence imperative dominates over the profit objectives. 5
This second strategy for the use of the labor force, although varied
according to the type of producer, is essentially based on the capacity for
the reproduction and survival of a large part of the labor force during the
rest of the year, when they do not receive an income as salaried harvest
workers; and on the flexibility of their occupations during the rest of the
year, which allows them to adjust to the great seasonality of the demand.
How this labor force manages to subsist is touched upon later on in this
paper.
There are indications that the system is far from being perfectly adjusted and that there are chronic problems in the procurement of labor,
as indicated in Table 2.

Type of problems
(Percent)
In
cultivation
only

In
harvesting
only

In
both

Total

25.0

80.0
33.3
12.5

20.0
66.7
62.5

100.0
100.0
100.0

As seen in Table 2, more than 25 percent of those interviewed confessed to having chronic labor problems. Consistent with previous
arguments, it is among the medium and large producers where the incidence of problems is greater, since the small ones need help primarily
only in the harvest, which, because of their low productivity, is less than
for the other groups of producers.
In this respect, we must point out that a substantial increase in the
productivity of the small producers would bring about a greater accentuation in the seasonal demand for labor which, together with a labor
market that functions on a regional basis, would put an enormous stress
on the market. This could, in turn, seriously limit any serious consideration of rapid expansion of production given the socio-cultural and population mechanisms existing in the coffee-growing zones.
Given these characteristics of coffee production in Nicaragua, how
successfully has the labor force been adjusting to this seasonality of demand? What has been the predominant survival strategy for the rest of
the year? These issues are discussed in the following section.
SUR VIV AL MECHANISMS AND THE LABOR SUPPLY

The labor market for the coffee production is primarily regional and
self-contained. According to the evidence emerging from the INCAE
survey, the incorporation into the labor force during the picking season
is a family phenomenon; that is to say, several members of the same family
are incorporated into the picking activities, consitituting an informal work
group within the same plantation. Of an average of 6.7 members per
family, 2.9 join in the picking tasks. If those under 10 years of age are
not considered, average family size is reduced to 4.2 per family, meaning that nearly 70 percent join in the picking.
The decision to join the labor force during the coffee-picking season
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is influenced by two factors: first, the opportunities available to the
campesino for income-producing activities on his own land or land to
which he has access; and second, the opportunities for more stable sources
of employment elsewhere.
The first proposition is suggested by in-depth interviews with
campesinos, as illustrated in the results of the survey: 44.5 percent of the
families in the sample cultivate plots of land (averaging 3.7 manzanas per
family, mainly in basic grains) either on their own property (52.2 percent)
or under other arrangements (478 percent). Many of these plots that are
not owned are probably located on the plantations of the owner for whom
they work, as suggested by the fact that 46.1 percent of the picking families
reside on the same coffee plantations where they do the picking.
The important point, nevertheless, is suggested by Table 3. As can be
seen, the incorporation of family members seems to be directly related
to the absence of available land to do their own planting. Although the
evidence presented in the table is not conclusive, it is very probable that
an expansion in the cultivation of basic grains would lead to a reduction
of the labor force available for coffee picking if such expansion occurred
during the picking season. 7 In any case, data in Table 3 are consistent with
~1 the strategy of incorporation described above. The lesser the availability
\) of opportunities within family production units, the greater the propenc sity to join the labor force during the coffee picking season. Once the
possibilities of work within the family production unit are exhausted, a
part of the labor force within the family incorporates itself into coffee picking, while the other part goes to work more or less permanently in other
occupations, together with agricultural activities. Only 14.7 percent of the
members of the family over 10 years old do not become incorporated in
the labor force in some form or other, being mostly engaged in domestic
8
tasks. Of the total of the active labor force 10 years of age and older, 82.2
percent of those surveyed joined the picking, while the other 17.8 percent
were engaged in other activites, such as handicrafts, services, and the
cultivation of their own plots.
TABLE 3
SUPPLY OF FAMILY LABOR IN RELATION 1D OWN CULTIVATION

Proportion of pickers
as a % of the family labor
force, older than 10 years

O.Dl - 0.49
0.50 - 0.74
0.75 - 0.99

1.00

With own plot

Without own plot

(% of families)

(% of families)

68.2
54.5
36.0

31.8
45.5
64.0
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Behind this distribution of labor-working in the coffee harvest versus other occupations, including family activities-there is another logic
besides the availability of land: the largest number of pickers (48.8 percent) are young people between 10 and 19 years of age, with little education and few opportunities outside of coffee picking. While the average
age of the pickers is 25 years, the average age of the family labor force
in other occupations rises to 29. Of the latter, 45.8 percent have some formal education, while among the pickers, only 'Zl.7 percent present this
characteristic.
Thus, it would seem that inside the family there occurs a certain selectivity in the face of the opportunities in the labor market. The picking
activity, requiring physical skills and dexterity, 9 attracts mainly the young
people, whose productive work opportunities-given the existing socioeconomic arrangements and technological levels-are minimal or nonexistent outside the picking itself. On the other hand, those with better
human capital endowment are engaged in more stable activities and are
probably able to generate a higher income throughout the year.
Once the harvest is over, the survival logic consists of adapting as well
as possible to the opportunities existing both in salaried work (usually
piece-rate) and in family production, usually the cultivation of basic grains
either on plots granted by producers within the perimeters of their coffee
plantations or on family-owned plots.
Field research, as referred to earlier, revealed a marked annual occupation cycle of campesinos associated with coffee growing. The complementarity of the survival strategy may be clearly observed: some of the campesinos remain working as salaried laborers (piece-rate), while others take
refuge in subsistence plots, dedicating a minimal part to activities other
than agricultural activities. Finally, some campesinos, especially the young
people between 10 and 14 years old, remain inactive in the formal sense
of the word, although they do contribute with minor chores to the welfare
of their families. The arguments and the findings presented up to this
point may be summarized as follows: On the one hand, producers try
to obtain profits from a crop requiring large fixed investment by seeking
to adjust their cyclical labor input needs through a series of strategies,
such as piece-work payment, temporary hiring, and providing access to
land to some of the workers. Given the natural growing cycle of coffee
and the impossibility of mechanization, these strategies would appear to
reflect a very rational pattern of choice.
The campesinos, on the other hand, appear to follow a strategy of
survival and the betterment of their families that includes such
mechanisms as self-employment-often linked to subsistence plotsduring the season of scarcity of salaried jobs; the incorporation of most
family members, including the youngest ones, into the coffee harvest to
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maximize cash revenues; and finally, the allocation of the more able family
members in permanent jobs either in the countryside or in the urban areas.
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICIES

In earlier sections we have identified the operation and subsistence
logic of the coffee producers and the labor force associated with coffee
production. We examined the mechanisms employed by members of the
labor force, including their participation in coffee picking and the subsistence mechanisms employed throughout the year. As stated before, it
is my premise that the lack of careful consideration of these mechanisms
that operate with the producers and workers, and the interdependence
of both groups, can lead to an agricultural and rural development policy
characterized by high social costs and minimal benefits to the rural poor.
This may be illustrated with examples of some of the rural development
policies implemented up to mid-1982 in Nicaragua and the effect that they
have had in the coffee-growing regions.
Beginning in July 1979, the Revolutionary Government initiated a series
of measures intended to increase the levels of production and to raise the
living standard of the rural poor. Although the decree of confiscation
against all of the land previously owned by Somoza and his followers was
perhaps the step which received the most international attention, a series
of other less publicized but perhaps more significant policies were initiated
at this time.
'Q Beginning with the 1979-80 agricultural cycle and accentuated in the
1980-81 cycle, the amount of agricultural credit increased dramatically in
relation to the levels in the previous regime-an increase of 600 percent
over the 1978-79 cycle. The financing of corn and beans alone, typically
grown by small farmers, accounted for 14.4 percent of the country's total
amount of rural financing. 10
The general objectives sought by the government with its credit and
other agricultural policies were to make the country self-sufficient in basic
grains, to facilitate campesino access to the land by placing ceilings on
the rent prices of land, and to support the formation of cooperatives.
Alongside these policies, the government took a series of measures aimed at replacing exisiting internal and external commercialization
mechanisms through the nationalization of foreign trade and the regulation of internal prices. The government also encouraged the formation
of rural worker associations, 11 while at the same time demanding from
the producers higher wages and better living conditions for their workers.
The policies have had significant impact on producers as well as on
campesinos, though in many instances this impact has affected the operation and subsistence mechanisms without necessarily improving the life
of the poorest of the rural inhabitants, as shall be seen in the following
analysis.

Strategies of Household Subsistence and lnterckpendmcy In Nicaragua

9S

One of the immediate effects of these policies on the producers was
the loss of their direct access to foreign currencies as the government sold
the coffee abroad, received foreign exchange, and paid the producers in
local currency at rates set by the government itself. This commercializa12
tion mechanism has resulted in a loss in real income for producers.
Besides this loss in real income, many of the wage and price policies introduced have resulted in a substantial increase in costs to the producers.
Local experts in the coffee industry claim that total production costs have
doubled in the last three years, and coffee harvesting costs have tripled
13
due to lower productivity increases in wages.
The sum of all this is a reduction in profits and the erosion of incentives to reinvest in the coffee plantation. In response, many of the producers have suspended reinvestment and some have even cut back on
14
cultivation maintenance practices in order to reduce their costs. This is
the result not only of an economic logic, but also of the political uncertainty arising out of what the producers perceive to be a lack of clarity
in the "rules of the game:'
It is well to remember that the great majority of the coffee growers
are small producers, and that they, as well as the large producers, have
been affected by these policies. There are no mechanisms built into the
policies which discriminate in favor of these smaller producers.
We may conclude, then, that large and small producers alike have
responded to policies that have adversely affected the profitability of their
operations by curtailing investments and inputs. How have these policies
affected the logic of the campesinos?
The investment and cost curtailment strategy pursued by the producers
has had a direct effect on the campesinos that reside permanently on the
farm. With diminished investment and maintenance, the amount in wages
that they may earn is enormously reduced, with the resulting deterioration in their already low standard of living. In the words of a local mediurnsized producer:
I feel sorry for these poor people (the campesinos), because it is they
who have lost the most. I let them live on the farm, but cannot pay them.
I do not plan to invest a single cent to renovate anything (of the coffee plants)
since coffee is no longer profitable in Nicaragua. All of us here on this farm
are living on our past investments, feeding on what was done before ...

Demand for seasonal labor, on the other hand, remained strong, while
a number of factors contributed to the scarcity of seasonal labor during
the 1980 and 1981 picking seasons. The most important factor cited by
producers was the enormous expansion in credit for basic grains, which
caused many campesinos to leave the wage market. A second factor cited
was the growth of the army (E.P.S., or Ejercito Popular Sandinista), which
recruited many campesinos and their sons, further reducing the available
supply of seasonal labor.
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This shortage of labor during the harvest was, in part, the cause of the
drop in productivity during these years that reinforced the cycle of lower
income for the producers, less investment, and less demand for permanent wage workers. Attempts by the government to overcome the shortage with volunteers from the urban labor force were generally successful.
Urban workers were inexperienced and thus not as productive as their rural counterparts, whom they were replacing; moreover, through carelessness or a lack of knowledge of harvesting techniques, they often picked berries which were not yet ripe, and sometimes caused damage to the coffee
trees.
Although the permanent workers on coffee haciendas have not fared
well during the revolutionary period because of the decline in reinvestment, the case of the temporary workers who work only during the harvest
months appears to be quite different, as they have been favored by the
new policy of higher wages. Because of.the importance of the wage work
within the subsistence cycle of the campesinos and rural workers
associated with coffee, these salary increases and their effects should be
studied more closely. By government decree, wages rose 20 percent each
year between the W78-79, W/9-80, and 1980-81 harvests, while at the same
'-')time improvements in living conditions for workers on haciendas were
C> demanded by new government regulations. Although these welfare
I" measures have been effective in improving the quality of the workers' lives,
the benefits of wage increases have been completely nullified by the inflation rate that the Nicaraguan economy has been experiencing: between
1978 and 1982 wages rose by 53.6 percent, while the cumulative consumer
price index increased by 146.1 percent.
Many of the social gains obtained in food, health, shelter, and education are perceived by the workers as natural vindications postponed for
decades, and not necessarily linked to their contribution to production.
On the contrary, the response of the worker in the face of a drop in real
wages after inflation has been to reduce his work effort, with a resulting
lower productivity and further declines in income for the producer.
By rnid-1981, high-level Nicaraguan public officials from the agricultural sector recognized the serious national problems resulting from low productivity of the labor force, the lack of clear orientation in organized labor
policies, and a decrease in the accumulation of capital. Part of the government's reaction has been to nationalize the farms that disinvest or that
have strong labor conflicts. Nationalization, however, does not contribute
to solving these problems, at least in the short-run. Given the limited administrative capacity of the public sector, productivity has not risen as
much as expected in the farms that have been taken over. Moreover, the
campesinos themselves complain about the bureaucratic slowness which
characterizes the public administrative systems and which results in delay- ..J - 1lary - ·
'.lent ' :den
· me1 ·
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Jnfli
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If within the production of coffee we cannot find that the producers
or the campesinos have achieved improvement, then it is logical to examine the other aspect of the survival strategy of the rural workers; that
is, the production of basic grains. As previously mentioned, and as part
of a plan for self-sufficiency and inducing the campesinos to unite in
cooperatives guided by the state, credit to the small producer was increased by 600 percent. At first glance, this may seem a great push for the
development of the small producer, who had been traditionally abandoned by financial institutions. In practice, however, this policy demonstrated
once again that in the absence of complementary inputs and improved
technologies, effective marketing channels, and adequate administrative
systems, credit, by itself, only produces a temporary increase in the consumption of the beneficiaries, without increasing production.
For most campesinos equipped with traditional technologies, the
availability of credit under liberal conditions represented no more than
the opportunity to have cash for consumption purposes. For 1981, the
delinquency in repayment of loans was estimated at 45.3% of the beneficiaries. The reasons for nonpayment are varied:

- Excess of bank credit: In 1980, the government went so far as to
utilize light planes or "flying banks" for the distribution of credit
in remote areas where it was impossible to market the harvest
because of the inexistence of roadways or waterways. Also,
cultivation was financed in areas not suitable for the type of grains
sown.
- Inadequate organization of the agricultural cooperatives: There
were cases in which the members would get together to obtain
money and then would proceed to leave for other regions. Others
were thrown out of the cooperative for their irresponsibility.
- Lack of coordination among the various state institutions, such
as PROCAMPO (inputs) and AGROMEC (machinery) over the
technical services they should provide to their clients.
- Attitudes among some campesinos who considered that since the
Revolution was for them, they should not have to pay their debts.
These attitudes were reinforced by the inexistence of an adequate
administrative apparatus to supervise the application and recuperation of credit.
- Poor quality of the cultivated land: Most campesinos do not have
access to fertile land; these lands are usually in the hands of the
medium and large private producers or the state.
- Level of existing technology: The quality of the existing traditional
technology, as mentioned before, is poor. In some products, such
as com, the imported seeds were not suitable for certain regions,
re '· · 1g ir
'·sasb
han
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- Lack of selectivity of clients: Credit was given to anyone who requested it. It is believed that in many cases the credit was diverted
to other purposes.
The Minister of Agricultural Development recognized these problems.
In 1981 he said:
We have to be more rational with the credit, give to those who can produce most effectively. A little bit romantic, in a given moment, we were
in a helicopter with money, giving credit to campesinos who were in faraway
places; they would receive their credit from that helicopter that would practically throw the money into their hands; nevertheless, who was going to
bring out that production? Through roads? By what means of transport?
And the product stayed there, the production did not get out of there
because in many ways that money was used to buy salt, shoes, clothing
and not for producing. 15

As mentioned earlier, this easy credit policy resulted in a windfall
for many campesinos, which possibly enabled them to increase their consumption levels temporarily. On the other hand, the massive injection
of credit in an open economy with serious problems in its balance of
payments contributed to an inflation rate that, to a great degree, voided
v;- these temporary gains.
,~'.
The cost of production inputs rose by more than the prices of some
basic grains set by the government, with a resulting disincentive for the
campesinos. The opinion of some experts is that the effect has been such
that for some grains, such as corn, it is not profitable to produce for sale.
Thus, the tendency among campesinos now is to produce just for their
own consumption and in lands where there are no opportunities to
develop alternative crops.
Part of this lack of incentive comes from the inclination of ENA BAS,
the public institute that regulates the commodity prices, to favor the consumer and not the producer and from the inability of the small producer
to influence the price decisions of ENABAS.
In summary, although it is true that the campesinos obtained a temporary benefit from liberal credit policies, the combination of the absence
of technological improvement, inflation, and low prices has resulted in
. disincentives and has adversely affected the survival strategy of the
campesino. Moreover, the alternative model of state farms is at an incipient stage with serious administrative problems, and it can offer no
alternative as yet. The operation and subsistence model of the producers
and workers has been adversely affected by the agricultural policies to
date, yet it has not been possible to create an alternative model that is
effective for rural poor.
There are indications that the government is consciously pulling back
from its extensive credit strategy and is emphasizing rather the state farms
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and the distribution of land in cooperatives. 16 Without careful consideration of the interactions of the coffee production system, of the basic grains
system, and of the logic of their interaction, however, it is unlikely that
any policy will accomplish the dual purpose of raising productivity as
well as increasing rural welfare levels.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The following are some of the development policies and social
management lessons that can be derived from our previous analysis:
1. In the first place, I have tried to show how the existing socio-

economic structural arrangements and the subsistence logic of the
poorest in the rural areas make up extremely complex arrangements that we need to understand in depth-and not as simple
macroeconomic aggregates-to be able to visualize and evaluate
the results of policies that are intended to raise the living standards of the poor. This knowledge is important not only for the
aforementioned purposes, but also to enable a greater involvement of the beneficiaries in the process of change. Otherwise, one
succumbs to the temptation of playing the role of almighty planner, manipulating figures and political-economic objectives with
little regard for the target groups who are supposed to benefit.
2. It is important to point out, nevertheless, that no sectoral social
development program can isolate itself from the national context,
since the economic and political interplay at the macro level determines their success or failure. Often, the action at the macro level
thwarts the sectoral objectives, as we see in the case of agricultural
wages in Nicaragua, where an expansionist credit policy contributed to eliminating the nominal gains of the wage-workers.
Also, the state policy of capturing foreign exchange in order to
solve its balance-of-payments problem resulted in a loss of incentives for the producers and a greater reduction of foreign exchange. Where possible, the inconsistencies among policy objectives directed to other sectors and other levels must be carefully
examined, particularly with repect to the interactions between the
agroexport and local consumption sectors.
3. Apart from the above, it must be recognized that the bureaucratic
structures which implement these policies are slow to respond
to changes and unable to absorb new objectives. In the example
presented, it is clearly noted how the agricultural credit program
expanded without positive results due to the absence of a corresponding expansion in the rest of the institutions that provide
the complementary inputs and services. Even within the financ-
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ing system, some of its parts (e.g., the subsystem of portfolio
recuperation) were unable to adapt to the changes.
4. The most interesting lesson to be learned is that given a production system and the operational and subsistence logic associated
with it, it is impossible-without paying a high price-to affect
a part of the system without also noticeably affecting the rest of
it. In the case of the coffee production system in Nicaragua, the
policies aimed at seizing profits from the producers resulted in
a loss for the producer, in a disruption of the subsistence cycle
of the campesinos and agricultural workers in the coffee system,
and in a negative impact on macroeconomic objectives, since the
reduction in productivity led to a reduction in foreign exchange
inflow, thus affecting the economy and society as a whole.
NOTES
1. A "manzana" is a unit of measure equivalent to 0.7 hectares.
2. "Permanent workers" are those who remain on the plantation after the harvest season.

3. One-third of the large producers and approximately 6 percent of the medium-sized

V)

producers seek labor outside the regional market; none of the small producers do. Data

\)

based on INCAE Survey, 1980-81.

-{-

4. Sub-employment is measured as a relationship between the labor available throughout
the year and the labor technically required during the year, according to the cultural
practices carried out. This is a very approximate measure which requires refinement.
5. I shall not enter here into a debate as to whether there is a sui grneris "campesino"
logic, a la Oi.ayanov, or whether the behavior of the small producers is due to an insufficient development of the production and labor market mechanisms. The point is
that family labor is a basic mechanism of the small producer's survival strategy.
6. In some cases, the opportunities for the family are in the form of small business, handicrafts, etc.
7. Other variables should obviously be taken into account, such as access to credit, basic
grains prices, and above all, the coincidence of the coffee harvest, if any, with the period
of grain harvesting, and its duration.
8. Approximately 80 percent of the families surveyed were of rural origins (farms and
rural villages).
9. The survey shows that men are more productive than wome.n in picking, and that the
15- to 24-year-old group demonstrates greater producti\;ty during the picking (in cwt
picked per day).
10. Until 19&'.l, rural credit was extended to around 18,000 to 20,000 beneficiaries. In 1980-81
it had expanded to 90,000 clients, 75 percent of whom were members of cooperatives
and 25 percent individual producers.
11. These associations, known as Asociaciones de Trabajadores de! Campo (ATC), were
represented by delegates at departmental and national levels.
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12. The government maintains an official exchange rate of ten cordobas to one U.S. dollar
(C$10 = US$1) while in rnid-1982 the legal parallel rate was 24 cordobas to the dollar,
with black market rates at better than 40 cordobas to the dollar. There is a current inflation rate of 40 percent a year.
13.

A comparison between the 1979-80 harvest and the 1981-82 harvest shows an increase
of almost three times in the total costs; for semi-technological producers the total costs
rose from C$5,252 per manzana to C$13,536 per manz.ana, an increase of 257%. The
harvest cost, which previously represented 35% of the total costs, now represents 51%
of the total costs. Assuming a steady international price level since 197!W'9 (it has actually dropped), the profit per hundred-weight (quintal) would be C$117 (US$2.71 at
an exchange rate of C$43 to US$1.CXJ) versus US$63.90 in 19'78-;'9. At the domestic price
paid in 1981-82, the result is a loss of US$2.04 per hundredweight.

14. This in fact constitutes disinvestment. Though the elimination of cultivation mainlenance
practices does not seriously affect the yields in the first few years after the cutback,
more serious consequences arise in later years, with progressively lower yields.
15.

Cmdte. Jaime Wheelock, public discourse, 1981.

16.

Beginning in 1984, credit for state farms was also curtailed, and for the first time there
was talk of closing uneconomic operations. J. lckis, interviews with state enterprise
managers, August 1984.

LESSON 10

ENDING GRACEFULLY
Learning Objectives
The participants will:
1. Know some of the factors that inhibit the tranfering of power
to communities.
2. Understand the limitations and opportunity of being an
outsider.
3. Consider different ways of ending a job and course.
Activities
1. Discussion in large group
a) Factors that inhibit empowerment of.others.
b) Outsiders as empowering or disempowering.

(45 min)

2. Break

(15 min)

3. Triads
(40 min)
How to end an assignment - brainstorm all the ways in which
an assignment can end, which can be controlled and which are
preferred.
4. Large group evaluation
(1 hour)
What should be the appropriate ending for this course? What
have been the issues that make this ending suitable?
5. Discussion of final case papers and any other ends
discuss usefulness of readings in homework 10.
Materials
1. Cookies, coffee, and other yummy party things.
2. Special certificates?

(20 min)

HOMEWORK 10

ANALYZING YOUR CASE

1. Read:
1. Evans, "Analysis of Case Histories."
2. Batten, The Non-Directive Approach to Community Work.
3. Korten, "Reflections of a Rural Development Worker."
4. Oxfam Field Directors' Handbook.
3. Miller, "Columbia: An Innovative Approach to Rural
Development."
2.
The above readings will help you to finalize your case and
ensure that it results in a coherent and useful documentary.

,•

Appropriate Technology
II
for Development:
A Discussion and Case Histories
edited by Donald D. Evans
and Laurie Nogg Adler

~~

A Study Prepared by Denver Research Institute,
University of Denver

~

Analyses of Case Histories
Various methods could be devised as the basis on which
to analyze the case histories. Of course, the best method is
to discuss them in an interactive atmosphere with other
concerned persons, where a wide-ranging examination of
their implications can occur. The value in analysis of complex socioeconomic-technological situations is largely subjective in any event.
Somewhat arbitrarily, a system has been developed for
arraying these case histories according to a structure of
interactions and effects.
Cases can be examined in terms of three primary elements: (1) the resources, human and material, with which
they are concerned; (2) the means by which these resources
are developed or utilized; an~the effect that this utilization has on the environment and peopleWITFlin it.
Resources themselves can be classified in two ways:
one is in terms of natural endowments such as minerals,
energy sources, organic materials, and climatic factors. The
other is on the basis of human attributes, particularly analytic capability, innovation and inventiveness, and the elusive quality of entrepreneurship.
The classification of "means" includes, first of all,
technology in its multiple forms. It also includes the provision of finance for development purposes.
The role of
government as the manifestation of social and political will
plays a pivotal role. So, also, does foreign aid in the form
of materiel, finance, and technical assistance.
The effects of the interaction of resources with means
in the pursuit of some planned objective can be classified as:
(1) econornic--with a special subset concerned with foreign
and domestic markets; (2) social impact; and (3) the effect
on the physical environment. Within this generalized structure it is interesting to examine the various case histories.
It is not surprising that about half of the cases are
concerned particularly with resource utilization.
The
Tunisian use of available, less costly butagaz as an alternative for gasoline is an example, as is the harnessing of
hydro power in Samoa or the enlistment of human resources
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in the CRUTAC community development project in Brazil and
in the "rural university" in Colombia. In some cases it is
the use of a waste resource, as in the coffee beneficios of
Central America or the generation of biogas from cow manure
in Tanzania.
Perhaps most important of all the resources in the
various cases is the human function of providing inventiveness, organization, and drive toward goal achievement; this
element is especially prominent in fourteen of the twenty-two
cases. Certainly nothing occurs in the development process
without human intervention, but these qualities are particularly prominent .in such examples as the ball-point pen
manufacturing venture in Pakistan, the Samoan Methodist
land development program, the engineering consulting firm in
Singapore, and in the "coffee roads" project in Haiti.
In
each instance the enthusiasm and persistence of the motivated person or group played a dominant role.
In examining the means by which these projects have
been accomplished (and considering that technology is the
subject of this study), it is not surprising that some specific
aspect of technology has been at the focus of each situation.
This is especially the case in the involvement of such relatively sophisticated technologies as the explosive metalworking applications in Brazil or the use of bioengineering
approaches in developing cattle feed in Korea from natural
indigenous sources. At the other end of the sophistication
spectrum are the design of a simple, efficient cookstove in
Central America; the traditional process of preserving fish in
the Philippines; or the manufacture of bricks in Malaysia
using labor-intensive, energy-conserving methods.
foreign
technology use as a stimulus to domestic inventiveness is a
feature of the ball-point pen enterprise in Pakistan and the
fungal conversion projects in Central America.
Because of the complexity, pervasiveness, and scale of
the development need, it falls to governments of both the
developing and the industrialized countries to take a leading
role in planning and implementing appropriate programs
(notwithstanding the important role played by the private
sector in technology development and transfer).
Sometimes this government role can thwart the development process--it certainly does not always have a positive
effect. Government action was decisive in the case of the
non-use of composite flour to reduce wheat imports in
Colombia, where policy action and market intervention have
stopped this program.
Similarly, government policy in
Indonesia resulted in large dislocations in the farm labor
market. In Sri Lanka, the minimal support given a research
institute by government significantly inhibited its effectiveness. On the other hand, government support of a similar
institution in Brazil through provision of development funds
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has been instrumental in revitalization and growth in that
instance.
Also, government interest and support were
responsible for initiating the regional development program
on Che ju Island in Korea.
The provision or, conversely, lack of finance will
always be a fundamental factor in any endeavor. The lack
of finance in the case of the entrepreneur in butagaz conversions in Tunisia was a cause of the slow development of
that promising technology application.
Government grants
are important to the functioning of the rural university in
Colombia and to the similar project in Brazil. The Korea
Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), as well as the
Ceylon Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CISIR) and most other research institutions, were funded at
least initially through government grants. Private financial
support makes the rural development program in Samoa
possible (along with the dedication and enthusiasm of the
participants, of course).
foreign assistance from the industrialized nations is a
prominent part of many development efforts. This is supplied in combinations of material products, technical assistance, and finance. In Colombia, the composite flour project
received technical and financial assistance over a period of
years from both the Dutch government and the Organization
of American States, as well as assistance from the United
States through a private research institution. The coffee
roads project in Haiti received both financial and technical
assistance from USA ID. The Lorena cookstove project had
technical advice from consultants provided by a private
voluntary organization, as did the small-scale sugar processing project in Ghana and the lime kiln development effort in
Honduras.
Private sources assisted with equipment and
technical assistance on the hydroelectric project in Papua
New Guinea. One of the most intensive and sustained technical assistance programs was that provided by the Denver
Research Institute in the transfer of explosive metalworking
technology to the Institute for Technological Studies (IPT) in
Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Assistance of the industrialized countries to the developing world is, of course, a central theme of the development effort, although in recent years there has been
increasing emphasis on the attainment of greater degrees of
technological self-sufficiency on the part of the Third World
(note especially the precepts of the New International Economic Order).
In over half of the cases one of the principal outcomes
of the impact of technology has been its economic effect.
Thailand's main export, cassava pellets, has been heavily
influenced by technology, both foreign and domestic. Coffee
roads in Haiti are expected to have great economic effect on
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remote rural areas that the roads open up to commerce and
communication.
The Lorena cookstove is making possible
appreciable savings in fuel costs for users. Che ju Island's
economy has grown significantly as a consequence of development work based on technology application.
Explosive
metalworking in Brazil makes savings possible through import
substitution.
Sugar-processing technology in Ghana is also
saving foreign exchange and creating domestic employment.
Imports have been reduced by butagaz use in Tunisia and
by ball-point pen manufacturing in Pakistan. Local professional engineers and architects are being used in Singapore
in place of foreign experts. On the other hand, the Thai
mint project, which had such optimistic beginnings, has not
lived up to expectations of having a major economic effect.
Social impact of technology is sometimes difficult to
assess and especially to measure; only in recent years have
there been systematized efforts at technology assessment
from this standpoint.
Nevertheless, the cases reveal some
important social results of technology utilization as in the
instance of community development along Haitian roads, the
changes in community life in Papua New Guinea as a result
of electrification, and the social development aspects of the
extension and education projects by universities in South
America. Rice hulling in Java had serious impact on rural
populations, especially women. Part of the disappointment in
the economic performance of the Thai mint program was the
result of life-style preferences of farmers in that country.
The absence of technological innovation in the Philippines'
fish-drying industry permits it to continue as a familycentered activity.
Finally, environmental effects have resulted from technology introduction in several of the examples. Cassavapellet dust pollution has been a very important cause of
technological innovation and economic impact in Thailand.
The Lorena cookstove has not only reduced deforestation in
Central America but has also improved the health conditions
of housewives in that region.
The biog as generators in
Tanzania have also reduced the demand for fuel wood. And
fungal fermentation holds promise of reducing the polluting
effects of coffee processing wastes while creating a valuable
feed supplement for livestock.

CASE HISTORIES MATRIX
This matrix is based on the analysis method presented
in the text. Principal elements of case histories appear in
the left-hand column; the individual cases, identified by
number and country of occurrence are across the top; the
numbers and country names correspond to the list of cases.
A mark was entered in a column if that specific element
of the analysis format was judged to be relevant to the case.
There is, obviously, a degree of subjectivity in deciding the
relative importance of one of the analysis elements, but it is
felt that this system is useful.
It can be used as a means of selecting cases for review, based either on country site or on identification of
some particular set of characteristics. Or, it may be useful
to compare to the reader's own assessment after reading an
individual case.
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OBTAINING, SELECTING, AND .EDITING CASES

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Obtaining, Selecting,
and Editing Cases
TRAINERS who want to use cases need cases to use. In our experience the best providers of cases are the members of training
groups. They can be stimulated to provide them if, when they
have listed their problems according to the procedures outlined
on pp. 8g-gI, the trainer asks each member of the group to
write a brief descriptive account of what he did and with what
result in some specific situation in which he encountered one of
these problems and felt that he had not succeeded in coping
satisfactorily with it. Each situation of this kind provides
material for a case, and once the trainer has thus stimulated the
members of the group to try to remember one or more of them,
nearly everyone will usually be able to do so.
The trainer will then have a stock of potentially suitable cases
for use with the group which produced them and he can continually add to his stock by following the same procedure with
other groups whenever he can. In this way he can accumulate
a wide variety of cases which he can, at need, use with training
groups whose members cannot contribute their own cases for
discussion, either because of shortage of time, or because they
are inexperienced, or for any other reason.
Cases produced in this way, however, are only potentially
suitable, even for the group which produced them, and most
cases as originally contributed can be very much improved by
careful editing before they are used. In fact, careful selection
and editing of a case can greatly increase the chances that the
members of a group will accept it when the trainer tests it
with them for relevance and acceptability as described on
130
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pp. 97-8, and that they will be able to discuss it profitably if
they do accept it.
Every case should satisfy certain basic requirements and cases
which do not satisfy them should either be edited until they do,
or if this should prove impossible, they should be scrapped.
These requirements can be stated as follows:
I. that it leaves TW room for doubt about the identi!J ef the person
who encountered the problem;
2. that the problem it presents is one that quite commonly occurs and
one that workers find it dijficult to cope with;
3. that it states quite specifically what the worker did and with what
result; and
4. that he might have succeeded if he had more skill.
There are many other editing points too numerous to have
specific mention here, although some of them are indicated by
the editing of the three examples which follow. However, two
points particularly deserve mention. The first is that even the
slightest hint of criticism of the conduct of the worker in the
case should be deleted. If it is left in the members of the training group will not want to accept the worker and his problem
as typical of themselves and their problems, and this will defeat
the purpose of the trainer in introducing the case.
The second point is that a trainer may edit a case differently
according to the kind of training group he has specifically in
mind. Thus the inclusion of detail about the kind of situation
in which a particular problem occurs will strengthen the
presentation of a case when it is used with members of a training
group who all work in situations of a similar kind: but the same
amount of detail will weaken a case-and should therefore be
omitted-when the case is used with a training group composed
of members most of whom do not work in situations of that
specific kind. This point occurs in the editing of Exampk Three
below.
The following case is in the form in which it was contributed
for discussion by a member of the Youth Service.
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Example One
The 'Commando Club' which has a strong tradition for outdoor
activities arranged a week-end camp on their usual camping site.
'The Arabs', a mixed group from a different club, asked if they
could share the camp with them. The 'Commandos' agreed and
twelve members of the mixed group came to the camp accompanied
by their leader.
On the Saturday evening the 'Commandos', their leader, and the
leader of the mixed group went off for a hike, while the 'Arabs', the
mixed group, preferred to stay in camp. When the hikers returned,
they found the 'Arabs' lounging around the fire 'necking'. The leader
of the 'Commandos' was annoyed and said so, whereupon the 'Arabs'
became abusive. The 'Commandos' leader then said flatly that he
would not have them in camp again and has since refused to accept
another visit.
This is a poor case and if one assesses it to see how well it
meets the requirements stated on the previous page it is easy
to see why. There are two youth leaders and two groups of
young people and the case is so presented that the reader is left
to think out for himself whose problem is presented by the case
and just what the problem is.
This could be remedied by editing, but even if this were done
it is more than doubtful whether it could ever become a good
case. One would expect most training groups of youth leaders
to reject it, partly because mo't of them would feel that they
might never get involved in a situation of that kind, and partly
because the outcome or problem aspect of the case might seem
to them too insignificant to worry about. This, therefore, is the
kind of case to scrap.

Example Two
A Youth Centre has been established for several years in its own

trnnius ( 1) with a good Management Committee and also a hardworking Members' Committee. When the Centre was established
the canteen was staffed by a rota of lady helpers and this rota has
worked satisfactorily for four years.
A full-time leader is appointed and tM two previous leaders are made
assistants. This team works well in tM club situation. (2)
The leader suddenly decides that it should be the task of his senior
girl members together with a few boys to staff the canteen. (3)

OBTAINING, SELECTING, AND EDITING CASES
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At a Management Committee he puts forward this proposal,
pointing out that the running of a canteen is a responsible job and
offers a training situation for his senior members.
The representative on the Management Committee of the lady
helpers is upset at this idea, threatens to withdraw her services from
the club and intimates that she will be able to persuade the other
lady members to do likewise.
The Club Leader, however, has already committed his members to fonn a
rota and this is due to start the following Monday. (4) He therefore tries to
persuade the Management Committee that his idea is the right one,
but their sympathies are with the lady helpers' representative whom
they have known for four years and not with the leader who has
recently been appointed.
The Chairman of tM Management Committee sees this as a possible rift
in tM organization of tM club and closes tM discussion by saying that he will
discuss the problem with tM leader and tM representative of the lady Mlpers
after the formal business of the Management Committee has been concluded. (5)

This has the makings of a very good case. Today's trend in
the You th Service is all for getting young people to undertake
more responsibilities for the day-to-day conduct of affairs within
their clubs, and one of the major difficulties of a youth leader
who tries to do this may be the reluctance of his adult helpers
to hand over some of their responsibilities to young people. Thus
very many youth leaders are likely to agree that this case illustrates a problem that is very relevant to themselves. The case is
also a good one because it provides quite a clear picture of what
the leader did and of the kind of difficulty he got into as a result
of what he did.
This having been said, it is still true that the case can be considerably improved by editing. The points at which this might
be done are indicated in the text of the case by italics and by
the figures in parentheses. The first two points are very minor
ones, for the italics merely indicate information which could
be omitted as irrelevant to the problem contained in the case.
Point (4) is more important, for the information provided by
the words italicized refers to something the leader did at an
earlier stage and would be more suitably provided at (3). It is,
however, even more important that something should be done
about the final paragraph, for it weakens the case from the
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point of view of leader-training by informing us that the Chairman of the Management Committee has taken over from the
leader responsibility for dealing with the leader's problem. For
use with youth leaders, therefore, the case would be much
improved if the whole of the last paragraph were omitted.
If the case were edited in this way it would then read as

communicant, and by the technical group to which he belongs which is responsible for maintaining the club electrics (record player, etc.).
This group loo/cs on newcomers with suspicion and Richard expresses his
resentment (I) by avoiding the payment of subscriptions whenever
possible. When the leader tackles him on this he becomes abusive,
and the leader feels that he can take little definite action because the
subscriptions are administered in a slack way, and there ia no easy
way to check up.
The problem reaches a critical point when the Membm' CommiUee, of
which the leader is chairman, (2) decides to tighten up the door procedure and raise the subs.
At the meeting, some of the committee who do not pay subs claim
that they need not as they are in effect helpers. The Chairman (3)
said that the responsibility as to whether they paid or not was theini,
but he advised that they should pay and put forward several reasons.
After a full discussion they voted in favour of exempting themselves
from subs. Then the question of Richard was raised (4) as he was not
a committee member. The committee were strongly divided and
recommended as a compromise that the leader should cxcrcUc his
discretion in the matter.
Subsequently the leader tried to regularize the situation by asking
Richard to pay up, but Richard was abusive. He left the club and tJie
church ( 1) and took his technical group with him.
Could the leadt:r have avoided this outcome?

follows:
A Youth Centre has been established for four years with a good
Management Committee and also a hard-working Members' Committee. When the Centre was established the canteen was staffed by
a rota oflady helpers, and this rota has worked satisfactorily for four
yeani.
Then a new full-time leader is appointed who thinks that his
senior girl members together with a few boys should staff the canteen. He discusses this with his Members' Committee and other club
members who accept the idea and organize a rota which is due to
start the following Monday.
He then seeks the approval of his Management Committee, explaining that the running of a canteen is a responsible job which
provides a good training situation fur his senior members.
The representative on the Management Committee of the lady
helpers is upset at this idea. She threatens to withdraw her services
from the club and intimates that she will be able to persuade the
other lady helpers to do likewise.
Aware that he has already committed himself with his members,
the leader does his best to persuade the Management Committee
that his idea is the right one, but their sympathies are with the lady
helper on the Management Committee whom they have known for
four years, and not with the leader who has only recently been
appointed. So the leader now has a difficult problem on his hands.
Could he have avoided it and still achieved his purpose, and if so,
how?

Example Three
Tiu leader of a church club of some thirty members, meeting once a week,
decUhs after fall consultation with the Management and Membm' Committus and the chUTch authorit"W to relax the rule of church mmrbmhip and
apen the club to mere people.
This move is resented by Richard, a member of long standing and a keen
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.This is also potentially a good case. It leaves one in no doubt
about whose problem it presents, and the problem itself is one
that any leader may encounter from time to time and have
difficulty in dealing with. Once again, however, the case can be
considerably improved by editing. Most of the detailed information ( x) given at the beginning of the case should be
omitted, since it helps to distract attention from the basic fact
that the leader thought that Richard should pay and Richard,
for reasons best known to himself, thought otherwise. Also, if
the club is defined as a club of one particular kind-a small
church club open on one night a week only-the case may
appear less relevant than it really is to leaders, for example, of
large open clubs which meet nearly every night of the week.
This might influence them against accepting it in spite of the
fact that the basic problem the case presents can face the leader
in any kind of club.
)[
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The case can also be improved by editing it at points (2),
(3), and (4) to bring out more clearly what the leader actually
did. This can be done by rewriting the words underlined at (2)
to make it clear that it was the leader who introduced into the
Members' Committee the idea of tightening up the door procedure and raising the subs; by substituting 'leader' for 'chairman' at point (3); and by substituting 'Then the leader raised
the question of Richard .. .' for 'Then the question of Richard
was raised' at point (4). The purpose of all three emendations
is to help focus the attention of the members of a training group
more directly on how the leader tried to cope with his problem.
If the case is edited in this way it will then read as follows:
A club leader has noticed that Richard, a senior club member who
leads the group which looks after the club's electrics (record-player,
etc.), has got into the habit of avoiding paying his club subscription
whenever possible. When the leader tackles him on this he becomes
abusive, and the leader feels that he can take little definite action
because he is aware that the subscriptions are not well administered
and there is no easy way to check up.
The leader then decides to get the Members' Committee, of which
he is the chairman, to tighten up the door procedure and raise the
subs.
At the meeting of this committee some of the committee members
who are also in arrears with subs claim that they need not pay as
they arc in effect club helpers. The leader replies that whether they
should pay or not is for the committee to decide, but he suggests they
ought to pay and puts forward several reasons. After a full discussion
the members of the committee vote in favour of exempting themselves from subs. Then the leader raises the question of Richard who
is not a committee member but who also helps in the club. The
members of the committee are strongly divided and recommend as
a compromise that the leader should exercise his own discretion in
the matter.
Subsequently the leader tries to regularize the situation by asking
Richard to pay up. But Richard becomes abusive and finally leaves
the club taking the technical group with him.
Could the leader have avoided this outcome?
The impact of a case can sometimes be strengthened by
editing it so that the person who encountered the problem tells
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his own story. If Example Three were rewritten in this way it
might read as follows:
I am a bit worried about the way I handled a problem that I came
up against in the club recently. I had noticed that one of my senior
club members, a chap called Richard, had got into the habit of
avoiding paying his club subscription whenever he could, and since
the system for collecting subs had got a bit slack, he had been getting
away with it for some time. Apart from that he was quite a useful
club member for he and a few of his friends looked after the club
electrics (record-player, etc.) and repaired them iftheywcntwrong.
However, that was no reason why he should not pay his subs, but
when I tackled him on the subject he became abusive, so I let the
matter drop for the time being until I could feel I was on really
strong ground.
I'm chairman of the Members' Committee in our club, and my
next step was to get them to tighten up the door procedure so that
no one would be able to get by without paying his subs. This wasn't
at all popular with some of the committee members who also happened to be in arrears with their subs, and they took the line that as
committee members they were really helpers and should not have to
pay anything. I said that that was for the committee to decide, hut
that in my view everyone ought to pay and I told them why. The
committee members discussed the pros and cons of this for a long
time, but the upshot was that they decided to exempt themselves
from paying subs.
I then raised the question of Richard who is not a committee
member but who also d~ a lot to help the club. This led to still
more discussion which ended with them telling me that I must do
what I thought best.
I thought it over and decided that if I exempted Richard then a
whole lot of other members would claim exemption too, so orice
again I asked Richard to pay up but he would have none of it.
When I insisted, he left the club and his friends with him, and none
of them has been back since.
Could you have handled this problem better?
A case can also sometimes be rewritten from the viewpoint
of the person who, in the original case, was seen by the 'worker'
as the cause of his problem. In Example Two, for instance, the
youth leader's problem is with his Management Committee,
and the case is suitable for use with a training group of youth
leaders. But the final paragraph of the original case shows that
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the youth leader, through what he did, had also created a
problem for the Chairman of the Management Committee. If
the case were rewritten to present the problem as the Chairman
saw it, it could then be used on a training course for chairmen
and members of Management Committees. The training applications of many cases can be extended in this way.
But however carefully a trainer may edit a case, and however
good a case may seem to him to be, he can never be sure that it
really is good until he has tested and used it with a training
group. This may reveal the need for further editing and it is
only when this has been done and the amended case has satisfactorily passed the test of further use that the trainer can confidently add it to his permanent stock of 'good' cases.
There is one final point. Cases vary very greatly in respect of
the difficulty of the problems they present and in respect of the
level of skill, or lack of it, of the 'workers' who encounter them:
and the training value of a case is greatly enhanced if the members of the training group are able to identify themselves with
the way the 'worker' tries to achieve his purpose as well as with
the problem presented in the case. The ideal case for any particular group is one which presents a 'worker' tackling a situation in much the same way as the members of the training group
would normally have done themselves, and with much the
same result. They then become thoroughly involved in the
process of pooling their ideas and experience in order to
understand just why the 'worker' failed and just how he (and
by implication also themselves) could have done better.

Conclusion
IT has been our theme in this book that every 'worker' in every
situation in which he works will necessarily use one or other of
two approaches according to whether his intention is basically
directive or non-directive; that each approach offers some
advantages and incurs some disadvantages that the other lacks;
and that in order to be consistently efficient in achieving his purposes the worker needs realistically to assess which of these
approaches is the more appropriate one for him to use in each
of the situations in which he works.
We have outlined the relevant factors of choice as we see them
and have described the kinds of skill we think are needed to
enable workers to use the non-directive approach to good effect.
We have done this becawe we believe that many workers
habitually use the directive approach in situations where the
non-directive approach would suit their purposes better; and
that many others who aim to work non-directively often defeat
themselves: either because they sometimes try to do so when the
situation is not right for it, or because in trying to be nondirective they adopt too passive a role. In fact, their role should
be negative only in the sense that they refrain from giving their
own opinions, since this would defeat their main object of
getting people to think things out for themselves. In every other
respect their role is a very active one. It demands real skill to
help people to think and decide realistically and constructively
in the light of all the available facts about the things that really
matter to them : and it is by thus helping people to think more
effectively for themselves that the worker also helps them more
fully to develop their potentialities as persons.
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Dedicated
to the Living Memory of

Community Management
Asian Experience and Perspectives

Evelia Javier
October 31, 1942 - February 11, 1986

'The challenge today stands not in the battlefield but in the
provinces, in the barrios. They are where leaders are needed. Yet where are those who can lead where angels fear to
tread!'
-Evelia Javier, editorial written as a law student.
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Elected Governor in lWl at age 29
Antique Province, Philippines.

David C. Korten

Evelia accepted his own challenge.
He committed himself to empowering the poor of his
province.
He died in the defense of justice,
gunned down by political assassins.
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May his cause endure.
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Reflections of a Village Droelopment

~rker

Large square mesh composed of farm huts and houses.
People and their Way; one hundred and sixty years have passed,
change creeps slowly, filled with energy, yet balance.
Hot potent wind swoops in shouting unexpected turbulence;
aching and cracking.
One question drifts in on the hot wind, lingering in my thoughts:
"What am I to do here?"
CHAPTER THREE

Reflections of a Village
Development Worker1
Apichart Thongyu
(Translated by fames Hopkins)

~
---..\

Old bumpy laterite road-to the right, paddy fields and dikes;
small stream on the left, water nearly dry.
All along the road, a patchwork of grove and paddy
just past the shabby wooden bridge
resting on the stream ahead,
lies the village ..... people.
Large tamarind grove, dawn awakens:
smoke drifts overhead in early morning light,
cattle, buffalo and people emerge from dwellings.
Noon passes, dusk falls:
children herd buffalo to pens, maidens draw and fetch water,
smoke arises once again.
Evening comes, only sounds of householders:
sorrow, joy, happiness, suffering.
Silence and tranquility crawl in, covering the village.
Arising early,
vanishing into the fields carrying a spade,
in my heart a question:
this? backward, undeveloped land;
this? problem people of the country;
this? symbol of ignorance;
this? symbol of malnutrition;
this? symbol of blackness, deprivation, and poverty?
40

After the season which has passed,
yellow wildflowers cover the paddy fields,
sunheat nearly bums crisp dried leaves.
People passing to and fro, in their hands:
workknives, baskets, fish nets.
Far in the distance, ahead lies a dry mountain.
As dusk falls, people return home carrying scrub wood,
vegetables, grass, tadpoles, crabs, fish.
Moonlight fills the sky, lustrous gold covers all;
undeveloped backwardness cannot be found.
Again the question arises: "What am I to do here?"
Sitting, reflecting on the past, reviewing sounds spoken from the
outside and their thoughts toward here: "stupid ... poor... sick;"
"backward ... undeveloped; not-growing ... inert .. .lazy;"
"unhealthy.. .lacking education:'
That is the force which pushed me here, together with the sound
floating on the wind: "You are a developer:'
The village is burning with heat, everyone works in the paddy
fields; grandpa and son plow the fields, grandma and daughter
care for little children and prepare food.
Dawn till dusk, then go home.
Hot wind blows by; outside and inside, scorching heat.
Thought turns to the words of rice-eaters who have never farmed,
words which echo with a striking feeling: 'Those rice farmers ...
so lazy that they are poor:'
Another hot blast sweeps in, leaves fall to the cracked earth;
people herd buffaloes home.
Hoey! Hoey! Hoey!
Kung king ... kung king ... kung king,
Small boys stuffs sticky rice in mouth,
runs and jumps upon buffalo back.
Dawn rays of silver and gold grasp the horizon,
shortly the picture will fade.
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Development as a Human Enterprise

On the road from the village to the paddy fields,
no trace of '1ife" apart from "work,"
no trace of "education" apart from '1ife."
Bamboo is split open; one, two, three, four.
Enough for a house to live, only three walls is ample.
Out front a ladder leans, tied to a beam;
when leaving draw up the ladder, all villagers know...
gone to the paddy fields.
No question about morality of the village people.
No noisy sounds of confusion,
no loud sounds of people-crowds,
no heaps of noise from engines,
no sound of search for freedom,
no sound of calls for honor and rank;
only quietude,
life, and love.
One hundred sixty years of this village,
no introduction to Dharma,
':') no ethical theories,
~
no economic plan,
no articles of government,
no philosophical theory.
Only the life of people,
propagated in tranquil bliss.
lat aat..iat aat,
bamboo leaves drift down into a pile on the ground;
Grandma sits spinning cotton.
Under the house is a buffalo pen ...
a shady resting place ...
a conversation spot ...
where the weaving loom sits ...
tomorrow... grandma's new sarong will be finished.
Sitting reflecting quietly in my heart
with the picture appearing before me,
'1s this the meaning of laziness and backwardness?"
While philosophers are investigating the answers of life,
economists are thinking and searching for economic systems,
politicians are struggling for power,
specialists are arguing over theories,

Reflections of a Village Development ™irker

barristers are drafting laws,
social workers are speaking of freedom,
humanitarians are speaking of human rights,
monks are delivering sermons to the people,
rice farmers in the village are harvesting.
Those rice kernels
shall feed the people.
Rice is food;
vegetables, fish, birds, mice, are food.
People in the village create, make .. .find by themselves.
Silkworms, mulberry, cotton;
with two hands, they become clothing.
Tree roots, grass blades;
with brains, they become curatives for disease and illness.
Trees, leaves;
with labor, they are constructed into dwelling.
Ethics, virtues;
by telling and showing the way of life,
establish and thoroughly transmit values of righteousness.
What else do humans want!
Entire Khun trees blossom in yellow flowers,
today the village is exited.
Some people are saying:
"The Boss is coming today to recommend planting new crops:'
The people fill the village temple pavillion;
shortly, a green vehicle glides in,
three men alight.
They start training about planting crops after the rice season,
together with exhortations not to be lazy.
People nod their heads as if they understand.
When the three men have left,
sounds of some people arise randomly:
''The plague! ...only good at speaking, can they do it? ...
I've planted since my father, my grandfather!
What do they know better than I?"
Grandpa, seventy-six years old,
is planting rice in the middle of the paddy field,
from morning until afternoon;
rushing the planting to catch the early rains,
and hurrying back home before dusk
because yesterday,
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the district office ordered:
all villagers must prepare to enter training about:
"Conditions of Malnutrition Which Cause Ill-health and Weakness."
Jong, a small girl in the village, is carried out,
she is being taken to a hospital in the city.
White-haired grandfather prevents it;
they all take Jong to his house,
place her on the porch.
Before the Buddha altar, grandfather busily prepares things.
Shortly, the exorcist arrives;
after sitting and chanting for awhile,
a strange language bursts out.
White-haired grandfather translates,
then steps down and disappears towards the garden,
everyone sits waiting:
grandfather returns with four or five leaves,
binds them together, puts them in his mouth, chews them,
it's so confusing: I don't know, are they backward or not?
and sprays them on Jong's head.
Jong gradually moves her eyes, awakens, and regains consciousness;

'··"I Afterwards, Jong arises and walks back home;
·~ in the evening,

I see her pushing a water cart vigorously.
Days and time change,
people change,
feelings and moods change.
I, too, am the same;
many things have changed.
I really wonder about myself:
who is actually being developed,
us, or the people in the villages?
Baskets covered and wrapped with an old sarong,
placed on wooden shelves under the house:
one ... two... three ... four...
five ... six .. .
Grandmother delicately pulls them out,
unwraps the cloth carefully;
left hand swatting flies swarming around,
right hand scratching and flicking
silkworms crowded in the basket,
white and nearly full-grown.

Reflections
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Not too much longer,
and another new sarong will exist.
Daybreak,
another new day.
Arising slowly,
lonely and thinking of someone;
turning and seeing Grandfather sitting next to the water jar,
using an axe to cut a plow handle,
stroking it delightedly.
Loneliness disappears;
the person who turns the earth is right here.
It's nearly time to leave the village:
Mother pulls my arm and has me sit close by;
she describes the collective life of the village,
history which has never poured out in print.
Each word ... each sentence
is full of life:
the story of the village in the past,
the fear of the future,
the struggle of the present.
Turning back to look once again,
to be sure.
Water in the stream is clear and clean,
Mother with a new silk skirt,
Father with a checkered sarong,
people with Virtue,
life with simplicity.
Questions are not exhausted, even at parting:
Undeveloped, really?
Backward, really?
In the time that has passed,
only one type of development was seen:
that of myself!

NOTE
1. Abstracted by David C. Korten from Apichart Thongyu "Reflections of a Village Development \A.brker," (Research Development Institute, Khon Kaen University, 1985). Reprinted
with permisssion.
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timetable. This pressure, which may cause considerable strain i:
project, is compounded by the need felt b·
st NGOs to bt
structures to demonstrate a programme's succt. __ .
This is not to say that the NGO should not support small, short-tE
projects with limited, concrete goals, but that development should
seen as a gradual and sometimes radical process rather than a serie~
projects. Often it is not the :lUtcome of a project - in terms of
material benefits accruing, the numbers of people affected etc. - wh
is most important. The very act of demanding a service can b1
reflection of a people's awareness of their role in society, their needs i
the obstacles they confront. And sometimes the development of 1
awareness can be the main goal of a programme. (See PART FOUi

The Objectives of Oxfam's Work
C rseas

===========The non-governmental organisation
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In 1t11 fiold operations the NGO cannot expect to create structures parallel
to those of the State, nor act as a substitute in the provision of services
which are recognised as a State responsibility. However, NG Os can be
effective in working with those groups ignored or by-passed by large
State development schemes. The main priority should be to try to reach
the growing numbers of people not affected by liberal reforms or
increases in wealth.
Perhaps the main problem for the NGO is that the scale of its
operations is too small to effect direct structural change at a general
level. It can, however, be effective in supporting small-scale self-help
schemes and pilot pro1ects, and can assist in the development of ideas
It must be recognised, though, that the self-help approach, while it 1s
ohen the only way open to the poor in a world of shrinking resources.
and can bring tangible benefits to those in need, is part of a trend in
economic development that mainly benefits the wealthy. So long as the
poor are forced to sustain their own development, without the
assistance or even cooperation of society at large, they will remain
marginalised both economically and politically. Therefore the NGO
shouid encourage enlightened development education directed at the
general populations of both Third World and industrialised nations and
especially at governments. By exposing the problems caused by poverty
to society at large, it is hoped to change attitudes towards the poor and
affect policies so that those who are privileged will become more active
in helping the poor and will direct funds and resources to that end.
Frequently in low-income areas many of the resources necessary for
development exist, but are either under-utilised or appropriated by
wealthy elites. Foremost among these is the intelligence, ingenuity and
effort of labour itself. Self-help programmes funded by the NGO may
well not bring about structural change on a large scale, but they can at
least help ensure that reserves of capital, labour, appropriate
technologies etc. are used to a more constructive end - an end which
will benefit the poor and not the upper income groups.
Thus, the ability of the NGO to achieve its goals depends not only on
its own resources and policies, but also on the constraints operating in
the environment in which it works. Much of the NGO input may seem
discouragingly fragmentary and yet the development agency must work
within prevailing political conditions. With persistence and tact some
solutions may be possible, even in the most intractable political
situations. In many areas the NGO faces not so much an antipathetic
government as a complete vacuum, where the development effort is
circumscribed by problems other than the political. In such
circumstances the government may well welcome the operations of the
NGO.
However, even in areas where the need is very great, NGOs should
never take for granted their impact, and their work must be monitored
and assessed regularly. One of the shortcomings of much past NGO
work has been the way programmes have been influenced by the need
to be financially accountable in the short-term. Development in a true
and profound sense 1s a slow process. One cannot expect people to
change their life-styles and life-chances in the short time-span of the
average NGO programme In some ways funding and volunteer
agencies can be blamed for a proiect-centred view of development

II

Oxfam and development
Oxtam's main objective is outlined in its Memorandum of Associatir
"The relief of poverty, distress and suffering in every part of the we
without regard to political and religious beliefs. "
This involves, on the one hand, trying to relieve the suffering cau:
by poverty and, on the other, reducing the total number of poor. [
Oxtam is trying to do something more: namely, to influence the proc•
of development in such a way that the poorest are enabled to t;
charge of their own lives and to mount their own initiatives in
improvement of living standards. Thus, the main objective is to try
end bias against the poor in the development process.
It is hoped that the projects supported by Oxfam will be designed b'
for:
O the poorest to have more (particularly in terms of food and heal
care) and to gain control of a fair share of the world's resources, ar
O for the poor to be more, in terms of self-confidence, ability
manage their own future, and improving their status in society
large.
We are not just concerned, therefore, with material improvem
through rural or urban production schemes or health programmes. I
also with the manner in which material change is organised; i.e., v...
the social institutions and organisations that accompany th'
programmes.
It follows that the main aim of Oxfam as a funding agency is not s1m
to improve access to resources or deliver essential services, but to as~
the poor to gain increasing control over resources and to remove 1
obstacles to a more equitable distribution. To have any real impa
development must involve a more rational distribution of ownersh
income transfer; institutional reform; the provision of services and t
increased participation of the poor in political life.
Ox tam has identified three key ob1ectives 1n its work:
a: To fund and support small-scale development programmes in cert,
priority areas (geographic and functional) which will enable the poor
as tar as possible - to provide for their own needs, to obtain soc
justice and to secure their basic human rights.
b: To fund and support humanitarian welfare work among depr1v
people in certain priority areas.
c: To fund, plan and, where necessary, operate an effective rel
response to those disasters identified as requiring Oxfam's assistanc
Each of these priorities is discussed in some detail in the followr
'PARTS' of the Handbook. Often development. relief and welf;
programmes will in reality be indivisible. And it is hoped that
programmes will have a strong development component. enabl1

peoole gradually to devise their own strategies for subsistence and
31.
.s the primary purpose of this Handbook to provide guidelines.
grouped largely under the headings of Agriculture, Health, Social and
Economic Development, to show how our aims may be pursued But.
however important such guidelines and the development framework
they imply may be, we must always remember that Oxfam exists to serve
people, not to promote an ideology or development model
The first essential. then. is to respond to human need out of
compassion and a sense of natural kinship with those who suffer. The
guidelines are necessary so that this humanitarian impulse may be
tempered with realism, so that it does not degenerate into mere
sentimentality. Oxfam field staff should be flexible and imaginative in
interpreting the guidelines and should respond to human need wherever
there is a genuine opportunity to do so.
~

t Distinction
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The main challenge for aid agencies is twofold:
the urgent need to save the destitute from extreme deprivation and
premature death, and
D the need to arrest and reverse the process of decline towards
destitution.
To the extent that in any given situation the former dominates.
Oxfam's response will be in terms of gifts in cash and kind. and will be
a short-term measure until a more substantial change in the condition of
the victims can be effected. Thus, even though'Oxfam's main aim is to
help people to help themselves. 'welfare' projects may 1n certain
circumstances be necessary, especially where the people concerned are
not in a position to benefit from a development programme.
In situations where the main priority is to reverse the process of
destitution, it is important to understand not only present conditions.
but also the past and likely future dynamics of change. and to seek a
durable solution. This will be one which results in the rehabi11tat1on of the
poor in such a way that there is a good chance of continued
improvement after Oxfam ceases to be involved.
The alternative strategies available to field staff. when set against the
limited resources at their disposal, serve to underline the dilemma they
constantly face between 'rescue' and development aid. Whereas rescue
aid may ensure survival but solve none of the long-term problems,
development aid, while holding the promise of a self-sustaining pattern
of development, entails a high degree of risk and may easily fail.

O

Although the Handbook is primarily concerned with development
strategy, it must be emphasised that the destitute who have no
resources and little hope should receive assistance to secure their
survival. Ideally, relief will give way to longer-term development
programmes.
Disasters and emergencies present a challenge which Oxfam cannot
ignore. The plight of people made homeless or afflicted by sudden
disaster such as earthquakes, hurricanes, epidemics or forced
migrations evokes a response from the public which has provided much
of the impetus for the growth of Oxfam. To do justice to the compassion
felt by our supporters and by the public as a whole, it 1s essential that we
continue to assist 1n times of emergency and disaster (for detailed
gu1del1nes see PART EIGHT)
There are many communities in the world where people live 1n a
chronic state of destitution, degradation and illness, for which
development can offer no solutions. Compassion demands that Oxfarn
sho' ·
;pon1 ·
1ch c
3tanc

@] Development

If it is accepted that Oxfam strives to arrest ·
reverse the proc
that result in deprivation, the difficulties of ,
Jning appropriat•
effective programmes should not be underestimated. It takes
patience and imagination to gain a full understanding of C'conditions and their causes, and to formulate and promote solu'
This is in many ways a new field and, unfortunately, little can be le;
from orthodox development programmes designed from the top d
indeed, in some cases it is the unequal and unacceptable effects of
programmes that Oxfam will have to counter.
Disillusionment with development projects which stress n,
economic objectives has resulted in a search for other strategies v
stress the social dynamics of change and the nature of the distrib
of assets within society. The dominant, 'modernisation', approa
rural development may well have increased levels of agricu
production but has also increased inequalities and helped to perpe
unjust and inegalitarian forms of organisation. Modernisation
benefited some, but the vast majority of people in the world cont in
be marginalised and excluded from development projects.
Oxfam tries to avoid becoming involved in development work ;
operational agency, but to retain its integrity as a funding agr
Whereas in the past funds were often channelled through
international agencies, missions and other expatriate groups, nov
emphasis is on funding directly either grass-roots groups or
intermediate development agencies. Sometimes the opera!
approach to aid may seem less frustrating and more dramatic in its E
(especially if development is measured by material indices) than thr
centralist approach. But a decentralised form of development is t
on the view that the development initiative is more likely t•
sustainable if there is strong support for, and a high degree of contr•
the programme at the local level.
It is mainly for this reason that Oxfam's policy in developmen
moved away from the funding of large numbers of expatriate ex
and technical advisers towards providing local people with
opportunity to put their own initiatives, ideas and enthusiasm to
for the benefit of their own communities. Thus, Oxfam's role ir
development process is that of a partner. Although the organisatio1
benefited from the experience of working in many different cour
and contrasting circumstances, each culture and socio-political co1
presents unique problems, and it is therefore neither possible
desirable that the organisation should manage the process of cha
Funding and intermediate agencies, grass-roots groups and all r
interested parties should work together in a partnership, exchar
ideas, sharing their effort and taking risks towards achieving their g
Emphasis is placed on the individual and unique circumstancr
each society. The era of 'blue-prints' for the development of the World, in which pre-packaged solutions are worked out in the capit<
the industrialised countries is over. Stress is placed on small-~
projects rather than on comprehensive planning strategies, and
secondary importance is given to quantitative results. Much r
emphasis is placed on the processes by which results are achieved
on the resultant forms: for example, it 1s much more important to er
that the content and continuity of educational provision are appror
than merely to construct a school. Major emphasis is placec
increasing the opportunities of previously excluded groups to partiC'
more fully 1n the development process.
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De\fempment strategies

have a strong influence on field staff and project hol~ 0 rs alike, and yet
1e group they
they frequently inhibit the political development
represent and marginalise the weaker members
d: If the emphasis is on a democratic polity and collective effort, then it
is important to examine the tradition of collective action in any given
area so as to avoid imposing models. For example, in Latin America,
despite extreme social differentiation, the pre-Columbian tradition of
collective labour organises and reinforces many present day
development programmes in both rural and urban communities. In
India, on the other hand, strict caste observances would make this kind
of community involvement impossible and collective effort would more
likely be based on different principles of unity, such as kinship.
e: It may be that democratic participation is not simply a means of
achieving a given end, but is seen as a goal in itself; a goal which helps
focus social awareness and provides continuity in development.

:ipatory
>cracy

··..).:.

If Pt
a are to 'be more', they must participate fully rn their own social
and economic development: they must make therr own choices and not
become the servants of an externally-devised grand design
In the past ten years or so an approach has emerged whrch
emphasises the parriciparion of the poor in determining self-re/rant
development strategies. The paternalism of 'traditional' strategies is
replaced by an emphasis on the provision of education and employment
skills which will enable the poor to formulate their own programmes for
change (see PART FOUR) Thus, an increasing number of development
projects which Oxfam supports stress what we might term non-material
objectives
Such objectives include the raising of people's
consciousness, increasing solrdarrty and creating organisations through
which the impoverished and margrnalrsed groups within a society can
build a more secure, less oppressed base from which to challenge
established privilege. Oxfam's aim to relieve poverty, when translated
into such terms, means supporting projects to increase awareness and
self-determination and to remove the material barriers to self-reliant
development.
This approach means drrectrng support to particular groups within
society: the poorest of the poor, those marginalised socially or politically
and the unemployed. It rs different from the traditional social welfare
approach, which emphasises the care of the socially disabled. Firstly, rt
extends the meaning of this disability to include much larger sections of
the population. Secondly, and more importantly, it sees disability as a
product of the disabling processes of rapid social change; processes
which encourage dependence and push more people into poverty and
thus on to the periphery of society. Participatory democracy is identified
as the most important mechanism for ensuring that a programme rs
appropriate to the problems presented in a grven area Participation rs
not merely an ideal; neither is it simply a question of consultation wrth
project holders; nor is rt defined by the acceptance and/or use of a
particular service provided by the development agency. Partrcrpatron rs
crucial to the identification of the goals of a rirogramme, rts
implementation, organisation and evaluation, and is thus a vrtal factor
affecting its potential for success. The partrcrpatory approach places
strong emphasis on the need for social awareness; the rdentrfication by
people of their common problems and goals; the importance of
rnformatron, education and training to enable the effective use of local
resources; and the necessity that all programmes be founded on
collaboratron between the funding agency, grass-roots organrsatrons
and, if applicable, the rntermedrate agency
The stress on partrcrpatory democracy rn development has certain
practical rmplrcations

a: The outcome will depend on the extent to which part1c1pat1on has
occurred at the local level in all aspects of the pro1ect and on whether
local resources have been truly mobilised
b: The level of funding and the technological input must be appropriate
to the local culture economy and the admrnistratrve and organ1sat1onal
capacity of the project holders. For example, in those rural areas where
the need for assistance rs very strong, but the population rs only
nominally incorporated rn the market economy, rt rs all too easy to flood
a zone with funds. In such circumstances, local 1nit1at1ve and
partrcipatron rn, or control of, a pro1ect may easr/y be destroyed.
c: The potential for full part1c1pat1on at the local level rs very much
determined by the degree of sacral d1fferent1at1on and the interests of the
local leadership Char1smat1c leaders may be very persuasive and ri-1Jy

~ Self-Reliance

Where there is full participation at all levels and stages of a development
programme, it is hoped that one result will be self-reliance in financial,
administrative, educational and social terms. However, in many
instances - and particularly in remote rural areas - complete
independence is not possible. Even in industrialised countries where
extensive infrastructures have been established, the cost and
organisational problems involved in creating a new service may be
enormous; but in low-income countries the obstacles to improving
health or education provision etc. will be even greater. A people
occupied almost full-time with survival cannot be expected to have the
time, energy or even the interest to sustain a programme without
support of some kind from outside.
Perhaps in an ideal world all funding would be directed at grass-roots
organisations - communities, cooperatives, associations etc. Even
though this kind of work requires a high staff input from the funding
agency, direct funding can bring considerable savings, since the
institutional structures, staff and capital equipment of intermediate
agencies can be extremely costly. However, it is often necessary to seek
the support of local development institutions in the planning and
implementation of projects or the provision of specialist services.
Working through such organisations has- the advantage of assisting in
the formation of local development expertise. Further, the foreign
funding agency is not capable of providing outreach to all groups that
need help, nor is it desirable that it should do so. Therefore, where
appropriate, local intermediate agencies should be identified and
encouraged
If a local development agency rs involved in a programme, it rs
extremely important to examine its relationship with the grass-roots
organisations. All too often it is assumed that the credibility of local
professionals stems automatically from the very fact that they are local
as opposed to expatriate. The marked social stratification characteristic
of most low-income countries means that local middle-class
professionals frequently have very little understanding of the problems
faced by the poor In most cases, the mandate to work in a given area,
or with a given group of people, arises not because of a person's origins
but because of their motives, their actions and their ability to foster a
relationship of trust. The difference in status between the manual
labourer and the local professional may be such that there is very little
exchange of ideas between the two and very little chance of their
working together on equal terms
The achievement of self-reliance depends on a number of factors
a: The constraints of the area: geographical, economic, social and
pol1t1cal
Independent
development
1nit1at1ves are
frequently

undermined by forces external to the programme; income generation
projr
for example, often increase dependence and exploitation
b: T1. ,..,roject timetable should not be planned simply to fit in with the
requirements of the funding agency. The decision to end funding is an
enormous responsibility. The progress of a project may be much slower
than expected and therefore a lot of flexibility is needed in planning
financial assistance Constant monitoring and evaluation by all
interested parties is the best way of determining when the funding
agency should be able to withdraw without destroying a programme.
c: Where a project will require a permanent external input, for example.
1n the form of technologies which cannot be produced by project
holders, then alternative sources of finance (other than the funding
agency) must be ident1f1ed from the outset. If there are sufficient
reserves, the project itself may take over funding, but 1f not,
arrangements must be made with the government or some other
institution. It is too often the case that only when a project has already
absorbed all the capital available from a funding agency does the search
for an alternative source of finance begin.

mmeScale
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However, small-scale development programmes;
have a number
of disadvantages. For example, small groups ofte
ve very limited
skills and abilities; they are frequently dominated by one or two people;
they have difficulty in planning a programme and in assessing the results
of their efforts. The activities of small programmes, by definition, have
limited impact and sometimes it is hard for the funding agency to detect
any impact at all - much depends on faith in the organisations involved.
Finally, their size frequently makes them very vulnerable to attack by the
vested interests they offend.
Thus, there are no rigid rules regarding the size or scope of
development programmes. The priority of field stall should be to
support those programmes which with the minimum possible outlay
reach the maximum possible numbers of people, the scale of funding or
institutional development never undermining the feasibility of
participation of, and control by, project holders

@ Development as
an Intervention

The scale of a programme can be measured by the level of funding, the
area or population affected, the number of structures built, or the size of
the implementing institution. Oxfam's commitment is mainly to smallscale development programmes, not simply because of the limited
availability of resources, but more because larger programmes are less
likely to guarantee a high level of participation or address problems at the
local level.
In recent decades there has been world-wide criticism of many of the
large-scale, 'top down', development programmes Attention has been
focused on certain shortcomings which seem often to result: alienation
of project management from project holders; the lack of involvement of
project holders in implementation and administration; bureaucratisation
and the use of inappropriate technologies and policies. The impact of
these programmes is rarely commensurate with the resources invested.
Thus, throughout the world we see large, unwieldy development
projects boasting massive funding, sophisticated equipment and
expertise and large numbers of professional staff And yet, despite
exaggerated claims, they often prove unrealistic in their objectives, illadvised in their methods and ineffective in terms of results; above all,
failing to reach those most in need.
There are certain problems specific to funding large nongovernmental operational agencies:
a: The institutionalisation of the agency A commitment to working
for/with the poor may rapidly be replaced by a commitment to
mainta1n1ng the institution and providing jobs for the staff. This trend 1s
accentuated in countries with high unemployment among middle-class
professionals. Projects will often be devised by staff in order to secure
their own future, and participation in project design and implementation
will be severely restricted
b: Large operational agencies will be seriously affected by changes in
funding The cost of maintaining institutional. structures with inflated
bureaucracies and staff numbers can be exorbitant - especially where
they are based in urban areas - and 1t is unlikely that self-financing will
be feasible.
Perhaps the most serious problem with large-scale 'top down'
programmes is the tendency to create a level of dependence which
leaves the project extremely vulnerable to changes 1n circumstance. If a
project is beyond the control of project holders or is extremely
expensive. then it 1s unlikely to be able to survive changes either in
"~""rnnw~· ~- 1n fu; ~ ·
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Evaluation and
Monitoring

It must be recognised that however little field staff may wish to interfere
in the development process, the role of Oxfam as a funding agency will
always imply an intervention of some kind. But Oxlam at least has the
advantage of not being forced to work to any specific directive and can
support either single-or multi-purpose programmes, in response to local
priorities. Continual evaluation and monitoring of both policy and
practice is necessary to assess the impact of the funding agency in the
countries in which it is active.
Perhaps the most controversial feature of intervention by the
development agency is the way in which it may affect local cultural
traditions. The wide range of cultural and institutional conditions in
different parts of the world will affect radically what the funding agency
is able to achieve in each region. Enormous tact and sensitivity are
required when dealing with cultural attitudes which apparently obstruct
educational or developmental activities. Yet one of the main challenges
faced by the development agency is to try to reach those most deprived
and marginalised: this implies that we cannot take local structures and
attitudes at face value.
Rigid rules regarding marriage and kinship; taboos, prohibitions and
other cultural practices; strict class and caste observances, etc., may all
contribute to group security, but often at the expense of individual
freedom. While these cultural traditions may be appropriate in many
contexts, they frequently outlive their usefulness to the individual or
community in changing circumstances. And yet they do not disappear
easily, nor should a pattern of development which is destructive of a
cultural tradition be encouraged. Sometimes the most violent social and
psychological disruptions brought about by economic change can be
those which result from the destruction of the integrity of a local culture
and the removal of a people's links with their past (see PART TWO,
Section 5).
It is recognised that all development programmes are experimental and
entail some risk. Therefore, constant monitoring and evaluation is an
essential component of ANY programme !see PART THREE). This kind
of assessment not only helps to min1m1se detrimental effects but enables
all interested parties (funding, intermediate agencies and grass-roots
groups) to benefit more fully from the experience of development.
Evaluation should be integral to a programme and not added as an
afterthought or as a requirement of the funding agency anxious to
demonstrate success in order to justify its involvement. Evaluation and
monitoring offer all concerned a chance of redefining goals or
procedures where necessary and of applying the experience to future
pro·
1es
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Appraisal

If the above procedures are followed, the funding<
;y will be able
to meet its obligations to donors and to recipients tu 0otain publicity
material and assist in its own resource allocation and policy formulation.
More importantly, these procedures provide a means whereby the
project can stimulate and improve its own management. There is no
doubt that good management is one of the critical elements affecting
the outcome of prowcts.
Similarly, at this early stage it should be made clear to what extent
grants will be subject to the receipt of satisfactory reports, and any other
conditions should be specified.

Appraisal of projects prior to making
grants
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The idea has already been mentioned that the funding agency functions,
not simply to underwrite material change, but more to enter into
partnership to achieve social and economic development. The
achievement of muwal understanding and respect between field staff
and project holders takes great sensitivirv, understanding and
perception, which cannot be substituted bv anv amount of paperwork
A good relationship between field staff and project .holders is vital
Where the rapport does not exist and project holders are unwilling to
discuss their programme, and where there is no understanding of the
reciprocal obligations, it will not be possible to develop a working
relat1onsh1p
Consultation between field staff and project holders may often start
before the preparation of a project proposal Such preliminary
discussions frequently help avoid mistakes If possible, when
considering a new project the following should be incorporated:
a: Adequate baseline data The information available should be
sufficient to en-able errors to be avoided in the decision-making process
Projects often collapse because the information on which certain
assumptions have been based is either inadequate or false. It is difficult
to assess a project 1f there 1s no baseline data against which to judge
progress. Even in cases where it is hard to obtain information, the
question should be asked: what 1s the minimum one needs to know
before work can be initiated?
b: Tangible, and preferably quantifiable, objectives Some
projects may have ob1ectives that do not lend themselves to assessment
by statistical methods for example, those concerned with social
education. In these cases, 1t is vital to ensure that the ob1ectives of the
prowct are well defined and understood by all. Many programmes fail
because project objectives are vague, ill-defined or over-ambitious. The
ob1ectives should also specify the group to benefit from the programme,
its numbers and location.
c: Control groups. Where feasible, 1t is useful to identify a control
group against which progress can be measured. Sometimes projects
have resulted in apparently remarkable improvements, but further
1nvest1gat1on has shown that the circumstances of neighbouring
communities not exposed to the pro1ect have improved to the same
degree. The use of a control group, therefore, can give a more modest
and realistic impression of a pro1ect It is unlikely that sufficient
resources will be available for detailed mon1tonng of a control group;
however, relatively informal comparisons with such a group may suffice
d: Reporting and monitoring procedures should be discussed at the
earliest possible moment: what information is to be included, by whom,
how often and how to implement any changes indicated by the reports/
e: Provision for self-evaluation and for external evaluation
studies, if appropriate, should also be discussed (see Section 41. A
useful approach is to incorporate plans for a mid-term review in the life
of a pro1ect, in which pro1ect staff and beneficiaries, field staff and
outside consultants etc. meet to discuss the project and to measure
achievements against goals and ob1ect1ves. This should be done with a
view to changing ob1ect1ves and programmes in the second period of the
pro1ect 1f necessary. Future funding should also be discussed at this

~ Background

It is essential that in the appraisal of all projects due regard is paid to the
national, regional and local socio-economic context. Even the most
effectively designed programme will collapse if insufficient attention has
been paid to the background against which it 1s working. National
policies may easily run counter to the objectives of the programme. For
example, a rural community may seek to improve agricultural production
only to discover that the government has decided to cut the price paid
to producers, thus rendering production unprofitable. Many political
variables have a bearing on development initiatives and must be
analysed before decisions are made. Field sraff mav feel that the general
political and economic circumstances of a counrry are bevond the
immediare frame of reference, ro ignore them, however, is to risk projecr
failure. It is rare for Oxfam to support surveys of national and regional
soci.al trends, because frequently there will be existing studies or
specialists will be available who can advise on the context of a proposed
project. (See Appendix Ill SOCIAL SURVEYS!
Many factors may affect the life of a development project, and it is
impossible to predict all of these. There are, however, certain factors
which should always be taken into account·
a: Government policies are of obvious relevance to any project; food
prices, education policies and political outlook are some of the aspects
of government which need to be assessed.
b: Development programmes. Before funding a project, field staff
should find out about other development programmes in the area and
programmes mounted in the past. It is not unknown for different
development programmes to be antagonistic in their goals. For example,
plans to settle jungle areas in South America are harmful to attempts to
establish the rights of indigenous peoples inhabiting the zone. In other
cases, development agencies have been found to be duplicating their
efforts This problem is particularly unfortunate given the limited
resources available for development. A preliminary survey is especially
important with service projects (e.g., health and education) where an
NGO might duplicate work planned by the State or even give the State
an excuse to withdraw from its programme, thereby depriving a
population of a long-term service. Similarly, investigations should be
made into the previous development experience of those groups
intending to mount a project. Often the impact of previous aid
programmes can be such that the potential for future success is severely
restricted. For example, communities that have at some stage received
large sums from official sources may well become dependent on
external funding and in such circumstances small-scale, self-help
schemes will probably fail. Investigation may reveal a poor use of funds
1n previous programmes. Or it may be found that a funding application
has been made primarily to enable a group to pay off debts incurred
through earlier programmes.
c: Local social and political hierarchies and structures have
1mmed1ate relevance to a small development programme: care should be
•~"'°"in Pn~11rP th;ir lor.;il elites do not destroy the pro1ect in its infancy

Largr
iowners fearful of competition, for instance, may well seek to
unde,
.e rural cooperatives or marketing groups. The first defence is
to be aware of the possible dangers and to avoid a development plan
that leaves gaps which could be exploited by outsiders. Many small
marketing schemes, for example, fail because insufficient attention 1s
paid to obtaining appropriate legal recognition or status for the group,
thus leaving it open to harassment from local authorities. Similarly, there
is little point in building a health post or digging a well if it is not clear who
has legal title to the land on which the construction is to be sited.
d: Cultural norms and practices may impede a development project.
Field staff must be sensitive to those practices and beliefs which could
have an adverse effect on a project or isolate certain groups.
Unfortunately, expatriate development workers have often been
particularly remiss in this respect, not taking full account of local
conditions. In some areas differences between classes, sexes, castes
and tribes may be quite evident. In other areas social and cultural factors
may not appear to be decisive; but it is all too easy to assume that all
people engaged in the same kind of activity, dressed alike and speaking
the same dialect have the same interests.
e: Long-term trends. Long-term climatic and social trends affecting a
population are not always clear. Further, people's perceptions of these
trends can sometimes be misleading. It is therefore vital to examine the
history of the area in which the project is located. Extreme drought can
be treated - mistakenly - as if it were an emergency which could be
alleviated with short-term relief measures. However, if it is found that
drought is becoming an annual event, then it might be more appropriate
to think in terms of funding measures designed to have a long-term
impact.
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a: Reid staff should assess projects mainly on the basis of
O whether the people have a genuine need;
O whether the project is desired by the intended beneficiaries, both
men and women;

O
O
O
O
O

c: There are certain guidelines which can assist in pla1

objectives:
An objective should be realistic in terms of time, quu• 1tity, quality
and cost. The beneficiaries should be clearly identified in number
and location. If the objectives are not defined precisely, what
remains is simply a vague statement of intent
O The planning process must involve people, and objectives should be
defined with people and not for them. Involvement of project
holders in planning a programme generally results in their greater
commitment to implementation.
O In some cases the main objective of a programme might result from
an outsider's perception of a given community's needs, and might
differ from those perceived by the community itself. However, the
participants in the project must be able to see some objectives in the
project which relate to their own experience; there will otherwise be
no reason for them to continue working with the programme.
d: The following sequence can be used in planning projects in relation to
their objectives:
O define objectives (both primary and secondary!;
O consider the alternative ways of achieving these objectives;
O choose the best, or least costly, alternative, given the resources
required and available;
O plan expenditure (see notes on project budgets);
O plan implementation of the project, and
O plan regular assessment of progress against objectives, allowing for
the adjustment of objectives, methods and resources in the light of
experience. (See Section 3, Monitoring.)
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II

The following notes draw attention to some of the problems likely to be
encountered in pro1ect appraisal. Above all it must be remembered that
its development is about people, and so is project appraisal. However
rechnicallv feasible a projecr, it is the participarion of people which will
determine whether it is a success or not. The general atmosphere
prevalent in a programme will indicate a great deal about the relations
between the people involved in it. Are the people relaxed in their work?
Are relationships within the group cordial? When entering a community
in the company of project workers, do local people wave as you pass by?
Do they even recognise the project workers? Do people stop and talk in
the streets, or are they in awe of the proiect staff? Alternatively, are the
staff respectful of local people? Do they keep them waiting for long
periods? Do they treat locals as social inferiors, or as a hindrance to their
work? On consecutive visits is the same small number of people always
present, or is there evidence of a large number of people involved in the
project? The appraiser should try to make sure that their visit is not
treated as a special event since it is extremely important to establish, as
far as possible, what a normal working day is like

whether the objectives of the pro1ect fall within the scope of Oxfam's
policies and terms of reference;
whether the project is likely to achieve its ob1ectives;
whether the project is technically appropriate and economically
viable;
whether the project will survive the test of time (or, in other words,
what likelihood there is that the benefits will continue once the
project ends), and
whether the constraints can be overcome.

b: Defining the objectives of a project is perhaps the single most
important stage in project preparation. There will obviously be a
hierarchy of objectives, and these should be listed in order of
importance, always taking care not to confuse ends and means
Frequently neither project holders nor field staff distinguish between the
purpose of a grant (e.g., to build a health post) and the objective of the
project (to improve the general level of health or eradicate infectious
disease, etc ) Once the principal objective has been defined, the
secondary objectives should be established. Thus the main aim of an
agricultural programme may be to increase production and incomes;
and once this primary objective 1s clear, then the secondary ob1ectives
will indicate more immediate goals (such as the introduction of a new
cropping system, reclaiming of land or building of an irrigation system)
The next stage is to decide on the appropriate means to achieve these
ends (e.g., to build an irrigation ditch, carry out educational and
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Specific elements in project appraisal

[I] Leadership

People with qualities of leadership play an important role in all
organisations. Many communities are fortunate enough to have a strong
person to represent them, to lead the community in development and
other initiatives. Inertia can be overcome by dynamic leadership.
However, people may frequently agree with a leader, or be persuaded to
take action during the excitement of a public meeting, but once away
from the direct influence of the person's charisma may question the
decision, and be unenthusiastic about implementing it. For example,
pear
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n '•arismatic leader may make appraisal of a project difficult, for
r presence overshadows others, making it hard to assess with
his c
accuracy their attitudes and opinions. The leader may apparently know
all the answers, communicate well with the appraisers, and always
appear to speak on behalf of colleagues and neighbours. It is important
to find out what the remainder of the group really thinks, or whether
they even understand the project in question.
Many leaders work for long hours and put an enormous amount of
effort into their work on behalf of other people. However, by taking so
much onto themselves they do not allow others to participate fully in the
project or to learn from their own experience. If leaders concentrate
information, management and decision-making into their hands, others
may fail to understand what is happening in a project.
It can be very d1ff1cult to explain to a hard working and committed
person that their very immersion in their work may be detrimental to the
people on whose behalf they are working. But for a group to be totally
dependent upon one person is risky; leaders may obstruct new ideas or
impede the participation of others, and their absence or removal can
lead to the total collapse of the pro1ect.
There are people who will exploit power for their own ends. It is often
all too easy for such persons to undermine morale by financial
dishonesty or by encouraging a s1tuat1on of permanent conflict in order
to maintain their own dominant position.
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The advantages and disadvantages should be weigher
·efully. Some
of the more obvious advantages are that expat1
,: may have
professional experience and technical skills, and can train local people;
have experience beyond national boundaries; are often highly motivated
and committed and willing to work in d1ff1cult areas; often have greater
ob1ect1vity and are able to identify more clearly local needs; can provide
some protection against abuses of human rights by channelling
information to the international press; can expose local prejudices and
cross social boundaries, for example by working with women, low
castes, tribal groups, minorities, refugees etc. The disadvantages are
that: 1f expatriates are unfamiliar with local conditions and languages, a
lot of time may be lost in training; they may be replacing local people in
the 1ob market; their participation continues the dependence on foreign
knowledge; volunteers can be used as cheap labour, or if paid,
expatriate labour can be very expensive; they may stay for a very short
period and therefore destroy continuity; the project may collapse when
they leave; they may push the programme too fast for local people in
order to complete work before their contract ends; their lack of
understanding of local society can lead to inappropriate responses; local
agencies may seek to use expatriate assistance as a way of obtaining
access to funds controlled by foreign agencies.
In an ideal world there would be little need for expatriate personnel. In
certain areas, however, they are still required to assist in development
and humanitarian work whether as paid staff or as volunteers. It is
important to establish whether there 1s a real need to employ expatriate
personnel or whether there are local people available with the necessary
skills. Will the expatriate be teaching a counterpart or replacement?
What will the role of the expatriate be? If it is as leader or project director,
is someone being prepared to take over or will the project collapse on his
or her departure? Are the expatriates encouraging a level of activity and
funding which will be difficult to maintain in the future?

People's motives for becoming involved in development vary greatly,
although there is little evidence that the nature of individual motivation
has any direct relationship to a project. However, it is important to be
aware of the possible problems that can be caused by particular sorts of
motivation.

a: Religious conviction. Involvement in development work is
sometimes seen as a path to individual salvation rather than a process of
participation with a group in a common activity. The improvement of the
individual ego becomes a major Objective of daily work. Religion can also
be used to exaggerate the righteousness of the adherents, and this can
make them unreceptive to outside ideas. Finally, development and
humanitarian work can be seen merely as a vehicle for proselytising
b: Political. The same factors can also affect the work of those people
with strong political motivations. Sometimes outsiders will attempt to
use poor people for their own political ends. Thus, different factions may
compete for the allegiance of a group of people by offering development
programmes as an enticement. Any pro1ect risks coming into conflict
with power elites, but certain political factions may have the expressed
aim of inciting conflict, or using the poor as political 'cannon fodder'.
c: Professional. The field of development is increasingly becoming an
independent profession and offers to many an interesting and
challenging career. Greater professional1sm in development can bring
many advantages, but the danger is that projects will be written
specifically with the aim of professional advancement in mind
Intermediate agencies for example may look more towards the survival
of their own institution than to the interests of those for whom they
supposedly work.
d: Expatriates. There are many committed, experienced and well
qualified expatriates working in development programmes throughout
the Third World. They often provide scarce skills and work in
inhospitable areas neglected or abandoned by others. Furthermore,
some expatriates make long-term commitments to their adopted
country and cease to be regarded or to regard themselves as foreigners.
However, the relationship between expatriates and local people is
complex and should be taken into ilccoiint when assess1nn a nrrwwr

~ Funding

a: Support for individuals. In the absence of development agencies,
individuals without any institutional backing sometimes become
involved in development or humanitarian work. Some of the points
raised above will be relevant in the assessment of such initiatives. For
example, what will happen when the individual withdraws? Is
management too centralised or is there allowance for community
participation, etc.? What length of time is the person likely to continue
their work?
It 1s highly inappropriate for agencies like Oxfam to provide funds 1n
response to individual cases of hardship whether they be refugees,
destitute people, the sick or anyone else. Not only is it an inefficient use
of funds, but it entails many risks. It is not possible for the NGO to make
a true assessment of individual cases. Individuals should be referred to
an agency competent to undertake case-work. Other agencies specialise
in providing grants for individual study. Where possible this is usually
best carried out 1n the country of origin.
b: Overfunding. NGOs and governments alike constantly request an
increase in resources available for development, but it must be
remembered that the over-funding of projects can be very harmful. In
part 1t is the uneven spread of assistance, which results in some groups
rece1v1ng funds from many different sources whilst others are hardly
touched by development activities. This imbalance is largely due to the
def1c1enc1es of funding agencies, which tend to concentrate their efforts
in the same geographic areas, 1n those areas with good communications
and with those people who are most articulate and able to present
applications for funding. Unfortunately, many small groups have been
Funding must be
destroyed by receiving excessive funds.

com1
urate with a group's capacity to grow, and to cope with the
management, administrative and personnel problems incurred in such
growth. As a group grows, informal mechanisms of coping with
decision-making and coordination between the participants begin to
break down. The result may be inefficiency, an erosion of trust, and
emergence of conflicts and tensions. Alternatively, some activities are
possible on a small scale, but become more difficult if expanded; for
example, handicraft production at the basic level requires little
administration, but with many people involved may encounter problems
of obtaining supplies and markets, and incur fiscal and legal obligations.
A project should be allowed to grow at its own pace. New initiatives,
good ideas and successful schemes deserve support but not at the risk
of flooding them with funds.

c.- Competition. Beware of the possibility of duplication of effort
between agencies in the same area and, worse still, competition
between them. Certain circumstances may exacerbate this problem. For
example, political, religious or personality differences can cause
communities or agencies to break up into smaller groups which continue
their work in competition with each other.
d: Continuity and self-funding All funding agencies are, or should
be, preoccupied with the long-term management and financial
arrangements of projects. Most recurrent costs are met by external
funding agencies for only short periods, and therefore it is essential that
before commencement some thought be given to possible sources of
funding at the end of the initial grant.
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Certain types of project should become self-sufficient as soon as
possible. If, for example, an income-generating pro1ect is feasible, wellmanaged and well-planned, there should be no need to provide
subsidies for running costs. Production should never be subsidised,
although it might be acceptable to subsidise initial capital costs (or
related social costs such as training). On the other hand, even though
local people should make some kind of contribution to the costs of their
services, it is unrealistic to expect all services to become self-funding,
One common problem is that many proposals for service projects are
over-optimistic about the likelihood of a contribution from local sources,
whether private or governmental For example, the ideal health
programme would allow for referral to a hospital and for laboratory
services. However, the system of referral in many countries is very
inefficient and in some areas 1s completely absent. Governments
sometimes use the involvement of NGO funding agencies in health
programmes as a pretext for neglecting the service. Allowance must be
made for these possibilities.
If a service provided is more lavish than is the norm for the country or
area, then the government is unlikely to be able or willing to maintain 1t.
Many mission facilities transferred to state control have subsequently
fallen into decay because they were more expensive to run than the
average for the country. It may therefore be advisable to fund and plan
for a programme which is less than the ideal, but which stands a better
chance of obtaining finance for the future.
By not taking into account the longer-term future of a programme it
1s possible that services will be created and will disappear according to
the availability of funds. It is important to plan for the longer term, to
ensure follow-up, continuity and a lesser degree of dependence on
external funds. It is unfortunately the case that many programmes only
survive financially by being passed from one funding agency to another

a: Technical feasibilitv. Once the basic aue~t1ons relating to a pro1ect
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the technical details of agricultural, health. social
economic
development, educational and disaster programmes. It
.nportant to
measure the obiectives of the programme against its technical
feasibility; people tend to be over-opt1m1st1c about the expected results
of small pro1ects and hence are disappointed when goals are not
achieved. it is also important to ensure that the management and
technical capacity of the project team 1s sufficient to meet the
requirements of the programme.
b: Concentration on theory. The development process is highly
complex, and in the attempt to understand often contradictory factors
there is a tendency to formulate all-encompassing models. These may
not only over-simplify reality but also restrict the implementation and
achievement of goals. Any group which claims to have discovered the
only true road to development must be treated with some
circumspection, as it is unlikely to learn from its mistakes.
Project proposals which are over-theoretical in approach may obscure
the empirical problems likely to be encountered in the project's
implementation. Care should also be taken with plans for immediate
replicability of a successful programme, as conditions may vary so much
as to prohibit duplication of the model.
It 1s one thing to write a well thought-out proposal and provide all the
necessary background information and analysis, but it is something else
actually to implement the ideas. Excessive concentration on the theory
of development can be as unproductive as extreme pragmatism.
c: Regional concentration. It is important to ascertain whether the
proposed project is too concentrated geographically or, alternatively,
too dispersed. Excessive concentration will lead to a reduction in the
number of beneficiaries, and may increase costs per person as against
benefits. Furthermore, neighbouring communities may become hostile
if they are excluded from a programme: on the other hand, a programme
taking in a larger area may become too thinly stretched and therefore
lack impact. In dispersed programmes travel expenses may be high and
a great deal of time can be wasted in travelling. There may be too little
time available to spend in each locality for good relationships to develop.
Rather than concentrating on one locality, and rather than attempting
to tackle many different problems in an integrated fashion, a programme
may choose one single aspect of development. There have been some
remarkable projects which have developed one type of expertise or pilot
activity, sometimes as a complement to the development work of other
agencies. However, such specialisation may lose the many advantages
of integration.
d: Legal identity. This element of an organisation should not be taken
for granted when assessing a project proposal. It is important to ensure
that the legal identity of the pro1ect is appropriate to the nature of the
activity proposed (e.g., if a production cooperative is envisaged, then in
most countries the organisation should not be legally registered as a
charitable bodyl. Legal recognition may be essential for a programme to
operate. For instance, an export licence may be a requisite for a
handicraft group. Obviously the legal requirements will vary from
country to country. Once legal status has been established, it is
important to see how the control and ownership of assets are organised.
Field staff must be cautious of projects which register ownership in the
name of individuals. There is always a possibility that an institution may
have only a short life-span; it should be clear how assets will be disposed
of if the organisation dissolves (assets should preferably be given to a
similar group to be used for the purposes for which they were originally
acquired). The disposal of capital items will be of particular importance
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impact on its operational success A very small group with
cen
,ed management may 1n time run into trouble, since a highly
centralised structure can become inadequate as the group grows. It is
probably impossible to achieve a perfect balance between a hierarchy
and democracy. While a hierarchical structure inhibits participation,
total democracy impedes decision-making But it is important to
establish that an organisation does have a clear system of management,
decision-making, procedures for reconciling conflicts etc. Is there, for
example, a governing body to which staff and beneficiaries can appeal
in case of conflict within the group?
However well a proposal is written, if the project holders are not
sufficiently prepared technically, or committed personally to the project,
then it cannot progress. Some people are excellent at preparing project
proposals but lack the capacity for implementation. It is important to
look at the project members as a team and not simply as a collection of
1nd1viduals: a project director may be impressive in many ways but not
work well with the team. The appraisal should include a study of group
dynamics, leadership and, where funding is not aimed directly at grass
roots groups, the relationship between the project team and
beneficiaries.

f: Finance. There are two aspects of the project finance which need to
be examined: firstly, the economic feasibility of the project - where this
1s appropriate - and secondly, the details of the operational budget It
must be ascertained whether the budget 1s realistic 1n terms of salaries,
running costs and capital equipment; whether it takes due account of
inflation and possible unforeseen costs. and whether it details additional
contributions from the community and/or from other sources. It may
also be important to examine plans for the attainment of self-financing
or alternative funding at the end of the grant period.

Specialised appraisal techniques
.ssessment
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A project which has admirable objectives may still be refused a grant if
it appears to have a poor chance of reaching those objectives. However,
1n cases of urgent need, Oxfam may be willing to take much greater risks
than would normally be acceptable, a willingness to take risks being one
of the strengths of non-governmental organ1sat1ons Assessment of the
degree of risk may depend mainly on intuition based on experience
However, certain questions may help in making this assessment:
O To what extent 1s the project likely to be interfered wnh by the
government, local authorities, or by other power elites?
O How confident are you of the managerial ability of the pro1ect staff,
and their ability to work together?
O In the long-term, what permanent improvements should the project
bring about? Will the project have any adverse environmental
effects? To what extent will the pro1ect be replicable?
A key part of the design of pro1ects 1s the preparation of budgets
covering anticipated expenditure and revenue. The failure to analyse
budgets properly has often hidden from view potential risks or pitfalls
Field staff should pay close attention to budgets and income estimates
and check especially economic forecasting and assumptions. Detailed
advice on budgets is included in Section 6, Budgeting and Accountancy
and in PART FIVE, Economic Development Guidelines.
One simple measure for appraising a project is to estimate the cosr per
person that is, divide the cost of the pro1ect by the number of people to
benefit fit 1s important to define the exact number of benef1c1aries, not
the total population 1n the areil) WhPre two alternative merhnrl~ nf

reaching the same objective are presented, a decisir
·tween them
may be made on the basis of cost effectiveness or co~ ,,cir person.
This is a fairly crude measure, however, applicable only to clear-cut
objectives where there are only 'direct' beneficiaries, all of whom stand
to benefit equally; for example, with the provision of clean water to a
village or construction of a health post. It is difficult to make any
ob1ect1ve estimate in situations where the benefits resulting from a
programme are indirect and unquantifiable
The greatest per capita expenditures are probably 1ustified in projects
which train individuals to help others, for example extension workers or
nutritionists, as these projects have a muluplier effect. In general,
projects which invest in buildings or capital equipment have a low
multiplier effect as compared with pro1ects which train or educate
people. In particular, investment in buildings is hard to justify because of
the long period of use required to merit the high levels of capital
investment entailed.

@] Cost Benefit
Analysis and
Investment
Appraisal

The evaluation techniques of Cost Benefit Analysis (CSA) are now
widely used in appraising development pro1ects, and field staff should be
aware of the principles involved in applying such techniques, the
limitations and difficulties involved, and their relevance to the types of
project likely to be supported by NGOs
CSA is a pro1ect appraisal technique that helps decide whether or not
a particular project is economically acceptable, or which out of a number
of alternative pro1ects is the most acceptable.
a: Concepts involved. It is important to see how the perspective of
'social CSA' differs from a purely financial analysis of a project. Both try
to predict the profitability of a project by comparing the project's
expected costs with its expected return If the project's return exceeds
its costs, then the project is acceptable
In contrast to purely financial appraisals, social C BA takes a wide view
of a project, and considers all the costs and benefits that may result. A
businessman may not take into account the environmental
consequences of a project, for example. The pollution of rivers or the
preservation of wild life may be irrelevant to the economics of a project.
Social CBA, however, views such effects as costs that may have a very
important effect on a particular society, and they must therefore be
considered if a project's wider implications are to be adequately
assessed.

b: The three stages of social CBA.
O Estimaring future costs and benefits. The procedure is first to
identify all costs and benefits of a pro1ect, and then to put a value on
them. All relevant costs and benefits should be included, whether
direct or indirect. For example, an indirect cost of new industry
might be the possible adverse effect on local artisans. Another
important difference between financial appraisal and social CBA
arises in estimating the monetary value of costs and benefits. A
financial appraisal will assess the cost of materials, labour and
equipment at just the market prices paid for them. Social CBA will
assess these costs using the economic concept of the opportunirv
cost. For example, an industrial project decides to recruit a worker.
He or she is at present earning a living in agriculture. The project
offers a wage that is higher than the total value of his or her
agricultural production. The cost to the economy is not the new
wage that will be paid, but the cost of the agricultural production lost
as a result of the worker's transferring from agriculture to the
project. This is therefore the opportunity cosr to the economy as a
whole of the labour input of the new worker in the project; it is also
known as the shadow wage rare, or the accounting wage rate.

O

'Discounting' furure cosrs and benefirs. Since the benefits of costs
not appear until airer the initial outlay, a technique known as
..:>counting is used to take this into account.
Discounting occurs when the immediate prospect of receiving,sa1·.
£100 is more attractive than receiving the same sum, or even a greater
amount, at some point 1n the future: £100 received now may be
equivalent to £120 received next year (because of inflation, pressing
needs etc.). Next year's £120 is discounted to this year's £100 The
discount rate 1n this case 1s 20%, 1.e. the difference expressed as a
percentage of £100.

Typically, over the lifespan of a proiect the ma1or cost will be
incurred in the early stages and the benefits will accrue later. In an
agricultural project, the cost of land improvement and irrigation
demands an immediate outlay_ The increase in agricultural output
may not appear until a year or more later. So costs and benefits have
to be identified and calculated year by year.
Once the future costs and benefits have been estimated over the
life-span of the project. a second major step is therefore to reduce
these costs and benefit flows to what are called presenr day values
This 1s done by the use of discount tables, after choosing a suitable
discount rate over the time period.
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In order to establish the suitable discount rate, the investor must
decide upon a standard reqUJred rare of return. This is the lowest
acceptable return on an investment, and is calculated in one of two
ways: with an organisation like Oxfam, experience would suggest the
lowest rate of return that makes a pro1ect a realistic proposition;
alternatively, the required rate of return could be established by
taking current interest rates into account.
Having discounted all future costs and benefits to obtain present
day values, these can then be added to give rota/ discounred future
costs and total discounted furure benefits. Appendix I includes
project examples which illustrate the kind of calculations required to
undertake a CBA
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Acceptance or rejection of a project. Criteria need to be established
with which to decide upon a project's economic acceptability. One
or more of three decision rules may be used·
Net Presenr Value (NPVJ: this 1s the discounted total benefits less the
discounted total costs. If this difference 1s positive, i.e. 1f the
monetary value of benefits outweighs the monetary value of costs,
the pro1ect is deemed acceptable.
Benefit-Cost Ratio (8/CJ: this 1s the ratio of the discounted benefits
to the discounted costs. If this ratio 1s greater than one, the pro1ect
1s acceptable.

lnrerna/ Rare of Return (/RRJ. this 1s the most commonly used
decision rule. It is rather like quoting a rate of return on investment:
a project with an IRR of 30% is better than one with an IRR of 20%.
The computation of the I RR is rather more d1ff1cult to understand and
explain, and will not be attempted here. In practice, a project will be
acceptable if its IRR 1s higher than the required rate of return (see
'Discounting' future costs, above). The required rate of return
therefore becomes the cut-off rate for acceptance or re1ection of the
pro1ect

c: Practical problems. The three main steps in conducting social CBA
outlined above include a great number of theoretical and operational
problems. Some of these are touched upon here:
D Predicting future benefits 1s clearly difficult or impossible in many
projects. For example, 1n an agricultural project, the adoption of
1nnovat1ons by farmers depends upon a whole range of technical,
ec<
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(!] Surveys

of these are difficult to predict; e.g, unexpr ·.-,d weather
conditions, recession, crop failure .
D Estimating benefits of 'social development' projects (such as
training schemes or social education) 1n money terms is highly
controversial. In the case of an industrial or agricultural project, the
main direct benefits will be the increased output attributable to the
project, e.g., bags of fertiliser or tons of rice. However, in the case
of a nutrition or rural health project. the benefits are not normally
expressed in such terms. These can be estimated by considering the
costs these pro1ects will avert if they are implemented. For example,
a malnourished population will impose costs on an economy
because people do not work as well as they would if they were
adequately fed. Needless to say, valuing benefits in such a way is a
difficult and controversial matter, as it involves putting a quantitative
value on the quality of life.
D The impact of inflation can only be ignored if all relevant resources
will be subject to the same rate of inflation. For example, if labour
rates are expected to be subject to a rate of inflation different from
the general inflation rate, then the different rate for labour must be
brought into the calculation.
D The treatment of risk and uncertainty can be done by carrying out a
sensitivity analysis. This is to undertake a series of CBA calculations
by modifying the original assumptions of costs and benefits (e.g.,
price of inputs, cost of labour, price and quantities of project output)
by, say, plus or minus 10% or plus or minus 20%. This will produce
a range of inrernal rates of return, each reflecting the assumptions or
estimates made during the CBA calculation.
D The final internal rate of return of the pro1ect will have made use of
a whole range of assumptions about opportunity costs, future prices
and quantities of output, an appropriate discount rate, the life-span
of the proiect, and so on. Many of the assumptions are likely to be
based on subjective judgement alone. It is therefore advisable to test
the more important assumptions by using sensitivity analysis as
described above, particularly since the final rate of return may turn
out to be disproportionately affected by a particular assumption or
group of assumptions.
The many difficulties involved in valuing benefits has led to a growth
of interest in developing alternative appraisal procedures, such as CostEffectiveness Analysis. It is possible that CBA, by emphasising
monetary values, could distort the project's potential; however, this
would not happen if the results were weighed against and compared
with the results of other appraisal techniques. In other words, these
techniques should not be used in isolation.
A simple list of all the relevant costs and benefits, and some indication
of their magnitude, would aid the formulation of a suitably objective
judgement of a particular project. Where CBA is considered appropriate,
but where the project holders are unable to carry out a full CBA, this list
could then be included in the project's proposal so that field staff can
make these calculations. (See Appendix I for examples.)
Field staff are unlikely to have to participate directly in surveys, although
there are times when it will be necessary both to initiate a survey and to
interpret its results. (A special note on nutrition surveys can be found in
PART SEVEN, Section 1). All too often too much data is collected
because the use of random sampling techniques has not been fully
understood (see random sampling in Appendix Ill); excessive data
collection can merely complicate the task of collating and interpreting
the information.

There is always room for testing assumptions and hypotheses through
. 1e use of unstructured interviews and casual discussions; the more
obvious information can often be overlooked by the use of complex
questionnaires However much thought goes into a questionnaire, the
questions posed still determine to an extent the answers received.
Important information may not be forthcoming because the
questionnaire does not ask the appropriate question. Less structured
questioning might well provide the information.
In planning any survey it is important to know:
O the types of situations in which a survey 1s/1s not needed;
O where/how a group can get advice before it wastes time on the
wrong kind of survey. What information is already available?
O the different approaches to surveys: participant observation,
structured questionnaires, random sampling, participatory 'action'styled investigation, etc.;
O the main types of sampling and statistical analysis available
(ensuring that these are appropriate to the task in terms of
sophistication, accuracy, and costs); and
O whether the survey will produce the sort of material necessary for
future decision-making
Further details are available in Appendix Ill.
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cklist of Questions

General remarks
1 Does the project fall within the gu1del1nes and prior1t1es for the area?
2. Is the pro1ect known to you7 If not, then have you allowed suff1c1ent
time to get to know the group, and for a relationship of trust and
confidence to be developed between you and the group7
3. The size of the project will have some bearing on the visit, whether 1t
will be possible to talk of past work, and on aspects such as evaluation,
planning and management. Small grass-roots groups will be more
concerned with the immediate project 1n hand than with more general
discussions about development and its mechanics Discretion will
always be required when v1s1ting projects and the people involved 1n
them.

Specific points
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It should be remembered that every project 1s to an extent unique, and
that the relevance of particular questions will vary from project to
project
1 Objectives:
Are the short-term aims and goals of the project compatible with its
longer and medium-term objectives?
D Are they clear? Are they reasonable and practical?
D Are they based on reality as illustrated through experience and
discussion, and on the results of study!
2. Design·
D Is the project feasible/
D Does the design take into account local traditions and customs/
D Is the project over-ambitious! Are the resources adequate to the
requirements?
D Does the project design cater for suff1c1ent feedback/
D Is the timing realistic!
D Would a short pilot project be advisable to gain experience before
commencing the project/
3. Financial involvement·
D Do all the people aided by the project have a stake in it7 Are they
contributing in some way (in cash, 1n kind or in labour)/ ls the project
simply a source of income or career advancement for the
professionals and other development workers involved?
D Could those involved be asked to contribute morel
4. Education·
D Are the people involved going through a process of 'critical
appraisal' 7 Does the pro1ect enable them to assume greater control
over their own lives7
D Have they reached a stage at which they are able to articulate their
problems, aspirations and prior1t1es7
O Is it felt necessary to mount a programme of 'self-awareness'? How
is this to be achieved, and how does 1t relate to the rest of the
programme!
5. Practical effects
O Wtll the pro1ect improve people's lives by bringing them material
benefits? Wtll they have more cash, food, animals etc. 7 Will they
have better access to services such as health?
O Compare this with the answers on the educational process. Material
ar
cat1c
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expansion of the economic process helps to build up· -,,pie's critical
awareness, but the reverse is not nec2ssanly true.
6. Staff of project team and/or promoters
D Are they reliable, realistic, capable and motivated?
D Have they sufficient experience! In what fields are they
experrenced7 Is thrs experience appropriate to the task in hand?
D Are they well qualified or do they need more training?
D Are the leaders strong? Do they respect and/or reflect the opinions
of others? What do other local groups and 1nd1v1duals say about the
project leaders?
D Do the staff/promoters work well together/ What relationship do
they have with the poor/ What do the local people say about them?
D How open to new ideas and suggestions are the staff/promoters!
7. Partic1pat1on:
D How was the application drawn up7 Who was involved in this
process?
D To what extent are the people supposedly being helped able to
influence the course of the project? What mechanisms are there for
this? Have they already participated in the planning of the project?
D Is the feedback of information being properly heeded by the project
managers! Is there a mechanism to allow participants to voice
complaints or make suggestions to amend the proj8ct?
8 Organ1sat1on
D What is the nature of the organi::;at1on? Does it have legal status? In
practical terms what effect does the legal status have/
D Are there clearly set rules for running meetings, taking minutes,
following up decisions, changing leadership, etc?
O How democratic is the organisation and how difficult is it for the
membership to overturn decisions of the executive body?
O If things go wrong with the project, what allowance has been made
for either resolving internal conflict, or disposing of donated assets?
O Is there an education programme for members of the organisation7
This is especially important for cooperatives and similar institutions.
O What safeguards are there to ensure that the organisation is not
taken over by an elite group?
9. Monitoring·
O Is there a system for regular self-evaluation7 If so, how is this carried
out and who participates?
D Are the conclusions of the monitoring process used to change
objectives or plans? Does the project design allow for the
incorporation of new ideas?
O Are any outside agencies or ind1v1duals invited to assist in the
planning, monitoring or evaluation process7
10. Budgets and cost effectiveness:
D To what extent is the project, as planned, the cheapest way to
achieve the objectives defined/
D Is the budget reasonable I How do staff /promoter salaries, for
example, relate to those of the benef1c1aries of the project? Are
salaries compatible with local norms7 Are equipment costs
appropriate to local conditions 7
O What previous aid has the project rece1ved7 What were the results of
this aid 7
O Is there a danger that further aid wtll do more harm than good?
11. Measurab1l1ty·
O Will it be possible to measure the progress of the project? If so, how7
O Is a form of measurement built in to the project design?
O How often will this monitoring be carried out? At regular intervals/
12. Repl1cabtl1ty
O If '
·ojec •- - ::cesc,.·' -1uld :• h - ·3pea·-" -'-;ewh---' 'Vhat -

the multiplier effect likely to be7 Could the programme be expanded
o neighbouring areas?
Continuity·
O When outside aid ceases, rs 1t likely that the project would be able tc
continue on its own 7
O What plans are there for cont1nuat1on at the end of the pro1ect
period?
O Is it likely that government and local authorities will encourage or
oppose the project?
O Is the project so designed as to allow it to survive rnto future
generations, i.e. are new techniques being passed on, and is there a
teaching element/
14. Other institutions·
O Is the project linked to other similar institutions? Is it able to learn
from other groups?
O Does an appropriate intermediate or representative group exist to
which the pro1ect holders should belong, e.g. a federation of
cooperatives 7
O Is the agency responsive to requests for assistance from similar
groups7
15. Risk assessment I see Section 2):
O Compared with other appl1cat1ons for funds, how much risk rs
involved in helping this particular project?
O Which applications are the most viable, with the greatest poss1brlrty
of achieving results, of being able to expand and of having a
multiplier effect/
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Other considerations
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1 When considering the funding of intermediate agencies rt is essential
to talk not only to the staff of the project but also to the people who are
to be helped by the project, e.g. peasant groups, community
committees, indigenous groups, women or handicapped people. It 1s
also important to talk to other agencies and prominent local figures such
as priests, development officers etc.
2. Even before a project has begun to receive funding, 1t can be useful
to arrange for prospective project members to visit other srmriar
programmes.
3. It can also be helpful to organise simple surveys and/or baseline data
collecting. This should be done by an experienced agency. If at all
possible, the people from the project area should help in the process
4. Sometimes after visiting a group that rs seeking funds, field staff will
be forced to consider whether, in spite of its def1cienc1es, the group !
shows sufficient potential to merit receiving limited support, in the hope
that - in time - the good points will outweigh the faults. This requires
much thought, tact and a good relationship with the group.
5. In certain cases, where the needs of the community are great and
where the prospect of a successful proiect seems minimal, 1t mrght be
possible to give a small donation, on condition that an evaluation
(internal or external} should be undertaken at once. If all goes well, a
further application can be 1nv1ted after this process has been completed.
6. Freid staff should never try to impose forcibly their own, or the
funding agency's, ideas or rules. Ultimately, both the applicants and the
funding agency must feel that they are convinced about what they are
undertaking. An imbalance in this respect 1s not only lrkely to result in
disaster but is also an insult to the applicant's integrity Hence the
insistence that field staff should spend as much time as possible getting
to know and ur,derstand the group concerned.

7. Funding agencies must be consistent in their work
y cannot say
one thing and do another. Consistency is also impc
it in the way
agencies raise their money, deal with applications in their home office,
alert their own nationals to the problems of the Third World, criticise
th err own government's policies towards development, and stand up for
human rights rssues, etc Always try to explain to those seeking help
how the funding agency is run, where the money comes from, what the
organisation stands for, what it does at home in the way of educating
the public on Third World issues, etc.
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The Foundation for the Application and Teaching of the
Sciences (FUNDAEC) is a private, nonprofit organization that
was granted legal status by Resolution #4747 of the government of Cauca Valley, Colombia, on 25 October 1974.
FUNDAEC actually had begun several years earlier at
the University of Valle (funded by the Rockefeller Foundation), where questions had been asked about the role of
higher education in the field of development. Many years of
involvement in community projects, primarily in the area of
health, had led several of the professors to question the
very concepts of development. It was clear that traditional
indicators such as Gross National Product and exportation
indices were not applicable in terms of describing the conditions of the poor.
In spite of economic growth, health
conditions, nutrition, living conditions, and educational
opportunities for the majority of the people had not improved
and, in many cases, had actually worsened. This is attributable to the large gap that exists between the established
institutions--governmental or private, national or multinational--that have know-how, human and financial resources, and infrastructure, and the small farmers, who
each year abandon their villages in large numbers to migrate
to the slums of urban areas.
One of the often-mentioned solutions to needed improvements in development projects is to formulate interdisciplinary
groups and multi-institutional programs.
One such group
consisting of professors at the university met regularly for
almost one year and began to consider models for social
development. However, problems related to the integration
of their efforts at the level of community action arose. An
element seemed to be missing:
someone or a group of
persons who could coordinate actions or needs at the family
and community levels. Since no one with this type of skill

~:

could be found from among the group of university experts,
issues were raised about the effectiveness of the various
academic disciplines themselves.
To begin with a specific problem, that of rural development, a new approach was taken by asking the question,
"What would a person need to know in order to help the
small farmers improve their living conditions?" Many fields
of knowledge were seen ·as indispensable, especially agriculture, health and nutrition, sanitary engineering, civil engineering, formal education, and elements of the social
sciences.
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THE SMALL FARMER JN COLOMBIA
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The size of landholdings in itself is a somewhat variable
parameter since in regions such as the western plains of
Colombia, twenty hectares is a small expanse, while in the
fertile land near Bogota, one to three hectares cultivated in
flowers or vegetables are sufficient for a good income.
Traditionally, in Colombia a .small farmer is defined by the
government as one who possesses less than ten hectares of
land, who consumes most of what he produces, and who
utilizes primarily his own manual labor. However, the majority of the small farmers have plots much smaller than ten
hectares, consume little of what they produce, and are dedicating an increasing portion of their time to working in
larger enterprises. These farmers, who do not have access
to the services offered by the Colombian Social Security
Institute, the Agriculture and Livestock Financial Fund, or
other public institutions, grow approximately 60 percent of
the food commodities produced in Colombia. This same rural
population, according to data from the Survey of Human
Resources for Health and Medical Education, has the least
access to income, heal th care, sanitation facilities, and
education of any group in the country.
The amount of land dedicated to agriculture in Colombia
during 1970 was 31.3 million hectares, of which 76 percent
was owned by 7 percent of the landowners in individual
holdings generally far in excess of 50 hectares.
In the
decade of 196()._-1970, the number of holdings with less than
ten hectares decreased by approximately 5. 5 percent due to
abandonment or sale of the property. Of these, the farms
most affected were those consisting of less than five hectares. This represents a total loss of land for more than
90 ,000 small farmers and their families, or an equivalent of
540, 000 persons.
Twenty percent of persons employed in the rural sector
work only six months of the year; 30 percent work up to
eight months. Only 50 percent work all year. Although the
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national average income is $162 1 , small landowners receive
only between 21 percent and 60 percent of this figure, or
from $34 to $97.
Therefore, in most instances, only a
farmer with holdings between ten and fifty hectares can
begin to have the possibility of an acceptable standard of
living. As of April 1979, only 22 percent of the farmers are
in this category.
Consequently, the rural population has the worst conditions in housing and sanitation and the lowest levels of
literacy and primary education in the country. Nutritional
levels are lower than those found in urban areas.
The
number of malnutrition cases, which in urban areas is
around 30 percent, reaches levels of almost 90 percent in
some rural regions.
A particular example of these conditions is present in
northern Cauca Department. This region comprises various
rural communities that are characterized by an unequal
distribution and inadequate utilization of the land. With a
population of 65,000, of which 25,000 live in the small town
of Puerto Tejada, the region is inhabited primarily by small
farmers who have partially abandoned their own agricultural
labors in order to work for the nearby large sugar industries. Data show that 60 percent of the rural population are
involved in this type of labor. Some 80 percent of the rural
population have plots smaller than three hectares, of which
27 percent have only one-half hectare. Fifty-six percent of
the houses lack sanitary facilities and, in some places,
malnutrition reaches levels of between 65 and 70 percent.
The principal causes of these problems in the rural
sector traditionally have been identified as the scarcity of
credit, the poor quality of technical assistance, and difficulties in marketing.
As mentioned previously, while
accepting the indisputable importance of these factors, it
seems in general that other aspects of possibly equal importance are not fully considered in the life of the small farmer.
These include the need for new and adequate systems of
agricultural production and animal husbandry and new technology that would permit the small farmer to live with a
certain degree of independence.
The majority of development agencies have investigated
and promoted solutions that have been successful for the
larger agricultural industries.
Such solutions have then
been reduced in scale to be applicable to the small farmer.
Much experience indicates, however, that a mere reduction
in scale is not always effective and may not produce improvements in rural living conditions.
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In the Cauca Valley the credit guide published by the
Regional Corporation of Cauca Valley (CVC) shows an
average profit of be~een $30 to $40 per hectare per month
for commonly cultivated crops such as corn, soybeans,
cassava, and red beans--a sum that represents an appreciable income for the owner of fifty or more hectares. These
figures assume optimal conditions in the accessibility of
modern machinery, credit, and marketing. In other words,
assuming the perfection of existing national agencies and the
accessibility of these services to the small farmer, the owner
of two hectares (which is considerably more than the average
in northern Cauca) would have a monthly income of sixty
dollars. Considering that the prices of basic foodstuffs are
relatively high ( $1. 25 per pound of meat, $. 60 per pound of
red beans, and $. 30 per pound of rice), it would be
extremely difficult to feed a family.
Confronted with this situation, the majority of those
who have not already sold their lands to the large agricultural industries maintain their traditional farms with permanent cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, plantain, or fruit
trees. Although the lack of techniques such as crop rotation and the use of fertilizer has diminished the productivity
of these landholdings, the crops nevertheless contribute to
the low, but fixed, income of the rural family. The other
part of the income derives from occasional low salaries from
the agricultural industries.
Historically, and even today in many parts of the
world, small farming is not as bad an occupation as the
foregoing discussions show. Where, then, lies the contradiction between the actual situation of the farmers in
northern Cauca (and in many similar parts of the world) and
the potential for small farming? The quality of land in the
Cauca Valley is so good that one hectare could produce
abundant food for a large family. Why, once working within
the economic system of a society that even in its most inefficient form is designed to render at least some benefits to
its members and is seemingly preferable to a system in which
individual families work their own farms in isolation from
society, do the small farmer and his family suffer from
severe malnutrition?
Part of the answer is found by examining modern agricultural production and animal husbandry, which, because of
their mechanized and technical nature, have high requirements for investments of capital, energy, and natural
resources. The question arises, then, whether science,
which has permitted the development of a system applicable
to a certain life-style, could not also improve the life of the
small farmer. Wouldn't this contribute to the solution of the
worldwide food problem given that, for example, in many
countries in Latin America more than 60 percent of all food
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already is produced by the small farmer under present
adverse conditions?
Other questions examined are:
(1) what experiences
are there concerning making science and appropriate technology available to the small farmer?
(2) what are the
proper channels? (3) what methods are showing promising
results? (4) where is the manpower for such a vast program
of community education? (5) how is this manpower in itself
to be trained? (6) what portion of the existing knowledge of
appropriate agricultural practice actually needs to be propagated and to what extent? (7) how should the recipients of
these services be organized? (8) what are the methods to
bring about community participation?
(9) what is really
meant by it? (10) who should make the decisions about
priorities?
(11) are these organizational models at the
village level?
(12) what is the role of the economically
advantaged section of the community? (13) how should the
private sector participate in rural development and through
what institutions?2
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS
Farzam Arbab, who received his Ph. D. in elementary
particle physics from the University of California, Berkeley,
and currently is a professor of physics at Valle University
in Cali, concluded that solutions extended beyond traditional
academic disciplines and indeed beyond the traditional
educator. A concept of supplying a person with knowledge
about his/her environment was required. Arbab gathered a
small group of professionals from the natural sciences, social
sciences, humanities, medicine, agriculture, and engineering
fields. He set up what is now known as the Rural University ( FUNDAEC), but which is not accredited in the usual
academic manner.
The staff of FUNDAEC totals twenty-three full- and
part-time professionals in the following fields: agricultural
systems, mechanical and civil engineering, sociology, physiology, education, biology, medicine and public health,
physics, anthropology, and veterinary medicine.
With the objectives of educating rural candidates in
their own environment and having them remain in the rural
scene rather than migrating to urban areas, selection teams
went into rural areas discarding aptitude testing and concentrating instead on ability to learn. They gave courses to
volunteers, then tested the volunteers for potential achievement in an accelerated program.
2
~tne foregoing was extracted from papers by Dr.
Farzam Arbab, head of FUNDAEC, and Ms. Christine Tucker
of FUNDAEC.
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The first group of candidates, twenty-six in number
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three, started in
May 1975.
The lowest level of schooling was through the
fourth grade. in grammar school (three in this group remain),
and the highest level of schooling was the third year in high
school. Six were young women. After the first two years,
the group had dropped to sixteen, three being young women.
The class then stayed this size for the remaining four years.
Training is for six years and, for lack of a better name, is
called "Engineering for Rural Welfare."
The second class began two years later with twenty-two
students. Four were women. The class still retains fourteen, four of whom are women.
All classes are held in FUNDAEC facilities built in the
community of Arrobleda, forty-five minutes from Cali. The
students are completely subsidized, and they stay in dormitories for the three-month periods, some returning home for
a one-month vacation following each trimester.
Textbooks are all originals written by FUNDAEC staff.
The Colombian Ministry of Education has approved the curriculum as experimental for· Arrobleda, in the Cauca Valley,
making two years of FUNDAEC equivalent to four years of
the Colombian high school program.
The objective of the "engineering" program has been to
educate a new professional who can work within the rural
milieu and look for answers to problems concerning. health
and nutrition, sanitation, housing, agricultural production,
income, and community organization. The six-year training
program has been designed in three stages, each consisting
of two years. The curriculum fits into the following scheme:
V\
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Preparatory
Stage
(First two years)

University Studies
Stage
(Second two years)

Professional
Stage
(Third two years)

Language
Science Courses
Manual Arts &
(special texts)
Technology
Community Service
Natural Science
Math
Community Service 3

Integral Courses
Community Service

The five general areas of the first two-year phase are
designed to develop within the student scientific and investigative abilities. They do not follow the usual system dedicated almost totally to information delivery. Development of
these fundamental capacities enables the students to learn in
university-type courses of the second phase. The students

learn to study texts, extract information, express themselves, and communicate with others. They are given the
opportunity to utilize their creativity and become familiar
with the concepts of appropriate technology for translation
into community service.
Looking at the first of three "text" examples--language
--the objective is to regain and even strengthen the student's ability to communicate in terms of his rural language.
Tapes and lecture material are built around this concept of
retaining idiomatic usage as well as proceeding with developing language ability to cope with university-level education.
The text begins with concepts like forms, size,
geometry, substances and their properties, and color and
expands into more complex concepts such as systems,
changes in the state of a system, and interactions. True
and False tests are given every five days.
In the area of mathematics, although abilities are taught
systematically, immediate applications to real situations or to
other areas of knowledge contribute to the process of integration.
For example, in the first text, after a review of
the concepts related to sets, a few lessons are dedicated to
the classification of the plant and animal kingdoms. The
text on geometry includes a number of activities in simple
topography that are applied immediately by the students to
their work in the community. The text on fractions includes
many pages of material on epidemiology, a subject that
generally is introduced in advanced university courses. The
first concepts of the topic, however, only use rates and
ratios, which are applications of the mathematical concepts
well within the grasp of the students. The student uses
these tools immediately to examine the health indicators for
the Cauca Valley, the rates of mortality, and the prevalence
and incidence of the most important diseases. This reorganization of knowledge is an important task for educators, and
what FUNDAEC has done is indeed a very small step toward
a far more ambitious program of changing the content of the
text for primary and secondary education. 4
During the first deliberation about possible methods and
content in the areas of natural sciences, the educational team
of FUNDAEC became aware of the inherent limitation of
teaching the sciences as distinct disciplines. According to
Arbab, the student, when introduced to the field for the
first time through highly structured disciplines, with their
definitions and formulas, never learns the fundamental task
of observing, discovering, and describing that which
surrounds him. The student mentally divorces science from
nature, which, paradoxically, is what science tries to study.
~Farzam

3

Arbab.

Ibid.
228

229

l?'
It therefore was decided to teach the sciences of systems
and natural processes related to the future work of the
students. A list was made of the themes that are covered in
pre-university science courses.
These themes were separated concept by concept and reorganized into units that
examine systems and processes such as the cultivation of
beans and corn, the biosphere, the digestive system and
nutrition, and the betterment of varieties of crops and
animal breeds. In addition to developing the basic scientific
capacities of the student, this approach has led to increased
motivation and greater clarity of the material presented. 5
The second phase of science courses (third and fourth
years) is designed around University of Valle courses but
with special texts. Professors from the university conduct
many of these courses. Throughout all six years, emphasis
remains on community services.
This emphasis involves
observation and description of the environment and its
needs, which is carried out in cycles through specific
packages developed by the facility of the Rural University
around "research-action-learning."
The fifth and sixth
years of professional integration are almost entirely devoted
to community services and are organized around these
packages.
Currently, packages under development are child development, production in small farms, appropriate technology,
environmental sanitation, and community organization. The
following sample details one of the packages selected at
random.

Concepts of Sanitation:
·~

A Three-year Program. 6

The first year includes lessons in diagnosis:
General sanitation

\ ),)
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Problems of intestinal parasites relating to gastrointestinal systems
Taking fecal samples
Taking data on incidence of diarrhea
Laboratory diagnosis at the University of Valle of
intestinal parasites

The second year includes action/interventions based on
diagnoses of the first year:
Water supply and disposal systems
Continue measuring indicators
Deeper theory and practice
The third year:
Analyze what has been accomplished.
As the training activities progressed, it became increasingly evident that more was required than placing new
professionals as agents for rural change.
The need for
activities in the field of appropriate technology led to the
establishment of a new department within FUNDAEC called
"Technology for Rural Welfare." This effort seeks to adapt
technology that is more suited to the economic capacities of
the small farmer.
Two full-time engineers are dedicated to research in the
field, supported by additional staff when necessary. They
are seeking viable alternatives for production systems for
the small farm.
Work is underway in minimal irrigation,
fertilizers, land preparation, credit, and availability of
seeds.
This work on appropriate technology opens the opportunity of educating technicians and para-professionals in
shorter training programs within the six-year training of
Engineers for Rural Welfare. This program has two levels:
(1) the practitioner for rural welfare, who undergoes one
year of study; and (2) the technician for rural welfare, who
has a three-year period of study and is classified as a
middle-level professional.
These two programs will become
available during the coming year.
ECONOMIC ASPECTS
A large number of people (on staff and otherwise) plus
organizations and industry have continuously contributed
services and materials to this program.
No donated value
appears in the following fundings:

Diagnosis of water supply and disposal systems
Diagnosis of nutritional systems
5

Dr. Farzam Arbab.

6
0ne of the authors of this program
Carrasquillas, M. D., who also holds an
health.

230

is Dr. Gabriel
M.A. in public
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Appropriations:

(all in U.S. dollars)

1974

$32, 000

Rockefeller Foundation
(design programs and curricula)
Colombian Foundation for Higher Education
(Arrobleda land)

Total

4 ,000
--$36, 000

1975

$29,000

1976

53,000
2,000

Total

55,000

1977

75,000
10,000
10,000
~

Rockefeller Foundation
FES
Carvajal Foundation of Colombia

1978

50,000
30,000
10,000
23,000
7,000
27,500

Rockefeller Foundation
UNICEF
Colombian National Plan/Foods & Nu tri ti on
Fundo Nacional para el Desarrollo (FONADE)
Eder Foundation of Colombia
U.S. Inter-American Foundation

Total

1~

1979

70,000
55,000
15,000
*27,500
7,000
**45,000
24,000
50,000

Total

29T,"500

Rockefeller Foundation
Rockefeller Foundation
Colombian Foundation for Higher Education
(FES)

Total

\
~'.

~

Rockefeller Foundation
PACT of the U.S.A.
United Nations University
Inter-American Foundation
Eder Foundation of Colombia
Colombian CIID (estimates pending)
Ford Foundation
PAN of Colombia

* Divided

into 1978 and 1979.
**To cover two years.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
The community services "packages" vary in length
throughout the six years.
The sanitation package, for
example, is three years. They then are to be repeated in
subsequent classes, which will provide the basis for longerterm evaluations that will indicate the success or failure of
specific interventions.
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At present, each of the students in the first class
(1974) has done about eighty family case descriptions that
have led to assessments of need, e.g., water supply, animal
feed, waste utilization, agricultural needs, and social/
economic associations between families.
The latter, for
example, has resulted in separate cooperative systems for
chicken production, processing, and marketing as individual
small business enterprises.
The success of the program, according to Arbab, can
only be measured by the welfare of the families and communities in which the rural engineer works. Evaluation plans
are drawn up to yield the educational program's improvement.
Immediate conclusions are premature, but the small projects
now being implemented show excellent relationships between
students and communities.
An obvious indicator of success is the fact that all
sixteen students in the first class have been offered positions in various Colombian government agencies, even two
years prior to graduation. They are to remain in the rural
environment. Another strong indication of acceptance is the
funding growth from $36 ,000 in 1974 by two agencies to
$293, 500 by eight agencies, national and international.
In terms of potential social impact, all aspects of health,
education, nutrition, housing, social and community development, public utilities, recreation, and retention of professional leadership in the rural scene are areas of great
promise for the future. Arbab advised that the best student
with the most potential is one who finished only the fourth
grade. According to Arbab, it is inspiring to see intellects
saved for productive use for their communities.
Favorable economic impact, increased agricultural production and utilization, higher income levels, strengthened
family relationships, and local and regional development with
reduced urban migration all appear to be quite possible.
RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL GOALS
The Colombian PAN Food and Nutrition program plus
the Integrated Rural Development program call for increased
food production, better nutrition, improved sanitation, and
improved rural infrastructure. The National Health System
is extended to small towns and inaccessible areas.
The
National Education System aims at the application of knowledge to local conditions. FUNDAEC, with its engineers and
technology for rural welfare through its university and
community service, intends to fulfill all of these objectives.
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PERSONS INTERVIEWED
Dr. Farzam Arbab
President of the Board of Trustees, FUN DA EC
Apartado Aereo 6555
Cali, Colombia
Dr. Gabriel Carrasquillas, staff member, FUN DA EC
Ms. Christine Tucker, staff member, FUNDAEC
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER
1.

The more direct application of academic education to the
problems of the rural areas is a sought-after objective.
Do the students in this program have sufficient opportunity to learn the basics of their fields of interest, or
are they too dispersed across their rural activities to
develop a real specialty? If not, should there be an
institution to accomplish these sorts of development
activities, in addition to the more traditional forms that
concentrate on academic preparation of students?

2.

The minimum land area necessary for self-sufficiency in
this region of Colombia appears to be below that which
is typically owned.
ls there a clear need for land
redistribution policies in this instance?
If so, how
might they be accomplished?

3.

ls the assistance program introduced by the university
faculty likely to be perpetuated, or is it a phenomenon
that depends on the motivation of a few individuals for
its success? ls this concept replicable in other situations?

4.

Other than the limited testimony of a few interviewees,
is there any evidence that the program was having a
material impact on the rural economy? ln view of the
land tenure situation and the economics of agricultural
self-sufficiency, is there any real prospect for the
long-term viability of the small farmer system?
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